Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 21STCV23811, Date: 2023-10-16 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Charles Steven Sedlacek IV (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on June 28, 2021 against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (2) violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (3) violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (4) breach of express written warranty, and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

Plaintiff indicates that on March 20, 2023, the parties entered into a “Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims.” (Sasik Decl., ¶ 55, Ex. 3.) The Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that “Defendant agrees to pay attorney fees, costs and expenses in an amount to be negotiated between Strategic Legal Practices, APC and GM or by noticed Motion. GM agrees that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for the purposes of the attorney fees, costs and expenses Motion and that Plaintiff’s counsel can file a single Motion for fees, costs and expenses.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff now moves for an order awarding attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the total amount of $43,969.85. GM opposes.

Objection No. 1: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 2: sustained as to “which consisted of the same requests that Counsel propounds to GM in every Song- Beverly case,” overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 3: sustained as to “which is also the same notice that Counsel propounds to GM in most Song-Beverly cases,” overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 4: sustained as to “with templated objections—the same responses that Counsel serves in every case against GM,” overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 5: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 6: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 7: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 8: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

Objection No. 9: sustained as to the second sentence, overruled as to the remainder.

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act grants car buyers the right to sue a manufacturer or retail seller for failure to comply with implied or express warranties. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subdivision (a).) “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subdivision (d).)

Strategic Legal Practices, APC indicates that the following attorneys and law clerk performed work on this case, followed by their requested hourly rates:

In addition, the background and experience of Plaintiff’s counsel and law clerk is discussed in Plaintiff’s counsel’s supporting declaration. (Shahian Decl., ¶¶ 41, 43, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67.)

In the opposition, GM asserts that “[c]ounsel does not present any evidence that the hourly rate increases of $40 for Debora Rabieian (from $395 to $435), $50 for Caitlin Scott (from $400 to $450), $120 for Tionna Dolin (from $450 to $570), or $60 for Rebecca Neubauer (from $435 to $495), are ‘reasonable rates in the local community.’” (Opp’n at p. 4:13-16.)[5] GM asserts that “Counsel’s rates should be reduced as follows: Ms. Dolin from $570 to $450; Ms. Scott from $450 to $400, Ms. Rabieian from $435 to $395…” (Opp’n at p. 4:28-5:2.) However,

the Court finds that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable and commensurate with rates charged by attorneys with comparable skill and experience.

In addition, GM asserts that “[c]ounsel also failed to present any evidence that any court has approved an hourly rate higher than $595 for James Carroll.” (Opp’n at p. 4:21-22.) But Mr. Carroll’s requested rate is $595/hour. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 56.) In addition, GM does not cite any legal authority demonstrating that Plaintiff must present evidence of another court approving Mr. Carroll’s hourly rate to demonstrate that Mr. Carroll’s rate is reasonable. Thus, the Court declines to reduce Mr. Carroll’s requested hourly rate from $595 to $495, as requested by GM.

While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award” and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)

However, the court must not consider extraordinary skill and the other Serrano factors to the extent these are already included within the lodestar. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138-1139.) “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable.” (Id. at p. 1139.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that a 1.35 lodestar multiplier is appropriate primarily because this is a contingency case. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 74.) However, other factors do not support the application of a multiplier. There is no indication that this case was complex or presented challenging legal issues, particularly considering that Plaintiff’s counsel specializes in these types of cases. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 4.) In addition, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the success achieved by Plaintiff’s counsel is exceptional.

“[T]he court’s discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.)

From June 24, 2021 through the present, Strategic Legal Practices, APC billed 57 hours for services rendered for a total of $27,837.50. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 70, Ex. 16.) Plaintiff’s counsel has provided billing records detailing the nature of the work performed. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 70, Ex. 16.)

GM objects to many time entries on the grounds that Plaintiff’s counsel charged excessive time to prepare motions, discovery requests and responses, and other documents for which Plaintiff’s counsel has templated documents. (See Opp’n at p. 6:7-7:26; 8:11-19.) However, the Court does not find that any of the entries reflect excessive or unreasonable amounts of time for the particular tasks specified. Although the use of forms and templates help with efficiency, counsel is still expected to review and modify each document for each individual case, and time spent to ensure that each document is appropriately modified is reasonable.

In addition, GM asserts that certain billing entries were block-billed. (See Opp’n at p. 7:4-6; 7:27-8:9.) The Court notes that “[b]lock billing occurs when a block of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279 [internal quotations omitted].) “Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not,” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) The Court does not find that GM has shown that the asserted block-billed entries contain tasks that are not compensable.

Further, in its discussion of billing entries from January 13, 16, 20, 27, and 30, 2023, GM asserts that “there is clear duplication of efforts in these entries.” (Opp’n at p. 7:6-7.) The Court does not find that the time entries on these dates are duplicative or unreasonable. GM also asserts that “Counsel should not recover for any of the work done by Law Clerk Ms. Canton” (Opp’n at p. 7:9) without any supporting legal authority or further argument.

GM further asserts that “[t]he additional 0.7 hours for ‘[r]evise’ and ‘finalize’ by Caitlin Scott billed on January 23, 2023 was unnecessary and should be discounted entirely.” (Opp’n at p. 7:23-24.) GM appears to assert that this entry is duplicative of a billing entry of 3.2 hours on January 10, 2023 by Ian McCallister to “Draft P’s oppositions to D’s MILs 1-8.” (Shahian Decl., ¶ 70, Ex. 16.) The Court does not find that the foregoing billing entries are duplicative or unreasonable.

Lastly, Plaintiff indicates that “Plaintiffs’ counsel also expects to incur over $3,500 in attorney fees in connection with reviewing Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses, preparing the Reply brief, and attending the hearing on this Motion. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ counsel is seeking only $3,500 in connection with these anticipated future tasks.” (Shahian Decl., ¶ 71.) In the opposition, GM asserts that “it should not have taken Mr. Sasik…more than 1.0 hour to review GM’s opposition, and 1.0 hour to prepare a reply brief, for a total of 3.0 hours,” and that “[a]ssuming Mr. Carroll will attend the hearing,” that should “last no more than an hour…” (Opp’n at p. 8:15-17.) The Court notes that although Mr. Shahian attests to the fact that “Plaintiffs’ counsel” expects to incur more than $3,500.00 to review the opposition, prepare a reply, and attend the hearing on the motion, there is no evidence of which attorney is billing for those tasks, what that attorney’s hourly rates are, and how much time that attorney expects to spend on those tasks. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 71.) In any event, as set forth above, GM concedes that a total of $1,585.00 is warranted for these tasks. (See Opp’n at p. 8:18-19.) Thus, the Court reduces the total amount requested and awards Plaintiff $1,585.00 in connection with “reviewing Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses, preparing the Reply brief, and attending the hearing on this Motion.” (Shahian Decl., ¶ 71.)

Lastly, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for costs and expenses in the amount of $2,889.22. (Shahian Decl., ¶¶ 70, 73, Ex. 16.)

In the opposition, GM asserts that “[t]he ‘Costs and Expenses’ table appears to have been generated by Counsel’s billing system or created specifically for [sic] purpose of Counsel’s fee motion. There simply is no way to know. This is insufficient. Without a more detailed description of the claimed costs and back-up documentation to show that Counsel’s firm billed these costs to the correct case, it is impossible for GM or this Court to determine whether these costs were actually incurred in this case and whether they were reasonable or necessary.” (Opp’n at p. 13:3-8, emphasis omitted.) But Plaintiff’s counsel states in his declaration that “Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks reimbursement for costs and expenses in the amount of $2,889.22.” (Shahian Decl., ¶ 73.) In addition, Exhibit 16 to Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration contains a date, description, and total amount as to the requested costs. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 70, Ex. 16.)

GM also asserts that “[c]ounsel’s demand for $161.97 (“Expense paid to First Legal for PDF Courtesy Delivery TRIAL DOCS”) on January 31, 2023 should be denied because Counsel has failed to provide any evidence of what ostensibly occurred in this case, leaving GM and this Court with no way to determine whether the filing was necessary and reasonable.” (Opp’n at p. 13:12-14.) The Court does not understand this argument, as the subject item clearly references “[e]xpense paid to First Legal for PDF Courtesy Delivery - TRIAL DOCS.” (Shahian Decl., ¶ 70, Ex. 16.) The Court does not find that GM has demonstrated that the requested costs for this item are unreasonable.

Lastly, GM asserts that “Counsel’s $412.50 in costs incurred for mediation (Prepare for and attend mediation’) on February 14, 2023, should not be billed as a cost and should be more properly billed as a time entry…No details are provided as to who attended the mediation or for how long. This lacks sufficient information for GM or the Court to assess the reasonableness and necessity of these costs.” (Opp’n at p. 13:15-17.) Indeed, the February 14, 2023 cost item is for “WDRC Prepare for and attend mediation.” (Shahian Decl., ¶ 70, Ex. 16.) It is unclear what “WDRC” stands for, and the item appears to refer to attorney’s fees, not costs. (Ibid.) In the reply, Plaintiff states that “[t]he February 14, 2023 cost of $412.50 is mediation cost that GM’s counsel always splits with SLP.” (Reply at p. 10:11-12, emphasis omitted.) But Plaintiff still does not explain what the purported “$412.50” in costs pertains to.

Based on the foregoing, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s total requested costs by $412.50.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is granted in the amount of $31,899.22 ($27,837.50 + $1,585.00 in attorney’s fees + $2,476.72 in costs.)

[1]The Court notes that this objection is misnumbered as Objection No. 8.

[2]The Court notes that this objection is misnumbered as Objection No. 9.

[3]The Court notes that this objection is misnumbered as Objection No. 10.

[4]The Court notes that this objection is misnumbered as Objection No. 11.

[5]GM cites to Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641, 652, where the Court of Appeal noted that “we do not accept Horn’s argument that the lodestar amount calculated by the trial court was not reasonable and should be reversed. As stated above, the trial court used the reasonable rates in the local community as a basis for its award. It was also presented with Murphy’s time records and billing statements to show the work done. That Murphy could have provided more detailed billing records and the precise amount it was paid for its services does not render the trial court’s determination an abuse of discretion.”

CHARLES STEVEN SEDLACEK IV, Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV23811
	Hearing Date:	October 16, 2023
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	TENTATIVE RULING RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50