Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 21STCV28284, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV28284    Hearing Date: May 18, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Armando Vazquez-Ramos, as Successor Trustee of the Lourdes R. Vazquez Family Living Trust of 2004 (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on July 30, 2021 against, inter alia, Adelfia Castillo and Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) quiet title to real property and for injunctive relief, (2) constructive trust, and (3) accounting.

On February 14, 2023, default was entered against (1) Adelfia Castillo, and (2) Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007.

Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 (“Adelfia” or “Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007”) now moves for an order setting aside the default entered against Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007.[1] Adelfia also seeks monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorney Julia Sylva. Plaintiff opposes.   

Discussion

In the motion, Adelfia asserts that the default entered against Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 was “fraudulently obtained and is improper.” (Mot. at p. 2:8-9.)

Adelfia cites to County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1221, where “Artis Earl Gorham appeal[ed] from an order denying his motions to set aside a 1998 default judgment obtained against him by the County of San Diego Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) and to dismiss the action. He brought his motion to vacate the judgment on grounds the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him in this case because he was never served with a summons and complaint, contrary to the fraudulent representation of the process server’s return, and, therefore, the judgment was void.” The Court of Appeal concluded that “[u]nder the unique circumstances of this case, we determine the trial court erroneously concluded it was foreclosed from granting the equitable relief requested by Gorham’s failure to timely file his motions under various statutory provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Family Code for relief from a void child support default judgment. Because the court never acquired fundamental personal jurisdiction over Gorham in this case, we reverse the order denying his motions and direct the trial court to dismiss this action.” (Id. at p. 1221.) The Court of Appeal found that “[b]ecause Gorham was never served with the complaint and summons, or other documents and notices as required by the statutory procedures used by the DCSS to commence this action against him, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him, and the resulting default judgment was, and is, therefore void, not merely voidable, as violating fundamental due process.” (Id. at p. 1230 [internal citation omitted].)

The Gorham Court noted that “even where relief is no longer available under statutory provisions, a trial court generally retains the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on equitable grounds where a party establishes that the judgment or order was void for lack of due process or resulted from extrinsic fraud or mistake. Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present a claim or defense to the court as a result of being kept in ignorance or in some other manner being fraudulently prevented by the opposing party from fully participating in the proceeding.” (County of San Diego v. Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228-1229 [internal citations omitted].) The Gorham Court found that “[i]n addition to providing proof that a judgment or order is void, a false return of summons may constitute both extrinsic fraud and mistake. When a judgment or order is obtained based on a false return of service, the court has the inherent power to set it aside, and a motion brought to do so may be made on such ground even though the statutory period has run.” (Id. at p. 1229 [internal citations omitted].)

Here, Adelfia submits the declaration of her counsel, who notes that Plaintiff’s counsel filed several requests for entry of default against Adelfia Castillo and Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007, which were denied. One of such requests was filed by Plaintiff on October 14, 2022, which sought entry of default against “Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007; Adelfia Castillo.” The Court’s Notice of Rejection Default/Clerk’s Judgment filed on October 17, 2022 states, inter alia, “Proof of Service of Summons & Complaint required for Adelfia Castillo in her capacities.”

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a proof of service on January 27, 2023 indicating that “Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007; Adelfia Castillo” were personally served with the Complaint on November 1, 2021. The proof of service filed on January 27, 2023 states that the person who served the papers is “S. Wierzbinski, III.” The proof of service contains a signature next to Mr. Wierzbinski’s name and the date December 13, 2021. Adelfia’s counsel states that she “confirmed with S. Wierzbinski and Signal Attorney Service that this proof of service is false.” (Potier Decl., ¶ 15.)

Adelfia notes that Plaintiff previously filed a proof of service on October 14, 2022, indicating that only “Adelfia Castillo” was personally served with the Complaint on November 1, 2022. The October 14, 2022 proof of service is also signed by Mr. Wierzbinski, and dated December 13, 2021. Adelfia asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel altered the first page of Mr. Wierzbinski’s proof of service. (Potier Decl., ¶ 27.)

In addition, Adelfia notes that on February 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed another request for entry of default against “Adelfia Castillo, in her individual capacity; Adelfia Castillo, Beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007; Adelfia Castillo, Cotrustee of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007.” The Court’s Notice of Rejection Default/Clerk’s Judgment filed on February 10, 2023 states, inter alia, “[p]roof of Service filed on 01/27/2023 must be separate Proof of Service for each Defendant.”

Adelfia notes that on February 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating that “Adelfia Castillo” was personally served with the Complaint on November 1, 2021. Plaintiff filed a second proof of service on February 14, 2023 indicating that “Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007” was personally served with the Complaint on November 1, 2021. The second pages of both of these proofs of service contain Mr. Wierzbinski’s signature next to the date December 13, 2021.

Adelfia’s counsel asserts that the proofs of service filed on February 14, 2023 are also false. As to the February 14, 2023 proof of service pertaining to Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007, Adelfia’s counsel states that she “confirmed with Signal Attorney Service that this is a false proof of service. (Potier Decl., ¶ 22.) Adelfia’s counsel also states that “[o]n February 28, 2023, I received a telephone call from the process server Steve Wierzbinski. He confirmed that he had only served one defendant, Adelfia Castillo, on November 1, 2021.” (Potier Decl., ¶ 30.)

Adelfia also submits a declaration stating that she “has never been served papers in [her] capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 in this case.” (Castillo Decl., ¶ 4.) Adelfia’s counsel further indicates that on March 9, 2023, she emailed counsel for Plaintiff requesting that she voluntarily set aside the defaults entered against Adelfia Castillo and Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007. (Van Zee Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 24.) Adelfia’s counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel sent an email response on March 9, 2023 indicating, inter alia, “[t]he defaults will be set aside.” (Van Zee Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 24.)

Adelfia thus asserts that “[w]hile the default as to Adelfia Castillo is proper because     Mr. Wierzbinski’s true proof of service as to Adelfia Castillo was filed on October 14, 2023 [sic], the default as to Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 is improper, as it is based upon a false proof of service.” (Potier Decl., ¶ 26, emphasis omitted.) As set forth above, “[i]n addition to providing proof that a judgment or order is void, a false return of summons may constitute both extrinsic fraud and mistake. When a judgment or order is obtained based on a false return of service, the court has the inherent power to set it aside...” (County of San Diego v. Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229 [internal citation omitted].)

Although Adelfia provides evidence of Plaintiff’s counsel’s email indicating that “[t]he defaults will be set aside,” (Van Zee Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 24) Plaintiff opposes the instant motion. Plaintiff’s opposition indicates that Plaintiff “opposes [Adelfia’s] above-styled Motion to Set Aside, to the extent that it seeks to set aside the entry of default against her; he does not oppose, and actually supports, the setting aside of default judgment against her.” (Opp’n at p. 1:23-27.) The Court does not see why Plaintiff raises this argument in the opposition, as no default judgment has been entered against Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 (or Adelfia Castillo). Moreover, Plaintiff thereafter acknowledges that no default judgment has been entered. (Opp’n at p. 2:5.)

Plaintiff also asserts in the opposition that “if Ms. CASTILLO was served with a true copy of the Summons, then she was validly served in both her individual and representative capacities.” (Opp’n at p. 3:26-27.) However, Plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority to support this assertion. Moreover, and importantly, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that altered proofs of service were filed to indicate that Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007, was served with the Complaint in this matter. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Adelfia has demonstrated good cause to set aside the default entered against Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007.

Lastly, Adelfia seeks sanctions in the amount of $2,500.96 against Plaintiff’s attorney to reimburse Adelfia for attorney fees and costs incurred in the preparation and filing of the instant motion. The Court notes that Adelfia does not cite to any legal authority supporting her request for sanctions. Accordingly, the Court denies the request.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Adelfia’s motion to set aside default is granted. The default entered against Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 is ordered set aside.

Adelfia Castillo, in her capacities as cotrustee and beneficiary of the Vazquez-Castillo Family Trust of 2007 is ordered to file her answer to the Complaint within 10 days of the date of this Order. 

Adelfia’s request for sanctions is denied. 

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Adelfia is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  May 18, 2023        

            ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court