Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 21STCV29932, Date: 2025-03-17 Tentative Ruling

This matter came on for trial on June 3-5, 2024, June 11, 2024 and June 17, 2024 in Department 50 of the above-entitled Court before the Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet, sitting without a jury. The Court, having considered the evidence and read the trial briefs and closing arguments of counsel and the parties, issues this tentative and proposed Statement of Decision. This tentative and proposed Statement of Decision will become the Statement of Decision unless, within 15 days hereafter, a party serves and files objections to the proposed Statement of Decision.

· If so, did they breach the implied warranty of habitability regarding the garage unit?

· Did Plaintiff suffer any damages as a result of the breach of the warranty of habitability?

· Is Plaintiff entitled to recover in negligence for the same damages she suffered as a result of the breach of warranty of habitability?

· Is Plaintiff entitled to disgorgement for the rent she paid Defendants pursuant to Los Angeles Municipal Code sections 151.04/151.10?

· Is Plaintiff entitled to relocation benefits pursuant to Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09H/163.06A?

· Did Defendants misrepresent to Plaintiff that (1) if anything needed to be fixed, they would

· fix it; (2) that she and her children could use the bathroom in the main house whenever they wanted; (3) that the unit was legal?

· Did Plaintiff establish that the Defendants intentionally tried to terminate the lease by depriving her of such things as water, heat, light etc.?

The evidence at trial established that the three Defendants were the owners of the property

where the garage unit at issue was located during the time that Plaintiff resided in the garage unit. The evidence also showed that on October 30, 2020, Defendant Lorenza Alvarez Roman (“Ms. Lorenza”) [1] verified an unlawful detainer complaint seeking to evict Plaintiff from the garage unit. She verified the complaint as the property manager of the property where the garage unit was located, indicating that the garage unit had been rented to Plaintiff at the rate of $850. The Court did not find credible the contention by Ms. Lorenza that the attorney assisting Ms. Lorenza made an error when setting forth this information in the unlawful detainer complaint and that Ms. Lorenza had allowed Plaintiff and her children to stay in the garage unit for free because they were homeless.

B. Did Defendants breach the implied warranty of habitability regarding the garage unit?

Plaintiff established at trial that the garage unit was not habitable. The evidence showed,

inter alia, that there was no bathroom within the garage unit and that Plaintiff and her children who resided with her had to exit the garage unit and enter the main house to use one of the bathrooms that the Defendants had designated for their use. On a number of occasions, she was not able to use the bathroom. During a portion of her tenancy, there was no hot water. The garage unit also suffered from roaches, ants and rats. The sink leaked onto the carpeting. There was no heating or air conditioning. There was no smoke or carbon monoxide detector. Evidence was admitted showing that during her tenancy, the City of Los Angeles had issued a “Substandard Order and Notice of Fee” regarding the code violations in the garage unit. Defendants did not establish that they addressed the habitability issues raised by Plaintiff or the City.

C. Did Plaintiff suffer any damages as a result of the breach of the warranty of habitability?

Plaintiff testified that she could not sleep and experienced a lot of anxiety as a result of the

lack of habitability of the garage unit, particularly the stress she experienced in seeing the impact on her children. She experienced depression and crying. She said her hair fell out as a result of the stress and one of her sons suffered hair loss. However, Plaintiff did not proffer any expert testimony as to the cause of the hair loss. The cause of hair loss, particularly the extreme hair loss suffered by Plaintiff’s son, is not within one’s common knowledge and would require expert testimony to determine if stress due to the habitability situation might be the cause of extreme hair loss. Plaintiff requests $200,000 in compensation for the lack of habitability during the approximately 23 months she resided in the unit. The Court finds that $70,000 (approximately $100 per day) is an appropriate amount to compensate Plaintiff for the lack of habitability and the anxiety, stress and depression she experienced.

D. Is Plaintiff entitled to recover in negligence for the same injuries she suffered as a result of the breach of warranty of habitability?

Although Plaintiff may seek recovery in tort (i.e. negligence) or in contract (i.e., breach of

the warranty of habitability), she cannot recover twice for the same injuries. As noted in Plaintiff’s Closing Argument Brief, pursuant to Stoiber v Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 929-930, “a tenant can choose to pursue a cause of action for the recovery of tort damages, or a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, for the recovery of contract damages.” Of course, if Plaintiff still resided in the garage unit, she would be entitled to have the lack of habitability cured in addition to her emotional distress damages.

E. If so, is Plaintiff entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendants?

Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages in this case because no evidence of the financial

condition of Defendants was presented at trial. The fact that Defendants own the property where the garage unit is located does not establish the value of the property and whether Defendants have any equity in the property. No other evidence of the financial condition of the Defendants was presented at trial. Under Adams v Murakami (1991) 54 Cal 105, 108, the California Supreme Court found that evidence of the defendant’s financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.

F. Is Plaintiff entitled to disgorgement plus treble damages for the rent she paid Defendants pursuant to Los Angeles Municipal Code sections 151.04/151.10?

Plaintiff seeks disgorgement and treble damages of the rent she paid Defendants and cites to

the sections above in support of her request. The Court does not find that the cited sections or the cases cited by Plaintiff provide for disgorgement, but section 151.10 does provide for treble damages of the amount of rent that should not have been accepted by the landlord. Section 151.10 A. states as follows:

A. Any person who demands, accepts or retains any payment of rent in excess of the ; maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or any regulations or orders promulgated hereunder, shall be liable in a civil action to the person from whom such payment is demanded, accepted or retained for damages of three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted or retained exceed the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent which could be lawfully demanded, accepted or retained together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as determined by the court.

As pointed out by Plaintiff, Defendants were not permitted to charge any rent for an unpermitted garage unit. Consequently, all the rent paid by Plaintiff (i.e., $3,400) must be trebled for a total of $10,200 due from Defendants to Plaintiff. [2]

G. Is Plaintiff entitled to relocation benefits pursuant to Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09H/163.06A

“Any tenant subject to displacement due to an unapproved dwelling unit as a result of a notice to vacate or other order requiring the vacation of the dwelling unit in violation of the municipal code or any other provision of law, where the landlord has had a reasonable opportunity to correct the violation, shall be entitled to relocation payable by the landlord to the tenant of the affected rental unit within 15 days of service of the tenant’s written notice of termination of the tenancy in accordance with Section 151.09 G. of this Code.”

On May 25, 2021, Plaintiff sent a demand for relocation benefits to be paid, citing these ordinances. The Building and Safety Substandard Order states that relocation fees are required to be paid if the tenant must be relocated in order to comply with the notice. See, LADBS Substandard Order, Exhibit 4. p. 3. “If the landlord fails, neglects or refuses to make timely payments to a tenant pursuant to an order to pay relocation benefits, except in the situations described in Sections 163.02 B. or 163.02 C., and if the tenant does not receive relocation payments from the City, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant in a civil action for an amount equal to one and one-half times the relocation benefits payable pursuant to Section 163.05. The tenant shall also be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as determined by a court.” LAMC 163.06.A.

Despite Plaintiff’s May 25, 2021 demand via certified mail, Defendants refused to pay the required relocation benefits in the amount of $21,900. Accordingly, Defendants must pay Plaintiff the amount of $32,850 ($21,900 x 1.5 pursuant to LAMC § 163.06A).

H. Did Defendants misrepresent to Plaintiff that (1) if anything needed to be fixed, they would fix it; (2) that she and her children could use the bathroom in the main house whenever they wanted; (3) that the unit was legal?

The Court does not find that the Defendants made the first and third statement to Plaintiff. She testified generally that these statements were made but she did not identify who made the statements or anything else about the statements. The Court did not find Plaintiff’s testimony about these representations to be credible, particularly the statement about the legality of the garage unit. Plaintiff did not provide any context or any explanation as to how these purported statements arose or which of the Defendants made each statement. Regarding the bathroom, both sides acknowledged that Plaintiff had use of one of the bathrooms in the house but there was no testimony by Plaintiff that any of the Defendants told her she could use the bathroom whenever she wanted, although that seemed to be the arrangement. Moreover, the Court did not find Plaintiff’s testimony credible about being excluded from the bathroom other than when someone else was using it. The evidence did not support her assertion that the representation about the use of the bathroom was false. Thus, the Court finds in favor of the Defendants on the intentional misrepresentation cause of action.

The Court did not find that the evidence supported Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants

engaged in a systematic campaign to influence her to vacate the garage unit by stealing her phone, not permitting her and her children to use the bathroom in the house and entering the garage unit without her consent and without notice to give alcohol to her children and take pictures of them. There was no testimony at all regarding the last point. The Court finds in favor of the Defendants on this cause of action.

J. Did Plaintiff establish that the Defendants intentionally tried to terminate the lease by depriving her of such utilities water, heat, light etc.?

There was no evidence presented that the Defendants attempted to terminate Plaintiff’s

occupancy under the lease by engaging in so-called “self-help” by willfully causing the interruption or termination of any utility such as water, heat, etc. There was testimony that the unit did not have hot water or air conditioning but that was the situation from the beginning of the tenancy. Consequently, the Court finds in favor of the Defendants on the cause of action for violation of California Civil Code section 789.3.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds for Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of $113,050, plus attorney fees and costs in connection with the violation of Municipal Code section 163.06A, to be proven by noticed motion.

Within ten days after this Statement of Decision becomes final, Plaintiff is ordered to file and serve a proposed judgment as to Plaintiff in accordance with this Statement of Decision (with a courtesy copy delivered to Dept. 50). The Court hereby dismisses the Doe defendants if not dismissed previously.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this tentative and proposed Statement of Decision.

[1] At trial, Defendant Lorenza Alvarez Roman stipulated to being referred to as “Lorenza.”

[2] In Plaintiff’s Closing Argument, Plaintiff merely mentions Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. in the heading on page three. However, Plaintiff does not discuss the 17200 cause of action in the Closing Argument. Consequently, Plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned that cause of action.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50