Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 21STCV30140, Date: 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV30140    Hearing Date: April 20, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Jerome Anderson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on August 16, 2021 against a number of defendants, including Eloise Williams, an individual and a trustee of the Williams Trust Dated August 2, 1988 and Gaylord Williams, an individual and a trustee of the Williams Trust Dated August 2, 1988 (jointly, the “Williams Defendants”).

Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on February 17, 2023, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, (3) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09, (4) breach of warranty of habitability, (5) private nuisance, (6) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) negligence, (8) violation of unfair business practices, and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he and the Williams Defendants entered into a written lease agreement in 2012 pursuant to which Plaintiff paid rent for premises located at 3105 West 27th Street #32, Los Angeles, CA 90018 (the “Subject Property”). (FAC, ¶¶ 5, 12.) The Williams Defendants were the owners of the Subject Property until approximately February 2018, when the Subject Property was sold to Chloe’s Apartments, LLC. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that substantial habitability defects existed at the Subject Property during Plaintiff’s tenancy. (FAC,  ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants repeatedly failed to address or abate the endemic problems plaguing the Subject Property.” (FAC, ¶ 36.) 

            The Williams Defendants now move for an order to strike certain portions of Plaintiff’s FAC. Plaintiff opposes.

Discussion

A court may strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of a pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

The Williams Defendants assert that certain allegations of the FAC are outside of the statute of limitations and should thus be stricken.

The Williams Defendants note that the causes of action alleged against them in the FAC are Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract, fourth cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability, sixth cause of action for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, and eighth cause of action for violation of unfair business practices.

The Williams Defendants assert that the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (a) is applicable to Plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of contract, breach of warranty of habitability, and breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment. Code of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (a) sets forth a four-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except as provided in Section 336a…”  The Williams Defendants also assert that the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Business and Professions Code section 17208 is applicable to Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of unfair business practices. This provision provides that “[a]ny action to enforce any cause of action pursuant to this chapter shall be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date of this section shall be revived by its enactment.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208.)

The Williams Defendants assert that the FAC contains allegations of wrongdoing against them prior to August 16, 2017, which is more than four years prior to the initiation of this lawsuit on August 16, 2021. Specifically, the Williams Defendants point to the following allegations, which they seek to strike:

·       “On January 1, 2016, an HCIDLA investigation occurred and HCIDLA notified the Defendants WILLIAMS that the Subject Property’s smoke detector was not secure, there was a broken light switch at the Subject Property’s entry, and that they needed to install an approved trap under the kitchen sink.” (FAC, ¶ 20.)

·       “Further, the roof of the common area of the Subject Property was noted to not be properly weatherproofed, which constituted a failure to maintain the premises free of structural hazards. (Health & Safety Code §17920.3(b)).” (FAC, ¶ 21.)

·       “Two months later, on March 11, 2016, HCIDLA noted that the Defendants WILLIAMS did nothing to remedy the Subject Property’s unsecure smoke detector. Notice of the Subject Property’s continued need of a smoke detector and lack of habitability was provided by the city of Los Angeles, yet Defendant WILLIAMS still did not respond. HCIDLA also had to notify the Defendants a second time that the roof of the Subject Property’s common area was still not properly weatherproofed.” (FAC, ¶ 22.) 

·       “On July 10, 2017, HCIDLA noted that the Subject Property had unsanitary stairways and walkways, the exterior areas needed to be painted because they were not weather protected, there was evidence of water damage, and the exterior overhangs near the second floor were deteriorated.” (FAC, ¶ 23.)

In the opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that four-year statutes of limitations apply to his first, fourth, sixth, and eighth causes of action. However, Plaintiff asserts paragraphs 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the FAC should be not be stricken because “the ‘theory of continuous accrual’ allows Plaintiffs to recover for every violation that has occurred during the pertinent statute of limitations period even if the initial violation occurred years before and outside the period.” (Opp’n at p. 3:8-10.)[1]

Plaintiff cites to Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1198, where the California Supreme Court noted that “the theory of continuous accrual…is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent breach or misconduct; parties engaged in long-standing misfeasance would thereby obtain immunity in perpetuity from suit even for recent and ongoing misfeasance. In addition, where misfeasance is ongoing, a defendant’s claim to repose, the principal justification underlying the limitations defense, is vitiated. To address these concerns, we have long settled that separate, recurring invasions of the same right can each trigger their own statute of limitations.” As an example, the Aryeh Court noted that “in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th 809, the plaintiffs belatedly challenged the validity of a municipal tax. Though the limitations period had run on any direct challenge to the validity of the ordinance imposing the tax, we concluded suit was still permissible because the continuing monthly collection of the tax represented an alleged ongoing breach of state law.” (Id. at p. 1199.)

The Aryeh Court noted that “[g]enerally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period. Because each new breach of such an obligation provides all the elements of a claim—wrongdoing, harm, and causation—each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for recovery.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) 

In Aryeh, the Court noted that “Aryeh runs a copy business under the name ABC Copy & Print. Defendant Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (Canon), sells, leases, services, and repairs copiers and other office products. In November 2001 and February 2002, Aryeh entered agreements with Canon to lease copiers for a term of 60 months. The leases required Aryeh to pay monthly rent for each copier, subject to a maximum copy allowance. Copies in excess of the monthly allowance required payment of an additional per copy charge.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1189-1190.) “Aryeh sued in January 2008, alleging a single claim for violation of the UCL. The original complaint alleged Canon knew or should have known it was charging for excess copies and that the practice of charging for test copies was both unfair and fraudulent.” (Id. at p. 1190.) The California Supreme Court found that “Aryeh cannot recover alleged excess charges preceding the four-year limitations period, but is not foreclosed from seeking recovery for charges to the extent they fall within that period. Because the complaint alleges excess charges within the four years preceding suit, it is not completely barred by the statute of limitations.” (Id. at pp. 1200-01.)

Plaintiff argues that here, “it is well settled that landlords have continuing obligations or duties to maintain residential units in safe and habitable conditions and to provide all tenants with a quiet enjoyment of the premises, and that the named Defendants were Plaintiffs’ landlords, this Aryeh ‘element’ is easily met. Additionally, as Plaintiff continues to suffer from the effects of Defendants’ illegal construction, lack of regular maintenance, improperly weatherproofed roof, rodent and cockroach infestation, water leaks, lack of hot water, and from the Subject Property’s generally unsanitary condition, Plaintiff also easily meets the criteria of the Aryeh court’s first element.” (Opp’n at p. 4:17-23.)

            The Williams Defendants counter that “[i]f this court were to apply the theory of continuous accrual (as within Aryeh), then ¶20, ¶21, ¶22, and ¶23 of the FAC would still be irrelevant because under the theory of continuous accrual, Plaintiff can only sue for damages with respect to happenings four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. ¶20, ¶21, ¶22, and ¶23 pertain to damages arising from happenings on 1/1/16, 3/11/16, and 7/10/17, which are beyond four years prior to the filing of this subject lawsuit.” (Reply at p. 5:1-6.)  

The Court also does not see how the theory of continuous accrual supports recovery for damages arising from the wrongdoing alleged in paragraphs 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the FAC here. The Aryeh Court noted that “unlike the continuing violation doctrine, which renders an entire course of conduct actionable, the theory of continuous accrual supports recovery only for damages arising from those breaches falling within the limitations period.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) As set forth above, paragraphs 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the FAC concern wrongdoing that allegedly took place more than four years prior to the initiation of this lawsuit.

            Plaintiff also asserts that paragraphs 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the FAC should not be stricken because “each of these paragraphs provides factual support to Plaintiff’s enumerated causes of action and claims for punitive damages by exemplifying Defendants’ pattern of failing keep the Subject Property in a safe and habitable condition.” (Opp’n at p. 4:26-28.) The Williams Defendants counter that punitive damages are not requested against them. (See FAC, pp. 18:25-19:6.) 

Based on a consideration on the arguments presented, the Court finds that the Williams Defendants have demonstrated that paragraphs 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the FAC are barred by the statute of limitations.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Williams Defendants’ motion to strike is granted, with leave to amend.

The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days of this Order, the Williams Defendants are ordered to file and serve their answer within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿ 

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The Williams Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  April 20, 2023                                ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court