Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 21STCV36052, Date: 2025-04-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36052    Hearing Date: April 1, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

In 2020, Plaintiff Majed Elaawar purchased a Chevrolet Bolt from Defendant General Motors LLC. In September of 2021, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of express and implied warranties. Plaintiff Majed Elaawar moves under CCP § 1794(d) for an award of $118,755.45 in attorney’s fees, $7,420.64, in costs and expenses, plus an additional $4,500.00 in fees for the Reply to Defendant’s Opposition. Plaintiff General Motors opposes.

On September 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action.

On August 7, 2024, this matter was settled. Notice of entry of judgment was filed and served on August 14, 2024.

On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for Attorney Fees.

On March 18, 2025, Defendant filed the Opposition.

On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Reply.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff submits evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Natalie Keshishian in their Reply. The Court rules on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections as follows: 

Objection 1: Overruled

Objection 2: Overruled

Objection 3: Overruled

Objection 4: Overruled

Objection 5: Overruled

Objection 6: Overruled

Objection 7: Overruled

Objection 8: Overruled

Objection 9: Overruled

Objection 10: Overruled

Objection 11: Overruled

Objection 12: Overruled

Objection 13: Overruled

Objection 14: Overruled

Objection 15: Overruled

Discussion

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. … The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” ((PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citations omitted]); (see Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818 [applying the lodestar method to determine attorneys’ fees in Song-Beverly action].)

The Hourly Rate of Counsel

Plaintiff requests a lodestar total of $87,967.00 for work performed by Strategic Legal Practices. Courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. ((569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437.)

From August 30, 2021 through the present, Strategic Legal Practices (SLP) billed 194.9 hours for its legal services. (Shahian Decl. pp. 229-233. Ex. 23.) Strategic Legal Practice’s primary case team was comprised of eight attorneys: Mani Arabi at $495/hour; Angel Baker at $595/hour; Olivia Avelino at $595/hour; Christopher Campbell at $495/hour; Tionna Carvalho at $595/hour; Elizabeth Larocque at $595/hour; Rebecca Neubauer at $495/hour; and Greg Yu at $20/hour (Shanian Decl. ¶ 12.) Mr. Shanian’s billing hours were not included in this total. (Shanian Decl. ¶ 1.) Mr. Shahian also attests to the reasonableness of the hourly rates of these eight lawyers. (Shanian Decl. ¶ 4.) Additionally, Mr. Shanian cites numerous lemon law cases brought by Strategic Legal Practices where the courts found SLP’s hourly rates reasonable. (Shanian Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9(b-q).) Defendant does not object to the hourly rates of SLP’s primary case team.  

The Court finds that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable and commensurate with rates charged by attorneys with comparable skill and experience.

Lodestar Multiplier

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier for their fees. While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award[;]” and (4) the success achieved. ((Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)

However, the court must not consider extraordinary skill and the other Serrano factors to the extent these are already included within the lodestar. ((Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138-1139.) “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable.” ((Id. at p. 1139.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks a 1.35 lodestar multiplier on account of the risks of litigation, the novelty of the case, the outcome, and the skill exhibited by counsel. (Motion, p. 13:20-23.) However, the Court finds that the factors don’t support the application of a multiplier. There is no indication that this lemon law case was complex or presented challenging legal issues, particularly considering that Plaintiff’s counsel specializes in these types of cases. There is no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from taking other cases because of the nature of this case. Nor is the success achieved by Plaintiff’s counsel exceptional. The Court also notes that the hourly rate requested by Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable because of counsel’s demonstrated skill and experience. Because the quality of representation and the degree of skill exercised by Plaintiff’s counsel is already factored into the lodestar, it would be unreasonable to award an enhancement. ((See Holguin v. Dish Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1333 [“Where, as here, the court determines that the lodestar itself constitutes a reasonable fee for the action at issue, no enhancement is warranted.”].)  

Accordingly, the Court declines to apply a multiplier to the lodestar amount.

Reasonableness of the Requested Hours 

While Defendant does not challenge SLP’s hourly rates, they do argue that the total hours billed, 194.9, is unreasonable. “[T]he court's discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” ((Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.)  The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. ((Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” ((Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, at p. 396.) Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has attached billing statements detailing the nature of the work performed. (Shahian Decl., p. 231, Ex. 23.) Defendant raises several arguments about the reasonableness of these billing entries.

First, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s attorney billed multiple hours for a fraud claim they cannot recover from. Under California law “[w]hen a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action,” unless the issues are common or the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate [them].” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 349; see also In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Prods. Liability Lit., No. ML 18-02874 AB (PVCx) (July 22, 2021) [finding that prevailing Plaintiff under Song-Beverly Act properly excluded from its request any fees solely related to fraud].) Defendant argues that the fraud claim they briefly litigated stood on its own, and therefore the 7.5 hours of work attributed to that claim should be subtracted from the total. (Opp. p. 5:12-13.)

The Court disagrees. As Plaintiff points out, it is improper to apportion fees when plaintiffs’ various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories. (Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises, (1985) 163 Cal. App. 3d 486, 492-93.) In Drouin, the Court of Appeals found that plaintiff’s Lemon Law claims under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) and her remaining claims (including a claim for fraud) could not be apportioned because they all “were related to her purchase of the motor home from defendant and her subsequent efforts to obtain repairs of its defects.” (Id. at 493) Similarly, here, Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims all relate to Plaintiff’s purchase of his vehicle from Defendant, as well as their subsequent efforts to obtain repairs of its defects. Thus, these fees cannot be apportioned between the SBA claims, as they involve common facts and legal theories.

The Court declines to strike these 7.5 hours.

Second, Defendant argues that the hours billed are unreasonable due to their heavy reliance on templates for discovery responses. (Opp. pp. 7-9.) Defendant supplies multiple exhibits, comparing SLP’s work product from previous cases against GM and their filings in this case. (Keshishian Decl. ¶¶ 3-7.) Defendant points out that, in the past year, Plaintiff’s counsel has filed 61 fee motions against GM. (Keshishian Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. R.) Defendant argues they shouldn’t be forced to pay for the same work every time SLP sues them.

It is true that SLP’s work regularly relies on templates. Much of the law does. That said, counsel still has to apply the individual circumstances of a case to their templates. Because each of these cases are unique, the motions are too, so Defendant is not being charged for the same work. Ultimately, the Court sees no reason to punish Plaintiff’s counsel for working more efficiently.

The Court declines to reduce the amount of hours billed for this reason.

Third, Defendant argues Plaintiff billed 2.3 hours of administrative tasks at attorney rates. (Opp. p.9:14-26.) Upon review, the Court finds that the following reflect unreasonable and excessive billing: 

·        January 3, 2022 – revise and finalize P’s Notice of Case Management – 0.5 hours at $410. (See generally Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p.1.)

·        January 18, 2022 – review and finalize P’s CMS and Notice of Posting Jury Fees – 0.2 hours at $410. (See generally Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p.1.)

·        December 12, 2022 – Initiate Plaintiff’s outgoing discovery to Defendant – 0.30 hours at $595. (See generally Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p.1.)

·        December 13, 2022 – Mediation Scheduling – 0.60 hours at $595. (See generally Shahian Decl., Ex. 23, p.1.)

The Court finds that the above listed tasks were predominantly administrative tasks to be performed by a secretary or attorney service. Therefore, the Court deducts $822.50 from the overall fee award.

Fourth, Defendant requests a 10% reduction in Plaintiff’s billings. (Opp. p. 13:11.) In Song-Beverly cases, a court can “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff deployed 25 timekeepers on this matter, which created inefficiencies. (Opp. p. 12.) However, as Plaintiff points out, only six attorneys and one law clerk account for 75% of the hours billed on this case. (Reply p. 1:12-13.) The rest, Plaintiff argues, are not duplicative, as Plaintiff audits its billing to remove duplicative billing. (Declaration of Angel M. Baker re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses, Ex. 1, Shahian Decl. iso Fee Motion, ¶ 19.) After reviewing the hours, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s counsel padded their billings by using multiple attorneys.

The Court declines to reduce Plaintiff’s billings by 10%.

Costs 

Plaintiff seeks $7,420.64 in costs per their agreement with Defendant. (See Baker Decl. ¶ 84, Ex. 4.) Defendant argues Plaintiff’s costs are not compensable. (Opp. p. 13:13.) Defendant notes that Plaintiff failed to file a Memorandum of Costs pursuant to CRC 3.1700. However, Plaintiff argues they don’t need to file a Memorandum of costs, as they are seeking costs under CCP § 1794(d). A memorandum of costs is generally only required where the attorney’s fees sought as costs are of a fixed amount. (See Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9.) Additionally, Defendant has not actually filed a motion to strike or tax Plaintiff’s costs.

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for costs.  

Reply Billing

Plaintiff seeks $4,500 in connection with Plaintiff’s counsel’s review of Defendant’s opposition to the instant fee motion, the preparation of a reply and appearance at the hearing on the fee motion. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 23.) This Reply was submitted on March 25, 2025. Assuming an hourly rate of around $550, $4,500.00 is about 8 hours of billing. Given the quality of the Reply and the future time spent arguing this motion, the Court finds this estimate reasonable.

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for Reply Billing.

Conclusion

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is granted. Plaintiff is entitled to recover $87,144.50 in attorney fees, $7,420.64 in costs and expenses, and $4,500 for Plaintiff’s work on the Reply from Defendant. This totals $99,064.14.

            Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

DATED:  April 1, 2025                                  ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court