Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case 21STCV37799 2022-09-27 Tentative Ruling

ALEX COTRAVIWAT, Plaintiff, vs. CHARLIE CHENG-HAN TSAI, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	21STCV37799
	Hearing Date:	September 27, 2022
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS

On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff Alex Cotraviwat (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Charlie Cheng-Han Tsai (“Tsai”), asserting causes of action for (1) breach of contract, and (2) unjust enrichment.

Default was entered against Tsai on December 13, 2021. On April 28, 2022, the Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff’s request for default judgment against Tsai. Judgment by default was entered against Tsai on April 28, 2022.

Tsai now moves for an order that the default judgment be set aside as void pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (d), and for an order quashing service of the Summons due to lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1). No opposition to the motion was filed.

Tsai moves to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which provides that “[t]he court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) “[B]ecause the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233 (negative treatment on other grounds).) Where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and no prejudice to the opposing party will result from setting aside the default, “very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.” (Ibid.)

Tsai notes that Plaintiff filed a proof of service of the Summons and Complaint on October 25, 2021, which indicates that Tsai was served by substitute service on October 21, 2021 at the address 250 N. Puente Ave., City of Industry, California 91746 (the “N. Puente Address”). The proof of service indicates that the person served was Dorothy Lo, identified as the “Person in Charge,” and that service was made at the office or usual place of business of the person to be served.

Tsai indicates that the N. Puente Address is not, and has never been, his office or usual place of business. (Tsai Decl., ¶ 6.) Tsai also indicates that the N. Puente Address is not, and has never been, his dwelling house or usual place of abode. (Tsai Decl., ¶ 7.) Tsai also notes that Plaintiff filed a Notice of Filing Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint Upon Defendant Charlie Cheng-Han Tsai on October 25, 2021, and that the proof of service attached to the notice indicates that the notice was served on Tsai at the address 218 W. Las Flores, Arcadia, California 91007 (the “Las Flores Address”). Tsai indicates that at no time from 2021 to the present was the Las Flores Address Tsai’s office or usual place of business, or his dwelling house or usual place of abode. (Tsai Decl., ¶ 9.) Tsai indicates that he permanently resides in Hong Kong, and that his work address is in Hong Kong. (Tsai Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)

Tsai asserts that the default judgment should be set aside because the Summons and Complaint were not properly served by substitute service pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b). “Section 415.20, subdivision (b) governs substitute service on individuals.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 545.) It provides:

“[i]f a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b), emphasis added.)

As set forth above, Tsai provides evidence that the address at which the substitute service occurred (the N. Puente Address) was not Tsai’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or office. (Tsai Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7.) Tsai indicates that he permanently resides in Hong Kong and that his work address is in Hong Kong. (Tsai Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)

Tsai notes that “[c]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void. Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service.” (Ellard v. Conway, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

In light of the foregoing and the lack of any opposition by Plaintiff, the Court grants Tsai’s motion to set aside the default judgment.

Tsai also moves for an order quashing service of the Summons. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), “(a) A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”

Tsai asserts that the service of the Summons was invalid, and that there was thus no basis for personal jurisdiction over him in this action. Tsai notes that “[a] party cannot be properly joined unless served with the summons and complaint; notice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) “California is a jurisdiction where the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.” (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048.) In addition, Tsai notes that “[m]ere knowledge of the action is not a substitute for service, nor does it raise any estoppel to contest the validity of service.” (In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693.)

Based on the foregoing, and in light of the lack of any opposition by Plaintiff, the Court also grants Tsai’s motion to quash service of the Summons.

Based on the foregoing, Tsai’s motion to set aside the default judgment and quash service of Summons is granted, and the Court sets aside the default judgment entered against him.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50