Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV01348, Date: 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV01348 Hearing Date: March 28, 2023 Dept: 50
TAMIM, LLC, Plaintiff, vs. EUGENE CHORNY, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22VECV01348 [r/w 22STCV18736] |
Hearing Date: |
March 28, 2023 |
|
Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
|
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
RE: MOTION FOR ORDER
REQUIRING DEPOSIT OF RENT AS A CONDITION OF CONTINUED STAY OF UNLAWFUL
DETAINER ACTION |
Background
On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff Tamim, LLC (“Tamim”) filed this
Unlawful Detainer action against Defendants Eugene Chorny and Irina Ermakova (jointly,
“Defendants”).
In the Complaint, Tamim alleges that Defendants are in possession of
the premises located at 13300 Burbank Boulevard, Sherman Oaks, California 91401
(the “Premises”). (Compl., ¶ 3.) Tamim is the owner of the Premises. (Compl., ¶
4.) On or about July 1, 2005, Defendants agreed to a 10-year lease of the
Premises and agreed to pay rent of $4,200 monthly. (Compl., ¶ 6(a).) Tamim
alleges that the lease term
subsequently extended through June 30, 2022, and Defendants became holdover tenants as of July 1,
2022. (Compl., ¶ 6(d).) At the
time the 3-day notice to pay rent or quit was served, the amount of rent due
was $21,480.75. (Compl., ¶ 12.)
On November 30, 2022,
Defendants filed a motion in this action for an order consolidating the instant
case with the case Eugene Chorny, et al. v. Samuel Ohana, et al., Case No. 22STCV18736 (“the Chorny Action”). The instant
case and the Chorny Action were related pursuant to this Court’s October
17, 2022 minute order.
The Court’s January
25, 2023 minute order in this action provides, inter alia, “[o]n the
Court’s own motion, the Hearing on Motion to Consolidate scheduled for
01/25/2023 is continued to 03/28/2023…The Court hereby stays the case in its
entirety. until the completion of the hearing set for March 28, 2023, related
to case 22STCV18736.”
Tamim now moves for an order requiring Defendants “to pay monthly rental expenses in the
amount of $7,896.15 to the Court as the rental expenses becomes due and payable or into an escrow designated
by the Court for so long as
the Defendants remains in possession pending the termination of the action.”
Tamim further moves “for an order requiring Defendants to deposit an additional
sum representing the amount
of rental expenses due under the lease from November 14, 2022 (the date 20 days
after [Tamim] first filed
its request to set case for trial) through the hearing date of this motion.”
Defendants oppose.
Request for Judicial
Notice
The
Court denies Tamim’s request for judicial notice filed with
the reply. The Court notes that “[t]he general rule of motion practice…is that
new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey¿(2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.)
Discussion
Tamim notes that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1170.5, subdivision (a), “[i]f the defendant appears
pursuant to Section 1170, trial of the
proceeding shall be held not later than the 20th day following the date that
the request to set the time of the trial is made. Judgment shall be entered
thereon and, if the plaintiff prevails, a writ of execution shall be issued
immediately by the court upon the request of the plaintiff.” On October 25, 2022, Tamim filed a Request to Set Case
for Trial – Unlawful Detainer.
Code of Civil
Procedure section 1170.5, subdivision (c) provides as follows:
“If trial is
not held within the time specified in this section, the court, upon finding
that there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the
action, shall determine the amount of damages, if any, to be suffered by the
plaintiff by reason of the extension, and shall issue an order requiring the defendant
to pay that amount into court as the rent would have otherwise become due and
payable or into an escrow designated by the court for so long as the defendant
remains in possession pending the termination of the action.
The determination
of the amount of the payment shall be based on the plaintiff’s verified
statement of the contract rent for rental payment, any verified objection
thereto filed by the defendant, and the oral or demonstrative evidence
presented at the hearing. The court’s determination of the amount of damages
shall include consideration of any evidence, presented by the parties,
embracing the issue of diminution of value or any set off permitted by law.”
A trial date has not
yet been set in this action. As set forth above, Tamim seeks an order requiring
Defendants to “pay monthly
rental expenses in the amount of $7,896.15 to the Court as the rental
expenses becomes due and payable or into an escrow designated by the Court for
so long as
the Defendants remains in possession pending the termination of the action.” (Mot. at p.
2:1-3.) Tamim also seeks an order requiring Defendants “to deposit an
additional sum representing the amount of rental expenses due under the
lease from November 14, 2022 (the date 20 days after Plaintiff first filed its request to
set case for trial) through the hearing date of this motion.” (Mot. at p.
2:4-6.)
Tamim
provides the Declaration of Samuel Ohana, a manager/member of Tamim, in
connection with the instant motion. (Ohana Decl., ¶ 1.) Mr. Ohana states that Tamim
owns the commercial real property located at the Premises. (Ohana Decl., ¶ 2.)
At the time Tamim purchased the property, it inherited Defendants as tenants at
the property under a written lease agreement (“Lease”) with Tamim’s predecessor
in interest. (Ohana Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)
Mr.
Ohana states that “[t]he Lease expired on June 30, 2022 at which time
Defendants became holdover tenants. As Defendants became holdover tenants, the
monthly base rent increased by 150% as per the Lease (Lease paragraph 26) and,
accordingly, increased from $4,500.00 to $6,750.00 effective July 1, 2022. In
addition to the monthly base rent, the Lease requires payment of property taxes
(Lease paragraph 10.2).” (Ohana Decl., ¶ 3.)
Mr. Ohana states that
“[o]n or about September 2, 2022, Defendants were served with a three day
notice to pay rent or quit in which the $21,480.75 was demanded inclusive of
base rent due from July 1, 2022 through September 30, 2022 and prorated
property taxes for the period of May 1, 2022 through September 30, 2022.
Defendants failed to pay the demand, or any amount for the matter, and instant
action was filed. Moreover, Defendants have not tendered any rent since the filing of this action.” (Ohana Decl., ¶
4.) Mr. Ohana indicates that “[t]otal
monthly rental expenses amount to $7,896.15. Divided by 30 days, the daily rental rate totals $263.21.” (Ohana Decl., ¶ 5.)
In the opposition,
Defendants assert that “Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the motion at bar as
Samuel Ohana is judicially estopped from asserting property rights on behalf of
Tamim LLC.” (Opp’n at p. 3:1-3.) But Tamim is the moving party bringing the instant
motion, not Ohana.
Defendants also assert
that in a demurrer filed in the related Chorny Action, Tamim indicated that
“Ohana did not purchase the property and is not the owner of the property. The
property was purchased by Tamim, LLC.” (See Opp’n at p. 3:15-17.)[1] Defendants
assert that “the
court should deem Ohana’s admission of not being a part of Tamim, LLC as true
and dismiss this Motion as based on Declaration of a person who cannot
represent Plaintiff Tamim, LLC.” (Opp’n at p.
4:15-18.) But Defendants do not provide any evidence that Ohana admitted he was
not a part of Tamim. Rather, Defendants indicate that Tamim stated in a
demurrer that Ohana is not the owner of the subject Premises. In the instant
motion, Ohana does not
assert that he owns the Premises. Rather, he states that he is a
“manager/member of Plaintiff Tamim, LLC,” and that Tamim owns the Premises.
(Ohana Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.)
Next, Defendants assert
that Tamim “did not comply with statutory requirements of an unlawful detainer
proceeding, thus is unlikely will [sic] prevail in the action.” (Opp’n at p.
4:23-25.) Defendants assert that Tamim “did not
provide Defendants with a valid notice of termination,
increase in lease and change in lease
terms.” (Opp’n at p. 5:6-8.) Defendants appear to cite to Civil Code section 827, subdivision (b)(3)(A)[2],
which provides that “[i]f the proposed rent increase for that tenant
is greater than 10 percent of the rental amount charged to that tenant at any
time during the 12 months before the effective date of the increase, either in
and of itself or when combined with any other rent increases for the 12 months
before the effective date of the increase, the notice shall be delivered at
least 90 days before the effective date of the increase, and subject to Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure if
served by mail.”
Defendants assert that “[o]n September 9, 2022,
Plaintiff served Defendants with the Three-Day Notice, asserting $21,480.75 in retroactive charges for the months the
defendants had already paid the rent. The Notice
indicated fifty percent increase in rent, without a prior notice to the
defendants.” (Opp’n at p. 5:16-19.)
Tamim counters
that Defendants’ contention that Tamim imposed a rental
increase for which it was required to provide statutory notice is wrong. As set
forth above, Tamim alleges in the Complaint that Defendants became holdover
tenants as of July 1, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 6(d).) Tamim notes that here, the parties’
lease contains the following provision:
“26. No
Right To Holdover. Lessee has no right to retain possession of the Premises or
any part
thereof beyond the expiration or termination of this Lease. In the event that
Lessee holds over, then the Base Rent shall be increased to 150% of the Base
Rent applicable immediately preceding the expiration or termination. Nothing
contained herein shall be construed as consent by Lessor to any holding over by
Lessee.” (Ohana Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, § 26.)
Tamim asserts that
accordingly, when Defendants became holdover tenants under the lease, the base
rent was adjusted in accordance with the lease.
Next,
Defendants assert that “even if Ohana’s contention that one hundred fifty
percent increase had happened after the defendants became holdover tenants
(which is not true), the increase is unenforceable penalty and thus unlawful.
As such, Plaintiff will unlikely prevail in the unlawful detainer action and
the court shall not make an order requiring deposit of rent with the court.”
(Opp’n at p. 6:13-18.) Defendants cite to Harbor
Island Holdings v. Kim (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 790, 793, where “[a] landlord, displeased with its tenant, reluctantly
agreed to a lease extension requiring greatly increased rental payments. The landlord
demanded one price if the tenant complied with the lease agreement in every
regard and double that amount in the event of any breach. After the conclusion
of the extended lease term, the landlord sued the tenant, seeking both damages
occasioned by the tenant’s failure to properly maintain the premises, plus
nearly a quarter of a million dollars for the doubled rent. The trial court
awarded damages for the failure to maintain the property, but held the lease
provision for the doubled rent was unenforceable as a penalty.” The
landlord appealed, and the Court of Appeal “agree[d] with the trial court’s
reasoning and affirm[d].” (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he validity of the deferred rent provision is
determined under Civil Code section 1671.
Subdivision (b) thereof provides: [A] provision in a contract
liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is valid unless the
party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision
was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was
made.” (Harbor Island Holdings v. Kim, supra,
107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 795-796 [internal quotations omitted].) “A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered
unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under [Section
1671(b)], if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual
damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach. The
amount set as liquidated damages must represent the result of a reasonable endeavor
by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss that may be
sustained. In the absence of such relationship, a
contractual clause purporting to predetermine damages must be construed as
a penalty.” (Id. at p. 796 [internal quotations
and citations omitted].) The Harbor Island Holdings Court found that “[h]ere, the lack of a proportional
relationship between the $ 240,912 amount sought and the actual damages Harbor Island suffered on account of the breach of
the covenant to maintain and repair could not be more obvious.” (Id. at p. 797.)
Tamim counters that it was well within its rights to impose
holdover rent. Tamim cites to Constellation-F,
LLC v. World Trading 23, Inc. (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 22, 25, where a “commercial
lease set the rent to increase if the tenant stayed past a certain date. That
date came and went. The commercial tenant stayed put. Yet it would not pay rent
at the increased rate.” The Court of Appeal found that “[t]he trial court
improperly refused to enforce the rent increase. We reverse this ruling. We
also direct the trial court both to amend the judgment to include a sanctions
award and to rule on two arguments concerning estoppel and agency.” The Constellation-F,
LLC Court noted as follows:
“The lease clause in this case specified
rent would increase after the lease expired. The case law refers to such a
clause as a holdover rent provision or as ‘a graduated rental.’ (Vucinich v. Gordon (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 434, 435, 437 [124 P.2d 868] (Vucinich).) Commercial provisions of this sort are enforceable even if
the increased rent is much greater than the base rent. (Id. at
pp. 435, 437–438 [500 percent increase enforced].)”
(Constellation-F,
LLC v. World Trading 23, Inc., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 26.)
The Constellation-F,
LLC Court also noted that “[t]ransactors in a competitive market
are free from obligation to each other when they enter their lease
contract. They dealt at arm’s length. Deliberately and free from coercion, they made the provision for the
rental to be paid for the use of the premises after the expiration of the
definite term. This they had the right to do.”
(Constellation-F,
LLC v. World Trading 23, Inc., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 26-27 [internal
quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted].)
Next, Defendants assert
that “Plaintiff’s
unlawful detainer action is an attempted retaliatory eviction, within Cal. Civ. Code Proc. §
1942.5,
therefore, bars Plaintiff’s chance in prevailing in the action.” (Opp’n at p.
6:18-20.) It appears Defendants intended to cite to Civil
Code section 1942.5, not Code of Civil Procedure
section 1942.5.
Defendants
also refer to “Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5.”
(Opp’n at p. 6:21.) Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (c) provides that “[t]o
report, or to threaten to report, the lessee or individuals known to the
landlord to be associated with the lessee to immigration authorities is a form
of retaliatory conduct prohibited under subdivision (a). This subdivision shall
in no way limit the definition of retaliatory conduct prohibited under this
section.” As Tamim notes, this provision is inapplicable
here.
Defendants may
appear to be referring to Civil Code section 1942.5,
subdivision (d), which
provides that “[n]otwithstanding subdivision
(a), it is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a
lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or
threaten to do any of those acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the
lessee because the lessee has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’
association or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has lawfully and
peaceably exercised any rights under the law. In an action brought by or
against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall bear the
burden of producing evidence that the lessor’s conduct was, in fact,
retaliatory.”
Defendants
state that “[o]n June 8 of 2021, Defendant filed the action against Tamim, LLC and Samuel
Ohana in this court, alleging intra alia a fraudulent misrepresentation of Samuel Ohana and intentional
interference of
Tamim, LLC in
prospective business opportunity. Following that, Defendants’ received the Three-day notice with an
egregious increase in rent.” (Opp’n at p. 7:8-13.) Defendants appear to refer
to the related Chorny Action, which was filed on June 8, 2022. The Complaint in
the instant action alleges that approximately three months later, on September 2,
2022, Defendants were served with a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit. (Compl.,
¶¶ 9-10.)
Tamim counters that “the
claim that the rental increase was retaliatory is of no moment because, as
described above, there was no rental increase for which statutory notice was
required. Plaintiff simply seeks to enforce a preexisting obligation that was
jointly negotiated by Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest and
Defendants.” (Reply at p. 5:4-7.)
Next, Defendants assert
that the “[t]he instant
Motion does not consists [sic] of a Plaintiff’s verified statement of the
contract rent, required by Cal Code Civ Proc §1170.5.
The Declaration of Samuel Ohana, verifying the amount, which may be construed
as a statement of rent, nevertheless contradicts Plaintiff’s prior judicial
admission that Mr. Ohana is not a part of Tamim, LLC and therefore cannot
represent the plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff requests the amount of rent of
which the parties have never had the agreement about.” (Opp’n at p. 8:1-8.)
But as set forth
above, Mr. Ohana states that “[t]otal
monthly rental expenses amount to $7,896.15. Divided by 30 days, the daily
rental rate totals $263.21.” (Ohana Decl., ¶ 5.) Moreover, Tamim provides evidence of the
subject lease. (Ohana Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) In addition, as discussed, Plaintiff does not
provide evidence indicating that Mr. Ohana stated that he “is not a part of Tamim, LLC.”
Based
on the foregoing, the Court finds that Tamim has demonstrated a reasonable
probability of prevailing in the instant action.
However, the Court notes
that it has tentatively granted Defendants’ motion to consolidate the instant
case with the Chorny Action. The Court notes that the consolidation of an unlawful
detainer action with an unlimited action causes the unlawful detainer
proceeding to lose its summary character and the entire case is treated as an
ordinary civil proceeding. (Lynch
& Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603, 608 [“It is
well-established an action for unlawful detainer can co-exist with other causes
of action in the same complaint so long as the entire case is treated as an
ordinary civil action, not as a summary proceeding.”]; Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 387 (same).) Code of Civil Procedure section
1170.5, subdivision (c) only applies to summary proceedings and is not
available in an ordinary civil action.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
Tamim’s motion is denied. Tamim is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
DATED:
________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]The Court notes
that Defendants did not request that the Court take judicial notice of such
demurrer or provide a copy of the demurrer in connection with the
opposition.
[2]Defendants’
opposition references “Civil Code 827(a)(3)(A).” (Opp’n at p. 5:8, emphasis added.)