Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case 22STCV03332 2023-05-04 Tentative Ruling

MARISOL CHAVEZ SANDOVAL, as an aggrieved employee, and on behalf of all other aggrieved employees under the Labor Code Private Attorneys’ General Act of 2004,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ABSOLUTE BONDING CORPORATION, dba ABSOLUTE BAIL BONDS, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

22STCV03332

Hearing Date:

May 4, 2023

Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS ABSOLUTE BONDING CORPORATION AND MICHAEL L. BENCH’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Plaintiff Marisol Chavez Sandoval, as an aggrieved employee, and on behalf of all other aggrieved employees under the Labor Code Private Attorneys’ General Act of 2004 (“Plaintiff”)

filed this action on January 26, 2022 against Defendants Absolute Bonding Corporation dba Absolute Bail Bonds (“Absolute Bonding”) and Michael L. Bench (“Bench”) (jointly, “Defendants”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) civil penalties under Labor Code section 210, (2) civil penalties under Labor Code section 226.3, (3) violation of Labor Code section 558, (4) violation of Labor Coe section 1174.5, (5) violation of Labor Code section 1197.1, and (6) civil penalties under Labor Code section 2699.

Defendants now move for an order “compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims, and dismiss the nonindividual PAGA claims in this action.” Plaintiff opposes.

In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability, etc.). (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414.)

Generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.)

“California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) “This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts “involving interstate commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 2, et seq.; Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)

Plaintiff alleges that she “worked for Defendants from approximately June of 2019 through at least September of 2020.” (Compl., ¶ 26.) Defendants indicate that on or about July 9, 2019, Plaintiff and Absolute Bonding entered into a “Resolving Differences and Misunderstandings” agreement (herein, the “Agreement”). (Ambriz Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) The Agreement provides, inter alia, as follows:

“[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating to employee’s employment and/or the terms of this agreement, including but not limited to any claims of harassment or discrimination, violation of any federal or state law and any other aspect of Employee’s compensation, employment or its termination (except a workers’ compensation or unemployment claim) shall be resolved by an arbitrator of the American Arbitration Association, as the exclusive remedy for such dispute and instead of any court action, which is hereby

Defendants assert that the Agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s causes of action here. Defendants also assert that while Bench “is not a signatory to the Agreement, he can nonetheless compel arbitration.” (Mot. at p. 8, fn. 2.) Each of the causes of action of the Complaint are alleged against all Defendants. In addition, as noted by Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that “at all times mentioned herein, each of the defendants was the agent, principal, employee, employer, representative, joint venture or co-conspirator of each of the other defendants, either actually or ostensibly, and in doing the things alleged herein acted within the course and scope of such agency, employment, joint venture, and conspiracy.” (Compl., ¶ 30.)

Defendants cite to Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 608-609, where “[a]n investment advisor and related defendants appeal[ed] the order denying their petition to compel an investor’s successor in interest to arbitrate claims alleging the defendants mismanaged the investor’s accounts. The trial court denied the petition on the grounds that the claims against two of the six defendants were not subject to arbitration because those defendants were not parties to any arbitration agreement, and that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common questions of law or fact if arbitration of the claims against the other four defendants were ordered.” The Court of Appeal reversed. (Id. at p. 609.) The Thomas opinion provides that “John contended at oral argument…that the allegations of agency he made in the operative complaint cannot be used to require him to arbitrate his claims against the defendants which are not parties to any of the agreements Katherine executed. According to John, agency is only a theory of tort liability by which he may hold those defendants responsible for the wrongdoing that allegedly arose out of the relationship created by those agreements. We disagree. Having alleged all defendants acted as agents of one another, John is bound by the legal consequences of his allegations. And, as the cases cited above hold, a plaintiff’s allegations of an agency relationship among defendants is sufficient to allow the alleged agents to invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by their principal even though the agents are not parties to the agreement.” (Id. at pp. 614-15 [internal citation omitted].)

In the opposition, Plaintiff does not argue that she did not sign the Agreement. Plaintiff also does not dispute that the Agreement covers the claims alleged against Defendants in the Complaint. Therefore, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to prove a ground for denial.

Plaintiff asserts that arbitration of Plaintiff’s “individual PAGA claims” cannot be compelled because the Agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable.

Plaintiff contends that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiff asserts that “[t]o the extent that any agreement was executed at all here, it would have unquestionably constituted a contract of adhesion. It is clear from Defendants’ own evidence that the agreement was ‘presented on a take it or leave it basis[,]’ as a contract of adhesion.” (Opp’n at p. 6:17-19.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites to paragraph 4 of the Declaration of Lisa Serna. Ms. Serna is an Accounts Receivable Manager at Absolute Bonding and was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Serna Decl., ¶ 2.) Ms. Serna states that “[o]n or about July 9, 2019 at Absolute Bonding’s office, I handed to Plaintiff an unexecuted copy of the Agreement for her review, consideration, and execution along with other onboarding documents like the employee handbook.” (Serna Decl., ¶ 4.) Other than referencing that the Agreement was distributed to Plaintiff with other onboarding documents, Plaintiff does not cite to any statement in Ms. Serna’s declaration indicating that the Agreement was presented on a “take it or leave it basis.”

Plaintiff also asserts that “nothing on the face of the document itself appears to suggest that the employee would have had any opportunity to negotiate changes to the form agreement.” (Opp’n at p. 6:22-23.) However, Defendants provide evidence that “Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to ask questions about the Agreement or propose any edits or revisions to the language of the Agreement prior to execution.” (Serna Decl., ¶ 4.) Ms. Serna states that she “did not receive from Plaintiff any objection to the Agreement, suggestions that any language in the Agreement needed to be edited or revised, or requests for clarification of any language in the Agreement prior to or after Plaintiff’s execution of the Agreement.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff asserts that “there is also clear evidence of surprise here, as well. Defendants allege that the purported arbitration agreement was provided to Ms. Chavez not on its own, but alongside various onboarding documents with the effect that each individual document would not have been as easily reviewable.” (Opp’n at p. 7:2-4.) But Plaintiff does not present any evidence actually demonstrating that each individual onboarding document was difficult for her to review.

Plaintiff also argues that the Agreement “features an innocuous, misleading title (‘Resolving Differences and Misunderstandings’), and, assuming that the figure at bottom left of the document is to be believed, appears at page 39 of a larger document, rather than as a standalone document…In short, the purported arbitration agreement appears to have been buried at the conclusion of nearly forty (40) pages of onboarding documentation and under a heading that appears designed specifically to throw off even the most diligent of employees reviewing it.” (Opp’n at p. 7:5-10, internal emphasis omitted.) On the bottom left-hand corner of the Agreement is the number “39.” (Ambriz Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Defendants assert that Absolute Bonding was not required to specially highlight the Agreement for Plaintiff. Defendants cite to Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 914, where the California Supreme Court noted that “Valencia was under no obligation to highlight the arbitration clause of its contract, nor was it required to specifically call that clause to Sanchez’s attention.” Defendants also note that “[r]easonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it. A party cannot use his own lack of diligence to avoid an arbitration agreement.” (Rowland v. PaineWebber Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 279, 286.)

Plaintiff also asserts that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. “Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” (Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 85 [internal quotation and citation omitted].)

Plaintiff asserts that the Agreement lacks mutuality. Plaintiff cites to Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 118, where the California Supreme Court noted that “[t]he employer cites a number of cases that have held that a lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement does not render the contract illusory as long as the employer agrees to be bound by the arbitration of employment disputes. We agree that such lack of mutuality does not render the contract illusory, i.e., lacking in mutual consideration. We conclude, rather, that in the context of an arbitration agreement imposed by the employer on the employee, such a one-sided term is unconscionable. Although parties are free to contract for asymmetrical remedies and arbitration clauses of varying scope, Stirlen and Kinney are correct that the doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent to which a stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the arbitration forum on the weaker party without accepting that forum for itself.” (Internal citations omitted.)

Plaintiff asserts that here, the Agreement makes clear that only the employee is required to arbitrate his or her claims against the employer. Plaintiff points to a provision of the Agreement providing that “[i]f this procedure does not resolve the problem and you still have a dispute with the Company regarding termination, discrimination, or harassment, you and the Company agree to submit that dispute to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the employment rules of the American Arbitration Association, instead of any court action. (Ambriz Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also notes that the Agreement provides that “[s]hould either party pursue any other legal or administrative action against the other regarding any matter included within this binding arbitration clause (except an action to enjoin the taking or disclosure of the Company’s trade secrets or proprietary information before an arbitration can be held), the responding party shall be entitled to recover its costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees incurred as a result of such action.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff asserts that the carve-out for actions to “enjoin the taking or disclosure of the Company’s trade secrets or proprietary information before an arbitration can be held” demonstrates that the arbitration clause is “one-sided.”

Defendants counter that the Agreement is mutual because it requires both sides to submit employment-related claims to arbitration. Defendants note that the Agreement provides that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating to employee’s employment and/or the terms of this agreement…shall be resolved by an arbitrator of the American Arbitration Association.” (Ambriz Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff asserts that “the pre-arbitration dispute resolution process laid out in the agreement also facially applies solely to the employee, giving the employer yet another advantage against the employee.” (Opp’n at p. 8:11-13.) The Agreement provides, inter alia, as follows:

“Occasionally problems arise in any workplace. To assist employees in resolving such issues and to promote a good working environment for all of us, the Company has the

2. If your immediate supervisor does not resolve the issue to your satisfaction or if

you do not feel comfortable about discussing it with your immediate supervisor, you

3. If the matter is still not resolved to your satisfaction, you may discuss the

problem with each level of management, including a meeting in person with the president

4. If this procedure does not resolve the problem and you still have a dispute with

Company agree to submit that dispute to final and binding arbitration in accordance with

the employment rules of the American Arbitration Association, instead of any court action.” (Ambriz Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff asserts that “[b]y the time the employee has completed all the required pre-arbitration steps, she will have effectively provided the company with a comprehensive summary of her case, thereby granting the company an advantage in any ensuing arbitration process—should the employee manage to even get that far.” (Opp’n at p. 9:4-7.) Plaintiff cites to ¿Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1282-1283¿, where the Court of Appeal found that “¿[t]he employment agreement—in addition to compelling plaintiff to arbitrate all of his disputes with defendant—requires him to submit to discussions with his supervisors in advance of, and as a condition precedent to, having his dispute resolved through binding arbitration. While on its face, this provision may present a laudable mechanism for resolving employment disputes informally, it connotes a less benign goal. Given the unilateral nature of the¿arbitration agreement, requiring plaintiff to submit to an employer-controlled dispute resolution mechanism (i.e., one without a neutral mediator) suggests that defendant would receive a ‘free peek’ at plaintiff’s case, thereby obtaining an advantage if and when plaintiff were to later demand arbitration.”¿

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s reliance on Nyulassy is misplaced. Defendants cite to Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 710, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[r]elying on language in Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, Serpa contends the agreement to arbitrate ‘requires’ her to submit her dispute informally to the company before seeking arbitration and thus unfairly gives the CSI parties a ‘free peek’ at her case. The agreement states that if the dispute ‘cannot be resolved through informal internal efforts, I will submit’ the claim to binding arbitration. ‘Informal internal efforts’ are not defined in the agreement or the handbook, and there is no reasonable basis to infer the agreement requires anything other than some informal notice of a grievance before proceeding to arbitration. This case is thus far different from the provisions in Nyulassy, which the court found unacceptable primarily because it was yet another employer-based mechanism in an agreement permeated by unilateral provisions favoring the employer. Moreover, to the extent the cited language is anything other than precatory, a requirement that internal grievance procedures be exhausted before proceeding to arbitration is both reasonable and laudable in an agreement containing a mutual obligation to arbitrate. It plainly does not ‘shock the conscience’ so as to vitiate the arbitration agreement.” (Internal citations here.)

Defendants assert that here, both Defendants and Plaintiff are required to arbitrate disputes, so the Agreement is not unilateral. Defendants also note that the provision in Nyulassy requiring Plaintiff “to submit to discussions with his supervisors in advance of, and as a condition precedent to, having his dispute resolved through binding arbitration,” was only one of three aspects of the arbitration agreement at issue that the Court found when “taken together,” rendered the agreement “substantively unconscionable.” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1282-1283.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has met her burden of demonstrating that the subject Agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability.

Defendants assert that the Court should compel “Plaintiff to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims, and dismiss the nonindividual PAGA claims in this action.” (Mot. at p. 1:8-9.) Plaintiff counters that “should the Court be inclined to compel arbitration as to her individual claims, Ms. Chavez respectfully requests that the Court decline to dismiss the non-individual PAGA claims and permit her to proceed forthwith with prosecution of those claims.” (Opp’n at p. 2:17-19.)

In ¿Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, 1916¿, cited by the parties here, the United States Supreme Court found that “¿[i]n the first sense, PAGA actions are ‘representative’ in that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State. But PAGA claims are also called ‘representative’ when¿they are predicated on code violations sustained by other employees. In the first sense, ‘every¿PAGA action is . . . representative’ and ‘[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action,”¿¿¿Kim, 9 Cal. 5th, at 87, 459 P. 3d, at 1131¿(quoting¿Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 387, 327 P. 3d, at 151)¿, because every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity.¿But when the word ‘representative’ is used in the second way, it makes sense to distinguish ‘individual’ PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff, from ‘representative’ (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees. For purposes of this opinion, we will use ‘individual PAGA claim’ to refer to claims based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff.”

Defendants assert that here, “[a]fter Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims are compelled to arbitration, Viking River requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims, because Plaintiff cannot reserve standing to be a representative while her individual claims are resolved in arbitration.” (Mot. at p. 14:18-20.) The Viking River Court found that “¿the FAA preempts the rule of¿Iskanian¿insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.¿This holding compels reversal in this case. The agreement between¿Viking¿and Moriana purported to waive ‘representative’ PAGA claims.¿Under¿Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect¿of¿Iskanian¿is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any ‘portion’ of the waiver that remains valid must still¿be ‘enforced in arbitration.’ Based on this clause, Viking¿was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim. The lower courts refused to do so based on the rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-individual claims. Under our holding, that rule is preempted, so¿Viking¿is entitled to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim.¿” (¿Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 1924-1925¿.) The Viking River Cruises Court further held that “¿[a]s we see it, PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate nonindividual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding...As a result, Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct course is to dismiss her remaining claims.¿” (¿Id. at p. 1925¿.)

In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that “[i]t is clear that the question of whether Ms. Chavez retains standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims in the event that her individual claims are compelled to arbitration is a wholly state-law issue.” (Opp’n at p. 3:3-5.) Plaintiff notes that the concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor in Viking River Cruises provides, “¿[t]he Court concludes that the FAA poses no bar to the adjudication of respondent Angie¿Moriana’s non-individual PAGA claims, but that PAGA itself provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding…Thus, the Court reasons, based on available guidance from California courts, that¿Moriana¿lacks statutory standing under PAGA to litigate her non-individual claims separately in state court.¿Of course, if this Court’s understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the last word.¿” (¿Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1925 [internal quotations and citations omitted]¿.)

Plaintiff asserts that “[s]ince Viking River…multiple California courts have ruled that an aggrieved employee does not lose standing to pursue PAGA claims on behalf of other aggrieved employees simply because her own PAGA claims are compelled to arbitration.” (Opp’n at p. 4:14-16.) Plaintiff cites to the recent case of Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 644, where the Court of Appeal concluded, inter alia, that “the PAGA claims seeking to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by employees other than plaintiff may be pursued by plaintiff in court. Thus, we disagree with the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion that California law requires the dismissal of those claims. More specifically, we conclude plaintiff is an aggrieved employee with PAGA standing and the general rule against splitting a cause of action does not apply to the two types of PAGA claims.” (Emphasis in original.)
The Galarsa Court noted that “[i]n Viking River, after the United States Supreme Court concluded the employer was entitled to compel arbitration of the Type A claims, it addressed ‘what the lower courts should have done with Moriana's non-individual claims’ —that is, her Type O claims. The court referred to PAGA’s standing requirement, cited subdivisions (a) and (c) of section 2699, and stated: ‘When an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit…As a result, Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to maintain her [Type O] claims in court, and the correct course is to dismiss [those] claims.’ Initially, we note that a federal court’s interpretation of California law is not binding.” (Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 652 [internal citations omitted].)[1]

The Galarsa Court further “conclude[d] plaintiff satisfied the two requirements for PAGA standing because she was employed by Dollar General and was subjected to at least one of the Labor Code violations initially alleged in her pleading. Stated another way, a plaintiff’s PAGA standing does not evaporate when an employer chooses to enforce an arbitration agreement. This interpretation of the term ‘aggrieved employee’ is consistent with, rather than contrary to, PAGA’s remedial purpose, which PAGA achieves by deputizing employees to pursue civil penalties on the state’s behalf. Revoking an employee’s standing as to Type O claims would severely curtail[] PAGA’s availability to police Labor Code violations.”
(Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 653 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) The Galarsa Court then “consider[ed] whether California’s rule against splitting a cause of action bars plaintiff from pursuing the Type O claims in court once the Type A claims are sent to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 653.) The Court noted that “[w]e predict that the California Supreme Court will conclude that California law does not prohibit an aggrieved employee from pursuing Type O claims in court once the Type O claims are separated from the Type A claims ordered to arbitration. The reason for this prediction is simple—it is the interpretation of PAGA that best effectuates the statute’s purpose, which is ‘to ensure effective code enforcement.’” (Id. at p. 654.)

In addition, in the recent, post-Viking River opinion of Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1285, the Court of Appeal concluded that “[d]espite the deep deference we afford the United States Supreme Court, even on purely state law questions where the United States Supreme Court’s opinions are only persuasive, not binding, we conclude we must follow Kim and hold that plaintiffs retain standing to pursue representative PAGA claims in court even if their individual PAGA claims are compelled to arbitration. We simply cannot reconcile the Viking decision’s standing analysis with the Kim decision.” In Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 80¿, the California Supreme Court considered whether “employees lose standing to pursue a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA;¿¿¿Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.¿)¿if they settle and dismiss their individual claims for Labor Code violations.”¿ The Kim Court concluded that “¿¿the answer is no.¿Settlement of individual claims does not strip an aggrieved employee of standing, as the state’s authorized representative, to pursue PAGA remedies.¿” (Ibid.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims against Defendants.

In the reply, Defendants assert that “[i]n the event the Court is not inclined to dismiss Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim, the case should be stayed pending arbitration of the individual PAGA claim.” (Reply at p. 4:25-5:1.) The Court agrees that a stay is warranted, particularly to avoid inconsistent rulings. Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ request to stay Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is granted as to Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims. Defendants’ motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims.

The action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims.

The Court sets an arbitration completion status conference on May 6, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. The parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the arbitration five court days prior to the status conference, with a courtesy copy delivered directly to Department 50.

[1]In Galarsa, the Court indicated that “‘Type A’ is used for a claim seeking to recover a civil penalty imposed because of a Labor Code violation suffered by the plaintiff,” and that “‘Type O’ is used for a claim seeking to recover a civil penalty imposed because of a Labor Code violation suffered by an employee other than the plaintiff.” (Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 648-649.)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50