Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV06291, Date: 2022-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV06291    Hearing Date: August 3, 2022    Dept: 50

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

            This case was filed on February 22, 2022, and from that date it has been assigned to Judge Teresa Beaudet for all purposes.  On June 29, 2022, the Court made a  written disclosure, which indicated in pertinent part:

Judge Beaudet hereby discloses that approximately 22 years ago, she and her husband purchased a pickup truck for her husband’s use that he recalls was either a Dodge or Chrysler pickup; Judge Beaudet does not remember the maker of the pickup. The pickup developed electrical problems. Judge Beaudet's husband took the pickup to the dealer many times for the same electrical problem. The pickup was tested with some device while it was operating, and eventually, the manufacturer and the dealer agreed to take the pickup back and refund the purchase price. No litigation was involved. Judge Beaudet doesn’t believe that her experience will cause her to be biased for or against either party: However , if you believe differently, you will have until Monday, August 1, 2022, by noon to file and serve a verified statement of disqualification per section CCP 170.J(c)(l) (the "Statement"). If you do not file and serve a Statement, grounds for recusal will be deemed waived. Tl¢ Case Management Conference will be continued to Wednesday, August 3, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 50 unless both parties waive the right to file the Statement. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Disclosure to any new parties who are added to the case and to file proof of service of same promptly after service, with a courtesy copy delivered to Department 50. Any new party has 14 calendar days from the date of service to file and serve the Statement per sect n CCP 170.3.

            The disclosure was made out of an abundance of caution because ethical considerations require the disclosure of any information reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification, even when no actual basis for disqualification exists.  (California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3 E(2)(a).)

            Within the time permitted, counsel for Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. faxed to the Department a pleading as a statement of disqualification for cause, contending that the assigned judge is biased.  The statement was not served on the undersigned in the manner prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure 170.3(c).  However, the Court became aware of it on August 2, 2022, and treated it as served that day. 

            The Court finds  that the pleading on its face sets forth no legal grounds for disqualification.  It is stricken pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subdivision (b

            A party's belief as to a judge's bias and prejudice is irrelevant and not controlling in a motion to disqualify for cause, as the test applied is an objective one. (Leland Stanford Junior University v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 403, 408; United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 104 ["the litigants' necessarily partisan views [do] not provide the applicable frame of reference."] [Brackets in original.])

            Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3,(c)(1) requires that the disqualification statement set forth "the facts constituting the grounds" for disqualification of the judge.  Mere conclusions of the pleader are insufficient.  (In re Morelli (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 819, 843 [overruled on other grounds]; Urias v. Harris Farms, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 415, 426.) The statement of disqualification cannot be based upon information and belief, hearsay, or other inadmissible evidence.  (See United Farm Workers of America, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 106, n. 6 [disqualification cannot be based upon hearsay or other inadmissible evidence]; cf., Anastos v. Lee (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1319 [declarations in support of a Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5 motion must include proper foundation, i.e., personal knowledge.])

            As a general rule, it is not grounds for disqualification that the judge is or is not a member of a class or group and the proceeding involves the rights of such a group.  (Code of Civil Procedure 170.2(a); 75 A.L.R.3d 1021 (Originally published in 1977) (membership in fraternal or social club or order.); Charles Malarkey, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation Cause in California? (1990) 41 Hastings L.J. 695 (Is Sexual Orientation Cause in California).

            This nondisqualifying membership rule is broadly construed by the appellate courts.

(See People v. Superior Court (Mudge) (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 407.)  In the Mudge case, the California State Judges Association filed a brief amicus curiae in the case.  The justices deciding the matter had to first determine if their membership in that Association disqualified them from presiding at the case.  The court found that Code Civ. Proc., § 170.2,(a) specifically prohibited such membership from being a grounds for disqualification:

            "Before proceeding to the merits of the writ petition, we must disclose that the members of this court belong to the California Judge's Association which has filed an amicus brief in support of the trial court's ruling.  Our membership in this organization does not disqualify us from acting here.  Section 170.2, subdivision (a) provides: 'It shall not be grounds for disqualification that the judge [or justice]: [¶] (a) Is or is not a member of a racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, or similar group and the proceeding involves the rights of such a group.

(Id. at 410.)

            In People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344 (“Chatman” the court found that the fact that the judge’s family was a victim of robbery did not disqualify the judge from presiding at a robbery trial.  “Judges, like all human beings, have widely varying experiences and backgrounds. Except perhaps in extreme circumstances, those not directly related to the case or the parties do not disqualify them. In [the Chatman] case, the judge stated unequivocally that he made no connection between the earlier robbery and the present case.” The same is true in this case.

            A judge may not shirk from her judicial responsibilities merely for the sake of accommodating the parties' wishes or to avoid any possible controversy.  A judge has a duty to preside at all cases assigned to the judge in which the judge is not disqualified.

            Code Civ. Proc., § 170, which introduces the disqualification statutes, expresses the proposition that “'[a] judge has a duty to decide any proceeding in which he or she is not disqualified.'  The legislative history shows this section was prompted by statements suggesting that certain judges did not believe they had such a duty. [Cit. omit.] Thus, the section serves to remind judges of their duty to hear cases which are controversial and might subject them to public disapproval as well as to protect them from public criticism by a clear statement of their responsibility.”   (United Farm Workers of America, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 103 [brackets in original.].)

            As stated in United Farm Workers of America, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 100, “the proper performance of judicial duties does not require a judge to withdraw from society and live an ascetic, antiseptic, and socially sterile life.  Judicial responsibility does not require shrinking every time an advocate asserts the objective and fair judge appears to be biased.  The duty of a judge to sit where not disqualified is equally as strong as the duty not to sit when disqualified.”  (Emphasis in original.)  (Accord Leland Stanford Junior University, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 408.)

Conclusion

            Since the statement of disqualification on its face discloses no legal grounds for disqualification, it is ordered stricken pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subdivision (b).    The parties are reminded that this determination of the question of the disqualification is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision.  (Code of Civil Procedure 170.3(d).)  In the event that a timely writ is sought and an appellate court determines that an answer should have been timely filed, such an answer is filed herewith.  (See PBA, LLC v. KPOD, Ltd. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 965, 972; accord, Fine v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 651, 658, n. 3.).

            GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THEREFOR, it is so ordered.

Date: August 3, 2022                          ____________________________

                                                            Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Verified Answer of Teresa A. Beaudet

            I, Teresa A. Beaudet, declare:

            1.         I am a Judge of the Superior Court and as such have been assigned to preside over this case.

            2.         I am not prejudiced or biased against or in favor of any party to this proceeding or their counsel.

            3.         All rulings made by me in this action have been based upon facts and arguments officially presented to me and upon my understanding of the law.  My statements and rulings are set forth in the records and the files herein, which are the best evidence thereof.  To the extent the moving party's statement of those rulings and statements are inconsistent therewith, they are denied.

            4.         All statements made by me and all actions taken by me in this proceeding have been done in furtherance of what I believe were my judicial duties.

            5.         I know of no facts or circumstances which would require my disqualification or recusal in this case.         

            I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be on my information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.  Executed this 3rd day of  August, 2022, at Los Angeles, California.

                                                                        __________________________________

                                                                        Teresa A. Beaudet