Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV07568, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV07568    Hearing Date: February 15, 2024    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff Brian Warner p/k/a Marilyn Manson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Evan Rachel Wood and Ashley Gore a/k/a Illma Gore (“Gore”) (jointly, “Defendants”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) defamation per se, (3) violation of the Comprehensive Computer Data and Access Fraud Act (Penal Code Section 502(c), (e)(1)), and (4) Impersonation over the Internet (Penal Code Section 528.5(a), (e)).  

Gore moved to strike Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and on May 9, 2023, the Court issued an order granting the motion in part. The Court’s May 9, 2023 Order provides, inter alia, that “Defendants are the prevailing parties on their respective motions, so they may file noticed motions pursuant to statutory requirements.” (May 9, 2023 Order at p. 33:14-16.)

Gore now moves “for a mandatory award of her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $204,483.25...” Plaintiff opposes.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court denies Gore’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1-3.

Discussion

The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs” (Code Civ. Proc.,     § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “[A]ny SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” ((Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) An award of fees may also include “the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.” (Id. at p. 1141.) “It is well established that the amount of an attorney fee award under the anti-SLAPP statute is computed by the trial court in accordance with the familiar lodestar method.” ((569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 432 [internal quotations and brackets omitted].) Under the lodestar method, the court tabulates the attorney fee lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.)

With regard to the number of hours reasonably expended, “the verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” ((Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) In determining the reasonable hourly rate, the “burden is on the successful party to prove the appropriate market rate to be used in calculating the lodestar.” ((MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Gorman (2006) 147 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 13.) The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. ((Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.)

Gore seeks an award of “attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $204,483.25, representing an estimated total of 380.1 hours of legal services at Hanson Bridgett LLP’s standard hourly rates, and $2,512.25 in costs.” (Notice of Motion at p. 1:7-9.) Gore states that “[t]his amount also includes an estimated total of $38,896 for 80.3 hours of legal services related to this fee motion at Hanson Bridgett LLP’s standard hourly rates.” (Id. at p. 1:9-11.)

In the motion, Gore states that “Ms. Ziemianek worked primarily with two other attorneys in connection with Ms. Gore’s anti-SLAPP motion: Warren A. Jackson and G. Thomas Rivera III.” (Mot. at pp. 11:26-12:1.) In her supporting declaration, Gore’s counsel, Margaret Ziemianek, states that “[m]y standard billing rate for the 2022 calendar year was $700 per hour, which increased to $755 per hour effective as of January 1, 2023…Mr. Jackson’s standard billing rate was $640 per hour. Mr. Rivera’s standard billing rate for the 2022 calendar year was $385 per hour, which increased to $435 per hour effective as of January 1, 2023. Hanson Bridgett’s services to Ms. Gore were billed at these rates for services provided through March 31, 2022.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 7.) Ms. Ziemianek further states that “[s]ervices provided between April 1, 2022 and December 31, 2022 were billed at a 15 percent discount, as follows: (a) $595 per hour for my services; (b) $544 per hour for Mr. Jackson’s services; (c) $336.17 for Mr. Rivera’s services. Services provided from January 1, 2023 through the present were billed at a 15 percent discount, as follows: (a) $641.75 per hour for my services; (b) $369.75 for Mr. Rivera’s services.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8.) Gore’s counsel also sets forth each attorney’s background and experience. (Ziemianek Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

Ms. Ziemianek further states in her supporting declaration that “[i]n setting its standard hourly rates, I am informed and believe that Hanson Bridgett staff reviews several market reports from Thomson Reuters on a monthly basis, including from a subscription services known as Peer Monitor. These reports provide hourly rates for law firms of comparable size and stature to Hanson Bridgett. Based on my review of these reports, Hanson Bridgett’s 2022-2023 standard hourly rates for the attorneys staffed on this matter fell at or below the mean hourly rates for comparable firms. Specifically, the Peer Monitor report for the Los Angeles area, for the 2022-2023 time period, reflects a mean hourly rate for 3rd year associates (such as Mr. Rivera) of $519 per hour, and a mean hourly rate for partners with 17-20 years of experience of $915 per hour.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 6.)

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not appear to dispute Gore’s counsels’ requested hourly rates.

Next, Gore asserts that her requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable. Gore’s counsel states that “[m]y team and I spent a total of 108.2 hours, representing $62,512.50 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $53,135.63 in fees at our discounted rates on review and analysis of the complaint for anti-SLAPP purposes, research, factual investigation concerning the claims at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion, and preparation of the moving papers…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $49,407 in fees (representing 88 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for these categories of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 18, emphasis omitted.)

In addition, Gore’s counsel states that “Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 27 hours related to opposing Plaintiff’s ex parte motion and motion to lift the discovery stay (including attendance at the ex parte hearing and discovery hearing), representing $17,062.50 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $14,503.13 in fees at our discounted rates…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $16,255 in fees (representing 25.3 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for this category of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 23, emphasis omitted.)  

Gore’s counsel states that “Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 34.1 hours representing $17,790 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $15,121.93 at our discounted rates for services related to the permitted discovery, including legal research that was ultimately utilized in preparing portions of the reply brief…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $16,250 in fees (representing 30.1 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for this category of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 27, emphasis omitted.)

Gore’s counsel further states that “Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 134.4 hours representing $68,648.50 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $58,351.23 at our discounted rates for preparing and filing Ms. Gore’s anti-SLAPP Reply brief, evidentiary objections and responses, RJN reply, declarations, supplemental RJN, Ms. Gore’s motion to seal, and the meet and confer efforts regarding the evidentiary disputes…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $68,648.50 in fees (representing 134.4 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for these categories of work.”  (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 35, emphasis omitted.)

In addition, Gore’s counsel states that “Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 11.7 hours representing $6,081.50 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $5,169.23 at our discounted rates for opposing Plaintiff’s post-briefing ex parte motion…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $5,429 in fees (representing 10.2 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for this category of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 38, emphasis omitted.)

Gore’s counsel states that “Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 11.8 hours representing $7,085 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $6,022.25 at our discounted rates for preparing for and appearing at the May 9 anti-SLAPP hearing…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $7,085 in fees (representing 11.8 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for this category of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 41, emphasis omitted.)  

In addition, Gore’s counsel states that “[t]o date, Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 79 hours representing $37,267 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $31,676.95 at our discounted rates for preparing the instant fee motion and supporting evidence. I estimate that Hanson Bridgett will incur at least 10 hours of attorney time including 4 hours of my time and 6 hours of Mr. Rivera’s time to review any opposition brief, prepare a reply, and attend any hearing that occurs…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $38,896 in fees (representing an estimated total of 80.3 hours in services at the standard hourly rates, including the anticipated 10 hours for any further work related to this fee motion)…for these categories of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 44, emphasis omitted, emphasis omitted.) 

Gore’s counsel also states that “Hanson Bridgett has…incurred $2,512.25 in costs that are directly related to Ms. Gore’s anti-SLAPP motion and related litigation expenses…” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12.)

Gore asserts that here, “[t]he total hours expended on the anti-SLAPP motion and related tasks is very reasonable given the complexity of the work and the number of tasks necessitated by Plaintiff’s counsel’s litigation strategy.” (See Mot. at pp. 14:24-17:1.)

In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that “Gore seeks reimbursement for excessive, duplicative, inefficient, and block-billed work that is vaguely described and obscured by copious redactions.” (Opp’n at p. 5:9-10.)

In her supporting declaration, Gore’s counsel states that “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit B are excerpts of Hanson Bridgett’s final bills…reflecting time worked and expenses billed in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion and the present fee motion…The bills were redacted to remove privileged information, entries for which no reimbursement is sought, and time totals.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff asserts that “[r]edactions to 75 time entries…make it impossible to determine how much time was spent on any particular task and whether the time was reasonable.” (Opp’n at p. 5:11-13, citing Trugman Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff further asserts that “[i]n many instances, counsel redacted tasks within a block-billed entry but never adjusted the total time….For example, one entry states, ‘Strategy call with L. Cirelli, [redaction], discuss research with T. Rivera.’ (MAZ 4/11.)…One task is redacted, but Gore seeks compensation for the entire amount.” (Opp’n at p. 5:21-24, see Trugman Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Plaintiff also notes that “[o]ne entry for 2.8 hours states, ‘Revise briefs,’ followed by four lines of redactions. (MAZ 5/18.) Another, for 2.7 hours, says, ‘Call with client,’ followed by two lines of redactions. (GTR 10/12.).” (Opp’n at pp. 5:25-6:1, see Trugman Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

In addition, Plaintiff argues that “Counsel also removed information necessary to determine whether the task even related to the motion…For example, two of the earliest entries state, ‘Review summary [redaction] allegations [redaction]’ and ‘review Manson’s Complaint to determine [redaction].’ (GTR 4/19.) Another, for 4.8 hours, states, ‘Review [redaction] allegations; [redaction] identify factual issues and questions to resolve [redaction].’ (GTR 5/12.) And counsel redacted people with whom they communicated...” (Opp’n at p. 6:4-9; see Trugman Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff argues that “[b]ecause Gore’s redactions make it impossible to determine the nature of the work performed, she has not carried her burden to establish entitlement to fees for that 97.6 hours of work.” (Opp’n at p. 6:13-15; emphasis omitted.)

In the reply, Gore asserts, inter alia, that “Counsel’s declaration alone is sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden to establish entitlement to attorney’s fees…Here, Gore provides both the billing entries and a declaration.” (Reply at p. 3:14-16, emphasis omitted.) Gore cites to Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 487-488, where the Court of Appeal noted that “Plaintiff similarly contends that defendants failed to meet their burden of proof to document the hours expended because they submitted declarations of counsel as to the time they spent on various tasks and did not even supply time records to [support] their … after-the-fact time estimates. A defendant, however, can carry its burden of establishing its entitlement to attorney fees by submitting a declaration from counsel instead of billing records or invoices.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Here, Gore’s counsel’s declaration under penalty of perjury provides a summary of the amount of fees sought in connection with specified categories of work. (See., e.g, Ziemianek Decl., ¶¶ 18, 23, 27, 35, 38, 41, 44.)

            Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration in support of the opposition also states that “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit B is a set of annotated excerpts from Ziemianek Exhibit B in which I have identified time entries that contain block-billing, i.e., multiple tasks grouped into the same time entry. The 116 entries in Exhibit B add up to 233.3 hours…” (Trugman Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]hese 116 entries (233.3 hours) (Trugman Ex. B) do not ‘allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.’…A reduction of at least 20% is appropriate.” (Opp’n at p. 7:1-9.) But Plaintiff does not appear to point to any tasks in such time entries that he asserts are not compensable. In Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010, cited by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal noted that “[t]rial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.” Gore also asserts that “the entries provide great detail regarding the work performed, much of which cannot be easily separated. For example, analysis of the complaint and related legal research is regularly intertwined...” (Reply at p. 4:9-11.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to reduce from the total amount of fees requested the fees for all of the partially redacted time entries and purported block-billed time entries.

Plaintiff also asserts that Gore billed for time not related to the anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff states that “[f]or example, Mr. Jackson billed time for work on ‘other responsive pleadings’ (5/10 (0.4)), for ‘research . . . including computer data and access fraud and impersonation over internet claims,’ which were not challenged (5/17 (2.5)), and to ‘revise and edit draft answer to complaint’ (5/23 (4.2)); and Ms. Ziemianek ‘review[ed] objections to subpoena, revise same’ (11/28 (0.2)), when there were no subpoenas in this case.” (Opp’n at p. 7:13-17; see Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. B.) Gore does not appear to respond to or dispute this point in the reply. Based on the foregoing, at Mr. Jackson’s rate of $544/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $3,862.40 from the total amount of fees requested. (7.1 x $544/hour). In addition, at Ms. Ziemianek’s rate of $595/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $119.00 from the total amount requested. (0.2 x $595/hour).

Plaintiff also asserts that certain hours were inflated.

First, Plaintiff asserts that “Counsel claims spending more than 88 hours on Gore’s twelve-page anti-SLAPP motion, which—despite assertions of ‘complexity’ and ‘nuanc[e]’ (Ziemianek Decl., ¶¶ 11, 15)—contained barely seven pages of legal argument. The time entries reflect ‘inefficient or duplicative efforts’ of experienced counsel ‘not subject to compensation.’” (Opp’n at p. 8:11-14.) The Court agrees that the requested 88 hours sought in connection with “review and analysis of the complaint for anti-SLAPP purposes, research, factual investigation concerning the claims at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion, and preparation of the moving papers” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 18) is excessive. The Court thus reduces the $49,407 in fees (representing 88 hours in services) by 20%, or $9,881.40. 

Second, Plaintiff asserts that “three lawyers spent up to 8.1 hours reviewing Wood’s motion, without further explanation. (See, e.g., WAJ 4/28 (1.7), 5/3 (2.5), 5/4 (2.8); MAZ 4/29 (0.2); GTR 5/3 (0.9).).” (Opp’n at p. 8:22-23.) The Court does not find that these time entries are unreasonable.

Third, Plaintiff asserts that “multiple attorneys spent time watching Wood’s film, Phoenix Rising (which the Court correctly found to be inadmissible). (See, e.g., WAJ 5/3 (0.5), GTR 5/8 (0.2).) Counsel wrote off some of this time but should have written off the rest. (See Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12 n.1.).” (Opp’n at p. 8:24-26.) The Court does not find that the time spent on the foregoing matters is unreasonable.  

Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that “three attorneys billed 4.7 hours to preparing a declaration of Gore. (See, e.g., GTR 5/13 (0.5), MAZ 5/13 (0.4), 5/13 WAJ (2.8), MAZ 5/16 (0.2), MAZ 5/17 (1.0)). No declaration was filed so the work is a mystery.” (Opp’n at pp. 8:27-9:1.) The Court notes that the first two May 13, 2022 time entries of “GTR” and “MAZ” do not specify that a declaration of “Gore” was prepared. (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. B.) As to the remaining entries, Gore does not respond to Plaintiff’s point that a declaration of Gore was not filed in connection with Gore’s motion. Thus, at Mr. Jackson’s rate of $544/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $1,523.20 from the total amount of fees requested. (2.8 x $544/hour). In addition, at Ms. Ziemianek’s rate of $595/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $714.00 from the total amount requested. (1.2 x $595/hour).  

Fifth, Plaintiff asserts that “block-billed entries on three days from Mr. Jackson reflect up to 9.5 hours dedicated to ‘begin preparation of strategy’ (e.g., WAJ 5/3, 5/4, 5/5), a month after Ms. Ziemianek’s analysis of the Complaint (Ziemianek Decl., ¶¶ 13-14, 18 n.2) and team discussion of ‘strategy re potential anti-SLAPP motion’ (e.g., MAZ 4/8, WAJ 4/8). Mr. Jackson then spent time on two more days to ‘prepare strategy.’ (WAJ 5/6, 5/9.).” (Opp’n at p. 9:4-8.) The Court does not find that the foregoing time entries are inefficient or duplicative, as Plaintiff asserts. In addition, most of the above-referenced time entries do not solely include work pertaining to “strategy.” 

Sixth, Plaintiff asserts that “multiple vague time entries from Mr. Jackson state that he did ‘[l]egal and fact research.’ (WAJ 5/4 (2.8), 5/5 (4.2), 5/11 (3.8), 5/11 (2.2); see also WAJ 5/17 (2.5) (‘[l]egal research’ and ‘[f]act research’ in same entry), 5/19 (3.0) (same)). Even more entries from Mr. Jackson—an attorney with 20 years of experience who charges partner-level rates—reflect ‘legal research,’ even though Mr. Rivera—a third-year associate—was also doing legal research. (E.g., WAJ 5/2 (2.5), 5/12 (3.0), 5/13 (2.8), 5/16 (1.0), 5/18 (2.0), 5/23 (4.2), 5/24 (2.1).) These vague, duplicative entries are not compensable.” (Opp’n at p. 9:11-17.)

Gore counters that “Plaintiff ignores Ms. Ziemianek’s explanation of how research tasks were divided, undermining the argument that these entries are duplicative and, therefore, unreasonable...” (Reply at p. 6:15-18.) In her supporting declaration, Ms. Ziemianek states that “[i]n order to minimize duplication of efforts and inefficiency, I divided up investigation and research tasks between Mr. Jackson and Mr. Rivera and checked in regularly regarding the progress of their efforts.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 14.) In addition, the above-referenced time entries do not solely include work pertaining to research, and the court does not find that they are vague. The Court also notes that there does not appear to be a time entry from May 11, 2022 for 3.8 hours, and the court is unable to locate the entry referenced as “WAJ 5/2 (2.5).” The Court thus declines to deduct the foregoing time entries.

Seventh, Plaintiff argues that “multiple attorneys spent up to 10.4 hours preparing a 2.5 page request for judicial notice (e.g., GTR 5/19 (1.2), 5/20 (0.3), 5/23 (0.8); WAJ 5/23 (4.2), 5/24 (1.8), 5/24 (2.1)) that was dedicated principally to the introduction of hearsay, such as the contents of websites and magazine articles, objections to which the court sustained. See Order, filed 5/9/23, at 2.” (Opp’n at p. 9:20-23.) The Court does not find that the foregoing time entries are unreasonable. The Court also notes that the foregoing time entries do not all solely pertain to Gore’s request for judicial notice.  

Eighth, Plaintiff asserts that “three attorneys spent 3.7 hours on the same day working on a one-page joinder and three-paragraph declaration in support. (GTR 7/21 (0.5), MAZ 7/21 (1.7), WAJ 7/21 (1.5).) Second, Mr. Rivera spent 1.7 hours ‘[a]nalyz[ing] California law regarding elements for defamation and [IIED]’ on the day of the motion hearing (GTR 9/27), even though he already did the same research before, as reflected in Gore’s filed papers. (See, e.g., GTR 4/20 ‘[a]nalyze . . . specific causes of action and necessary legal elements’)…” (Opp’n at pp. 9:27-10:5.) The Court does not find that the foregoing hours are unreasonable and declines to deduct such time. 

Ninth, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he 30.1 hours spent preparing for and defending a three-hour deposition on two ‘narrow topics’ should be reduced.” (Opp’n at p. 10:7-8.) But paragraph 27 of Ms. Ziemianek’s declaration, cited by Plaintiff, states that “the hours related to preparation of a protective order, preparation for legal and factual issues anticipated at the deposition, preparation of Ms. Gore for deposition, and defense of Ms. Gore’s deposition are as follows: Ms. Ziemianek, 14.8 hours, $8,806 (discounted)/$10,360 (standard); Mr. Rivera, 15.3 hours, $5,006.93 (discounted)/$5,890.50 (standard).” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 27.) The Court does not find that these amounts are unreasonable.

Plaintiff also argues that “all time related to Gore’s deposition should be deducted because she would have been deposed ‘whether or not [Gore] filed the motion to strike.’” (Opp’n at p. 10:13-15, emphasis omitted.) Gore asserts that this is incorrect, as “[t]he deposition was specifically limited to two narrow topics directly at issue in the defamation per se claim that was stricken in its entirety by the Court on the anti-SLAPP motion.” (Reply at p. 7:11-13.) Indeed, the Court’s September 27, 2022 Order in this case provides, inter alia, that “Plaintiff’s motion to conduct limited discovery pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (g) is granted in part and denied in part. The Court finds that Plaintiff has established good cause to conduct only the requested discovery set forth on page 4 of ‘Appendix A’ to Plaintiff’s motion concerning the claim issues of ‘state of mind/intent’ and ‘actual malice.’ The deposition of Ms. Gore will take place on or before 10/27/22…” (September 27, 2022 Order at p. 13.) The Court’s May 9, 2023 Order on Gore’s special motion to strike provides, inter alia, that “the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his cause of action for defamation per se against Gore.” (May 9, 2023 Order at p. 30:22-23.) The Court does not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated that all time related to Gore’s deposition should be deducted.

Plaintiff also argues that “no fees should be awarded for 2.3 hours spent in connection with the form stipulated protective order governing discovery (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 25; MAZ 9/29 (0.3), 10/6 (0.2), 10/11 (0.5), 10/13 (0.1); GTR 10/12 (0.7), 10/13 (0.2), 10/21 (0.3)), ‘all of which would have been incurred whether or not [Gore] filed the motion to strike.’…” (Opp’n at p. 10:17-20.) Gore does not appear to dispute this point in the reply. Thus, at Ms. Ziemianek’s rate of $595/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $654.50 from the total amount requested. (1.1 x $595/hour). In addition, at Mr. Rivera’s rate of $336.17/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $403.40 from the total amount requested. (1.2 x $336.17/hour).

Tenth, Plaintiff asserts that “the Court should not award fees for 8.5 hours described in indecipherable redacted entries regarding ‘depo prep’ and ‘correspondence’ with unidentified people. (E.g., MAZ 10/4 (0.6), 10/6 (0.2), 10/10 (0.3), 10/11 (0.5), 10/12 (3.8), 10/18 (3.1).) ‘[V]ague entries that fail to explain the work’ are not compensable.” (Opp’n at p. 10:24-27.) The Court does not find that these time entries are indecipherable or vague. Thus, the Court declines to deduct the foregoing hours.

Eleventh, Plaintiff asserts that “the Court should deduct 3.0 hours spent again researching elements of Plaintiff’s defamation claim (GTR 10/11 (0.4), 10/12 (1.5), 10/18 (1.10)), which as noted above, was duplicative of work done for Gore’s anti-SLAPP motion, opposition to Warner’s discovery motion, and preparing for the hearing on Warner’s discovery motion.” (Opp’n at p. 10:28-11:3.) The Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that these time entries are duplicative or unreasonable.

Twelfth, Plaintiff asserts that “up to 1.3 hours of research on ‘federal’ discovery (GTR 10/24) was unnecessary.” (Opp’n at p. 11:4.) Gore does not dispute this point in the reply. At Mr. Rivera’s rate of $336.17/hour (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 8), the Court deducts $437.02 from the total amount requested. (1.3 x $336.17/hour).

Thirteenth, Plaintiff asserts that “the deposition appearance did not take 4.5 hours. (MAZ 10/25; Mot. at 9:1.) The deposition started at 12:01 pm, and concluded at 3:34 pm.” (Opp’n at p. 11:5-6, citing Trugman Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. C.) But Ms. Ziemianek’s time entry from October 25, 2022 for 4.5 hours states “Appear for and defend Gore deposition, correspondence with T. Rivera re same, [redacted].” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. B.) The Court does not find that this time entry is unreasonable and thus declines to reduce it.   

Fourteenth, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he 2.3 hours of excessive attorney time related to Gore’s review of the deposition transcript should be removed because they would have been incurred even without the anti-SLAPP motion. (GTR 10/31 (0.3), 11/2 (1.4), 11/3 (0.3), MAZ 11/3 (0.3).).” (Opp’n at p. 11:8-10.) Gore counters that “[a]gain, the deposition on the particular topics addressed would not have happened but for the stricken claims.” (Reply at p. 7:21-23.) The Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that Gore’s review of the deposition transcript should be deducted. 

Fifteenth, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he 2.2 hours of attorney time that appear unrelated to any pending matter should be deducted. Entries on November 16 and 17 state ‘research re [redaction] in support of motion; summarize results’ and ‘follow up research re [redaction].’ Ms. Ziemianek’s declaration does provide a cogent explanation for entries related to a ‘motion.’” (Opp’n at p. 11:11-14.) The Court notes that there is a time entry from November 16, 2022 for 1.3 hours from the timekeeper “KLC” stating “Research re [redacted] in support of motion; summarize results” and a time entry from November 17, 2022 from “KLC” for 0.9 hours for “Follow up research re [redacted].” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. B.) It is unclear what this research pertains to. Gore’s counsel states in her supporting declaration that “Kristine Craig” is “a fourth-year Litigation Associate with previous anti-SLAPP experience, whose regular billing rate in 2022 was $385 per hour...” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 2.) Thus, the Court deducts $847.00 from the total amount requested (2.2 x $385/hour).

Sixteenth, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he moving papers provide ‘scant explanation for the exorbitant number of hours’—104.2—expended on Gore’s reply.” (Opp’n at p. 11:16-17.) Exhibit “A” to Ms. Ziemianek’s declaration states that 104.2 hours was expended on “[p]reparation and filing of anti-SLAPP reply papers and motion to seal.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. A, section (e).) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the requested 104.2 hours for the reply and motion to seal is excessive. Gore’s counsel states that “Hanson Bridgett spent a total of 134.4 hours representing $68,648.50 in fees at our standard hourly rates and $58,351.23 at our discounted rates for preparing and filing Ms. Gore’s anti-SLAPP Reply brief, evidentiary objections and responses, RJN reply, declarations, supplemental RJN, Ms. Gore’s motion to seal, and the meet and confer efforts regarding the evidentiary disputes…The instant fee motion seeks reimbursement for a total of $68,648.50 in fees (representing 134.4 hours in services at the standard hourly rates) for these categories of work.” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 35.) The Court reduces the requested $68,648.50 in fees by 20%, or $13,729.70.            

Seventeenth, Plaintiff asserts that “the Court should reduce excessive and inefficient time spent reviewing the transcript of Gore’s three-hour deposition—1.4 hours ‘for errors’ (GTR 11/2), then 2.9 hours ‘with focus on identifying confidential testimony’ (GTR 11/21), then 1.4 hours ‘for redactions’ (GTR, 11/22), and then 1.8 hours ‘to identify . . . non-party identities and details about law enforcement investigations’ (GTR 11/23)—in total 7.5 hours re-reviewing the same thing.” (Opp’n at p. 12:9-13.) The Court does not find that these time entries are unreasonable and declines to reduce them. 

            Nineteenth, Plaintiff argues that “the Court should reduce duplicative time spent preparing for the December 1 hearing. Given that counsel had just spent over 100 hours towards Gore’s reply submission on November 22, spending an additional 4.4 hours a week later to ‘prepare’ for the hearing is excessive. (GTR 11/29 (1.2), 11/30 (1.1), 12/1 (2.1); cf. MAZ 11/30 (0.5).).” (Opp’n at pp. 12:28-13:3.) The Court does not find that 4.4 hours to prepare for the hearing is excessive and declines to deduct this amount.

            Twentieth, Plaintiff asserts that “[w]ith the Reply, Gore submitted ‘92 evidentiary objections’…which the court rejected on their face as excessive and ordered counsel to reduce them to ‘just a few.’ Counsel appears to have spent up to 41.9 hours preparing these objections, and the time entries reflect not only over-litigation of unnecessary work but also unexplained duplication (among attorneys and of prior efforts) and inefficiencies. (MAZ 11/16 (6.5), 11/18 (6.1), 11/21 (11.5), 11/22 (4.7); GTR 11/19 (2.9), 11/21 (5.2), 11/22 (5.0).).” (Opp’n at p. 13:4-9.) Gore counters that Plaintiff mischaracterizes the “total time spent as being ‘up to 41.9 hours’ (Opp. at p. 13: 4-8) when the entries reflect other work on the reply brief.” (Reply at p. 8:17-18.) The Court agrees.

            Twenty-First, Plaintiff asserts that “7.1 hours spent on a three-page opposition to a four-page ex parte application are excessive. (GTR 2/22, 2/23, 2/24, 2/25, 2/27; MAZ 2/22, 2/26.).” (Opp’n at p. 14:7-8.) The Court does not find that these hours are unreasonable.  

Plaintiff also asserts that the requested 80.3 hours in connection with Gore’s instant fee motion is excessive.

Plaintiff asserts that “of the 70.3 hours claimed, counsel provided entries for only 8.3 hours in May and 50.1 in June…There are 11.9 hours missing, which Ms. Ziemianek calls ‘an estimate of time spent between July 3 and July 7.’ (Ziemianek Decl. ¶ 12.) Regardless of whether a ‘bill has yet been generated’ (id., ¶ 44), there is no evidence of how those 11.9 hours were spent.” (Opp’n at p. 14:13-17.) Gore counters that “[d]eclarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed are sufficient.” ((Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 994.)

Plaintiff also asserts that “a summer associate’s 17.1 hours spent researching billable rates should be reduced or ‘written off entirely’” and that “[t]his project duplicates information provided in counsel’s declarations…[Plaintiff] should not be charged for 2.6 hours ‘[c]oordinat[ing]’ and ‘[c]onfer[ing]’ with her ‘assigning attorney’ or reviewing materials that at least five others had already reviewed. (BCQ 5/25.).” (Opp’n at p. 14:21-22; 14:25-28.) Gore counters that “the time entries reflect that the work was primarily focused on researching market rates, and the Ziemianek Declaration explains that a portion of this time was already written off by counsel…This work was justified, as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff does not challenge the reasonableness of Gore’s counsel’s rates.” (Reply at p. 9:16-20.) Gore cites to paragraph 44 of Ms. Ziemianek’s declaration, which states, inter alia, that “I reduced Ms. Quintanilla’s time from 23.6 hours to 17.1 hours, totaling $5,232.60 (discounted)/$6,156 (standard).” (Ziemianek Decl., ¶ 44.) However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the requested 17.1 hours is excessive. The Court thus deducts the requested $5,232.60 in fees by 20%, or $1,046.52.

Plaintiff also asserts in the opposition that “Mr. Rivera spent an unreasonable amount of time solely on the factual background and procedural history. (GTR 5/22 (1.7), 5/31 (0.6), 6/8 (1.9), 6/9 (1.3)).” (Opp’n at p. 15:5-6.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that “the 8.6 hours of attorney time spent reviewing, categorizing, and creating a chart of billing records was excessive and over-staffed. (GTR 6/20 (3.0), 6/28 (3.6), 6/28 (1.8).) These clerical tasks should have been done by a non-attorney—e.g., the paralegal reviewing time records in parallel…and if done by an attorney, should not have taken 8.6 hours.” (Opp’n at p. 15:8-11.) However, the Court does not find that these time entries are unreasonable and declines to deduct them.

            Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that “Gore cannot recover $243.55 for ‘Computerized Research’ (May 2022, June 2023) because she has not explained what it is or how it was calculated.” (Opp’n at p. 16:18-20.) Gore does not appear to directly address this point in the reply. Plaintiff also asserts that “Gore cannot recover for $113.30 in ‘Court Costs’ incurred in September 2022 because there were no filings or other proceedings on the dates indicated,” and that “Gore cannot recover $935.10 for a deposition transcript because it would have been incurred regardless of the motion.” (Opp’n at p. 16:22-24.) Gore does not appear to respond to Plaintiff’s point concerning the $113.30 in “Court Costs.” This argument concerning the deposition is addressed above, and

the Court accordingly declines to deduct the requested $935.10 in transcript costs. However, the Court deducts $356.85 from the total amount of costs requested. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Gore’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in part. The Court awards Gore a total of $170,908.26 in attorneys’ fees and costs.  

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Gore is to provide notice of this Order.   

DATED:  February 15, 2024                          ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court