Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV18375, Date: 2023-12-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV18375    Hearing Date: February 16, 2024    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

 

 

ELIZABETH GODINEZ,

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

TRADER JOE’S COMPANY, et al.,

                        Defendants.

Case No.:

22STCV18375

Hearing Date:

February 16, 2024

Hearing Time:    10:00 a.m.

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FOR SANCTIONS

 

 

Background

Plaintiff Elizabeth Godinez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on June 3, 2022 against Defendant Trader Joe’s Company (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodation, (3) failure to engage in good faith interactive process, (4) harassment/hostile work environment, (5) failure to prevent harassment/hostile work environment, (6) retaliation, and (7) wrongful termination.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was “employed by Defendants from June 2010 until June 20, 2020.” (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s “duties included, without limitation, covering the register, stocking shelves, breaking down pallets, managing the demo sample table, and conducting inventory.” (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “[d]ue to the repetitive and demanding nature of her job, on or about 2018, Plaintiff sustained injuries to her bilateral hands and wrists. Plaintiff promptly reported the injuries to her manager, Pat Seeker, who sent Plaintiff to be evaluated by a medical provider.” (Compl., ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff alleges that she “was provided with work restrictions in the way of (i) No lifting over 25 pounds; and (ii) Minimal use of involved extremity, which Plaintiff immediately provided to Mr. Seeker. However, rather than accommodate Plaintiff or engage in any interactive process, Mr. Seeker instructed her to go home, specifically telling Plaintiff that she could not work with the current restrictions.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]s a result, Plaintiff reached out to her attending physician and asked that her restrictions be amended so that she could be allowed to return to her position, since she need to continue working. The physician amended the restrictions as follows: (i) No lifting over 25 pounds; (ii) No more than 2 hours of demo and 3 hours of register work per shift.” (Compl., ¶ 12.) “Plaintiff provided the updated restrictions to Mr. Seeker. However, Plaintiff was not accommodated as noted by the physician, and continued to work with pain.” (Compl., ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about April 2019, Plaintiff was placed on a leave of absence and underwent surgery for her hand. Thereafter, on or about September 2019, she was released to return to work at full capacity. However, due to the extent of her initial injuries and consequent surgery, Plaintiff started to have pain and discomfort in her hand once again.” (Compl., ¶ 15.) On or about November 2019, Plaintiff was provided with work restrictions, and on or about January 2020, Plaintiff’s restrictions were amended. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-17.)

Plaintiff alleges that “shortly after Plaintiff first reported her injuries to Mr. Seeker and asked for accommodations, Defendants started to retaliate against Plaintiff by providing her with less hours than what her physicians were recommending, giving her poor performance reviews, and continuously reprimanding her.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about March 2020, Plaintiff submitted an email to Human Resources complaining about the constant harassment, discrimination and retaliation she was experiencing at the hands of Mr. Seeker, however no remedial action was ever taken…Thereafter, Plaintiff made numerous inquiries regarding her complaint. However, she received no response.” (Compl., ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]hereafter, on June 20, 2020, Mr. Segal and Ms. Bunelos informed Plaintiff that her employment had been terminated.” (Compl., ¶ 21.)

In his supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that on May 8, 2023, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two. (Gould Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[t]hereafter, counsel for the respective parties met and conferred but were unable to resolve the issue amongst themselves and decided to submit the issue to an Informal Discovery Conference…” (Gould Decl., ¶ 6.)

On December 12, 2023, an Informal Discovery Conference was held in this matter. The Court’s December 12, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia, that “[t]he matter is called for hearing…In open court, the Informal Discovery Conference is held. The discovery issues as to Depositions has been resolved. Parties agree depositions are to be taken by February 1, 2024. The issues as to personnel files has not been resolved.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that thereafter, he and Defendant’s counsel “attempted, but failed to agree on the parameters of the requests at issue.” (Gould Decl., ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff now moves for an order compelling Defendant to “provide discovery responses”[1] to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set Two), Nos. 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, and 57. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a) provides that “[o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1)¿A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2)¿A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3)¿An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection must set forth specific facts showing good cause for the discovery sought and must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b).)

Discussion

Plaintiff asserts that an order compelling further responses to the discovery requests at issue is warranted. As discussed, the motion concerns Requests Nos. 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, and 57 of Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two.

Plaintiff’s Request No. 50 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to any complaints made against Pat Seeker.” Plaintiff’s Request No. 53 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to any complaints made against Annie Chon.” Plaintiff’s Request No. 56 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to any complaints made against Christie Wei.”

 Defendant’s responses to Requests Nos. 50, 53, and 56 provide, inter alia, that “Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it is overbroad in time and scope, burdensome, oppressive and harassing. Defendant objects that the terms ‘RELATING’ and ‘complaints’ as used in this request, are vague and ambiguous. Defendant also objects to this request on the grounds that the documents sought are privileged and confidential under the constitutional, statutory and/or common rights of privacy. Defendant also objects that such documents are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Plaintiff’s Request No. 51 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to the job performance of Pat Seeker.” Plaintiff’s Request No. 54 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to the job performance of Annie Chon.” Plaintiff’s Request No. 57 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to the job performance of Christie Wei.”

Defendant’s responses to Requests Nos. 51, 54, and 57 provide, inter alia, that “Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it is overbroad in time and scope, burdensome, oppressive and harassing. Defendant objects that the terms ‘RELATING’ and ‘job performance’ as used in this request, are vague and ambiguous. Defendant also objects to this request on the grounds that the documents sought are privileged and confidential under the constitutional, statutory and/or common rights of privacy. Defendant also objects that such documents are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Pursuant to meet and confer discussions with opposing counsel, the parties agreed to limit Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents No. 45 to any disciplinary actions contained in the personnel files of Pat Seeker, Annie Chon, or Christie Wei. With this understanding, Defendant responds: Upon diligent search and reasonable inquiry, no responsive documents could be located because no such documents exist.”

In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “Mr. Seeker’s, Ms. Wei’s, and Ms. Chon’s right to privacy outweighs Plaintiff’s need for the requested documents.” (Opp’n at p. 7:6-7.) Defendant cites to Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, where the California Supreme Court noted that “[t]he state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s central concern. In Hill, we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Internal citations omitted.)

Defendant argues that “[i]n one category, Plaintiff seeks the performance evaluations of Mr. Seeker, Ms. Wei, and Ms. Chon, which contain private employment information about the three individuals meant to be seen only by those three individuals and other Trader Joe’s personnel. These privacy concerns are objectively reasonable, as a reasonable person would feel personally invaded by a disgruntled former employee voyeuristically reviewing their personal career development information. The other category seeking ‘Complaints’ about the three individuals is equally intrusive, especially given the breadth of the request, encompassing all emails, hotline complaints, HR complaints, and Dayforce records related to ‘formal and informal grievances.’ This intrusion is especially acute as to Ms. Wei and Ms. Chon because neither are even named defendants or accused of wrongdoing.” (Opp’n. at p. 7:18-27.)

In the motion, Plaintiff asserts that Requests Nos. 51, 54, and 57 “seek to uncover whether Defendant Trader Joes promoted, demoted, transferred, suspended, or terminated any of the three individuals during or after their involvement with and handling of Plaintiff’s complaints.” (Mot. at p. 11:3-5.)

Plaintiff also asserts that “[g]iven the allegations of the lawsuit which include alleged harassment by Pat Seeker, a failure to prevent harassment by Trader Joes, retaliation after Plaintiff complained of harassment, and ultimately a termination motivated (at least in part) for her complaints of harassment, Plaintiff contends the privacy interests of alleged harasser, the regional Vice President whom was heavily involved in the process, and the Human Resources  Defendant tasked to handle the issue is outweighed by Plaintiff’s  legitimate discovery needs to investigate her claims.” (Mot. at p. 6:4-10.)

            Plaintiff further argues (without citing to supporting evidence) that “Annie Chon was the regional Vice President at Trader Joes for the region Plaintiff worked in. She was also Plaintiff’s supervisor. Further, the documents produced in this case, to date, demonstrate a very hands-on approach from Annie Chon. There are several emails sent from Ms. Chon to Plaintiff directly. Annie Chon over saw Plaintiff and likely Pat Seeker at their prior store locations. Annie Chon was in a position to not only field complaints but had the power to stop the illegal actions. Any complaints made about Annie Chon’s lack of response by Plaintiff, Pat Seeker, or other co-workers alleging similar harms could express a failure by Trader Joes to prevent the type of harassment Plaintiff suffered.” (Mot. at p. 9:17-25.) 

In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “none of these reasons establish that Ms. Chon’s private personnel files are relevant or essential to the case. That Ms. Chon was Regional Vice President, if anything, distances her involvement for the alleged facts. Ms. Chon was not Plaintiff’s supervisor, and in fact, had few interactions with Plaintiff.” (Opp’n at p. 10:20-23.)  As set forth above, Plaintiff does not provide evidence to support the foregoing statements concerning Ms. Chon. In her supporting declaration, Defendant’s counsel states that “Ms. Chon was…never Plaintiff’s supervisor.” (Gjedsted Decl., ¶ 3.) As further noted by Defendant, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not make any mention of Ms. Chon, and she is not named as a Defendant in the Complaint.  

            Plaintiff also argues in the motion (without citing to any supporting evidence) that “Christie Wei worked in Human Resources at Trader Joes. Apparently, for the region Plaintiff worked in. The documents produced in this case, to date, evidence several emails from Ms. Wei to Plaintiff directly. Ms. Wei was also in a position to not only field complaints but had the power to stop the illegal actions. Preventing harassment is a stated cause of action in this matter. Any complaints made about Ms. Wei from Plaintiff, Pat Seeker, or co-workers alleging similar harms in the stores Plaintiff and Pat Seeker worked would show a failure by Trader Joes to prevent the type of harassment Plaintiff suffered and can impute liability upon the Corporate-Defendant Trader Joes.” (Mot. at p. 10:7-14.)

In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “this supposed justification is insufficient to allow production of Ms. Wei’s private personnel documents because Ms. Wei had no supervisory authority over Plaintiff, and she is not mentioned in the Complaint or accused of wrongdoing.” (Opp’n at p. 10:6-9.) Defendant’s counsel states in her supporting declaration “Ms. Wei has never supervised Plaintiff.” (Gjedsted Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendant also asserts that “claiming Ms. Wei was ‘in a position’ to field Complaints and ‘had the power’ to stop alleged illegal actions is speculative, contrary to Ms. Wei’s non-supervisory position, and assumes facts neither in evidence nor alleged.” (Opp’n at p. 10:9-11.) As set forth above, Plaintiff does not provide evidence to support her foregoing statements concerning Ms. Wei.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to Requests Nos. 53, 54, 56, and 57 on the grounds of relevancy and privacy are well taken. In addition, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for further responses to these requests. As set forth above, Plaintiff’s arguments specifically concerning Ms. Chon and Ms. Wei do not appear to be supported by any evidence.  

The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for further responses to Requests Nos. 50 and 51. As discussed, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that “[o]n or about March 2020, Plaintiff submitted an email to Human Resources complaining about the constant harassment, discrimination and retaliation she was experiencing at the hands of Mr. Seeker, however no remedial action was ever taken.” (Compl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that she “was subjected to a campaign of harassment by her supervisor, Mr. Seeker.” (Compl., ¶ 54.) Plaintiff asserts that “[g]iven the allegations of the lawsuit which include alleged harassment by Pat Seeker, a failure to prevent harassment by Trader Joes, retaliation after Plaintiff complained of harassment, and ultimately a termination motivated (at least in part) her complaints of harassment, Plaintiff contends the privacy interests of alleged harasser is outweighed by her legitimate discovery needs to investigate her claims.” (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement at p. 2:17-21.) The Court agrees.

In addition, as to Request No. 51, Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant unilaterally limited request no[]. 51…to produce no documents at all.” (Mot. at p. 4:25-26.) The Court agrees that Defendant’s response to Request No. 51 is evasive, as it imposes a limitation based on the parties’ meet and confer efforts pertaining to another request, Request No. 45 of Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. Thus, the Court finds that further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests Nos. 50 and 51 are warranted.

Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that sanctions against Defendant are warranted. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h), “[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction…against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” The Court finds that Defendant acted with substantial justification in presenting its position, and thus finds that sanctions are not warranted. The Court also does not find that Plaintiff has shown that sanctions are warranted for any asserted misuse of the discovery process by Defendant.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part. The Court orders Defendant to provide further verified responses to Requests Nos. 50 and 51 of Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿¿¿ 

Plaintiff’s motion is denied as to Requests Nos. 53, 54, 56, and 57. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Order.¿¿ 

 

DATED:  February 16, 2024                          ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

 



[1]The Court notes that the caption page of Plaintiff’s motion concerns Plaintiff’s “Motion to Compel Defendant to Provide Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents and for Sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) As set forth above, Plaintiff notes that Defendant provided initial responses to the requests at issue. Thus, the Court construes the instant motion as a motion to compel further responses.