Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV18375, Date: 2023-12-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV18375 Hearing Date: February 16, 2024 Dept: 50
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ELIZABETH GODINEZ, Plaintiff, vs. TRADER JOE’S COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22STCV18375 |
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Hearing Date: |
February 16, 2024 |
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Hearing
Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FOR SANCTIONS |
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Background
Plaintiff Elizabeth Godinez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on June 3,
2022 against Defendant Trader Joe’s Company (“Defendant”). The Complaint
alleges causes of action for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to
provide reasonable accommodation, (3) failure to engage in good faith
interactive process, (4) harassment/hostile work environment, (5) failure to
prevent harassment/hostile work environment, (6) retaliation, and (7) wrongful
termination.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was “employed by Defendants
from June 2010 until June 20, 2020.” (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s “duties
included, without limitation, covering the register, stocking shelves, breaking
down pallets, managing the demo sample table, and conducting inventory.”
(Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “[d]ue to the repetitive and demanding
nature of her job, on or about 2018, Plaintiff sustained injuries to her
bilateral hands and wrists. Plaintiff promptly reported the injuries to her
manager, Pat Seeker, who sent Plaintiff to be evaluated by a medical provider.”
(Compl., ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff alleges that she “was provided with work restrictions in the
way of (i) No lifting over 25 pounds; and (ii) Minimal use of involved
extremity, which Plaintiff immediately provided to Mr. Seeker. However, rather
than accommodate Plaintiff or engage in any interactive process, Mr. Seeker
instructed her to go home, specifically telling Plaintiff that she could not
work with the current restrictions.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff further alleges
that “[a]s a result, Plaintiff reached out to her attending physician and asked
that her restrictions be amended so that she could be allowed to return to her
position, since she need to continue working. The physician amended the
restrictions as follows: (i) No lifting over 25 pounds; (ii) No more than 2
hours of demo and 3 hours of register work per shift.” (Compl., ¶ 12.)
“Plaintiff provided the updated restrictions to Mr. Seeker. However, Plaintiff
was not accommodated as noted by the physician, and continued to work with
pain.” (Compl., ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about April 2019, Plaintiff was placed
on a leave of absence and underwent surgery for her hand. Thereafter, on or
about September 2019, she was released to return to work at full capacity.
However, due to the extent of her initial injuries and consequent surgery,
Plaintiff started to have pain and discomfort in her hand once again.” (Compl.,
¶ 15.) On or about November 2019, Plaintiff was provided with work
restrictions, and on or about January 2020, Plaintiff’s restrictions were
amended. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-17.)
Plaintiff alleges that “shortly after Plaintiff first reported her
injuries to Mr. Seeker and asked for accommodations, Defendants started to
retaliate against Plaintiff by providing her with less hours than what her
physicians were recommending, giving her poor performance reviews, and
continuously reprimanding her.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or
about March 2020, Plaintiff submitted an email to Human Resources complaining
about the constant harassment, discrimination and retaliation she was
experiencing at the hands of Mr. Seeker, however no remedial action was ever
taken…Thereafter, Plaintiff made numerous inquiries regarding her complaint.
However, she received no response.” (Compl., ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff alleges that
“[t]hereafter, on June 20, 2020, Mr. Segal and Ms. Bunelos informed Plaintiff
that her employment had been terminated.” (Compl., ¶ 21.)
In his supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that on
May 8, 2023, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production
of Documents, Set Two. (Gould Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Plaintiff’s counsel states
that “[t]hereafter, counsel for the respective parties met and conferred but were
unable to resolve the issue amongst themselves and decided to submit the issue
to an Informal Discovery Conference…” (Gould Decl., ¶ 6.)
On December 12, 2023, an Informal Discovery Conference was held in
this matter. The Court’s December 12, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia,
that “[t]he matter is called for hearing…In open court, the Informal Discovery
Conference is held. The discovery issues as to Depositions has been resolved.
Parties agree depositions are to be taken by February 1, 2024. The issues as
to personnel files has not been resolved.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s
counsel states that thereafter, he and Defendant’s counsel “attempted, but
failed to agree on the parameters of the requests at issue.” (Gould Decl., ¶
11.)
Plaintiff now moves for an order compelling Defendant to “provide
discovery responses”[1] to
Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set Two), Nos. 50, 51, 53, 54,
56, and 57. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions against Defendant and its
counsel. Plaintiff opposes.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310,
subdivision (a) provides that “[o]n receipt of a response
to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party
may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the
demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1)¿A statement of
compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2)¿A representation of inability to
comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3)¿An objection in the response
is without merit or too general.” A motion to compel further responses to a
demand for inspection must set forth specific facts showing good cause for the
discovery sought and must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310,
subd. (b).)
Discussion
Plaintiff asserts that an order compelling
further responses to the discovery requests at issue is warranted. As
discussed, the motion concerns Requests Nos. 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, and 57
of Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two.
Plaintiff’s Request No. 50 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to any
complaints made against Pat Seeker.” Plaintiff’s Request No. 53 seeks “ALL
DOCUMENTS RELATING to any complaints made against Annie Chon.” Plaintiff’s
Request No. 56 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to any complaints made against
Christie Wei.”
Defendant’s responses to
Requests Nos. 50, 53, and 56 provide, inter alia, that “Defendant
objects to this request on the grounds that it is overbroad in time and scope,
burdensome, oppressive and harassing. Defendant objects that the terms ‘RELATING’
and ‘complaints’ as used in this request, are vague and ambiguous. Defendant
also objects to this request on the grounds that the documents sought are
privileged and confidential under the constitutional, statutory and/or common
rights of privacy. Defendant also objects that such documents are neither
relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”
Plaintiff’s Request No. 51 seeks “ALL
DOCUMENTS RELATING to the job performance of Pat Seeker.” Plaintiff’s Request
No. 54 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to the job performance of Annie Chon.”
Plaintiff’s Request No. 57 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING to the job performance
of Christie Wei.”
Defendant’s responses to Requests Nos. 51, 54, and 57 provide, inter
alia, that “Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it is
overbroad in time and scope, burdensome, oppressive and harassing. Defendant
objects that the terms ‘RELATING’ and ‘job performance’ as used in this
request, are vague and ambiguous. Defendant also objects to this request on the
grounds that the documents sought are privileged and confidential under the
constitutional, statutory and/or common rights of privacy. Defendant also
objects that such documents are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waiving
the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Pursuant to meet and
confer discussions with opposing counsel, the parties agreed to limit
Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents No. 45 to any disciplinary
actions contained in the personnel files of Pat Seeker, Annie Chon, or Christie
Wei. With this understanding, Defendant responds: Upon diligent search and
reasonable inquiry, no responsive documents could be located because no such
documents exist.”
In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “Mr. Seeker’s, Ms. Wei’s,
and Ms. Chon’s right to privacy outweighs Plaintiff’s need for the requested documents.”
(Opp’n at p. 7:6-7.) Defendant cites to Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531,
552, where the California
Supreme Court noted that “[t]he state
Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational
privacy is the provision’s central concern. In Hill, we established a framework for evaluating potential
invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a
legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.
The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and
important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking
protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or
protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then
balance these competing considerations.” (Internal citations omitted.)
Defendant
argues that “[i]n one category, Plaintiff seeks the performance
evaluations of Mr. Seeker, Ms. Wei, and Ms. Chon, which contain private
employment information about the three individuals meant to be seen only by
those three individuals and other Trader Joe’s personnel. These privacy
concerns are objectively reasonable, as a reasonable person would feel
personally invaded by a disgruntled former employee voyeuristically reviewing
their personal career development information. The other category seeking
‘Complaints’ about the three individuals is equally intrusive, especially given
the breadth of the request, encompassing all emails, hotline complaints, HR
complaints, and Dayforce records related to ‘formal and informal grievances.’
This intrusion is especially acute as to Ms. Wei and Ms. Chon because neither
are even named defendants or accused of wrongdoing.” (Opp’n. at p. 7:18-27.)
In the motion, Plaintiff asserts that Requests Nos. 51, 54, and 57
“seek to uncover whether Defendant Trader Joes promoted, demoted, transferred,
suspended, or terminated any of the three individuals during or after their
involvement with and handling of Plaintiff’s complaints.” (Mot. at p. 11:3-5.)
Plaintiff also asserts that “[g]iven the allegations of the lawsuit
which include alleged harassment by Pat Seeker, a failure to prevent harassment
by Trader Joes, retaliation after Plaintiff complained of harassment, and
ultimately a termination motivated (at least in part) for her complaints of
harassment, Plaintiff contends the privacy interests of alleged harasser, the
regional Vice President whom was heavily involved in the process, and the Human
Resources Defendant tasked to handle the
issue is outweighed by Plaintiff’s
legitimate discovery needs to investigate her claims.” (Mot. at p.
6:4-10.)
Plaintiff further argues (without
citing to supporting evidence) that “Annie Chon was the regional Vice President
at Trader Joes for the region Plaintiff worked in. She was also Plaintiff’s
supervisor. Further, the documents produced in this case, to date, demonstrate
a very hands-on approach from Annie Chon. There are several emails sent from
Ms. Chon to Plaintiff directly. Annie Chon over saw Plaintiff and likely Pat
Seeker at their prior store locations. Annie Chon was in a position to not only
field complaints but had the power to stop the illegal actions. Any complaints
made about Annie Chon’s lack of response by Plaintiff, Pat Seeker, or other
co-workers alleging similar harms could express a failure by Trader Joes to
prevent the type of harassment Plaintiff suffered.” (Mot. at p. 9:17-25.)
In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “none of these reasons
establish that Ms. Chon’s private personnel files are relevant or essential to
the case. That Ms. Chon was Regional Vice President, if anything, distances her
involvement for the alleged facts. Ms. Chon was not Plaintiff’s supervisor, and
in fact, had few interactions with Plaintiff.” (Opp’n at p. 10:20-23.) As set forth above, Plaintiff does not provide
evidence to support the foregoing statements concerning Ms. Chon. In her
supporting declaration, Defendant’s counsel states that “Ms. Chon was…never
Plaintiff’s supervisor.” (Gjedsted Decl., ¶ 3.) As further noted by Defendant,
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not make any mention of Ms. Chon, and she is not
named as a Defendant in the Complaint.
Plaintiff also argues in the motion (without
citing to any supporting evidence) that “Christie Wei worked in Human Resources
at Trader Joes. Apparently, for the region Plaintiff worked in. The documents
produced in this case, to date, evidence several emails from Ms. Wei to
Plaintiff directly. Ms. Wei was also in a position to not only field complaints
but had the power to stop the illegal actions. Preventing harassment is a
stated cause of action in this matter. Any complaints made about Ms. Wei from
Plaintiff, Pat Seeker, or co-workers alleging similar harms in the stores
Plaintiff and Pat Seeker worked would show a failure by Trader Joes to prevent
the type of harassment Plaintiff suffered and can impute liability upon the
Corporate-Defendant Trader Joes.” (Mot. at p. 10:7-14.)
In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “this supposed justification
is insufficient to allow production of Ms. Wei’s private personnel documents
because Ms. Wei had no supervisory authority over Plaintiff, and she is not
mentioned in the Complaint or accused of wrongdoing.” (Opp’n at p. 10:6-9.) Defendant’s
counsel states in her supporting declaration “Ms. Wei has never supervised
Plaintiff.” (Gjedsted Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendant also asserts that “claiming Ms.
Wei was ‘in a position’ to field Complaints and ‘had the power’ to stop alleged
illegal actions is speculative, contrary to Ms. Wei’s non-supervisory position,
and assumes facts neither in evidence nor alleged.” (Opp’n at p. 10:9-11.) As
set forth above, Plaintiff does not provide evidence to support her foregoing
statements concerning Ms. Wei.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to
Requests Nos. 53, 54, 56, and 57 on the grounds of relevancy and privacy are
well taken. In addition, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has
demonstrated good cause for further responses to these requests. As set forth
above, Plaintiff’s arguments specifically concerning Ms. Chon and Ms. Wei do
not appear to be supported by any evidence.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for further
responses to Requests Nos. 50 and 51. As discussed, Plaintiff alleges, inter
alia, that “[o]n or about March 2020, Plaintiff submitted an email to Human
Resources complaining about the constant harassment, discrimination and
retaliation she was experiencing at the hands of Mr. Seeker, however no
remedial action was ever taken.” (Compl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that
she “was subjected to a campaign of harassment by her supervisor, Mr. Seeker.”
(Compl., ¶ 54.) Plaintiff asserts that “[g]iven the allegations of the lawsuit
which include alleged harassment by Pat Seeker, a failure to prevent harassment
by Trader Joes, retaliation after Plaintiff complained of harassment, and
ultimately a termination motivated (at least in part) her complaints of
harassment, Plaintiff contends the privacy interests of alleged harasser is
outweighed by her legitimate discovery needs to investigate her claims.”
(Plaintiff’s Separate Statement at p. 2:17-21.) The Court agrees.
In addition, as to Request No. 51, Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant
unilaterally limited request no[]. 51…to produce no documents at all.” (Mot. at
p. 4:25-26.) The Court agrees that Defendant’s response to Request No. 51 is
evasive, as it imposes a limitation based on the parties’ meet and confer
efforts pertaining to another request, Request No. 45 of Plaintiff’s Requests
for Production of Documents, Set One. Thus, the Court finds that further
responses to Plaintiff’s Requests Nos. 50 and 51 are warranted.
Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that sanctions against Defendant are
warranted. Pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h), “[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall
impose a monetary sanction…against any party, person, or attorney who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a
demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust.” The Court finds that
Defendant acted with substantial justification in presenting its position, and
thus finds that sanctions are not warranted. The Court also does not find that
Plaintiff has shown that sanctions are warranted for any asserted misuse of the
discovery process by Defendant.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in
part. The Court orders Defendant to provide further verified responses to Requests
Nos. 50 and 51 of Plaintiff’s Requests for
Production of Documents, Set Two, within 30 days of
the date of this Order.¿¿¿
Plaintiff’s
motion is denied as to Requests Nos. 53, 54, 56, and 57. Plaintiff’s
request for sanctions is denied.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Order.¿¿
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]The Court notes that the caption page of Plaintiff’s
motion concerns Plaintiff’s “Motion to Compel Defendant to Provide Further
Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents and for
Sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) As set forth above, Plaintiff notes that
Defendant provided initial responses to the requests at issue. Thus, the Court
construes the instant motion as a motion to compel further responses.