Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV19989, Date: 2022-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19989    Hearing Date: August 24, 2022    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Lynn Andrea Couch (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on June 20, 2022 against various defendants. Plaintiff’s “Complaint for Toxic Injuries” asserts causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) strict liability – failure to warn, (3) strict liability – design defect, (4) fraudulent concealment, and (5) breach of implied warranties. Plaintiff alleges that she was exposed to certain chemical products throughout Plaintiff’s employment which caused Plaintiff to sustain serious injuries, including Chronic Myeloid Leukemia. (Compl., ¶ 13.)

Defendant Brenntag Great Lakes, LLC (“Brenntag”) was served with the summons and Complaint on June 28, 2022 by mail and acknowledgement of receipt of service. The acknowledgment of receipt was signed on June 29, 2022.

Brenntag now moves to quash service of the summons and the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes.  

Discussion

Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 provides in part: “A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion … (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” ((Id., § 418.10, subd. (a).)

“California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is not inconsistent with the state and federal Constitutions. Thus, the inquiry in California is whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the limits imposed by federal due process.” ((Young v. Daimler AG (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 855, 865 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Due process permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contact” with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” ((Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.) “A defendant that has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum state is subject to general jurisdiction in the state, meaning jurisdiction on any cause of action.” ((HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167.) A nonresident may be subject to specific jurisdiction if a three-prong test is met. “First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the state’s benefits. Second, the controversy must be related to or arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the state. Third, considering the defendant’s contacts with the state and other factors, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must comport with fair play and substantial justice.” ((Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568 (emphasis in original) [internal citations omitted].)

“When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” ((Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, at p. 449 [internal citations omitted].)

Plaintiff indicates that it agrees with Brenntag that general jurisdiction over Brenntag is lacking here, because Brenntag is not incorporated in the State of California and does not have its principal place of business in California. Brenntag provides evidence that it was incorporated in Illinois in July 2001 and that its principal place of business is in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin. (Vorlob Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.)

However, Plaintiff contends that specific jurisdiction “likely” exists over Brenntag in this case. (Opp’n at p. 4:10.) Plaintiff asserts that her causes of action arise out of Brenntag’s supply of benzene-containing solvents used by Plaintiff in California that caused her injury. (Opp’n at  p.1:14-16.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was exposed to certain chemical products during the course of her employment with “Chevron, Tosco, BP, Mobil, and ConocoPhillips.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that she worked for these companies from about 2005 through 2022. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s Complaint lists chemical products to which Plaintiff was allegedly exposed, with the names of different defendants above the products. (Compl., ¶ 11.) The chemical products listed below Brenntag are “n-heptane,” “diesel fuel,” and “other products to be identified in the course of discovery.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) 

 Plaintiff offers evidence that she obtained photographs of different chemical drums at the Chevron Refinery in El Segundo, California that were taken on March 17, 2022. (Couch Decl.,   ¶ 4.) Plaintiff asserts that one of the photographs shows a chemical drum of “n-heptane pure grade,” that lists Brenntag’s logo and contact information. (Couch Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5, 8, Ex. A.) Plaintiff states that she is very familiar with “n-heptane” and used “n-heptane” in her lab work in the refinery. (Couch Decl., ¶ 6.) In its reply, Brenntag notes that aside from its name on the label, no other information is offered by Plaintiff to show that Brenntag manufactured or distributed the “n-heptane” barrel or from where Plaintiff’s employer purchased the barrel. Brenntag also notes that Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of Brenntag’s manufacture or supply of diesel fuel at any location in California where she was employed.

In the opposition, Plaintiff requests that the court continue the hearing on the instant motion for a period of 120 days to permit Plaintiff to complete jurisdictional discovery. “A trial court has discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” ((Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 30); (see also Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 526, 533, “[When] jurisdiction is challenged by a nonresident defendant, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that minimum contacts exist between defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff has the right to conduct discovery with regard to the issue of jurisdiction to develop the facts necessary to sustain this burden.” [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Plaintiff indicates that she has propounded jurisdictional discovery on Brenntag, but has not yet obtained responses (as of when the opposition was filed).  

In the reply, Brenntag indicates that it is willing to participate in limited jurisdictional discovery with Plaintiff and that it is not opposed to continuing the hearing to allow sufficient time for the limited jurisdictional discovery to be conducted. However, Brenntag contends that the discovery served by Plaintiff is not tailored to the issues in the present case. Brenntag asserts that Plaintiff’s discovery requests should be limited to any records or information that Brenntag has relating to the products she has identified for Brenntag, with regard to the five employers and jobsites listed in her Complaint, and her dates of employment between 2005 and 2022. (See Compl., ¶ 12.) Brenntag cites to Burdick v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 30, where the Court of Appeal found that “[i]n light of the issues presented by this writ proceeding and our resolution of them, we conclude the respondent court should be given the opportunity to consider Plaintiffs’ request for discovery. Any discovery must be limited to the issue of specific personal jurisdiction based on the required minimum contacts we have identified in this opinion as relevant to the jurisdictional analysis.” 

In light of the foregoing, the Court will continue the hearing on the instant motion to allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues. The Court agrees with Brenntag that the jurisdictional discovery should be limited to the five employers and jobsites alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, as well as Plaintiff’s alleged dates of employment between 2005 and 2022. (See Compl., ¶ 12.) As to the specific products allegedly relating to Brenntag, Plaintiff lists “n-heptane,” “diesel fuel,” and “other products to be identified in the course of discovery.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) Thus, the Court does not find that the jurisdictional discovery should be limited to solely “n-heptane,” and  “diesel fuel.”

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court continues the hearing on Brenntag’s motion to quash to  ___________________, 2022 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff may conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues, as limited above. Plaintiff may file a supplemental opposition to the instant motion and Brenntag may file a supplemental reply. Any supplemental opposition and reply papers must be filed and served per Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b) based on the new hearing date, with courtesy copies delivered to Dept. 50 along with a courtesy copy of the motion papers which were not provided to Dept. 50.

Brenntag is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  August 24, 2022                                                                            

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court