Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV21513, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV21513    Hearing Date: April 28, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

On July 1, 2022, Plaintiffs Edwin Figueroa and Lizbeth Figueroa (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant Isabel Jones (“Defendant”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of warranty of habitability, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Defendant now demurs to each of the causes of action of the Complaint. Defendant also moves to strike portions of the Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer. No opposition to the motion to strike was filed.

Demurrer

A.    Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

B.    Allegations of the Complaint

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that around January of 2005, Plaintiffs were approached by Defendant with an offer to move into the property at 4928 Granada Street, Los Angeles, CA 90042 (the “Subject Property”). (Compl., ¶¶ 4, 7.) 

Defendant said that the Subject Property would have a “rent to own” Agreement, and Defendant would credit Plaintiffs with two years’ worth of payments that would be applied to the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs accepted the agreement and moved into the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs allege that the Subject Property had issues that need to be repaired, including but not limited to, a leaking roof and a mice infestation. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Defendant neglected to make any repairs to the Subject Property and denied Plaintiffs the ability to attempt repairs on their own. (Compl., ¶ 9.) On or about April 17, 2013, Plaintiffs signed on the purchase of a home located at 4317 W Avenue L4, Quartz Hill, California. (Compl., ¶ 13.)

In September of 2017, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that she was going to add them to the title of the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Defendant filed a Grant Deed to add Plaintiffs to the title of the Subject Property on September 29, 2017. (Compl., ¶ 16.)

Defendant then came to Plaintiffs in or about October of 2017 and “sought to have them…get a loan under their names.” (Compl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s the loan had not gone through, the Defendant in or about December 2, 2017 asked the Plaintiffs to sign a quit claim deed to remove themselves from the title of the Subject Property.” (Compl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs agreed. (Compl., ¶ 19.) A copy of the Quitclaim Deed is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Complaint. (Compl., ¶ 19, Ex. 3.) 

Plaintiffs also allege that “in September of 2018…Plaintiff requested that the Defendant take Edwin Figueroa off the title on the Lancaster home. By October 2018 the house in Lancaster transferred from Plaintiff Edwin Figueroa to Antonio Castro and Defendant…” (Compl., ¶ 20.) “The sale of the property was with the promise that Defendant would transfer title to the Subject Property to the Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 21.)

Then, “[o]n or about December 31, 2021 Defendant came to Plaintiffs with a possible solution to the issue of the Subject Property. Plaintiffs would sign a written agreement that stated Defendant Isabel Jones would be adding Plaintiffs to the title of the Subject Property so that Plaintiff Edwin Figueroa could apply for loans for the desperately needed repairs. Defendant would be given $53,000.00 on top of the loan needed for the repairs. Defendant returned later that New Year’s Eve asking Plaintiffs for the handwritten agreement which was granted and given to the Defendant.” (Compl., ¶ 24.) Then, “Plaintiffs learned on or about January 10, 2022 that Defendant no longer wanted to be removed from the tittle [sic]. Instead Defendant would merely add Plaintiffs to the title of the Subject Property. Given the myriad of issues in the Subject Property and the need for funds to get the repairs done the Plaintiffs had little choice but to agree…” (Compl., ¶ 26.)

Plaintiffs allege they made a formal complaint to the Housing Department of the City of Los Angeles in or about January 25, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 28.) On or about April 25, 2022 City Inspector Javier Ramos Sr. inspected the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n or about June of 2022 Defendant notified the Housing Department of the City of Los Angeles that all the repairs had been completed. The matter was closed until Plaintiffs contacted the inspectors and informed them that no work was actually done upon the Subject Property. As of June 14, 2022 the case has been reopened. Defendant upon learning this informed the Plaintiffs of her intention to retaliate against them by evicting them from the Subject Property.” (Compl., ¶ 31.)

C.    Statute of Frauds

In the demurrer, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ causes of action for quiet title, breach of contract, and breach of warranty of habitability are barred by the statute of frauds. Defendant notes that pursuant to Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(3), “[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent:…(3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).)

In support of the first cause of action for quiet title to real property, Plaintiffs allege that they are “currently the true owners of the Subject Property.” (Compl., ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs seek “a declaration that Plaintiffs are entitled to the legal and equitable ownership of the real property and the Subject Property and that title thereto should be vested in Plaintiffs name alone…” (Compl., ¶ 37.) In the demurrer, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs allege, “[a]round January of 2005 the Plaintiffs were approached by Defendant with an offer to move into the Subject Property at 4928 Granada Street which was located next door to their then current address of 4932 Granada Street. Defendant said that the Subject property would have the same ‘rent to own’ agreement…The Plaintiffs accepted the agreement…” (Compl., ¶¶ 7, 8, emphasis added.)

Defendant asserts that the “Complaint alleges elsewhere that Defendant was supposed to transfer title in the [Subject Property] to Plaintiffs…but it never alleges there was a written agreement to that effect and there is no such agreement attached to the Complaint.” (Demurrer at p. 5:26-28.) Defendant cites to Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1503, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[b]ecause the Rossbergs sought to allege a contract subject to the statute of frauds, they must allege a written contract signed by BofA and their failure to do so is a legal issue properly decided on demurrer.” Moreover, as Defendant notes, Plaintiffs allege that they agreed to sign a quit claim deed to remove themselves from the title of the Subject Property. (Compl., ¶ 19, Ex. 3.) The Quit Claim Deed is dated December 2, 2017. (Ibid.) The Complaint does not appear to allege that there was any written agreement to transfer title in the Subject Property to Plaintiffs after the alleged Quit Claim Deed was executed.

In support of the second cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiffs allege that “in or about January of 2022 an oral agreement was made between themselves and the Defendant. The terms of the agreement were that the Plaintiffs would take out a loan to cover the cost of the repairs to the Subject Property plus an additional $53,000.00 to be given to the Defendant and in exchange the Defendant would transfer title of the Subject Property to the Plaintiffs...” (Compl., ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the inaction by the Defendant, Plaintiffs have suffered damages in an amount not as ascertained, but the estimate on the Subject Property makes it worth a little over one million dollars ($1,000,000).” (Compl., ¶ 40.)

As to the breach of contract cause of action, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs allege that an “oral agreement was made between themselves and the Defendant.” (Compl., ¶ 39.) Defendant asserts that “[t]his on its face renders the Complaint subject to demurrer because the alleged agreement is oral and is for the purchase of real property.” (Demurrer at p. 6:26-28.)

In support of the third cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “[a] rodent infestation is ongoing as are termites and the Defendant has done little to show an earnest attempt to make any such repairs upon the Subject Property.” (Compl., ¶ 43.) As to the third cause of action, Defendant cites to Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 631, where the California Supreme Court held that “a warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases in California.” As set forth above, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]round January of 2005 the Plaintiffs were approached by Defendant with an offer to move into the Subject Property at 4928 Granada Street,” that “Defendant said that the Subject property would have [a]…‘rent to own’ agreement,” and that Plaintiffs “accepted the agreement and moved into the subject property.” (Compl., ¶¶ 7-8, underline added.)

To the extent Plaintiffs are alleging that they entered into a lease agreement with Defendant as of 2005, Defendant asserts that any such agreement is barred by the statute of frauds. As set forth above, “[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent:…(3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3), emphasis added.) In the opposition, Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that any purported lease agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant pertaining to the Subject Property is for a longer period than one year.  

In addition, in the opposition, Plaintiffs appear to concede that they are alleging that an oral agreement was made between Plaintiffs and Defendant to place Plaintiffs “on title to” the Subject Property. Plaintiffs assert that “[i]n this matter a clear agreement, albeit orally, was made between the Plaintiffs and Defendant in which in exchange for transferring ownership of property located in Quartz Hill, California would be placed on title to the property owned-by the Defendant. Part of this was a rent-to-own agreement which the Defendant fully benefited from.” (Opp’n at p. 6:14-19.)

Plaintiffs appear to argue that the statute of frauds is inapplicable here because a “constructive trust” was imposed. Plaintiffs cite to Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 373, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[a] constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed where the defendant holds title or some interest in certain property which it is inequitable for him to enjoy as against the plaintiff. Section 2224 of the Civil Code provides that: ‘One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.’ In order to create a constructive or involuntary trust as defined in section 2224, no conditions other than the three stated in that section are necessary: the existence of a res (property or some interest in property), the plaintiff’s right to that res, and the defendant’s gain of the res by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust or other wrongful act. A constructive trust is a remedial device primarily created to prevent unjust enrichment; equity compels the restoration to another of property to which the holder thereof is not justly entitled.” (Internal citations omitted.) Plaintiffs note “[t]hat the statute of frauds does not apply where a constructive trust is imposed is well settled.” (Edwards v. Edwards (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 33, 40.)

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he wrongful action as alleged in the complaint was that after the agreement was made between the Plaintiffs and Defendant in 2012 that while the Plaintiffs did everything to perform their pat [sic] of the rent-to-own agreement the Defendant did nothing but collect money from the Plaintiffs which she in turn used to pay off the mortgage owned upon the property in Quartz Hill, California. This fact which can be proven at trial will establish that Defendant Isabel Jones enriched herself to the detriment of Plaintiffs Edwin and Lisbeth Figueroa which in turn created a resulting trust.” (Opp’n at p. 7:13-21.)

Defendant counters that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support the imposition of a constructive trust, because the Complaint does not contain adequately pleaded underlying causes of action. Indeed, as noted in Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, footnote 3, “Glue-Fold’s complaint had a fourth cause of action seeking imposition of a constructive trust and an accounting. The former is not an independent cause of action but merely a type of remedy for some categories of underlying wrong…Because both of these equitable forms of remedies are dependent upon a substantive basis for liability, they have no separate viability if all of Glue-Fold’s other causes of action are time-barred.” In addition, as noted in Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at page 373, cited by Plaintiffs, “[a] constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed where the defendant holds title or some interest in certain property which it is inequitable for him to enjoy as against the plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the Complaint does not contain any allegations pertaining to the purported imposition of a constructive trust.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.

D.    Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In support of the fourth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress,

Plaintiffs allege that “[g]iven that the Defendant constantly goes back and forth from being helpful or hindering the Plaintiffs in their efforts to improve the property it is impossible to know what she intended or did not intend. The Plaintiffs however have had to live with constant worry and concern for their home and the health risks it imposes upon them, their children, and their pets.” (Compl., ¶ 49.) In the demurrer, Defendant notes that “[n]egligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort; the tort is negligence.” (Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517, 532.) Defendant notes that Plaintiffs plead a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, not negligence. Plaintiffs do not respond to this point in the opposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action, without leave to amend.

            Motion to Strike

A court may strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of a pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

As set forth above, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to each of the causes of action of the Complaint. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike portions of the Complaint is denied as moot.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action is sustained, with leave to amend. Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal within 30 days of the date of this order. (Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 186 [“An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not a final judgment; a judgment of dismissal follows such an order as a matter of course.”].) 

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Order. 

DATED:  April 28, 2023                                ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court