Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV21513, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV21513    Hearing Date: November 8, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

On July 1, 2022, Plaintiffs Edwin Figueroa and Lizbeth Figueroa (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant Isabel Jones (“Defendant”).

The original Complaint asserted causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of warranty of habitability, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant demurred to each of these causes of action and moved to strike portions of the Complaint. On April 28, 2023, the Court issued an Order sustaining Defendant’s demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend. Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action of the Complaint was sustained without leave to amend. Defendant’s motion to strike was denied as moot.

            On May 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of contract, and (3) breach of warranty of habitability.

            Defendant now demurs to each of the causes of action of the FAC. Plaintiffs oppose.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice. 

Discussion

A.    Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

B.     Allegations of the FAC

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that around January of 2005, Plaintiffs were approached by Defendant with an offer to move into the property at 4928 Granada Street, Los Angeles, CA 90042 (the “Subject Property”). (FAC, ¶¶ 4, 7.) Defendant said that the Subject Property would have a “rent to own” Agreement, and Defendant would credit Plaintiffs with two years’ worth of payments that would be applied to the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs accepted the agreement and moved into the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs allege that the Subject Property had issues that need to be repaired, including but not limited to a leaking roof, mold, and a mice infestation. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Defendant neglected to make any repairs to the Subject Property and denied Plaintiffs the ability to attempt repairs on their own. (FAC, ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs allege that around September of 2012, Plaintiffs grew tired of the issues with the Subject Property, and decided they would move from Los Angeles. (FAC, ¶ 10.) On or about April 17, 2013, Plaintiffs signed on the purchase of a home located at 4317 W Avenue L4, Quartz Hill, California. (FAC, ¶ 13.)

In September of 2017, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that she was going to add them to the title of the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Defendant filed a Grant Deed to add Plaintiffs to the title of the Subject Property on September 29, 2017. (FAC, ¶ 16.)

Defendant then came to Plaintiffs in or about October of 2017 and “sought to have them…get a loan under their names.” (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s the loan had not gone through, the Defendant in or about December 2, 2017 asked the Plaintiffs to sign a quit claim deed to remove themselves from the title of the Subject Property.” (FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs agreed. (FAC, ¶ 19.)

Plaintiffs also allege that “in September of 2018…Plaintiff requested that the Defendant take Edwin Figueroa off the title on the Lancaster home. By October 2018 the house in Lancaster transferred from Plaintiff Edwin Figueroa to Antonio Castro and Defendant…” (FAC, ¶ 20.) Defendant “promised that upon sale of the property she would transfer title to the Subject Property to the Plaintiffs…” (FAC, ¶ 21.)

Then, “[o]n or about December 31, 2021 Defendant came to Plaintiffs with a possible solution to the issue of the Subject Property. Plaintiffs would sign a written agreement that stated Defendant Isabel Jones would be adding Plaintiffs to the title of the Subject Property so that Plaintiff Edwin Figueroa could apply for loans for the desperately needed repairs. Defendant would be given $53,000.00 on top of the loan needed for the repairs. Defendant returned later that New Year’s Eve asking Plaintiffs for the handwritten agreement which was granted and given to the Defendant.” (FAC, ¶ 24.) Then, “Plaintiffs learned on or about January 10, 2022 that Defendant no longer wanted to be removed from the tittle [sic]. Instead Defendant would merely add Plaintiffs to the title of the Subject Property. Given the myriad of issues in the Subject Property and the need for funds to get the repairs done the Plaintiffs had little choice but to agree…” (FAC, ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs then alleges that “they realized that [Defendant] had no interest in deeding them the Subject Property and further allege that she never had a desire to do so since they made their initial agreement back in 2005…” (FAC, ¶ 28.)

Plaintiffs allege they made a formal complaint to the Housing Department of the City of Los Angeles. (FAC, ¶ 28.) On or about April 25, 2022 City Inspector Javier Ramos Sr. inspected the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n or about June of 2022 Defendant notified the Housing Department of the City of Los Angeles that all the repairs had been completed. The matter was closed until Plaintiffs contacted the inspectors and informed them that no work was actually done upon the Subject Property. As of June 14, 2022 the case has been reopened. Defendant informed the Plaintiffs of her intention to retaliate against them by evicting them from the Subject Property. Defendant as [sic] in fact filed an unlawful detainer action…” (FAC, ¶ 31.)

C.     First, Second, and Third Causes of Action of the FAC

In the demurrer, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ causes of action for quiet title, breach of contract, and breach of warranty of habitability are barred by the statute of frauds. Defendant notes that pursuant to Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(3), “[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent:…(3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).)

In support of the first cause of action for quiet title to real property, Plaintiffs allege that “[g]iven the length of time and the repeated changes to the agreement the Plaintiffs allege that [Defendant] had no intention to ever transfer title of the Subject Property to them and merely made hallow promises all the while collecting rent the Plaintiffs rightfully believed was part of a valid rent-to-own agreement. Yet due to the undue influence that [Defendant] had upon her son Edwin Figueroa excuses which should have given rise to suspicions instead were accepted at face value. Upon their belief that the Defendant was not acting in a fraudulent manner they proceeded with the action currently before the court.” (FAC, ¶ 34, p. 9.) Plaintiffs seek “a declaration that Plaintiffs are entitled to the legal and equitable ownership of the real Subject Property and that title thereto should be vested in Plaintiff’s name alone…” (SAC, ¶ 34, p. 10.) Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]he claims for Constructive Trust by the Plaintiffs rest in the clear fraud engaged by the Defendant and the undue influence she held upon her family.” (SAC, ¶ 35.)

In the demurrer, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs allege, “[a]round January of 2005 the Plaintiffs were approached by Defendant with an offer to move into the Subject Property at 4928 Granada Street which was located next door to their then current address of 4932 Granada Street. Defendant said that the Subject property would have the same ‘rent to own’ agreement…The Plaintiffs accepted the agreement…” (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 8, emphasis added.) Defendant thus asserts that “Plaintiffs allege in the FAC that they entered into a verbal agreement with Defendant in approximately 2005 for Defendant to eventually transfer title in the Property to Plaintiffs.” (Demurrer at p. 6:14-15, emphasis in original.) Defendant cites to Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1503, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[b]ecause the Rossbergs sought to allege a contract subject to the statute of frauds, they must allege a written contract signed by BofA and their failure to do so is a legal issue properly decided on demurrer.”

Moreover, as Defendant notes, Plaintiffs allege that they agreed to sign a quit claim deed to remove themselves from the title of the Subject Property. (FAC, ¶ 19, Ex. 3.) The Quitclaim Deed is dated December 2, 2017. (Ibid.) The FAC does not appear to allege that there was any written agreement to transfer title in the Subject Property to Plaintiffs after the alleged Quit Claim Deed was executed.

In support of the second cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiffs allege that “in or about January of 2022 an oral agreement was made between themselves and the Defendant. The Defendant since that time has not performed her part of the agreement even though the Plaintiffs have paid rent as part of a rent-to-own agreement consistently since that time. The Defendant kept insisting the contract was in place and used her influence upon her son Plaintiff Edwin Figueroa to change the terms of the agreement to her unilateral benefit until…it was clear that Defendant…had no intention to perform her part of the contract.” (FAC, ¶ 36, emphasis added.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the inaction by the Defendant, Plaintiffs have suffered damages in an amount not as ascertained, but the estimate on the Subject Property makes it worth a little over one million dollars...” (FAC, ¶ 37.)

As to the breach of contract cause of action, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs allege that an “oral agreement was made between themselves and the Defendant” in about January of 2005. (FAC, ¶ 36.) Defendant asserts that “[t]his on its face renders the FAC subject to demurrer because the alleged agreement is oral and is for the purchase of real property.” (Demurrer at p. 7:15-16.)

In support of the third cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendant has been charging rent for the Plaintiffs to reside on the property since they moved in. This was part of an alleged rent-to-own agreement between the parties. No writing exists between the parties as to terms of a lease, but given the years upon the property alongside the Defendant accepting rent created specific obligations between [Defendant] as a Landlord and the Plaintiffs as tenants on the property.” (FAC, ¶ 40, emphasis added.)

As to the third cause of action, Defendant cites to Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 631, where the California Supreme Court held that “a warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases in California.” As discussed, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]round January of 2005 the Plaintiffs were approached by Defendant with an offer to move into the Subject Property at 4928 Granada Street,” that “Defendant said that the Subject property would have [a]…‘rent to own’ agreement,” and that Plaintiffs “accepted the agreement and moved into the Subject Property.” (SAC, ¶¶ 7-8, underline added.) To the extent Plaintiffs are alleging that they entered into a lease agreement with Defendant as of 2005, Defendant asserts that any such agreement is barred by the statute of frauds. As set forth above, “[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent:…(3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3), emphasis added.) In the opposition, Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that any purported lease agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant pertaining to the Subject Property is for a longer period than one year.  

In addition, in the opposition, Plaintiffs appear to concede that they are alleging that an oral agreement was made between Plaintiffs and Defendant. They assert that “a clear agreement, albeit orally, was made between the Plaintiffs and Defendant in which in exchange for transferring ownership of property located in Quartz Hill, California would be placed on title to the property owned by the Defendant. Part of this was a rent-to-own agreement which the Defendant fully benefited from.” (Opp’n at p. 6:14-19.)

Plaintiffs appear to argue that the statute of frauds is inapplicable here because a “constructive trust” was imposed. Plaintiffs cite to Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 373, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[a] constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed where the defendant holds title or some interest in certain property which it is inequitable for him to enjoy as against the plaintiff. Section 2224 of the Civil Code provides that: ‘One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.’ In order to create a constructive or involuntary trust as defined in section 2224, no conditions other than the three stated in that section are necessary: the existence of a res (property or some interest in property), the plaintiff’s right to that res, and the defendant’s gain of the res by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust or other wrongful act. A constructive trust is a remedial device primarily created to prevent unjust enrichment; equity compels the restoration to another of property to which the holder thereof is not justly entitled.” (Internal citations omitted.) Plaintiffs note “[t]hat the statute of frauds does not apply where a constructive trust is imposed is well settled.” (Edwards v. Edwards (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 33, 40.)

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he wrongful action as alleged in the complaint was that after the agreement was made between the Plaintiffs and Defendant in 2012 that while the Plaintiffs did everything to perform their pat [sic] of the rent-to-own agreement the Defendant did nothing but collect money from the Plaintiffs which she in turn used to pay off the mortgage owned upon the property in Quartz Hill, California. This fact which can be proven at trial will establish that Defendant…enriched herself to the detriment of Plaintiffs Edwin and Lisbeth Figueroa which in turn created a resulting trust.” (Opp’n at p. 7:13-21.) 

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs “have not alleged the constructive trust exception to the [statute of frauds].” (Demurrer at p. 8:22.) As set forth above, “[i]n order to create a constructive or involuntary trust as defined in section 2224, no conditions other than the three stated in that section are necessary: the existence of a res (property or some interest in property), the plaintiff’s right to that res, and the defendant’s gain of the res by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust or other wrongful act.” (Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 373.)

Defendant asserts that here, Plaintiffs fail to allege “facts supporting their right to the Subject Property” and “a wrongful acquisition of the Subject Property by [Defendant].”

(Demurrer at p. 9:10-12.) As noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs allege (as set forth above) that “Defendant in or about December 2, 2017 asked the Plaintiffs to sign a quit claim deed to remove themselves from the title of the Subject Property…Plaintiffs preferred to avoid angering the Defendant and agreed.” (FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs attach a copy of the Quitclaim Deed as Exhibit 3 to the FAC. (FAC, ¶ 19, Ex. 3.) The Quitclaim Deed provides, inter alia, that “Grantors, Edwin Giovanni Figueroa and Lizbeth Figueroa…Hereby remise, release and forever quitclaims to Grantee, Isabel Jones, a married woman as her sole and separate property, the Real property in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California…Commonly known as: 4928 Granada Street, Los Angeles, CA 90042.” (Ibid.) The Quitclaim Deed is dated December 2, 2017. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiffs’ “admission that they voluntarily transferred their share of the title to [Defendant] defeats any notions of fraud or wrongdoing by her to support Constructive Trust.” (Demurrer at p. 12:2-3.) Plaintiffs do not appear to address the foregoing points in the opposition, or demonstrate how Plaintiff purportedly has a “right to that res…” (Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 373.)  

Defendant also asserts that the FAC is defective because it is uncertain. Defendant asserts that “after alleging the above-discussed verbal ‘rent to own’ agreement, the Complaint alleges various promises between the parties but it is not clear if these are supposed to form part of the oral ‘rent to own’ agreement or other agreements between the parties.” (Demurrer at p. 11:17-20, citing FAC, ¶¶ 10-21.) In the opposition, Plaintiffs do not address this argument or appear to dispute that the causes of action of the FAC fail for uncertainty.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for quiet title, the second cause of action for breach of contract, and the third cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability, without leave to amend. As set forth above, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to these causes of action in the original Complaint. In addition, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any way that they could amend their causes of action to alleviate the problems with the causes of action discussed above.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action of the FAC is sustained, without leave to amend.

The Court orders Defendant to file and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal within 30 days of the date of this order. (Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 186 [“An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not a final judgment; a judgment of dismissal follows such an order as a matter of course.”].) 

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Order. 

DATED:  November 8, 2023                          ________________________________

Hon. Rolf M. Treu

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court