Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV22953, Date: 2023-10-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV22953 Hearing Date: February 16, 2024 Dept: 50
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DENISE WHEELER, Plaintiff, vs. CENTER STREET
LENDING CORPORATION, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22STCV22953 |
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Hearing Date: |
February 16, 2024 |
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Hearing
Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER
RE: ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION |
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Background
Plaintiff Denise Wheeler (“Plaintiff”) filed
this action on September 21, 2023 against Defendant Center Street Lending
Corporation (“Defendant”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) violation
of Civil Code section 2923.55 and (2) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.
In
the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times, she owned the
property located at 637 E 29th Street, Los Angeles CA 90011. (Compl., ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n mid-2015, a fire virtually destroyed most of the
Property and left it in severe disrepair.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges
that “[o]n August 20, 2015, Plaintiff received a refinance from [Defendant] in
the amount of $350,000.00.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) “In the loan origination process,
Plaintiff was told by [Defendant] to use a different address for her personal
residence. Plaintiff alleges that [Defendant] knew Plaintiff’s only residence
was the property but was told to use a different address to fund the loan.”
(Compl., ¶ 11.) “In February 2016, the loan came due, and Plaintiff was unable
to pay the balloon amount.” (Compl., ¶ 13.) “In September 2017, [Defendant]
filed a Notice of Default. On December 26, 2017, [Defendant] filed a Notice of
Trustee’s Sale.” (Compl., ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff
further alleges that “[o]n January 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy. Plaintiff made payments throughout the bankruptcy until early 2023
when [Defendant] filed a Motion for Relief from stay.” (Compl., ¶ 15.) “The
Bankruptcy court granted the Motion for Relief from stay and [Defendant]
recorded a new Notice of Default on May 31, 2023.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff
alleges that “[o]n September 5, 2023, Defendant recorded a Notice of Trustee’s
Sale and set the property for auction on October 3, 2023. Despite the fact that
Defendant failed to contact Plaintiff to ‘assess her financial situation and
explore options to avoid foreclosure’ as required by Civil
Code 2923.55, Defendant intends to proceed [sic] the sale...” (Compl., ¶
18.)
On
January 4, 2024, the Court issued a minute order in this action providing, inter
alia, that “the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for a “preliminary
Injunction to enjoin the Trustee’s Sale of the subject property located at 637
E. 29th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90011.”
The
Court’s January 4, 2024 minute order further provides that “[o]n the Court’s
own motion, the Order to Show Cause Re: Re: Temporary Restraining Order to
Restrain Recording of a Notice of Trustees Sale scheduled for 01/04/2024 is
continued to 02/16/24…Defendant may file and serve by January 18, 2024 at
4:00p.m. a brief pertaining to the requested amount of the bond. Plaintiff may
file and serve a response thereto on or before February 1, 2024 at 5:00p.m.”
On
January 18, 2024, Defendant filed a brief captioned “Defendant’s Evidence of
Damages Defendant May Sustain by Reason of the Injunction Ordered by the Court
on January 4, 2024.” Defendant also filed a second supporting declaration on
January 19, 2024.
On February
1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an “Opposition to Defendant Center Street Lending
Corp.’s Motion for Plaintiff to Post an Undertaking.”
Discussion
Defendant cites to Code
of Civil Procedure section 529, subdivision (a), which provides that “[o]n
granting an injunction, the court or judge must require an undertaking on the
part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party
enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may
sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court finally decides that the
applicant was not entitled to the injunction. Within five days after the
service of the injunction, the person enjoined may object to the undertaking.
If the court determines that the applicant’s undertaking is insufficient and a
sufficient undertaking is not filed within the time required by statute, the
order granting the injunction must be dissolved.”
Defendant notes that “the
trial court’s function is to estimate the harmful effect which the injunction
is likely to have on the restrained party, and to set the undertaking at that
sum.” ((ABBA Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1,
14.) “[T]he first step is to identify the types of damages
which the law allows a restrained party to recover in the event that the
issuance of the injunction is determined to have been unjustified. The sole
limit imposed by the statute is that the harm must have been proximately caused
by the wrongfully issued injunction. (§ 529,
subd. (a).) Case law adds only the limitation that the damages be
reasonably foreseeable.” (Ibid.) The ABBA
Court also noted that “[i]t is now well settled that reasonable counsel fees
and expenses incurred in successfully procuring a final decision dissolving the
injunction are recoverable as ‘damages’ within the meaning of the language of
the undertaking, to the extent that those fees are for services that relate to
such dissolution…Thus, a successful appeal from an order granting an
injunction, after notice and hearing, gives rise to liability on the bond for
damages in the amount of the attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting that
appeal. If the preliminary injunction is valid and regular on its face,
requiring the defendant to defend against the main action in order to
demonstrate that the injunction was wrongfully issued, the prevailing defendant
may recover that portion of his attorney’s fees attributable to defending
against those causes of action on which the issuance of the preliminary
injunction had been based.” (Id. at pp. 15-16 [internal
quotations and citations omitted].)
Defendant also
cites to Surety Sav. & Loan Assn. v. National
Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 752, 759, where the Court of Appeal noted that “where
a sale under a deed of trust wrongfully is enjoined compensation for the delay
caused by the injunction may include an award to the beneficiary of interest on
the amount which would have been received from the enjoined sale, provided
the amount of the award, taking into consideration the amount received from the
subsequent sale, may not exceed the actual loss sustained.”
Defendant
asserts that its damages
as a result of the injunction include $105,900.00, representing Defendant’s
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs “to be incurred
in either prosecuting an appeal of the preliminary injunction, or defending at
trial against those causes of action upon which the preliminary injunctive
relief had been granted.” (Defendant’s
Brief at p. 3:15-19, citing ABBA Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist, supra, 235
Cal.App.3d at p. 16.) Defendant submits the declaration of its
counsel, who states that “[b]ased on my prior experience, I anticipate
that $105,900 will represent a fair estimate of Defendant’s fees and costs to
defend and pursue this matter through trial…” (Im Decl., ¶ 3.)
Defendant also asserts that it “has
suffered from lost profits that it could have generated through recovery of the
balance on the Loan on its original maturity date. For instance, Defendant
could have made separate loans with the balance recover [sic] on the Loan. In
addition, Defendant’s carrying costs associated with the Loan…Defendant will
continue to suffer from these costs as a result of the imposition of the
injunction because it cannot enforce its security interest and stop the ongoing
losses associated with the unpaid Loan.” (Defendant’s Brief at pp. 3:24-4:1.) In
support of this assertion, Defendant submits the declaration of Luis Montero,
an “authorized agent of defendant Center Street Lending Corporation.” (Montero
Decl., ¶ 1.) Mr. Montero states that “[t]he Loan remains outstanding and as of
the date of this Declaration, the total outstanding balance on the Loan is
$615,951.55.” (Montero Decl., ¶ 9.) Mr. Montero further states that “[t]he
daily interest charge is $261.42,” and that “Defendant’s monthly costs
associated with the Loan are 182.57 per month for force-placed insurance.”
(Montero Decl., ¶ 9.) The Court notes that Mr. Montero does not appear to set
forth a total amount of “lost profits that [Defendant] could have generated
through recovery of the balance on the Loan on its original maturity date.”
(Defendant’s Brief at p. 3:24-25.)
In any event, Defendant states that it “requests
that the Court order Plaintiff to post an undertaking in an amount no less than
an amount that will reimburse Defendant for its attorney’s fees and costs and
ongoing costs for the Loan. At minimum, Defendant should be repaid for the fair
rental value of the Property which Plaintiff admitted was $4,500 to represent
the value of the ongoing loss to Defendant from its inability to foreclose
pursuant to the Deed of Trust and sell the Property at a foreclosure sale.”
(Defendant’s Brief at p. 4:4-9.)[1] Accordingly,
Defendant appears to concede that an undertaking in the amount of $4,500.00 is
sufficient.
In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that
the Court should “deny Defendant’s motion for Plaintiff to post an undertaking
in an amount of $4,500.00. Defendant will not suffer any monetary damages or
harm because of the issuance of this injunction given the amount of equity that
there is in this property for the sole and senior lien holder and thus,
Plaintiff requests that any bond requirement be $1,000.00.” (Opp’n at p.
3:15-18.) Plaintiff contends that “[i]n the foreclosure context, the bond
amount is discretionary because the security interest in the Deed of Trust is
sufficient security.” (Opp’n at p. 2:7-8.) But Plaintiff does not appear to
cite to any binding legal authority in support of this proposition. (See
Opp’n at p. 2:7-27.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court
finds that Defendant has shown that an undertaking in the requested amount of
$4,500.00 is warranted here.
Conclusion
Based
on the foregoing, and pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 529, the Court orders that Plaintiff shall post an
undertaking in the amount of $4,500.00.
Defendant
is ordered to give notice of this Order.
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge,
Los Angeles Superior Court
[1]Defendant appears
to cite to “Exhibit F” to Defendant’s Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice
filed on November 30, 2023 in this case. Exhibit “F” is “Debtor’s Second
Revised Sixth Amended Disclosure Statement Describing Revised Sixth Amended
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization filed on November 7, 2019 in in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, in the matter In
re: Denise Latrice Wheeler, Case No. 2:18-bk-10597.” Exhibit “F” provides, inter
alia, that “Debtor also generates rental income from rental property in the
amount of $4,500 per month.” (Defendant’s Supplemental Request for Judicial
Notice, Ex. F, p. 10:16-18.)