Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV24209, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV24209 Hearing Date: February 23, 2024 Dept: 50
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VICTORIA TREVISAN, Plaintiff, vs. MERCK & CO., INC., et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22STCV24209 |
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Hearing Date: |
February 23, 2024 |
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Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MERCK
& CO., INC., AND MERCK SHARP & DOHME LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT |
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Background
Plaintiff
Victoria Trevisan (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on July 27, 2022 against
Defendants Merck
& Co., Inc., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., Providence Health System –
Southern California, Providence Medical Institute, Providence Medical
Associates, Inc., and Tristy Shaw, M.D. The original Complaint alleged causes of
action for (1) negligence, (2) strict liability (failure to warn), (3) strict
liability (manufacturing defect), (4) breach of warranty,
(5) fraudulent
concealment, (6) fraudulent misrepresentation, (7) violation of California’s
Unfair Competition Law, (8) medical malpractice, (9) battery, and (10) breach
of fiduciary duty.
Merck & Co., Inc.
and Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC (formerly Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp.) (jointly, the “Merck Defendants”)
demurred to the third, fifth, and sixth causes of action of the Complaint. The Merck
Defendants also moved to strike portions of the Complaint. On April 14, 2023,
the Court issued an Order providing, inter alia, that “[t]he Merck
Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained, with leave to
amend. The Merck Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action
is overruled. The Merck Defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to paragraphs 362, 382, 383, 405, 406, 433, 434, 448, 449,
476, and 477 of the Complaint, and paragraph F of the Prayer for Relief, with
leave to amend. The Merck Defendants’ motion to strike is otherwise denied.” (April 14, 2023 Order at p. 32:23-27.)
On May 4, 2023,
Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging causes
of action for (1) negligence, (2) strict liability (failure to warn) (3)
breach of warranty, (4) fraudulent concealment, (5) fraudulent
misrepresentation, (6) violation of California’s Unfair
Competition Law, and (7) breach of fiduciary duty.
In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his common-law products
liability, negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, fraud, and breach
of fiduciary duty case arises out of serious and debilitating injuries,
including autoimmune injuries and resulting sequalae that plaintiff, Victoria
Trevisan, sustained as a result of receiving multiple injections of the
Gardasil vaccine, which was manufactured, labeled, and promoted by defendants
Merck & Co., Inc., and Merck, Sharp and Dohme Corporation…and prescribed
and administered by medical provider defendant, Tristy Shaw, M.D. at a
Providence Medical Institute medical office…” (FAC, ¶ 1.)
The Merck Defendants now
move to strike portions of the FAC. The motion is unopposed.
Discussion
A court may strike any “irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or all or any part of a
pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court
rule, or an order of the court.” ((Code Civ.
Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike
shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which
the court is required to take judicial notice.” ((Id., § 437.)
The Court’s April 14,
2023 Order on the Merck Defendants’ previous motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s
original Complaint provides, inter alia, that “the Court grants the Merck Defendants’ motion to strike
Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations. Specifically, the Court grants the
Merck Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 362, 382, 383, 405, 406, 433,
434, 448, 449, 476, and 477 of the Complaint, and paragraph F of the Prayer for
Relief.” (April 14, 2023 Order at p. 29:23-26.) In the April 14, 2023 Order,
the Court noted that:
“The Merck Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to allege that any
Merck officer, director, or managing agent committed any purportedly
oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious act, and that Plaintiff does not plead
that any manager had ‘advance knowledge’ and ratified the
alleged conduct at issue.
Plaintiff asserts that she has adequately alleged
ratification. Plaintiff points to paragraph 14 of the Complaint, which alleges
that ‘[a]t all times
herein mentioned, defendants were fully informed of the actions of their agents
and employees, and thereafter no officer, director or managing agent of
defendants repudiated those actions, which failure to
repudiate constituted adoption and approval of said actions, and all defendants
and each of them thereby ratified those actions.’ (Compl., ¶ 14.) The Merck
Defendants assert that ‘not repudiating’ conduct does not mean a manager authorized it and does not mean that any
manager was aware of it. The
Merck Defendants note that ‘[a] company ratifies
a managing agent’s decision when it knows about and accepts the decision.’ (Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 521, 554.) The
Merck Defendants also note that this allegation does not identify any officer,
director or managing agent who supposedly ‘fail[ed] to repudiate’ the conduct.
Plaintiff also asserts that
paragraph 14 of the Complaint is alleged ‘in conjunction with pages of allegations
concerning high-level corporate conduct, conduct that would not be possible without officer, director, or managing agent performance
or ratification.’ (Opp’n at p. 9:1-3.) But the Court agrees with the Merck
Defendants that Plaintiff does not specifically allege that ‘the advance knowledge and conscious
disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice’
was ‘on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.’ (Civil
Code section 3294, subdivision (b).)” (April 14, 2023 Order at pp.
29:1-22.)
In
the instant motion, the Merck Defendants move to strike punitive damages
allegations in the FAC. Plaintiff
seeks punitive damages in connection with the first cause of action for
negligence, the second cause of action for strict liability (failure to warn),
the third cause of action for breach of express warranty, the fourth cause of
action for fraudulent concealment, and the fifth cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation. (FAC, ¶¶ 382, 383, 405, 406, 418, 419, 433, 434, 461, 462.)
In the Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff alleges that she seeks “exemplary
and punitive damages against Merck.” (FAC, p. 79:20.) In addition, in the
“General Allegations” section of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that “[m]oreover,
by engaging in conduct that Merck knew was unsafe and likely to injure
patients, and by placing Gardasil’s profits ahead of patient safety, Merck has
engaged in the same fraudulent, malicious and oppressive conduct it engaged in
with respect to Vioxx. Plaintiff, therefore, requests that exemplary damages be
assessed against Merck, so as to, once again, attempt to deter Merck and other
would-be defendants from engaging in similar reprehensible conduct.” (FAC, ¶
362.)
In the instant motion, the Merck
Defendants state that they “bring[] this second Motion to Strike because
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still does not specify how any of the conduct
alleged in the Amended Complaint was supposedly ratified; still does not state
where or when such ratification occurred; and still does not identify any
employees whose actions were allegedly sanctioned by the corporation’s
decision-makers.” (Mot. at p. 1:16-19.) As the Merck Defendants note, the FAC
now alleges as follows:
“At all times
herein mentioned, defendants were fully informed of the actions of their agents
and employees, and thereafter no officer, director or managing agent of
defendants repudiated those actions, which failure to repudiate constituted
adoption and approval of said actions, and all defendants and each of them
thereby ratified those actions. See Harman v. Shell
Oil Co., 68 Cal.App.3d 240,
250 (1977). Moreover, at all times herein mentioned, the advance
knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or acts or
oppression alleged herein were done on the part of Merck officers, directors
and/or managing agents, including, but not limited to, Eliav Barr (currently
Head, Global Clinical Development and Chief Medical Officer, Merck Research Laboratories
as well as Senior Vice President Global Medical and Scientific Affairs),
Christine Velicer (currently Senior Global Director of Medical and Scientific
Affairs), and Alison Fisher (currently Director Worldwide Regulatory Affairs,
Vaccines at Merck).” (FAC, ¶ 14.)
Civil Code
section 3294, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]n an action for the breach
of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) provides as follows:
“An employer
shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of
an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the
unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of
the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct
for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge
and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression,
fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent
of the corporation.”
The Merck Defendants cite to Grieves v.
Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 167-168, where the Court of Appeal found that “Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b)…sets forth the
circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for punitive damages
based upon acts of an employee. They include the employer’s (1) advance knowledge of the employee’s
unfitness; (2) authorization or ratification of the wrongful conduct; and (3)
personal culpability. Moreover, a corporate employer may be liable only if the
knowledge, authorization, ratification or act was on the part of an officer,
director or managing agent of the corporation. Petitioners claim
they satisfied the foregoing requirement by alleging Hospital was negligent and
careless in the hiring of the other defendants; undertook to carry out the care
and treatment of Cheryl; and allowed the tubal ligation to be performed without
confirming the baby had no abnormalities. However, we fail to see how any of
those allegations sets forth facts to show Hospital’s advance knowledge,
authorization or ratification.” (Internal citation omitted.)
The Merck Defendants assert that
“Plaintiff here has done no more to plead corporate ratification than in Grieves,
and her punitive damages allegations should be stricken for the same reason.
The Amended Complaint is silent as to any action taken by any named individual
to bless the supposedly malicious or fraudulent conduct alleged in the Amended
Complaint.” (Mot. at pp. 3:28-4:3.) As set forth above, Plaintiff did not file
an opposition to the instant motion. Plaintiff thus does not dispute this
point.
The Court agrees with
the Merck Defendants that Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts
demonstrating how any of the conduct alleged in the FAC was supposedly
ratified on the part of the officers,
directors and/or managing agents referenced in paragraph 14
of the FAC. Accordingly, the Court grants the Merck Defendants’ motion to
strike. The
Court grants the motion without leave to amend because the
Court previously granted the Merck Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages allegations in the
original Complaint on similar grounds (See April 14, 2023 Order).
Moreover, Plaintiff does not oppose the instant motion and thus has not
proffered any basis for any amendment to cure the foregoing deficiencies. ¿¿¿
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the
Court grants the Merck Defendants’
motion to strike paragraphs 362, 382, 383, 405, 406, 418, 419, 433, 434,
461, and 462 of the FAC, and paragraph F of the
Prayer for Relief of the FAC, without leave to amend.
The
Court orders the Merck
Defendants to file and
serve an answer to the FAC within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿¿
The Merck Defendants are
ordered to give notice of this Order.
DATED: February 23, 2024 ________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court