Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV28721, Date: 2023-03-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV28721    Hearing Date: March 24, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff 1^st Source Bank (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on September 2, 2022 against Defendants Screamline Investment Corporation (“Screamline”), Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc., Kamrouz Farhadi, Shoeleh Sapir, and Vahid Sapir (collectively, “Defendants”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) enforcement of guaranty, (3) enforcement of guaranty, (4) enforcement of guaranty, (5) enforcement of guaranty, (6) claim and delivery, (7) injunctive relief, (8) conversion, (9) unjust enrichment, (10) account stated, and (11) open book account.

Defendants now demur to the seventh and ninth causes of action of the Complaint. No opposition to the demurrer was filed.

Discussion

A.    Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿

B.    Allegations of the Complaint  

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 6, 2018, Plaintiff and Screamline executed a Loan and Security Agreement (the “Loan Agreement”) whereby Plaintiff agreed to lend money to Screamline for the purchase of goods. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, Screamline executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note-Term on or about June 6, 2018 (the “Note”). (Compl., ¶ 18.)

Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, Plaintiff and Screamline executed certain Amendment Agreements amending the terms of the Loan Agreement and Note on or about April 7, 2020, and again on July 3, 2020 (the “Amendments”). (Compl., ¶ 19.) The Loan Agreement, Note, Amendments and certain “Guaranties” are sometimes collectively referred to in the Complaint as the “Loan Documents.” (Compl., ¶ 19.)

To secure the obligations pursuant to the Loan Documents, and pursuant thereto, Screamline granted to Plaintiff interests in and liens upon, among other things, certain property

(“Collateral”), including without limitation various motor vehicles (“Vehicles”). (Compl., ¶ 20.)

By letters dated May 31, 2022 and June 16, 2022, notice was given to Screamline and

Kamrouz Farhadi, Shoeleh Sapir, and Vahid Sapir (collectively, the “Guarantors”) that Screamline was in default due to, among other things, failure to make payments when due. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 24.) On June 29, 2022, a further notice was given to Screamline and the Guarantors, by which Plaintiff accelerated the balance due pursuant to the Loan Documents based upon Screamline’s default thereunder, and demanded that Screamline assemble the Collateral and deliver it to Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 25.)

            Plaintiff alleges that Screamline failed to meet its obligations as set forth in the Loan Documents. (Compl., ¶ 26.) Pursuant to the Loan Documents, there is now due from Screamline the sum of $971,409.28 as of August 9, 2022, plus accrued and unpaid interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and other sums. (Compl., ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also seeks possession of the Vehicles that are allegedly being wrongfully detained by the Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 28.)

C.    Uncertainty

As an initial matter, the Court does not find that the seventh and ninth causes of action are ambiguous or unintelligible. Therefore, the special demurrer on the basis of uncertainty is overruled.¿ 

D.    Seventh Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief

In support of the seventh cause of action for injunctive relief, Plaintiff alleges that

“[d]espite Plaintiff’s demand, Defendants, and each of them, have refused, and continue to refuse, to deliver the Vehicles to Plaintiff, and now are, in wrongful possession of the Vehicles in

violation of Plaintiff’s right to immediate possession and benefit.” (Compl., ¶ 68.) Plaintiff requests that the Court “issue a Preliminary Injunction enjoining and restraining Defendants’ officers, managers, principals, directors, representatives, shareholders, agents, servants and/or employees and any third parties or lessees in possession of any of the Vehicles from: (i) selling, moving, transporting, negotiating the sale, transferring, leasing, renting, making assignments of, or otherwise removing the Vehicles; and (ii) diverting, spending or using the proceeds of the Vehicles or otherwise interfering with Plaintiff’s recovery of such proceeds.” (Compl., ¶ 70.)

            Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim is a remedy, not a cause of action. Defendants note that “[i]njunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted.” (Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168; see also Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 734, [“[i]njunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.”].) Defendants assert that the seventh cause of action accordingly fails to state a claim. Plaintiff did not file an opposition and thus does not dispute this point.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh cause of action.

E.     Ninth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment

In support of the ninth cause of action for unjust enrichment, Plaintiff alleges that “[d]espite Plaintiff’s demand, Defendants, and each of them, have refused, and continue to refuse, to deliver the Vehicles to Plaintiff, and now are, in wrongful possession of the Vehicles in

violation of Plaintiffs right to immediate possession and benefit.” (Compl., ¶ 76.) Plaintiff also alleges that “since on or about April, 2022, Defendants, and each of them, have had use of the Vehicles without paying therefor,” and that “[b]y virtue of such use, Defendants, and each of them, have been unjustly enriched and Plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable rental/lease value for said Vehicles.” (Compl., ¶¶ 77, 78.) 

Defendants assert that “unjust enrichment” is not a cause of action, such that the ninth cause of action also fails to state a claim. Defendants cite to Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793, where the Court of Appeal noted that “there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. The phrase Unjust Enrichment does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so. Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. It is synonymous with restitution.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the ninth cause of action. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh and ninth causes of action is sustained, without leave to amend. Plaintiff does not oppose the demurrer and therefore has not demonstrated any way that it could amend the Complaint to alleviate the problems discussed above.

Defendants are ordered to file their Answer to the Complaint within 10 days of this Order. 

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  March 24, 2023                              ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court