Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case 22STCV29091 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff David Hickman (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment action on September 7, 2022 against Defendants Martin Luther King, Jr. – Los Angeles (MLK-LA) Healthcare Corporation and SnapMedTech, Inc. The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) harassment based on

race – hostile work environment, (2) discrimination based on race, (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA, (4) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, (5) whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, (6) whistleblower retaliation in violation of Health & Safety Code section 1278.5, (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (8) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress.[1]

SnapMedTech, Inc. dba SnapNurse (“SnapMedTech”) now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to submit his claims to binding arbitration and to stay or dismiss the proceedings pending the arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. Martin Luther King, Jr. – Los Angeles Healthcare Corporation (“MLK-LA”) moves to join SnapMedTech’s motion to compel arbitration.[2] Plaintiff opposes.

In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability, etc.). ((Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414.)

Generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. ((Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2); (see Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.)

“California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration.” ((Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) “This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” ((Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts “involving interstate commerce.” (9 U.S.C. section 2, et seq.; (Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)

SnapMedTech notes that Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 22, 2021, he was hired as a registered nurse by SnapMedTech, a staffing agency for healthcare professionals. (Compl., ¶ 8.) On or about January 26, 2022, Plaintiff was assigned to the Emergency Department at MLK-LA. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s employment contract at the hospital was terminated by Defendants on or about June 24, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 9.)

SnapMedTech indicates that Plaintiff electronically signed an Arbitration Agreement on or about May 5, 2021. (Sims Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) SnapMedTech states that “[w]ith a predominantly remote workforce, execution of documents during the onboarding process are [sic] done electronically and remotely by the new hire. Employees have private access to the on-boarding system through the use of a password that they create at the time of hire/onboarding. The documents are executed via signature either through utilizing a finger on a cell phone to sign the document or alternatively using a mouse to sign the document on a computer. . . Only the employee has the ability to access the account, through the use of the established password, and execute documents. SnapNurse has no access or knowledge of the passwords used by employees.” (Sims Decl., ¶ 4.)

“Employee, on behalf of himself or herself and all heirs, successors, and assign,

agrees to resolve any and all disputes or claims related in any manner whatsoever to his or her employment with SnapNurse, including but not limited to, any claims against SnapNurse, its officers, shareholders, employees, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, parents, or successors (together, the “Company”), by binding arbitration before a neutral third party in accordance with the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). Disputes or claims related to employment include causes of action, allegations, claims or charges based upon federal or state statutes or laws, including, but not limited to, any federal or state civil rights or human rights law, federal or state wage and hour law, federal or state family, personal, or medical leave law, federal or state laws relating to benefits, tort or contract laws, or any other federal or state law affecting employment in any manner whatsoever. Employee agrees to pursue any disputes or claims on an individual basis in arbitration. Specifically, Employee agrees not to pursue, or allow anyone to pursue on his or her behalf, any claims on a class or collective basis in arbitration or otherwise. Judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The arbitrator shall be agreed upon by both sides unless unable to agree, in which case the arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the normal procedures of the AAA. The parties agree that the Federal Arbitration Act governs the enforceability of this agreement to arbitrate.” (Sims Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Arbitration Agreement, or that it covers the claims Plaintiff asserted against SnapMedTech in this matter.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that SnapMedTech has demonstrated the existence of an arbitration agreement and that it covers the claims asserted against SnapMedTech by Plaintiff in this action. Thus, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to prove a ground for denial.

Plaintiff argues that the subject Arbitration Agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the parties’ circumstances at that time. It focuses on the factors of oppression or surprise. ((Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1329.) “Oppression generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. In the case of arbitration agreements in the employment context, the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.” ((Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 84 [quotations and citations omitted].) “Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms. ((A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 484 [internal quotations omitted].)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that there was procedural unconscionability because the Arbitration Agreement was presented on a take it or leave it basis. Plaintiff states that he was required to electronically sign onboarding documents, including the Arbitration Agreement, to be employed by Defendant. (Hickman Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also states that he was not given an opportunity to negotiate or reject the Arbitration Agreement, and that there was no opt-out provision. (Hickman Decl., ¶ 6.) SnapMedTech counters that Plaintiff does not indicate in his declaration that he requested or attempted to negotiate the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. While it is true that “the existence of contract of adhesion supports a finding of procedural conscionability,” the court must still weigh the level of procedural unconscionability against any substantive unconscionability to determine whether the agreement can be enforced. ((Baxter v. Genworth North America Corp. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 713, 723.)

Plaintiff also asserts that the Arbitration Agreement was “oppressively and deceptively presented.” (Opp’n at p. 8:1.) Plaintiff states that the Arbitration Agreement was presented with other company policies within the onboarding documents. (Hickman Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff states that defendant did not explain to Plaintiff the content or the significance of the Arbitration Agreement. (Hickman Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also states that he was never informed and did not understand that he was giving up his right to a jury trial. (Hickman Decl., ¶ 5.) SnapMedTech counters that in Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1674, the Court of Appeal found that “[r]easonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it. A party cannot use his own lack of diligence to avoid an arbitration agreement.” In addition, the Brookwood Court found that “plaintiff was bound by the provisions of the [arbitration] agreement regardless of whether [she] read it or [was] aware of the arbitration clause when [she] signed the document.” ((Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) SnapMedTech also notes that “[o]rdinarily, one who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it.” ((Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163.)

Plaintiff also asserts that the language of the Arbitration Agreement supports a finding of surprise. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites to OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 128, where the California Supreme Court found that “[t]he facts also support the trial court’s finding of surprise. The agreement is a paragon of prolixity, only slightly more than a page long but written in an extremely small font. The single dense paragraph covering arbitration requires 51 lines. As the Court of Appeal noted, the text is ‘visually impenetrable’ and ‘challenge[s] the limits of legibility.’” Plaintiff argues that “[t]he agreement appears to be in small font, requiring the user to ‘zoom in,’ to read, especially on a mobile device.” (Opp’n at p. 9:8-9.) However, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that the Arbitration Agreement was written in extremely small font, as was the case in OTO. Plaintiff also asserts that the “sentences are complex, filled with statutory legal jargon,” (Opp’n at p. 9:6) but does not cite to legal authority demonstrating that this constitutes “surprise.”

SnapMedTech asserts that the failure to attach the AAA rules does not render the Arbitration Agreement unconscionable. SnapMedTech cites to Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246, where “Baltazar argue[d] that a somewhat greater degree of procedural unconscionability is present here—warranting closer scrutiny of the substantive fairness of the agreement’s terms—because Forever 21 did not provide Baltazar with a copy of the AAA’s rules for arbitration of employment disputes, which, by the terms of the arbitration agreement, govern any arbitration between the parties.” The Baltazar Court noted that “Baltazar relies on Trivedi, which notes that [n]umerous cases have held that the failure to provide a copy of the arbitration rules to which the employee would be bound supported a finding of procedural unconscionability. But in Trivedi itself and in each of the Court of Appeal decisions cited therein, the plaintiff’s unconscionability claim depended in some manner on the arbitration rules in question. These cases thus stand for the proposition that courts will more closely scrutinize the substantive unconscionability of terms that were artfully hidden by the simple expedient of incorporating them by reference rather than including them in or attaching them to the arbitration agreement. Baltazar’s argument accordingly might have force if her unconscionability challenge concerned some element of the AAA rules of which she had been unaware when she signed the arbitration agreement. But her challenge to the enforcement of the agreement has nothing to do with the AAA rules; her challenge concerns only matters that were clearly delineated in the agreement she signed. Forever 21’s failure to attach the AAA rules therefore does not affect our consideration of Baltazar’s claims of substantive unconscionability.” ((Id. at p. 1246 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Here, Plaintiff does not argue that he had been unaware of some element of the AAA rules that were hidden when he signed the Arbitration Agreement.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that there is a low level of procedural unconscionability.

Plaintiff notes that the Arbitration Agreement does not contain any provision concerning costs, and asserts that this renders the agreement substantively unconscionable. Plaintiff cites to a nonbinding federal case in support of this assertion. ((Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 916.) In addition, SnapMedTech notes that in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 113, the California Supreme Court held that “a mandatory employment arbitration agreement that contains within its scope the arbitration of FEHA claims impliedly obliges the employer to pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration. Accordingly, we interpret the arbitration agreement in the present case as providing, consistent with the above, that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs. The absence of specific provisions on arbitration costs would therefore not be grounds for denying the enforcement of an arbitration agreement.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, SnapMedTech states that it “agrees to bear all costs unique to arbitration for the above-captioned matter.” (Sims Decl., ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff also asserts that the AAA’s limited discovery rules are unconscionable. The Arbitration Agreement provides, inter alia, that the arbitration shall be “before a neutral third party in accordance with the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’).” (Sims Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Plaintiff cites to Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 106, where the Court of Appeal found that “[e]ven though the law requires plaintiffs to establish their elder abuse claims under the clear and convincing evidence standard, the governing AAA commercial rules only permit depositions in exceptional cases at the discretion of the arbitrator, upon a showing of good cause, and consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration. It is unclear whether an arbitrator would consider plaintiffs’ case to be exceptional with sufficient good cause to warrant depositions. In addition, although the arbitrator has authority to require document discovery, there is no provision for interrogatories or requests for admissions. These discovery restrictions run the risk of frustrating plaintiffs’ statutory rights under the Act.” (Internal quotations omitted].) Plaintiff asserts that here too, it is unclear whether the arbitrator would consider Plaintiff’s claims sufficient to warrant depositions or even written discovery.

SnapMedTech asserts that Plaintiff’s fear that the arbitrator will limit his ability for discovery is unfounded considering the Armendariz Court operated under the assumption that arbitration would be limited in some form by the arbitrator. SnapMedTech notes that the Armendariz Court found that “it is undisputed that some discovery is often necessary for vindicating a FEHA claim. Accordingly, whether or not the employees in this case are entitled to the full range of discovery provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.05, they are at least entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator(s) and subject to limited judicial review pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2.” ((Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 106.) In addition, Dougherty, cited by Plaintiff, was not an employment matter and involved different claims.

Plaintiff also asserts that the Arbitration Agreement lacks mutuality. Plaintiff cites to Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 117, where the California Supreme Court “conclude[d] that Stirlen and Kinney are correct in requiring this ‘modicum of bilaterality’ in an arbitration agreement. Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on ‘business realities.’”

Plaintiff asserts that here, the language of the Arbitration Agreement shows that it is only the employee giving up their right to a court trial. SnapMedTech counters that there is no lack of mutuality. As set forth above, the Arbitration Agreement provides, inter alia, that “Employee . . . agrees to resolve any and all disputes or claims related to any manner whatsoever to his or his employment with SnapNurse…” (Sims Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) SnapMedTech notes that in Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 251, the plaintiff “contend[ed] the arbitration clause lack[ed] mutuality, referencing the sentences beginning with the word ‘I’ (e.g., ‘I hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration … .’; ‘I further agree … that all disputes … which might arise out of or related to my employment with the company … will be submitted to binding arbitration’…According to him, such language require[d] only him but not defendant to submit to binding arbitration.” The Nguyen Court disagreed finding that “[t]he arbitration clause in this case…provides for arbitration of ‘all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the submission of [the] application’ and ‘all disputes … which might arise out of or relate to my employment with the company.’ Under Baltazar, such language created a mutual agreement to arbitrate all employment related disputes.” (Id. at pp. 251-252.) The Nguyen Court also “decline[d] to find that…the mere inclusion of the words ‘I agree’ by one party in an otherwise mutual arbitration provision destroys the bilateral nature of the agreement.’” ((Id. at p. 252.)

Plaintiff also argues that the Arbitration Agreement’s “purported waiver of Plaintiff’s right to act as a PAGA representative goes to the weight of the unconscionability.” (Opp’n at p. 12:16-17.) Plaintiff cites to Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 360, abrogated on other grounds by Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, where the California Supreme Court “conclude[d] that an arbitration agreement requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy.” As SnapMedTech notes, the Arbitration Agreement does not expressly reference PAGA actions. Rather, it provides that “Employee agrees to pursue any disputes or claims on an individual basis in arbitration. Specifically, Employee agrees not to pursue, or allow anyone to pursue on his or her behalf, any claims on a class or collective basis in arbitration or otherwise.” (Sims Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff also notes that the Arbitration Agreement does not contain any language informing the employee that they are waiving the Constitutional right to a jury trial. However, Plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority indicating that the lack of such provision in an Arbitration Agreement makes it unconscionable.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a high level of substantive unconscionability. In light of the finding of only a low level of procedural unconscionability, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability.

In its joinder, MLK-LA argues that the Arbitration Agreement encapsulates Plaintiff’s claims against MLK-LA, who is a third party beneficiary of the agreement.

“[A] third party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement may enforce it.” ((Ronay Family Limited Partnership v. Tweed (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 830, 838.) In Ronay, the Court of Appeal found that “[t]o invoke the third party beneficiary exception, Tweed and TFI had to show that the arbitration clause of the account agreement was made expressly for [their] benefit. It is not necessary that the beneficiary be named and identified as an individual. A third party may enforce a contract where he shows that he is a member of a class of persons for whose benefit it was made.” ((Id. at pp. 838-839 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was hired by SnapMedTech and assigned to MLK-LA. (Compl., ¶ 8; see also Compl., ¶ 26, “[d]espite signing a new employment agreement with SnapNurse for assignment at MLKCH…”) MLK-LA argues that the Arbitration Agreement “explicitly states that any and all claims or disputes arising from Plaintiff employment shall be resolved by binding arbitration. Since Plaintiff identifies that SNAPMEDTECH assigned Plaintiff to work at MLK-LA, MLK-LA is an express third-party beneficiary, and can now enforce the Agreement.” (Joinder at p. 6:11-14.)

But as Plaintiff notes, MLK-LA does not provide evidence demonstrating that the Arbitration Agreement was made for its benefit. Plaintiff notes that in Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 301, the Court of Appeal found that “[t]he test for determining whether a contract was made for the benefit of a third person is whether an intent to benefit a third person appears from the terms of the contract.” The Court does not find that MLK-LA has shown that an intent to benefit MLK-LA appears from the terms of the subject Arbitration Agreement. As Plaintiff notes, the Arbitration Agreement does not expressly indicate that it applies to the companies where Plaintiff is assigned.

MLK-LA also asserts that Plaintiff’s claims against it should be compelled to arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In addition, MLK-LA asserts that nonsignatories of an arbitration agreement may invoke arbitration agreements under ordinary agency and contract principles.

MLK-LA cites to Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 784, where “Narciso Garcia appeal[ed] from an order granting defendant Pexco, LLC’s (Pexco) motion to compel arbitration. Garcia opposed the motion on the ground Pexco was not a party to the arbitration agreement.” The Court of Appeal found that “Garcia is equitably estopped from denying Pexco’s right to arbitrate and the agency exception applies.” ((Ibid. .)

In Garcia, “[t]emporary staffing company Real Time Staffing Services, LLC, doing business as Select Staffing (Real Time), hired Garcia in 2011 as an hourly employee. Real Time then assigned Garcia to work for Pexco. As part of the hiring process with Real Time, Garcia filled out an employment application which included an arbitration agreement between Garcia and Real Time. Pexco [was] not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement provided that ‘any dispute’ Real Time and Garcia could not resolve informally would be determined by binding arbitration. The arbitration agreement also specifically defined disputes subject to arbitration as including, but not limited to, those regarding wages, vacation pay, sick time pay, overtime pay, state and federal employment laws and regulation, including but not limited to, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938…including the Equal Pay Act of 1963...” (Garcia v. Pexco, LLC, supra, at pp. 784-785.)

The Garcia Court noted that “Courts recognize exceptions to the general rule which allow nonsignatories to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of the scope of the agreement. One of the exceptions is equitable estoppel. Under this exception, a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. The doctrine applies where the claims are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from the arbitrable claims against signatory defendants.” ((Id. at pp. 785-786 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

The Garcia Court found that “[o]n these facts, it is inequitable for the arbitration about Garcia’s assignment with Pexco to proceed with Real Time, while preventing Pexco from participating. This is because Garcia’s claims against Pexco are rooted in his employment relationship with Real Time, and the governing arbitration agreement expressly includes statutory wage and hour claims. Garcia does not distinguish between Real Time and Pexco in any way. All of Garcia’s claims are based on the same facts alleged against Real Time. Garcia cannot attempt to link Pexco to Real Time to hold it liable for alleged wage and hour claims, while at the same time arguing the arbitration provision only applies to Real Time and not Pexco. Garcia agreed to arbitrate his wage and hour claims against his employer, and Garcia alleges Pexco and Real Time were his joint employers. Because the arbitration agreement controls Garcia’s employment, he is equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate his claims with Pexco.”
((Id. at pp. 787-788.)

MLK-LA asserts that here, Plaintiff’s claims against MLK-LA arise solely from and, are connected to, his employment with SnapMedTech, making his claims against SnapMedTech and MLK-LA inseparable and intertwined. MLK-LA also notes that similar to Garcia, Plaintiff here alleges that “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and alleges that at all times relevant herein, defendants SnapNurse and MLK-LA were his joint employers.” (Compl., ¶ 10; see also Compl., ¶ 31, “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and alleges that defendants MLK-LA, SnapNurse, and DOES 1 through 6 inclusive, were his joint employers within the meaning of the FEHA.”)

Plaintiff asserts that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s factual allegations of harassment, discrimination and retaliation are against Defendant MLK-LA, not SnapMedTech. Plaintiff asserts that the only factual allegations against SnapMedTech are that it was copied on one of Plaintiff’s complaints, and that SnapMedTech notified Plaintiff that his contract at MLK-LA was not going to be renewed. (Compl., ¶¶ 27-28.) However, each of the causes of action of the Complaint (except for the eighth cause of action) is alleged against both Defendants.

Plaintiff also cites to Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539, 554, and notes that the Court of Appeal in that case found that “[t]he only conclusion that can be drawn on this record is that there is some relationship between Hanlees and its affiliated dealerships. But it is unclear what that relationship may be and it has not been shown to be integral to support the application for equitable estoppel.” (Emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have not shown that they are “integrally” related in such a way that equitable estoppel principles would permit enforcement of the agreement by a nonparty to the agreement.

However, the Court finds that Garcia v. Pexco, LLC, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 782 is on point here. As set forth above, the Court of Appeal in that case found that “Garcia agreed to arbitrate his wage and hour claims against his employer, and Garcia alleges Pexco and Real Time were his joint employers. Because the arbitration agreement controls Garcia’s employment, he is equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate his claims with Pexco.” ((Id. at p. 788.) Similarly here, Plaintiff alleges that SnapNurse and MLK-LA were his joint employers (Compl., ¶ 10), and each of the causes of action (except for the eighth cause of action) is alleged against both Defendants.

For the foregoing reasons, SnapMedTech’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. MLK-LA’s joinder is granted.

The entire action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff’s arbitrable claims against SnapMedTech and MLK-LA.

The Court sets an arbitration completion status conference on _______________ 2023, at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. The parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the arbitration five court days prior to the status conference, with a courtesy copy delivered directly to Department 50.¿¿

[1]Each of the causes of action of the Complaint are alleged against MLK-LA, and each of the causes of action of the Complaint except for the eighth cause of action are alleged against SnapMedTech.

[2]SnapMedTech and MLK-LA are referred to jointly herein as “Defendants.”

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50