Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV32940, Date: 2024-07-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV32940 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 50
KERYN REDSTONE, Plaintiff, vs. ALEJANDRO HERRERA, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22STCV32940 |
Hearing Date: |
July 10, 2024 |
|
Hearing
Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: MOTION TO VACATE
ENTRIES OF DEFAULT |
Background
Plaintiff Keryn Redstone
(“Plaintiff”) filed this action on October 6, 2022 against Defendants Alejandro
Herrera, an individual; Alejandro Herrera, as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust
Dated August 1, 2021; Herrera Clifton Hess, PC, and Herrera Law Partners. The
Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) professional
negligence,
(3) fraud, (4) negligent
misrepresentation, (5) breach of fiduciary duty, (6) conversion,
(7) intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and (8) “Civil Rico - 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a)-(c).”
On January 17, 2023,
defaults were entered in this matter against Alejandro Herrera, an
individual, Herrera Clifton Hess, PC, and Herrera Law Partners. On February 28, 2023, a default was
entered against Alejandro Herrera, as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust
Dated August 1, 2021.
On August 1, 2023, the Court issued an Order that the default entered
against Herrera Clifton Hess, PC on January 17, 2023 is set aside.
Alejandro Herrera, an
individual and as trustee of the HCH Holdings Trust Dated August 1, 2021 and
Herrera Law Partners (collectively, “Defendants”) now move for an order
setting aside the defaults entered against them in this matter. Plaintiff
opposes.
Discussion
Defendants first cite to Code
of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) in support of the motion.
This provision provides that “[t]he court may,
upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes
in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order
directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party,
set aside any void judgment or order.” ((Id., § 473, subd. (d).)
As an initial matter, Defendants
assert that “the Court should set aside entry of defaults and default
judgments entered as against the HERRERA Defendants as void for failure to
properly serve summons.” (Mot. at p. 12:1-2.) Defendants
cite to Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[a] motion to vacate a judgment on the ground that it is
void is timely if made within a reasonable time, which has been determined
to be any time within two years of the entry of the judgment.” (Internal
citations omitted.) However, the Court did not enter default judgments
against the Defendants in this matter. Rather, as set forth above, defaults
were entered against Defendants. Thus, there is no “default judgment” to be set
aside.
Defendants also assert that “relief from
entry of default is appropriate under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473.5.” (Mot. at p. 14:3-4.)
Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a), “[w]hen service of a summons has
not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a
default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action,
he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or
default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall
be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the
earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her;
or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default
or default judgment has been entered.” Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (b), “[a] notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment
and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the
motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section
1005, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that
the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused
by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall
serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading
proposed to be filed in the action.”
Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 473.5,
subdivision (c), “[u]pon a finding by the court that the motion
was made within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that his or her
lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her
avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set aside the default or
default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend
the action.” In Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th
540, 547, the Court of Appeal noted that “[a]ctual
notice in section 473.5 means genuine knowledge of
the party litigant…[A]ctual knowledge has been strictly construed, with the aim
of implementing the policy of liberally granting relief so that cases may be
resolved on their merits.” (Internal
quotations and citations omitted.)
Defendants
assert that “[t]o date, the HERRERA Defendants still have not
received written notification that default has been entered and the Court
docket does not show the filing of any such notice.” (Mot. at p. 14:13-14.) In
the opposition, Plaintiff does not appear to provide any evidence that
Defendants were served with written notice that the subject defaults had been
entered.
In his declaration in support of the motion, Alejandro Herrera states
that “I was never served with either the Summons or Complaint in this matter
either on my own behalf, as trustee of the HCH HOLDINGS TRUST DATED AUGUST 1,
2021 or on behalf of HERRERA LAW PARTNERS.” (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 6.)[1] Alejandro
Herrera states that “[o]n or around January 27, 2022[2],
through examining the Court’s Register of Actions I became aware that Plaintiff
had filed a complaint and requests for entry of default against me and several
entities and non-entities. On about May 29, 2023 I pulled up the Proof of
Service and learned that Plaintiff claims to have personally served me with the
Complaint. Shocked, I discussed the issue with my wife and was surprised when
she told me that on October 18, 2022 and again in January someone had come to
the house, asked if she was ‘Alex Herrera’ and had left some papers with her.
My wife’s name is Alexandra Herrera. She had forgotten to give the documents to
me and was not sure where she placed them.” (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 2.)
In his declaration, Alejandro Herrera states that “[o]n about January
27, 2023, I reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel Mr. Galperin and advised him of
the facts I had learned regarding the attempted service and requests for entry
of default. I asked counsel to set aside the defaults and default judgments to
allow me file responsive documents, though they had not been entered at that
time…Counsel later got back to me and advised he would not set the defaults
aside because he believed service to be valid, but that he would consider a
stipulation.” (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 4.) Alejandro Herrera states that
“[f]or several months after communicating with Plaintiff’s counsel, I was
dealing with the deaths of close relatives and illness of my minor child and
wife, and eventually myself,” and that “around May 2023 I reported the matter
to my insurance carrier and requested an attorney be retained to represent me
in this matter.” (Alejandro Herrera
Decl., ¶ 5.) Alejandro Herrera also states that “I was not attempting to evade
service of the Summons or Complaint in this matter at any time.” (Alejandro Herrera
Decl., ¶ 7.)
Defendants assert that accordingly, they did not receive actual notice
of the action in time to defend. Defendants assert that “[t]he HERRERA
Defendants were not avoiding service at any time…Nor is there any inexcusable
neglect on the part of the HERRERA Defendants that caused the default. Since
all requirements for relief under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473.5 are satisfied, the Court should set aside entry of
default and grant The HERRERA Defendants leave to defend the action.” (Mot. at
p. 15:16-20.) Defendants provide a copy of their proposed answer to the
Complaint with the motion. (Kajo Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.)
Plaintiff does not appear to assert that Defendants’ request for
relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 should
be rejected as untimely. As set forth above, Code of
Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a) provides in part that “[t]he notice of motion shall be served and filed within a
reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after
entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service
on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been
entered.” Here, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that Defendants were not
provided with written notice that the subject defaults had been entered against
them. In addition, no default judgments have been entered against Defendants. The
Court finds that Defendants have shown that their notice of motion was served
and filed within a “reasonable time.” The Court also finds that Defendants have
shown that their “lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not
caused by [their] avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect…” (Code Civ. Proc., §
473.5, subd. (c).)
Based
on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated grounds for
the requested relief under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473.5.[3]
Conclusion
Based
on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to set aside the defaults entered against
them is granted.
The
January 17, 2023 defaults
entered against Alejandro Herrera, an individual and Herrera Law
Partners are ordered set aside. The February
28, 2023 default entered against Alejandro Herrera, as trustee of the HCH
Holdings Trust Dated August 1, 2021 is ordered set aside.
The Status Conference Review of default judgment is vacated.
Defendants
are ordered to file and serve their proposed answer to the Complaint within 10
days of the date of this Order.¿¿
Defendants are ordered to give notice of this
Order.
DATED:
________________________________
Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court
[1]Alejandro Herrera
states that Herrera Law Partners is his business. (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶
1.)
[2]It appears that
the reference to “January 27, 2022” is a typo. (Alejandro Herrera Decl.,
¶ 2.) In the motion, Defendants state that “[t]he HERRERA Defendants were not
aware that defaults had been entered until around January 27, 2023.”
(Mot. at p. 15:14-15, emphasis added, citing Herrera Decl., ¶ 2.) In addition,
Alejandro Herrera states that “[o]n about January 27, 2023, [he] reached out to
Plaintiff’s counsel…” (Alejandro Herrera Decl., ¶ 4.)
[3]In light of the
foregoing, the Court need not and does not address Defendants’ remaining
arguments in the motion.