Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22STCV33986, Date: 2023-03-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33986    Hearing Date: March 22, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

            Background

Plaintiff La Toya Johnson (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment action on October 20, 2022 against Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (“Defendant”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) religious discrimination, (2) religious discrimination – failure to engage in the interactive process, (3) religious discrimination – failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (4) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

Defendant now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to submit all claims against Defendant in this action to binding arbitration; and dismissing or staying this action until completion of the arbitration. No opposition to the motion was filed.

Legal Standard

In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability, etc.). (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414.) 

Generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.)

“California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) “This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts “involving interstate commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 2, et seq.; Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)

            Discussion

A.    Existence of Arbitration Agreement

In support of the motion, Defendant submits the Declaration of Bryan Hickey, whose current role with Defendant is as the Executive Director of Talent Acquisition, Human Resources. (Hickey Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Hickey indicates that on June 18, 2019, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement entitled, “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims.” (Hickey Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.)

The Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims provides, inter alia, that “except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, you and Cedars-Sinai agree that all claims or controversies in any way relating to or associated with your employment or the termination of your employment (‘Claims’) will be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. For purposes of this Agreement, Claims includes, but is not limited to, all statutory, contractual and/or common law claims including, but not limited to, claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Equal Pay Act of 1963; the Family and Medical Leave Act; the California Fair Employment and Housing Act; the California Family Rights Act; the California Labor Code and Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission; the Fair Labor Standards Act; and the Americans With Disabilities Act.” (Hickey Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claims in this action are directly related to her employment and the termination of her employment. As Defendant notes, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that she was an employee of Defendant and worked her final position as a Senior Administrative Assistant. (Compl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff worked for Defendant from 2008 to October 8, 2021. (Compl., p. 2:2.) In the first half of September 2021, Plaintiff sought a religious exemption to Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccine requirement because of her faith. (Compl., ¶ 12.) On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff’s request for a religious accommodation was denied by Defendant due to an alleged undue hardship. (Compl., ¶ 12.) On September 23, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an appeal. (Compl., ¶14.) On October 8, 2021, with no answer to Plaintiff’s appeal, Plaintiff was terminated from her job for not complying with Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. (Compl., ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff does not oppose the instant motion, and thus does not dispute that she signed the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims, or that it covers the claims made in the Complaint. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated the existence of an arbitration agreement, and that it covers the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion and thus does not present any grounds for denial of the motion.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. The entire action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff’s arbitrable claims against Defendant.

The Court sets an arbitration completion status conference on March 22, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. The parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the arbitration five court days prior to the status conference, with a courtesy copy delivered directly to Department 50.¿¿ 

Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this Order.¿ 

DATED:  March 22, 2023                             

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court