Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 22STCV35217, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff Jerry Usselman (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) religious discrimination in violation of FEHA, (2) disability discrimination in violation of FEHA, (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of FEHA,

(4) failure to engage in good faith interactive process in violation of FEHA, (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA, and (6) failure to prevent discrimination and/or retaliation in violation of FEHA.

Defendant now moves for an order continuing the March 20, 2024 trial date to August 31, 2024, or as soon thereafter as the Court can accommodate and continuing all related pre-trial dates and discovery deadlines in accordance with the new trial date. Plaintiff opposes.

“The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (c).) “In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (d).)

Defendant asserts that good cause exists for continuing the trial date here. In his supporting declaration, Defendant’s counsel states that “[o]n August 11, 2023, my office attempted to reserve the earliest date for a hearing on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. No hearing dates before the March 20, 2024 trial (and with enough time to provide timely notice of same) were available. Ultimately, my office reserved the earliest date available for a hearing on a motion for summary judgment/ adjudication, which was August 1, 2024. After October 23, 2023, I have repeatedly checked the Court’s Reservation System to see if any summary judgment hearing dates prior to trial (and with enough time to provide timely notice of same) have become available and have seen none.” (Waneis Decl., ¶ 7.)

Defendant asserts that “[t]he interests of justice are best served by a continuance. Granting a trial continuance is in the interest of justice and judicial economy, as Defendant believes that the ruling on its MSJ/MSA will obviate the need for a trial in this matter or significantly limit the issues to be determined by the fact finder.” (Mot. at p. 7:15-19.) Defendant further asserts that “[a]bsent a continuance, Defendant will undoubtedly be prejudiced by commencing trial on March 20, 2024, before Defendant’s MSJ/MSA can be heard.” (Mot. at p. 2:14-16.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, circumstances relevant to the Court’s determination of a motion for a trial continuance include, inter alia, “[w]hether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (d)(10).)

Another circumstance relevant to the Court’s determination is “[w]hether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (d)(2).) Defendant’s counsel states that “[t]here has been no previous continuance of trial in this case.” (Waneis Decl., ¶ 14.) In addition, circumstances relevant to the Court’s determination include “[a]ny other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (d)(11).) Defendant’s counsel states that he “intend[s] to be on paternity leave from mid-February 2024 to mid-April 2024.” (Waneis Decl., ¶ 13.)

In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that “Plaintiff has had his deposition taken as [sic] is prepared to go to trial on the merits. Any delay in the case, would lead to prejudice, since it would be a delay to his day in court. As to the factor (10), the interests of justice are not served with a continuance, because LAUSD should not be bailed out from its counsel’s negligence.” (Opp’n at p. 4:21-24.) In the reply, Defendant counters that “Plaintiff seems to suggest that the Court’s unavailability of an earlier MSJ/MSA hearing date is somehow due to Defendant’s counsel’s ‘negligence;’ this is absurd. No earlier hearing dates were available and the parties were initially amendable [sic] to a trial continuance.” (Reply at p. 3:12-14.)[1]

In the opposition, Plaintiff also notes that on December 1, 2023, the Court issued a minute order providing, inter alia, that “DEFENDANTS EX PARTE APPICATION FOR AN ORDER TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND RELATED PRE-TRIAL DEADLINES AND DEADLINES TO AUGUST 1, 2024, AND SETTING THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR JUNE 3, 2024 IN ORDER FOR DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY filed by LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT on 11/30/2023 is Denied. Denied pursuant to C.R.C. 3.1202(c).”

On December 5, 2023, the Court issued a minute order providing, inter alia, that “DEFENDANTS EX PARTE APPICATION FOR AN ORDER TO ADVANCE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING DATE filed by LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT on 12/05/2023 is Denied. Pursuant to CRC 3.1204 (b)(1) declaration is silent on proposed opposition, if any.” In addition, on December 6, 2023, the Court issued a minute order providing, inter alia, that “DEFENDANTS EX PARTE APPICATION FOR AN ORDER TO ADVANCE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING DATE filed by LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT on 12/05/2023 is Denied. Paragraph 7 of Declaration of Peter Waneis is largely hearsay and not considered. Denied pursuant to C.R.C 3.1202(c).”

Plaintiff appears to argue that because the foregoing ex parte applications were denied, the instant motion must also be denied. As noted by Defendant, Plaintiff does not provide authority for such an assertion.

As discussed, Defendant’s counsel states that “[o]n August 11, 2023, [his] office attempted to reserve the earliest date for a hearing on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. No hearing dates before the March 20, 2024 trial (and with enough time to provide timely notice of same) were available. Ultimately, [his] office reserved the earliest date available for a hearing on a motion for summary judgment/ adjudication, which was August 1, 2024.” (Waneis Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant asserts that “[a]s this hearing date is after the currently set trial date, a continuance is necessary to allow Defendant to have its motion for summary judgment heard.” (Mot. at p. 7:8-9.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated that “the interests of justice are best served by a continuance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (d)(10).) In Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 526, 530, cited by Defendant, the Court of Appeal noted that “[w]e are sympathetic to the problems the trial courts experience in calendaring and hearing the many motions for summary judgment. However, the solution to these problems cannot rest in a refusal to hear timely motions.”

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated good cause for a trial continuance.[2]

The Court continues the final status conference to ______________, at 10:00 a.m., in Dept. 50 and trial to _____________, at 9:30 a.m., in Dept. 50.

[1]In his declaration in support of the motion, Defendant’s counsel states that “I spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel, Amanda Collins, about the unavailability of a hearing date on a summary judgment motion before the current trial date and Ms. Collins raised stipulating to a trial continuance to allow such a motion to be heard. I then began preparing a stipulation to continue trial, consistent with my discussion with Ms. Collins.” (Waneis Decl., ¶ 8.) Defendant’s counsel states that “On October 27, 2023, after I had followed up with Ms. Collins regarding a stipulation to continue trial so that Defendant’s MSJ/MSA could be heard, Plaintiff’s counsel, Ali Sachani, emailed me stating Plaintiff is not amenable to continue the trial date.” (Waneis Decl., ¶ 11.)

[2]The Court notes that Plaintiff also states in the opposition that “Plaintiff’s counsel intends to move forward with the Motion for Sanctions pursuant to CCP 128.7, should Defense Counsel continue to proceed with this Motion to Continue the Trial and related dates.” (Opp’n at p. 5:26-28.) Plaintiff does not request sanctions in the opposition to the instant motion, and as noted by Defendant, a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 “shall be made separately from other motions or requests…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50