Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 22VECV01348, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22VECV01348 Hearing Date: June 28, 2024 Dept: 50
|
TAMIM, LLC, Plaintiff, vs. EUGENE CHORNY, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22VECV01348 |
|
Hearing Date: |
June 28, 2024 |
|
|
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
ORDERS: (1) DEEMING PLAINTIFF TO BE THE PREVAILING PARTY (2) FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $19,050.00 |
||
Background
On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff Tamim, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a
“Complaint – Unlawful Detainer” in this action against Defendants Eugene Chorny
and Irina Ermakova (jointly, “Defendants”).
On April 3, 2024, the Court entered a “Judgment - Unlawful Detainer
Amended” in this action (herein, the “Amended Judgment”). The Amended Judgment
provides, inter alia, that the case was tried on March 13, 2024, and
that judgment is for Plaintiff and against Defendants. The Amended Judgment
further provides that the party entitled to possession of the premises located
at 13300 Burbank Boulevard Sherman Oaks, California 91401 is Plaintiff.
(Amended Judgment, ¶ 4.) In addition, the Amended Judgment provides that
Defendants must pay Plaintiff past-due rent in the amount of $21,480.75 and
holdover damages in the amount of $142,491.44, for a total judgment of
$163,972.19. (Amended Judgment, ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff now moves for an order determining Plaintiff to be the
prevailing party in this action, and for an award of attorney fees to be paid
by Defendants to Plaintiff in the amount of $19,050.00. The motion is
unopposed.
Discussion
A. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees
Pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a), “[i]n any
action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s
fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded
either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is
determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the
party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”
In
addition, Code
of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A) provides
that attorney’s fees, when
authorized by contract,
are allowable as costs.
Plaintiff asserts that it is
entitled to an award of attorney’s fees here. As set forth above, on April
3, 2024, the Court entered the Amended Judgment in this action, which provides,
inter alia, that judgment is for Plaintiff and against Defendants.
(Amended Judgment, ¶ 3.)
In his declaration in support of the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel
states that “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit ‘1’ is a true and correct copy of the
subject lease agreement…” (herein, the “Lease”). (Isaacs Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff
points to paragraph 31 of the Lease, which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
“31. Attorneys’ Fees. If any Party or
Broker brings an action or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in
tort, contract or equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party
(as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall
be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Such fees may be awarded in the same
suit or recovered in a separate suit, whether or not such action or proceeding
is pursued to decision or judgment. The term “Prevailing Party” shall include,
without limitation, a Party or Broker who substantially obtains or defeats the
relief sought, as the case may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment,
or the abandonment by the other Party or Broker of its claim or defense. The
attorneys’ fees award shall not be computed in accordance with any court fee
schedule, but shall be such as to fully reimburse all attorneys’ fees
reasonably incurred…” (Isaacs Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff asserts that here, although it is “not a signatory to the
lease (insofar as the lease was entered into between Plaintiff’s predecessor in
interest and Defendants), Plaintiff is nonetheless…entitled to an award of
fees” under paragraph 15.2 of the subject lease. (Mot. at p. 4:2-5.) Paragraph 15.2
of the Lease provides, inter alia, that “[a]ny buyer or transferee of
Lessor’s interest in this Lease shall be deemed to have assumed Lessor’s
obligation hereunder…” (Isaacs Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 15.2)
In addition, the Court notes that
the March 13, 2024 minute order in this matter provides, inter alia,
“Plaintiff Tamim, LLC’s exhibits 1 (Grant Deed Recorded on 9/2/21 at 8:00a.m.),
2 (Tenant Lease dated 7/1/05), 3 (Copy of Checks, 8 pages), 4 (Annuel Secured
Property Tax Bill), 5 (Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit), and 6 (Proof of
Service of Certified Mail Receipt) are admitted in evidence.” The March 13,
2024 minute order further provides that “Plaintiff, through the testimony of
witness Jonathan Cohen, a member of Plaintiff, provided evidence that Plaintiff
is the owner of the premises located at 13300 Burbank Blvd, Sherman Oaks, CA
(the ‘Premises’) (Ex. 1), and that it is the successor in interest to the
original landlord under the lease with Defendants for the Premises (the ‘Lease’)
(Ex. 2).” Further, Defendants do not oppose the instant motion. Thus, they do
not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees under the Lease.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
demonstrated its entitlement to attorney’s fees here.
B.
The Hourly Rate of
Counsel and the Reasonableness of the Requested Fees
“[T]he fee
setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the
number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. …
The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar
work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors
specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the
legal services provided.” ((PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citations omitted].)
“[T]he
court’s discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to
fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably
provided to his or her client.” ((Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 395.) The trial court may reduce the award
where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the
attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. ((Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he
verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are
entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are
erroneous.” (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees
of California State Univ., supra,
at p. 396.)
Plaintiff’s
counsel’s requested hourly billing rate is $300.00 per hour. (Isaacs
Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendants do not oppose the motion and thus do not challenge
Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested hourly rate. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable.
In his supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s
counsel states that “[t]he total hours I have devoted to this
case thus far is 58.4. At my hourly rate of $300.00 per hour in this case, this
sum is equal to $17,250.00.” (Isaacs Decl., ¶ 6.)[1] Plaintiff’s
counsel also states that “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit ‘2’ are true and correct
copies of my billing statements with description of my tasks and hours I
expended in connection with my representation of Plaintiff in this action.”
(Isaacs Decl., ¶ 5.) As Defendants do not oppose the instant motion, they do
not assert that any of Plaintiff’s billing entries are unreasonable. The Court
finds that the requested $17,250.00 is reasonable.
Plaintiff’s counsel also states that “I have
spent four hours preparing this motion, anticipate spending one hour replying
to Plaintiff’s opposition and anticipate spending an additional one hour at the
hearing of this motion. Accordingly, an additional $1,800.00 is requested in
connection with this motion.” (Isaacs Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants do not oppose the
instant motion, and Plaintiff did not file a reply in support of the motion.
Thus, the Court deducts $300.00 from the total amount requested (1 hour x $300/hr.)
///
///
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion
for attorney’s fees is granted. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the
amount of $18,750.00.
Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]The Court notes
that 58.4 multiplied by 300 is $17,520.00. However, Plaintiff seeks less than
this amount - $17,250.00.