Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV02043, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02043    Hearing Date: February 13, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Jasmin Gonzalez Herrera (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on January 31, 2023 against Defendant Spruce Power 1, LLC (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) “Consumer Legal Remedies Act,” (2) “Unfair Competition Law,” (3) “Failure of Consideration,” and (4) “Song Beverly.”

            In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that “[o]n or about January 11, 2022, Plaintiff entered into a Transfer of Solar Lease Agreement (‘Transfer’) with [Defendant] for the transfer of a Lease Agreement (‘Lease’). The Lease is for the photovoltaic system (‘PVS’), also known as a solar panel system, installed at Plaintiff’s residence.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) “The PVS was already installed when Plaintiff purchased the residence in January 2022. The Lease was originally executed in June of 2015 between the prior owner of the residence and Greenday Finance 1, LLC.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that “[s]ince signing the Transfer, Plaintiff has been informed and believes and therefore alleges that the PVS is unpermitted. The PVS has not produced energy since approximately March of 2020. [Defendant] did not inform Plaintiff of the unpermitted status of the PVS or that it was not producing any energy before Plaintiff agreed to the Transfer.” (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[Defendant] continues to bill for energy that has not been produced by the PVS.” (Compl., ¶ 13.)

            Plaintiff indicates that on January 26, 2024, the parties in this action executed a Settlement Agreement and Release. (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)

            Plaintiff now moves “for an order enforcing the settlement agreement in this action by entering the settlement agreement as a judgment.” Plaintiff also seeks an order that Defendant “pay $2,959.30 to Plaintiff for the attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the settlement agreement.” Defendant opposes.

Discussion

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).)

“Although a judge hearing a section 664.6 motion may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 [internal citations omitted, emphasis in original].)

In his declaration in support of the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel states that on January 26, 2024, the parties in this action executed a Settlement Agreement and Release (herein, the “Settlement Agreement”). (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) The Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that “[t]his Agreement shall be enforceable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. If any action in law or equity is brought to enforce or interpret the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses from the opposing party(ies).” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, § 17.)

The Settlement Agreement provides, inter alia, that “[o]n January 11, 2022, Gonzalez entered into a Transfer of Solar Agreement (‘Transfer’) with Guojun Xuan and Spruce to transfer the lease agreement (‘Lease’), for the photovoltaic system (‘PVS’) at Gonzalez’s newly purchased residence, from Guojun Xuan to Gonzalez.” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, Recital “A.”) Section 2(a) of the Settlement Agreement provides that “[t]he Transfer and Lease are rescinded. This includes extinguishment of any and all debt, liability, deficiencies, and/or obligations of Gonzalez pursuant to the Transfer and/or Lease.” (Ibid., § 2(a).)

Section 2(d) of the Settlement Agreement provides in part that “[u]pon complete execution of this Agreement, Spruce transfers the PVS to Gonzalez for $0. Upon completion of the terms stated in section 2.e. below, Spruce will provide no further warranties for the PVS and will have no other obligations regarding the performance, maintenance, or repairs to the PVS.” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, § 2(d).) Section 2(e) of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows:

“It is the intent of the Parties that the PVS will receive permission to operate (‘PTO’) within 120 calendar days from the complete execution of this agreement. To achieve this intention, Spruce shall use commercially reasonable efforts to repair any defects to the PVS, and place the PVS in an ‘Operational Condition’ (producing electricity according to design and specifications). Gonzalez shall fully cooperate with Spruce and its third-part [sic] contractor(s) in this effort. PTO shall be confirmed by a written notice from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (‘DWP’) stating the PVS has PTO. Operational Condition shall be confirmed by data from the monitoring system and a DWP billing statement that shows net generation from the PVS. It shall not be a breach of this section if PTO is not obtained with 120 days if such delays are caused by the DWP, or any other City of Los Angeles Department, so long as the PTO application is fully submitted to the DWP within 60 calendar days.” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, § 2(e).)

In his declaration dated September 16, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[p]ursuant to the terms of the Agreement, [Defendant] was to perform all of its obligations by the end of March 2024. As of the preparation of this declaration, I have not received notice that [Defendant] has performed its obligations.” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff asserts that “it is proper for the Court to enter a judgment enforcing the terms of the settlement as set forth in the signed Agreement.” (Mot. at p. 4:22-24.)

In the opposition, Defendant asserts that “[t]he issues raised in Plaintiff’s Motion have since been resolved, as the PTO was submitted and granted, and therefore Plaintiff’s Motion is moot and should be denied.” (Opp’n at p. 4:4-5.) Defendant’s counsel indicates, inter alia, that “[o]n October 10, 2024, [Defendant] submitted the PTO application to the LADWP,” and that “[o]n November 12, 2024, the LADWP granted the PTO application.” (West Decl., ¶¶ 13-14.) Defendant’s counsel asserts that “[t]he delay on the submission of the PTO application to the LADWP was due to the confusion between myself, [Defendant], Mr. Valdez, and Plaintiff regarding the necessary form required to submit to the LADWP.” (West Decl., ¶ 22.)

Defendant argues that it “fulfilled its obligations under the Settlement Agreement within a reasonable time and because the settlement terms did not contain a ‘time is of the essence’ clause, any delay by [Defendant] was not a material breach of any terms of the Settlement Agreement.” (Opp’n at p. 5:20-23.) Defendant cites to Johnson v. Alexander (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 806, 813, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[d]elay in performance is a material failure only if time is of the essence, i.e., if prompt performance is, by the express language of the contract or by its very nature, a vital matter.” (Internal emphasis omitted.)

In the reply, Plaintiff counters that “the cases cited in the Opposition arguing a ‘time is of the essence’ requirement and mootness, are completely unrelated to CCP §664.6.” (Reply at p. 3:14-16.) In the motion and reply, Plaintiff cites to Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1176, where “Pat Lukes appeal[ed] an order granting a motion for entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement…The settlement was intended to resolve a dispute between two neighbors concerning the scope of an easement.” The Court of Appeal in Hines found, inter alia, as follows:

“Lukes argues further that Hines prevented her performance by refusing to provide his written consent, as the property owner, to resurface the driveway…She cites the rule that a party’s prevention of performance by another party excuses the nonperformance. (Civ. Code, § 1511, subd. 1.) The effect of this rule is that the nonperformance does not constitute a breach of contract and does not give rise to a remedy for breach of contract. (Ninety Nine Investments, Ltd. v. Overseas Courier Service (Singapore) Private, Ltd. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1135 [6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 891]; Taylor v. Sapritch (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 478, 481–482 [101 P.2d 539].) The statutory language makes it clear, however, that a party moving for the entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 need not establish a breach of contract to support relief under the statute. Accordingly, the court was authorized to enter a judgment pursuant to the settlement regardless of whether Lukes’s nonperformance of her settlement obligations was excused.” (Hines v. Lukes, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1184-1185.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated grounds for the Court to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the parties’ Settlement Agreement. As discussed, Plaintiff provides evidence of a signed Settlement Agreement, which provides, inter alia, that “[t]his Agreement shall be enforceable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6...” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, § 17.) As set forth above, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, “[i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).) As discussed above, the Hines Court noted that “a party moving for the entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 need not establish a breach of contract to support relief under the statute.” (Hines v. Lukes, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185.) Thus, Plaintiff need not establish a breach of the Settlement Agreement by Defendant to support relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. 

Lastly, Plaintiff “requests an order that Defendant Spruce Power 1, LLC pay $2,959.30 to Plaintiff for the attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the settlement agreement.” (Notice of Motion at p. 1:26-28.) As set forth above, the Settlement Agreement provides that “[i]f any action in law or equity is brought to enforce or interpret the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses from the opposing party(ies).” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, § 17.)

Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[s]ince the Agreement was executed and prior to preparing this motion, my client incurred $1,600.80 in attorney fees and costs enforcing the Agreement (2.5 hrs. at $625; $38.30 in filing fees). Additionally, my client has incurred $1,418.50 in attorney fees and costs (1.7 hrs. at $625; 1.6 hrs. at $185 for paralegal; $60 filing fee) with respect to the present motion, not including those anticipated addressing [Defendant’s] opposition and the hearing. In total, my client has incurred $2,959.30 in attorney fees and costs enforcing the Agreement.” (Valdez Jr. Decl., ¶ 10.)[1] These amounts do not appear to be addressed by Defendant in the opposition. The Court finds that the requested $2,959.30 in attorney’s fees and costs is reasonable.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement is granted. The Court enters judgment pursuant to the terms of the subject Settlement Agreement.

Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees against Defendant is granted in the amount of $2,959.30

Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this Order.¿ 

DATED:  February 13, 2025                    ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court