Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV03260, Date: 2024-05-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV03260 Hearing Date: May 6, 2024 Dept: 50
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MITAL TAMORO, Plaintiff, vs. QUANTUM CORPORATION,
et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
23STCV03260 |
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Hearing Date: |
May 6, 2024 |
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Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT
QUANTUM CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT |
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Background
Plaintiff Mital Tamoro (“Tamoro”) filed this action on February
14, 2023 against Defendant Quantum Corporation (“Quantum”). The Complaint
alleges causes of action for
(1)
pregnancy discrimination, (2) disability discrimination, (3) failure to
accommodate, (4) failure to engage in the interactive process, (5) denial of
CFRA rights, (6) failure to reimburse expenses, and (7) interference with
prospective economic advantage.
On February 14, 2024, Quantum filed a Cross-Complaint against Larkin
Benefit Administrators, d/b/a The Larkin Company, alleging causes of action for
(1) breach of contract – failure to perform, (2) breach of contract – failure
to defend and indemnify, (3) negligence,
(4)
comparative indemnity, (5) equitable indemnity, and (6) declaratory relief. On
April 17, 2024, Quantum filed a request for dismissal of the Cross-Complaint,
without prejudice. Dismissal was entered on April 17, 2024.
On August 22, 2023, the Court issued a minute order in this action
providing, inter alia, that “Jury Trial is scheduled for
08/28/2024 at 09:30 AM in Department 50 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.”
Quantum now moves for an order granting leave to file a
cross-complaint against third-party Larkin Benefit Administrators. An
opposition to the motion was filed by Larkin Benefit Administrators, d/b/a The
Larkin Company (“Larkin”)[1]
Discussion
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (a), “[a] party shall file a
cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint
against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or
cross-complaint.”
Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (b), “[a]ny other cross-complaint may be filed at any
time before the court has set a date for trial.” Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (c), “[a] party shall obtain leave of
court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in
subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any
time during the course of the action.”
Quantum cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10, subdivision (b), which
provides that “[a] party
against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-complaint
may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following:…(b) Any cause of action he has against a person
alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to
the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or
interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause
brought against him.”
Quantum seeks leave to file a
Cross-Complaint against Larkin, which alleges causes of action for (1)
breach of contract – failure to perform, (2) breach of contract – failure to
defend and indemnify, (3) negligence, (4) comparative indemnity, (5) equitable
indemnity, and (6) declaratory relief. (Hammon Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)
Quantum’s proposed Cross-Complaint alleges inter alia, as follows:
“Plaintiff,
Mital Tamoro (‘Plaintiff’ or ‘Tamoro’), brought the underlying action against
Quantum alleging various labor code violations premised on her allegation that
she was terminated while in a protected employment status following her
pregnancy. Quantum denies any liability to Tamoro, but to the extent it is
found to be liable, Larkin is the real party at fault. During all relevant
times before and after Quantum’s decision to terminate Tamoro, Quantum did not
determine protected leave eligibility status for its employees, or administer
employee leave programs, because it paid Larkin to fill that role. When Larkin
informed Quantum that it would not violate the law by terminating Tamoro (which
Quantum asserts it did not) Quantum believed that determination to be correct
based on Larkin’s expertise and specialized knowledge. Quantum relied on the
accuracy of the advice that Larkin provided with respect to Tamoro’s leave
status, and thus, if Quantum is found to have violated the law, Larkin is the
party who should answer for such violations and required to satisfy any
judgment rendered against Quantum.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 1.)
Quantum’s proposed Cross-Complaint further alleges that “Larkin was
obligated under its agreement with Quantum to administer Quantum’s employee
leave programs. If Quantum were to suffer ‘any costs, claims, liabilities,
damages, judgments, or expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
of litigation)’ as a result of a claim brought by a third party arising from
Larkin’s alleged negligence, willful or gross misconduct in the performance of
this agreement, then Larkin agreed to ‘defend and indemnify [Quantum] and its
affiliates, directors, officers, and employees.’ Therefore, Larkin is also in
breach for failing to indemnify Quantum for Tamoro’s claims that arise out of
Larkin’s alleged negligence.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 2.)
Quantum’s counsel states in his supporting declaration that “on May
12, 2023, Quantum requested confirmation from Larkin Benefit Administrators
(‘Larkin’) that it would indemnify Quantum in connection with Plaintiff Mital
Tamoro’s Complaint in this action…While Larkin initially disputed its indemnity
obligation, it repeatedly assured Quantum that it was reviewing Quantum’s
request in order to reach a ‘final response.’…Notwithstanding Quantum’s
repeated requests in the ensuing months for Larkin to provide its final
response, Larkin ultimately took nearly nine months to provide its final
response to Quantum, waiting until February 1, 2024 to inform Quantum for the
first time that it would not indemnify Quantum.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 2.)
Quantum’s counsel further states
that “[o]n February 14, 2024, Quantum filed the Cross-Complaint against Larkin
in this action. Thereafter, counsel for Larkin informed Quantum that it
intended to move to strike the Cross-Complaint under Code
of Civil Procedure section 428.50 on the ground that the Cross-Complaint
was filed after trial had been set and Quantum had not obtained leave to file
it.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 3.) Quantum states in the motion that “[a]fter Larkin
informed Quantum that it intended to move to strike the Cross-Complaint…Quantum
agreed to withdraw the Cross-Complaint for the purpose of seeking leave from
this Court to file the Cross-Complaint.” (Mot. at p. 6:15-19.)
Quantum asserts that the proposed
Cross-Complaint “arises out of the same occurrence as [Tamoro’s] claims against
Quantum: Quantum’s termination of [Tamoro’s] employment.” (Mot. at p. 7:21-23.)
Quantum cites to paragraph 27 of the proposed Cross-Complaint, which alleges
that “Quantum expressly denies any liability to Tamoro arising from or related
to the allegations in the Tamoro Complaint. However, if held liable to Tamoro,
such liability is a result of Larkin’s negligence, breach of contract, willful
or gross misconduct in performance under the Larkin Agreement.” (Hammon
Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 27.) Quantum asserts that accordingly, its proposed Cross-Complaint
is sufficiently related to the claims in Tamoro’s Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10, subdivision (b).
Quantum argues that “[g]ranting
leave to Quantum to file the Cross-Complaint would serve the interests of
justice in at least four ways: (1) it would prevent Larkin from using its own
lengthy delay to avoid participating in this action, especially where Larkin
has known about the existence of this action since shortly after its
commencement; (2) it would avoid repetitive litigation over the same or similar
issues; (3) public policy favors resolution of equitable indemnity claims in
the same action as the underlying claims; and (4) it would protect against the
potential for inconsistent judgments, which undermine the integrity of the
judicial system.” (Mot. at p. 8:3-9.)[2]
In its opposition, Larkin asserts
that Quantum’s motion is untimely. Larkin asserts that “the court set a date
for trial on August 22, 2023. If Quantum wanted to file a cross-complaint
against Larkin, it should have done so before the trial date was set.” (Opp’n
at p. 5:27-28.) But as discussed, Code of Civil
Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (c) provides that “[a] party shall obtain leave of court to file any
cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a)
or (b).[3]
Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the
course of the action.” (Emphasis added.)
Larkin also asserts that “[f]our
Quantum depositions in this case have been taken, all to Larkin’s prejudice
because it had not been brought into the case in a timely fashion.” (Opp’n at
p. 6:9-11.) Quantum indicates that “[t]o date, only the following four
depositions have been taken in this action, which occurred on the following
dates: (i) Natasha Beckley on September 7, 2023; (ii) Karen Edie on January 22,
2024; (iii) Dana Rosebrook on January 22, 2024; and (iv) Kristen Maglia on
February 16, 2024. The first three deponents are current employees of Quantum,
and the fourth deponent (Ms. Maglia) is a former employee of Quantum who was
represented by counsel for Quantum at her deposition. As indicated by the
transcripts of each deposition, those four depositions took a combined total of
5 hours and 29 minutes of time on the record.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 5.) Quantum’s
counsel also states that “[i]n the event that Quantum’s Motion is granted,
Quantum is willing to make each of those four deponents available for follow-up
depositions to be taken by Larkin to the extent that Larkin identifies areas
where new testimony is needed from those deponents.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 5.)
Larkin also argues in the opposition
that “the causes of action in the Cross-Complaint do not arise out of Quantum’s
termination of Plaintiff and do not involve repetitive or overlapping
litigation or inconsistent judgments.” (Opp’n at p. 7:3-5.) In the reply,
Quantum counters that “[w]hile it is true that Larkin was not involved in
determining that Plaintiff’s poor performance warranted termination, that does
not make Larkin any less relevant to this action because Quantum nevertheless
relied on Larkin’s determination that Plaintiff had not reached 1,250 hours of
work and was not entitled to protected leave.” (Reply at p. 5:15-19.) In the
Complaint, Tamoro alleges, inter alia, that “[a]t the time QUANTUM
terminated TAMORO, TAMORO had been employed with QUANTUM for over one year and
had worked over 1,250 hours in the previous year, and was therefore entitled to
CFRA leave.” (Compl., ¶ 35.) In the fifth cause of action of the Complaint,
Tamoro alleges that “QUANTUM denied TAMORO of her CFRA rights by terminating
her just one day into her CFRA protected leave, in violation of Government Code §12945.” (Compl., ¶ 99.) In the
proposed Cross-Complaint, Quantum alleges that “Quantum relied on Larkin’s
determination that Tamoro was not under a protected leave status to its
detriment should Plaintiff prove her case. If Tamoro proves that she was a
protected employee and that her termination was unlawful, then Larkin should
pay any monetary relief and other legal fees because it is the direct and
proximate cause of any harm.” (Hammon Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 3.)
Larkin also asserts that “[t]here is
no danger of repetitive or overlapping litigation or inconsistent judgments, as
Quantum argues, because a wrongful termination case and a breach of contract
case are completely unrelated.” (Opp’n at p. 8:4-6.) But as noted by Quantum,
“it is to be expected that Quantum’s claims against Larkin would depend on
different legal theories than Plaintiff’s claims against Quantum.” (Reply at p.
5:21-23.) Quantum notes that “[w]hat matters here…is the significant
overlapping factual issues between Plaintiff’s claims against Quantum and
Quantum’s proposed cross-claims against Larkin…” (Reply at p. 5:24-25.) As
discussed, in the proposed Cross-Complaint, Quantum alleges that “Quantum
expressly denies any liability to Tamoro arising from or related to the
allegations in the Tamoro Complaint. However, if held liable to Tamoro, such
liability is a result of Larkin’s negligence, breach of contract, willful or
gross misconduct in performance under the Larkin Agreement.” (Hammon
Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 27.) The Court agrees with Quantum that denying leave to
file the proposed Cross-Complaint could create a risk of inconsistent
judgments.
Larkin also argues that “there is
certainly no basis for an equitable indemnity claim by Quantum against Larkin
as an alleged ‘tortfeasor’ when their relationship is governed by a contract
such as the Administrative Services Agreement, and Larkin is not plaintiff’s
employer.” (Opp’n at p. 8:6-9.) However, Larkin does not appear to cite any
legal authority to support this assertion.[4]
Lastly, Larkin asserts that “the
Declaration of Patrick Hammon does not support Quantum’s motion for leave to
file a Cross-Complaint.” (Opp’n at p. 8:10-11.) Larkin asserts that “[t]he
declaration does not state what steps counsel took to ensure that the deadline
in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 428.50 was observed.”
(Opp’n at p. 8:23-25.) Quantum counters that the “Hammon Declaration, as well
as the proposed Cross-Complaint it attaches, describe Quantum’s timely
indemnity demand to Larkin on May 12, 2023, and repeated communications
thereafter to obtain a response to that demand from Larkin. Those facts are
squarely within Mr. Hammon’s knowledge, as he was involved in those
communications with Larkin.” (Reply at p. 8:7-10.)
Larkin also asserts that the Hammon
declaration “does not contain any statements made on personal knowledge
regarding the parties’ intent when they entered into the Agreement.” (Opp’n at
p. 8:24-25.) The Court does not see how this is relevant to the instant
motion.
Based on the foregoing, the Court
finds that Quantum has demonstrated good cause to file the proposed
Cross-Complaint.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Quantum’s motion for
leave to file cross-complaint is granted.
The Court orders Quantum to file and serve the proposed Cross-Complaint
within 3 days of the date of this Order.
Quantum is ordered to give notice of this
Order.
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]The Court notes that the caption page of Larkin’s
opposition references “Objections to Evidence.” However, separate evidentiary
objections do not appear to have been included with the opposition.
[2]Quantum cites to Paragon Real
Estate Group of San Francisco, Inc. v. Hansen (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
177, 189, where the
Court of Appeal noted that “[r]elevant public policy
considerations further support Paragon’s cross-complaint for equitable
indemnity: Rules permitting a joint tortfeasor to cross-complain against
another joint tortfeasor for equitable indemnity promote the public policy
considerations underlying multiparty tort litigation: the maximization of
recovery to the injured party; settlement of the injured party’s claim; and
equitable apportionment of liability among concurrent tortfeasors…Courts have consistently adopted procedures’
promoting these policies and ‘have rejected procedures which would undermine
these policies.” (Internal quotations omitted.)
[3]Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (a), “[a] party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties
who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the
same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint.” Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 428.50, subdivision (b), “[a]ny other
cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for
trial.”
[4]Larkin only cites to Labor
Code section 1132.2, which provides that “‘[e]mployer’ means a person, partnership firm, corporation,
association, or other entity, which employs any person or persons to perform services
for a wage or salary, and includes any person, partnership, firm, corporation,
limited liability company, association or other entity acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly.”