Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV08288, Date: 2023-10-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08288 Hearing Date: October 4, 2023 Dept: 50
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MICHELLE PARRELLA, Plaintiff, vs. SPECIAL X, INC. D/B/A UNDIVIDED, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
23STCV08288 |
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Hearing Date: |
October 4, 2023 |
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Hearing
Time: 2:00 p.m. TENTATIVE RULING
RE: DEMURRER TO
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANTS SPECIAL X, INC., D/B/A UNDIVIDED, SPECIAL
X LLC, JASON LEHMBECK, SETH BESSE AND STEPHEN JOHN ZIMMERMAN |
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Background
Plaintiff Michelle Parrella (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on April
14, 2023 against Defendants Special X, Inc. d/b/a Undivided, Special X, LLC,
Jason Lehmbeck, Seth Besse, and Stephen John Zimmerman (collectively,
“Defendants”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) violation of Labor Code section 230(a), (2) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5(c), (3) wrongful termination
in violation of public policy, and (4) breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
Defendants now demur to the second cause of action of the Complaint.
Plaintiff opposes.
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used
only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack
or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the
complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need
not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all
material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v.
Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2
Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
A
pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f)¿.) A demurrer
for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders
the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to
respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2¿.) However, “¿[a] demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.¿” (¿Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.)¿¿
B. Allegations of the Complaint
In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that she was hired by Defendants on January 23, 2020 to serve
as Director of Navigator Operations. (Compl., ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n
or around July 20, 2021, Plaintiff received a jury duty summons from the
Superior Court of California ordering her to call into the Court, starting
August 6, 2021, after 6:00 p.m., for information regarding whether or not she
would need to report for jury duty service.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) “On or around
August 10, 2021, Plaintiff was notified by the Superior Court of California
that she was required to appear the following day, August 11, 2021, for
mandatory jury duty service.” (Compl., ¶ 24.)
“Plaintiff immediately
notified Defendants Lehmbeck and Besse that she had been summoned to jury duty.
Defendant Besse feigned disbelief, stating: ‘What? I thought they released
you.’” (Compl., ¶ 25.) “On Monday, August 16, 2021, Plaintiff was selected to
serve as a juror. Between August 11, 2021 and September 3, 2021, (the dates of
Plaintiff’s jury duty service), Plaintiff continued to attend meetings
virtually and perform work for Defendant SPECIALX.” (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff
alleges that “[c]ontinuing its pressure to dissuade her from serving at all,
Defendant SPECIALX was unrelenting in its demands of Plaintiff, pressuring
Plaintiff on deliverables such as lead generation, gaining new leads for
potential staff, and completing interviews of candidates at times when
Plaintiff had specifically informed Defendant SPECIALX she was in Court,
serving on a jury.” (Compl., ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n
Friday, September 3, 2021, Plaintiff was released from jury duty. Plaintiff
notified Defendants that she would be returning to work the following week on
Tuesday, after the Labor Day holiday.” (Compl., ¶ 29.) “On or around Wednesday,
September 8, 2021, Plaintiff’s second day back to work following the completion
of her jury duty service, Defendant Besse met with Plaintiff. Plaintiff informed
Defendant Besse that she had a stressful and emotionally draining experience
serving jury duty and that she was happy to be back in the office. Defendant
Besse, coldly responded: ‘serves you right’ and ‘you wanted jury duty.’
Defendant Besse then abruptly ended the meeting.” (Compl., ¶ 30.) “Later that
same day, on or around September 8, 2021, Defendant Lehmbeck met with Plaintiff
via Zoom. Immediately upon entering the Zoom call, Defendant Lehmbeck abruptly
fired Plaintiff. Plaintiff was shocked and asked Defendant Lehmbeck why
Defendants were firing her. Without giving any explanation Defendant Lehmbeck
stated: ‘it’s just not working out.’” (Compl., ¶ 31.)
C. Second Cause of
Action for Violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5(c)
Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (c) provides that “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer,
shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an
activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a
violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or
regulation.” Plaintiff alleges in
the Complaint that “[a]s
alleged herein and in violation of California Labor
Code Section 1102.5(c), Defendants, and each of them, retaliated
against Plaintiff for refusing to participate in an activity that
would have resulted in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation
of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or
regulation.” (Compl., ¶ 43.)
Plaintiff’s second cause
of action is alleged against all Defendants. In the demurrer, Defendants assert
that the second cause of action may not be brought against the “individual, non-employer”
defendants. As Plaintiff notes, Defendants cite to non-binding federal cases in
support of this assertion. (See Demurrer at p. 4:8-24.) As further noted
by Plaintiff, Defendants do not cite to any binding California authority to
support Defendants’ assertion that “[t]here is no individual liability for
retaliation under Labor Code Section 1102.5.”
(Demurrer at p. 4:3.) Defendants acknowledge in the reply that “there is no
published California decision addressing the issue of personal liability under California Labor Code Section 1102.5…” (Reply at p.
5:1-2.)
In the opposition,
Plaintiff emphasizes that Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (c) provides that “[a]n employer, or any person acting on
behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for
refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of
state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local,
state, or federal rule or regulation.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff
also cites to Assembly Bill No. 263, effective January 1, 2014, which amended Labor Code section 1102.5 by, inter alia, adding the following
underlined language to Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (c): “[a]n employer, or any person acting on
behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee…”
In the demurrer, Defendants also assert that “Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation is uncertain, ambiguous and
unintelligible as she fails to identify what specific protected activity she was retaliated against for
refusing to engage in.” (Demurrer at p. 4:27-28.) Defendants assert that
Plaintiff “does not allege that she was prohibited from performing jury duty by
the individual defendants or otherwise. Quite to the contrary, Plaintiff admits
that she performed the entirety of her jury duty service.” (Demurrer at p. 5:12-14.)
Indeed, Plaintiff does not appear to allege that she refused to participate in
an unlawful activity and that Defendants retaliated against her as a result.
Rather, Plaintiff alleges that she was selected to serve as a juror on Monday,
August 16, 2021, and that Plaintiff’s jury duty service took place between
August 11, 2021 and September 3, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff does not
respond to this point in the opposition.
Based on the foregoing,
the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action, with
leave to amend.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action of the
Complaint, with leave to amend. The Court
orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days
of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days of
this Order, Defendants are ordered to file and serve their answer within 30
days of the date of this Order.
Defendants are
ordered to give notice of this Order.
DATED:
Hon. Rolf M.
Treu
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court