Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV08767, Date: 2023-10-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08767 Hearing Date: March 5, 2024 Dept: 50
LVNV FUNDING LLC, Plaintiff, vs. STEPHEN C DIMON; et
al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
23STCV08767 |
Hearing Date: |
March 5, 2024 |
|
Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
|
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT |
Plaintiff LVNV Funding LLC (“Plaintiff”) requests entry of
default judgment against Defendant Stephen C Dimon. Plaintiff seeks judgment in the
total amount of $62,561.68, comprising
$53,235.45 demanded in the Complaint, $6,838.02 in interest, $533.50 in costs, and
$1,954.71 in attorney fees.
The Court notes one defect with the submitted default
judgment package.
As set forth above, Plaintiff seeks $6,838.02 in
interest. However, as discussed in the Court’s December 14, 2023 minute order
on Plaintiff’s previous request for default judgment, Plaintiff does not appear
to allege in the Complaint that it seeks interest. As discussed in the December
14, 2023 minute order, “[a] complaint
or cross-complaint shall contain…the following:…(2) A demand for judgment
for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of
money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” ((Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) “[I]n all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on
recovery.” ((Finney
v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 534.) “A
trial court has no jurisdiction to grant a plaintiff more relief against a
defaulting defendant than is asked for in the complaint.” ((Feminist Women's Health Center v. Blythe (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1675.)
Plaintiff notes that the Complaint
alleges that “Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant as
follows:…4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
proper.” (Compl., p. 5:2-7.) Plaintiff cites to Segura v.
McBride (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1041, where the
Court of Appeal found that “[i]n his complaint Segura included a general request for ‘such other and
further relief as the Court deems just and proper.’ This prayer is sufficient
for the court, on its own, to invoke its power to levy such prejudgment
interest as it deems just and equitable.” However, Segura did not involve a request for prejudgment
interest in connection with a request for default judgment.
The Court notes that in Flores v. Smith (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d
253, 260, the Court of Appeal found that “Section
580 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ‘Relief to be awarded to
plaintiff. The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot
exceed that which he shall have demanded in the complaint. . . .’ A
default judgment, whether entered with or without the action of the court,
cannot properly be for an amount not shown by the complaint to be due. Interest
may be allowed only to the extent to which it is claimed in the complaint.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request
for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with counsel a
schedule for submitting a new default judgment package.
DATED: March 5, 2024 ________________________________
Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court