Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV09104, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV09104    Hearing Date: November 15, 2024    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Siranush Akherdyan (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on April 25, 2023 against Defendants Masis Tamazyan (“Tamazyan”) and Elen Tahmasian (“Tahmasian”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) declaratory relief re: real property resulting trust and (2) “in the alternative,” declaratory relief re: deed of trust priority.

On July 7, 2023, Tahmasian filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Siranush Akherdyan, a.k.a Siranush Akhverdyan, Soorage Tomasian, and Tamazyan. The Cross-Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) fraudulent conveyance, (2) quiet title, (3) cancellation of instrument, (4) negligence, and (5) declaratory relief.  

Tamazyan and Tahmasian (jointly, the “Moving Parties”) now move for judgment on the pleadings as to both causes of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff opposes.

Discussion

A.    Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by ¿Code of Civil Procedure section 438¿, the rules governing demurrers apply. (¿Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999¿.) A motion by a defendant can be made on the ground that the complaint (or any cause of action therein) “¿does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii)¿.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (d), “[t]he grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.”

¿“¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713¿.)

B.     Allegations of the Complaint

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the real property which is the subject of this action (the “Subject Property”) is located at 108 W. Maple St., #12, Glendale, California 91204. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

“On or about March 24, 1998, Plaintiff’s husband wanted to purchase the subject property as a home for Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her husband did not want Plaintiff’s name on the title because they believed that it would effect [sic] Plaintiff’s benefits.” (Compl., ¶ 7.) “Plaintiff’s husband and Defendant Masis Tamazyan agreed that the title of the subject property would be in Defendant Masis Tamazyan’s name. They agreed that Plaintiff’s husband would pay for the subject property. They also agreed that Plaintiff was the true owner of the subject property. Defendant Masis Tamazyan is Plaintiff’s son.” (Compl., ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff further alleges that “[o]n or about March 24, 1998, Plaintiff’s husband wanted to ensure that Defendant Masis Tamazyan did not remove Plaintiff from the subject property and transfer the title. To accomplish this Plaintiff’s husband and Defendant Masis Tamazyan agreed that Defendant Masis Tamazyan would sign a note and Deed of Trust in the amount of the purchase price of the subject property and that Plaintiff would be the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) “On March 24, 1998, Defendant Masis Tahmazian signed a note and Deed of Trust as described above. The note and Deed of Trust was given to Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶10.) “On March 26, 1998, a Grant Deed was recorded transferring title of the subject property to Defendant Masis Tamazyan.” (Compl., ¶ 11.)

“Since the purchase of the subject property to the present, Plaintiff has resided at the subject property.” (Compl., ¶ 12.) “On December 21, 2020, Defendant Masis Tahmazian signed an lnterspousal Transfer Grant Deed giving the subject property to his wife Defendant Elen Tahmasian. The lnterspousal Transfer Grant Deed was recorded on December 29, 2020…On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Elen Tahmasian did not pay value for subject property.” (Compl., ¶ 13.) “Subsequently, Defendant Elen Tahmasian attempted to evict Plaintiff from the subject property.” (Compl., ¶ 14.) “On August 23, 2021, Plaintiff recorded her Deed of Trust…” (Compl., ¶ 15.)

C.     First Cause of Action for “Declaratory Relief Re: Real Property Resulting Trust”

In the first cause of action for declaratory relief, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that “Plaintiff contends that she owns a 100% interest in the Subject Property based on a resulting trust. Defendants disputes [sic] these allegations and allege that Defendant Elen Tahmasian owns an interest equal to 100%.…Pursuant to Section 1060 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that Plaintiff is the owner of a 100% interest of the subject property.” (Compl., ¶¶ 18-19.)

The Moving Parties assert that the first cause of action fails, as “the alleged oral agreement to transfer an ownership interest in real property to Plaintiff is invalid under the Statute of Frauds.” (Mot. at p. 5:4-5.) The Moving Parties note that pursuant to Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(3), “[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent:…(3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.”

The Moving Parties assert that here, “Plaintiff alleges only an oral agreement between her husband and Masis that Plaintiff would be the ‘true owner.’…There are no allegations of any written agreement signed by Masis transferring ownership to Plaintiff.” (Mot. at p. 5:7-9.) As set forth above, the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff’s husband and Defendant Masis Tamazyan agreed that the title of the subject property would be in Defendant Masis Tamazyan’s name,” and that “[t]hey also agreed that Plaintiff was the true owner of the subject property.” (Compl., ¶ 8.)

In the opposition, Plaintiff argues that “[s]ince Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is seeking a Resulting Trust, the Statue of Frauds does not apply.” (Opp’n at p. 4:2-3.) As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that “she owns a 100% interest in the Subject Property based on a resulting trust.” (Compl., ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff cites to Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 238, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he terms constructive trust and resulting trust have often been confused by attorneys, as well as some courts. Both are involuntary trusts implied by law and exempt from the statute of frauds. However, [a] resulting trust arises from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest…It has been termed an intention-enforcing trust, to distinguish it from the other type of implied trust, the constructive or fraud-rectifying trust. The resulting trust carries out the inferred intent of the parties; the constructive trust defeats or prevents the wrongful act of one of them.” (Internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted, underline added.) In the reply, the Moving Parties contend that the cases cited by Plaintiff do not show that “a resulting trust claim is categorically exempt from the Statute of Frauds.” (Reply at p. 2:24-25.) But the Moving Parties do not appear to specifically address the Martin case discussed above.

In the motion, the Moving Parties also argue that “Plaintiff fails to allege the elements of a resulting trust…” (Mot. at p. 7:6.) The Moving Parties cite to Lloyds Bank Cal. v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1042-1043, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[a] resulting trust arises by operation of law from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest. Such a resulting trust carries out and enforces the inferred intent of the parties. Ordinarily a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another…The trust arises because it is the natural presumption in such a case that it was their intention that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold the property for the one with whose means it was acquired.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

The Moving Parties assert that here, “[t]he Complaint alleges no facts showing Masis agreed to hold the property in trust for Plaintiff, rather than being the true owner himself, or that any trust arose in March 1998 when Masis took title.” (Mot. at p. 7:9-11.) But as discussed, Plaintiff alleges that “she owns a 100% interest in the Subject Property based on a resulting trust.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) In addition, the Moving Parties do not appear to cite any legal authority demonstrating that Plaintiff must allege that Masis Tamazyan “agreed to hold the property in trust for Plaintiff” in order to state a cause of action for a resulting trust. (Mot. at p. 7:9-10.) As discussed, in Lloyds Bank Cal. v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at page 1042, cited by the Moving Parties, the Court of Appeal noted that “[a] resulting trust arises by operation of law from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not intended to take the beneficial interest.” As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff’s husband and Defendant Masis Tamazyan agreed that the title of the subject property would be in Defendant Masis Tamazyan’s name. They agreed that Plaintiff’s husband would pay for the subject property. They also agreed that Plaintiff was the true owner of the subject property.” (Compl., ¶ 8.) The Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff’s husband wanted to purchase the subject property as a home for Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 7.)   

            Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that the Moving Parties have shown that “Plaintiff fails to allege the elements of a resulting trust…” (Mot. at p. 7:6.)

            The Moving Parties also argue that “Plaintiff’s resulting trust claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The limitations period is three years for fraud or four years for contract…Here, the alleged resulting trust would have arisen in March 1998[1], but Plaintiff did not file suit until November 2021, over 23 years later.” (Mot. at p. 7:13-15.) The Moving Parties cite to Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 436, where the California Supreme Court noted that “section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure…provides a three-year period of limitations for commencement of: ‘An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.’” But Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for declaratory relief, specifically, “declaratory relief re: real property resulting trust.” The Moving Parties do not appear to provide any analysis as to why the limitations period for fraud set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338 would be applicable here.[2]

            In the opposition, Plaintiff argues that “the statute of limitation does not bar Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for a resulting trust.” (Opp’n at p. 4:24-25.) Plaintiff cites to Von Zastrow v. Schiffbauer (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 500, 502, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[i]n the case of a ‘resulting trust’ the statute of limitations does not begin to run until there has been a repudiation of the trust and the adverse claim of the trustee clearly and unequivocably made known to the cestui que trust…To enforce a resulting trust the action must be commenced within four years after the repudiation of the trust.” (Internal citation omitted, emphasis in original.)[3] Plaintiff asserts that here, “[t]he complaint does not state when or if Defendants repudiated the resulting trust agreement. Defendants cannot pinpoint a fact in the complaint showing that the ‘repudiation’ occurred four years before the filing of this complaint.” (Opp’n at p. 5:3-5.) But this argument appears to concede that the allegations of the Complaint do not show that the action was commenced within “four years after the repudiation of the trust.” (Von Zastrow v. Schiffbauer, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 502.) Plaintiff does not point to any allegations demonstrating that the Complaint was filed within four years of the “repudiation of the trust.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Court grants the Moving Parties’ motion as to the first cause of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.[4]

D. Second Cause of Action for “In the Alternative, Declaratory Relief Re: Deed of Trust Priority

In the second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that “[a]n actual, justiciable controversy has arisen between the parties as to their respective rights and obligations regarding the title of the Subject Property…Plaintiff contends that Deed of Trust, Exhibit 2, has priority over the lnterspousal Transfer Grant Deed, Exhibit 4. Defendants disputes these allegations…Pursuant to Section 1060 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust, Exhibit 2, has priority over the lnterspousal Transfer Grant Deed, Exhibit 4.” (Compl., ¶¶ 23-24, 19, p. 5.)

The Moving Parties argue that the second cause of action fails. First, the Moving Parties argue that “the deed of trust cannot have priority because it was not recorded until August 2021, after the December 2020 transfer to Elen.” (Mot. at p. 8:1-2.)[5] But the Moving Parties do not cite any legal authority to support this proposition.

The Moving Parties also argue that “Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. An action to establish the priority of a deed of trust has a three-year limitations period for fraud or four years for contract…Plaintiff is seeking to establish the priority of a deed of trust from March 1998 (Ex. 2) but did not file suit until November 2021, over 23 years later. The claim is therefore time-barred.” (Mot. at p. 8:3-6.)[6] But again, the Moving Parties do not provide any analysis as to why such limitations periods purportedly apply to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for declaratory relief “re: deed of trust priority.”

In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that “the statute of limitation does not bar Plaintiff’s second cause of action,” and that “[i]f any statute of limitations should apply it should be the statute of limitations for a Resulting Trust.” (Opp’n. at p. 6:1; 6:6-7.) Plaintiff cites to Von Zastrow v. Schiffbauer, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at page 502, which, as discussed above, provides that “[i]n the case of a ‘resulting trust’ the statute of limitations does not begin to run until there has been a repudiation of the trust and the adverse claim of the trustee clearly and unequivocably made known to the cestui que trust…To enforce a resulting trust the action must be commenced within four years after the repudiation of the trust.” (Internal citation omitted, emphasis in original.) However, as noted by the Moving Parties, Plaintiff does not appear to cite any authority for the proposition that such four-year limitations period for resulting trusts should apply to the second cause of action for “declaratory relief re: deed of trust priority.” In any event, the Court does not find that the Moving Parties have shown that this cause of action is barred by any applicable statute of limitations period.

The Moving Parties also argue that “Plaintiff’s allegation that the March 1998 deed of trust establishes her ownership of the subject property is incorrect as a matter of law.” (Mot. at p.  8:7-8.) But as noted by Plaintiff, the “second cause of action does not allege that the deed of trust establishes her ownership of the property.” (Opp’n at p. 6:15-16.) The second cause of action alleges, inter alia, that “Plaintiff contends that Deed of Trust, Exhibit 2, has priority over the lnterspousal Transfer Grant Deed, Exhibit 4. Defendants disputes these allegations.” (Compl., ¶ 24.) The Moving Parties do not appear to cite to any allegations of the Complaint stating that the alleged deed of trust establishes Plaintiff’s ownership of the subject property.

Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that the Moving Parties have shown that the second cause of action fails. Thus, the court denies the Moving Parties’ motion as to the second cause of action of the Complaint.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants the Moving Parties’ motion as to the first cause of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend. The Court denies the Moving Parties’ motion as to the second cause of action of the Complaint.

The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this order.  

The Moving Parties are ordered to give notice of this order.¿ 

DATED:  November 15, 2024                  ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court