Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 23STCV09794, Date: 2024-02-07 Tentative Ruling

On May 2, 2023, Plaintiff Carmen King, Assignee for Antolin Garcia (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jorge Garcia and Teresa Nonoal (jointly, “Defendants”).

On October 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) in this action, alleging causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud in the inducement, and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Plaintiff now moves to consolidate the instant action with “Case No. 23STUD16249.” Defendants oppose.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 grants discretion to trial courts to consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact. “Consolidation is not a matter of right; it rests solely within the sound discretion of the trial judge. . .” ((Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 402.) There are two types of consolidation under section 1048: “a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” ((Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) “The purpose is to enhance trial court efficiency (i.e., to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures); and to avoid the substantial danger of inconsistent adjudications (i.e., different results because tried before different juries, or a judge and jury, etc.).” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 12:340.)

The Instant Case – Carmen King, Assignee for Antolin Garcia v. Jorge Garcia, et al. (Case No. 23STCV09794)

As set forth above, in the SAC in the instant case, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud in the inducement, and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that “in early September of 2011, Antolin Garcia desired to purchase a home for his family and himself. Antolin Garcia was approached by Jorge Garcia at which time Jorge Garcia told Antolin that Jorge knew a realtor names [sic] Frank Aguilar who could assist him in locating a property and who could assist as a realtor in the purchase of any such property.” (SAC, ¶ 8.) Antolin found a property that he was interested in purchasing, which was located at 845 E. 27th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90011 (the “Property”). (SAC, ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[a]fter discussing the possibility of purchasing the Property further with Mr. Aguilar Antolin realized that he would not be able to qualify for a loan to purchase the property.” (SAC, ¶ 10.) “Antolin and Mr. Aguilar advised Jorge of the circumstances and Jorge suggested that since Jorge had good credit and could qualify for a loan that Jorge and Antolin would enter into an agreement wherein Antolin would pay $20,000 to open escrow and Jorge would apply for a loan to purchase the Property. Further Antolin and his family would live at the Property and would pay to Jorge the amount of $2,825 per month. That amount would cover the mortgage payment and would provide extra money for Jorge to keep in reserve for any unforeseen repairs or maintenance that may be required at the Property.” (SAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hen Antolin was able to get his own financing and replace Jorge as the borrower, Jorge would keep the reserve account as his payment for the joint venture.” (SAC, ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n furtherance of their joint venture, Antolin made all the monthly payments in full and on time from October 2011 through March 2023.” (SAC, ¶ 15.) “In November of 2022, Jorge advised Antolin that Antolin and his family had to leave the Property as Jorge now wanted to sell the Property to a third party.” (SAC, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hen Antolin reminded Jorge of their joint venture, Jorge took the position that the monthly payments made for the past 12 years were rent payments and not payments toward the joint venture.” (SAC, ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff alleges that “Antolin then learned that Jorge, without Antolin’s knowledge or consent, had refinanced the loan and decreased the monthly payments without providing Antolin with a commensurate reduction. Further, Antolin learned that Jorge had taken out additional loans against the Property again without Antolin’s knowledge or consent, which increased the debt on the Properly by a total of $150,000.” (SAC, ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that “Antolin demanded that Jorge comply with the terms of their joint venture agreement and Jorge refused. In April of 2023, Antolin assigned his rights under the agreement and all other rights to Carmen King, Plaintiff in this suit.” (SAC, ¶ 22.)

The Court notes that case number 23STUD16249 pertains to an unlawful detainer Complaint filed on December 18, 2023 by Plaintiff Jorge Nonoal against Defendants Antolin Garcia and Simon Garcia. The Court refers to Jorge Nonoal v. Antolin Garcia, et al., Case No. 23STUD16249 as the “Unlawful Detainer Action” herein.

In the Unlawful Detainer Action, Jorge Nonoal alleges that defendants are in possession of the premises located at 845 E. 27th Street Los Angeles, CA 90011. (Compl., ¶ 3(a).) Jorge Nonoal alleges that he is the owner of the subject premises. (Compl., ¶ 4.)

Jorge Nonoal further alleges that on or about June 1, 2020, Antolin Garcia and Simon Garcia agreed to rent the premises as a month-to-month tenancy and agreed to pay rent of $1,498.72 payable monthly. (Compl., ¶ 6(a).) Jorge Nonoal alleges that “[t]he tenancy was terminated for at-fault just cause…” (Compl., ¶ 8(a).) Jorge Nonoal alleges that at the time the

3-day notice to pay rent or quit was served, the amount of rent due was $13,488.48. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff asserts that the Court should consolidate the instant action and the Unlawful Detainer Action “on the grounds that both cases involve the same issue (contract for rent or investment) and/or same persons and the same facts.” (Mot. at p. 1.)

Plaintiff also cites to Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 370, where “Ivan Rene Moore appeal[ed] in propria persona from the superior court’s judgment following trial on the unlawful detainer complaint of Kimberly Martin-Bragg seeking forfeiture of a lease and possession of a property. The judgment…awarded Martin-Bragg possession of the disputed property,” along with certain specified damages. “Moore appeal[ed] from the judgment on a number of grounds, most notably the trial court’s refusal to consolidate the unlawful detainer case against him with another action then pending in the superior court, brought by Moore, seeking quiet title to the property based on allegations that Martin-Bragg’s title to the property was actually held in trust for Moore’s benefit.” ((Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Moore’s request to consolidate the unlawful detainer and quiet title actions for trial and that Moore was prejudiced by being forced to litigate the complex issue of title to the property under the summary procedures that govern actions for unlawful detainer.” ((Id. at pp. 370-371.)

The Martin-Bragg Court noted that “the trial court has the power to consolidate an unlawful detainer proceeding with a simultaneously pending action in which title to the property is in issue. That is because a successful claim of title by the tenant would defeat the landlord’s right to possession. When an unlawful detainer proceeding and an unlimited action concerning title to the property are simultaneously pending, the trial court in which the unlimited action is pending may stay the unlawful detainer action until the issue of title is resolved in the unlimited action, or it may consolidate the actions. If it does neither and instead tries the issue of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer proceedings, the parties’ right to a full trial of the issue of title may be unfairly expedited and limited. If complex issues of title are tried in the unlawful detainer proceeding, the proceeding loses its summary character; defects in the plaintiff’s title are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.” ((Id. at p. 385 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

Plaintiff asserts that here, “the cases must be consolidated or the unlawful detainer stayed pending a ruling defining any rights on the title to the property.” (Mot. at p. 3.) Plaintiff further asserts that “[a]ssuming arguendo, that the unlawful detainer action was successful, it would be based on the fact that the plaintiffs in the action were in fact the owners of the property against a tenant. Thus, this assumption could be false depending on the ruling in the initial action.” (Mot. at p. 4.)

In the opposition, Defendants assert that “the cases should not be consolidated because the SAC, even if proven true, does not establish tenants’ right to title.” (Opp’n at p. 2:21-22.) More specifically, Defendants assert that “[i]t is hornbook law that a purported oral contract concerning real property not to be performed within one year is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds…Assignee’s third cause of action for breach of the implied covenant found in the alleged oral contract similarly fails where there is no legally enforceable oral contract under the Statute of Frauds. Assignee’s second cause of action for fraud in the inducement, if she prevails, would similarly not confer title on the Garcia tenants.” (Opp’n at p. 3:2-9.) But the Court finds that such arguments challenging the legal sufficiency of the SAC are more appropriately raised by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or other appropriate proceedings.

Defendants assert that “[e]ven should Assignee somehow prevail in showing a verbal agreement whereby Defendants would hold legal title on behalf of their Garcia tenants for some reason, that agreement would not survive the Statute of Frauds, nor the statute of limitations, and it would be insufficient to confer title to the Garcia tenants.” (Opp’n at p. 2:12-15.) Thus, Defendants appear to concede that the instant action involves questions of title to the subject property located at 845 E. 27th Street Los Angeles, California. As discussed, the Martin-Bragg Court found that “[w]hen an unlawful detainer proceeding and an unlimited action concerning title to the property are simultaneously pending, the trial court in which the unlimited action is pending may stay the unlawful detainer action until the issue of title is resolved in the unlimited action, or it may consolidate the actions. If it does neither and instead tries the issue of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer proceedings, the parties’ right to a full trial of the issue of title may be unfairly expedited and limited.” (Martin-Bragg v. Moore, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [internal citation omitted].)[1]

[1]The Court also notes that Defendant argues that “the Assignee’s unauthorized practice of law for the Garcia tenants should be addressed. Assignee claims that Garcia assigned all his rights in this civil action to her, very likely because they have agreed to share any resulting property interest or profit. This amounts to unauthorized practice of law…” (Opp’n at p. 3:17-20.) The Court notes that Defendant does not provide any evidence in support of this assertion. The Court also notes that the Plaintiff in the instant action is “Carmen King, Assignee for Antolin Garcia.”

CARMEN KING, ASSIGNEE FOR ANTOLIN GARCIA, Plaintiff, vs. JORGE GARCIA, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV09794
	Hearing Date:	February 7, 2024
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THIS ACTION KING V. JORGE GARCIA ET AL. AND AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION JORGE AND THERESA NONOAL V. ANTOLIN GARCIA ET AL. CASE NO. 23STUD16249

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50