Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 23STCV13283, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling

NKEMJIKA AMADI,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHARLES R. DREW UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND SCIENCE, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

23STCV13283

Hearing Date:

May 8, 2025

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANT CHARLES R. DREW UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND SCIENCE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Plaintiff Nkemjika Amadi (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on June 9, 2023 against Defendant Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) breach of oral contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action. Plaintiff opposes.

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ((Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. ((Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. ((Ibid.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ((Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, he/she must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. ((Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)

On or about July 12, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral contract, wherein it was agreed that Plaintiff will pay fees to Defendant in exchange for an academic and clinical education for Plaintiff to receive a Bachelor of Nursing, which will qualify her to obtain a license to practice as a Registered Nurse. (Compl., ¶ 5.) The estimate of the total cost of tuition was $60,000.00. (Compl., ¶ 6.) Based on the above oral agreement, between July 12, 2022, and April 26, 2023, Plaintiff paid a total of $25,165.00, completed over eight months of more than five hundred and eighty hours of lecture time, more than two hundred and forty hours of clinical time, and hundreds of hours of study time. (Compl., ¶ 7.)

On or about April 26, 2023, Defendant, for no legitimate reason, sent a letter to Plaintiff stating "...you will receive a failing grade for the Course" NUR 428 (Medical Surgical). (Compl., ¶ 8.) Defendant alleged that Plaintiff displayed actions which violated the MMDSON Code of Conduct, and that based on the action, she displayed academic misconduct by: "Tampering with an exam on class setting that did not belong to her and should not be shared with other students. This demonstrates academic dishonesty and compromise test taking integrity". (Compl., ¶ 8., Exh. 1.) All the above-mentioned allegations were false, as Plaintiff did not display any academic misconduct. (Compl., ¶ 9.)

At the time of the April 26, 2023 letter, Plaintiff was at %88.90 Grade in NUR 428 (Medical Surgical). (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff has demanded that Defendant perform according to their agreement, but Defendant failed to perform accordingly. (Compl., ¶ 11.) As a result of Defendant's actions and inactions, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer damages and losses. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” ((Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Defendant argues that this cause of action is barred by the statute of frauds because Plaintiff alleged an oral contract for her enrollment in a program that lasted two years. (Defendant’s UMF no. 2.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the Defendant’s nursing program required a two-year commitment. ((Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 965, 981 [holding that a claim referring to oral representations be limited to those that can be performed within one year].) Defendant satisfies the initial burden of proof and the burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists.

Plaintiff argues that there is an alleged oral contract that is exempt from the Statute of Frauds because the July 12, 2022 conditional acceptance qualifies as a “note or memorandum” of the alleged oral contract sufficient to exempt the oral contract from the Statute of Frauds under Civ. Code§ 1624(a)(1). (Opp., p. 10-13; Amadi Decl., Exh. 1.) However, on its face, the document is a conditional offer of admission. This does not satisfy Plaintiff’s shifted burden. It does not raise a triable issue of material fact that Defendant and Plaintiff entered into an oral contract wherein it was agreed that Plaintiff would pay fees to Defendant, Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science and Defendant will provide academic and clinical education, for Plaintiff to receive a Bachelor of Nursing, which will qualify her to obtain a license to practice as a Registered Nurse. (Compl., ¶ 14.) The motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action is granted.

C. Second Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“ ‘The [implied] covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] implied by law in every contract.’ [Citation.] The covenant is read into contracts and functions ‘as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.’ [Citation.] The covenant also requires each party to do everything the contract presupposes the party will do to accomplish the agreement’s purposes. [Citation.] A breach of the implied covenant of good faith is a breach of the contract [citation], and ‘breach of a specific provision of the contract is not…necessary’ to a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [citation].” (Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1244.) (Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff’s allegations must show “that the conduct of the defendant, whether or not it also constitutes a breach of a consensual contract term, demonstrates a failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted not by an honest mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement. Just what conduct will meet this criteria will depend on the contractual purposes and reasonably justified expectations of the parties.” ((Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395.)¿¿

Defendant argues that this cause of action is barred by the statute of frauds. The summary adjudication as to this cause of action is granted for the same reasoning as the first cause of action.

“The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit which may not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 769, quotation marks and citations omitted.)

Notably, “[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of action”; it is simply “a restitution claim.” (Hill v. Roll International Corp. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1307; see also Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [“there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment”].) In her complaint, Plaintiff states that she paid a total of $25,165.00 to the Defendant (Compl., ¶ 39), and performed all the promises, covenants, and conditions on her part under the agreement (Compl., ¶ 45), but Defendant enjoyed Plaintiff's payment without providing the Plaintiff with the learning and certificate as agreed upon, thereby depriving Plaintiff of the benefit of the said payments at the expense of the Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 46.) However, as stated above, Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the existence of a contract in this matter. Therefore, as unjust enrichment is a restitution claim and here she has not shown that she has a cause of action against the Defendant, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to this claim is granted.

To prevail on an IIED claim, plaintiff must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (superseded by statute on other grounds).) “[L]iability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities, but only to conduct so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn.5.)

Under Civil Code section 3294, punitive damages may be recovered “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c).) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c).)

Defendant argues that its decision to fail Plaintiff from the course, even if contested, does not rise to the level of outrageous conduct required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant argues that it is a consequence explicitly outlined in the Student Handbook following an act of academic dishonesty, which Plaintiff received at the time of enrollment. (UMF 4.) Defendant has satisfied its burden that the facts as alleged do not rise to “extreme and outrageous conduct” as required for this cause of action.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant acted outrageously when it unjustly failed her from her nursing course when she had a grade of 88.90%. (Opp., p. 17; Amadi Decl., ¶¶ 6, 12.) Plaintiff provides evidence that it was not she who committed the act of academic dishonesty, but another student. (Id.) Even if Plaintiff was not the perpetrator of the academic dishonesty, Defendant failing Plaintiff is not an act “extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” The motion for summary adjudication as to this cause of action is GRANTED.

“In essence, an action based on Business and Professions Code section 17200 to redress an unlawful business practice ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” (People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 515.) A plaintiff alleging an “unfair” business practice under the UCL must show that the defendant’s conduct is “tethered to an underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law.” ((Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 613.) “‘Fraudulent,’ as used in the statute, does not refer to the common law tort of fraud but only requires a showing members of the public ‘are likely to be deceived.’” ((Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 618.) Plaintiff’s claim states Defendant engaged in unfair business practices in California by utilizing and engaging in unlawful pattern and practice of using false reasons to fail students depriving Plaintiff of the benefit of her academic contract in violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. (UMF 14-17). Defendant argues this cause of action fails because it is a derivative claim, and fails if the underlying claims fail.

Here, the Court grants summary judgment as to all other claims, and therefore grants summary judgment as to this derivative claim as well.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50