Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 23STCV16284, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Lawrence Vallely, Therese Vallely, Mary Bestwick, Nilan Gunewardena, Jessica Millan, Lubna Ibrahim, Taurell Lebeau, Julian Payton, David Ross, Hothyfa James Museitif, Giancarlo Samson, Curtis Saulnier, Suraj Sundar, Michael Capovilla, Lucia Senzatimore, Dustin Clark, Natalia Nowicka, Michael Samu, and Majan Zaldana filed this action on July 12, 2023 against Defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC (“Equity”). The original Complaint alleged causes of action for (1) violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”), (2) invasion of privacy, and (3) declaratory relief.

On July 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the Complaint naming Transunion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc. (“TURSS”) in place of Doe 1.

TURSS demurred to each of the causes of action of the Complaint and moved to strike portions of the Complaint. On October 9, 2023, the Court issued an order sustaining TURSS’s demurrer to the second cause of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend. The Court overruled TURSS’s demurrer to the first and third causes of action of the Complaint. (See October 9, 2023 Minute Order, p. 9.) The Court granted TURSS’s motion to strike as to paragraph 61 of the Complaint, with leave to amend. (Ibid.) TURSS’s motion to strike was otherwise denied. (Ibid.)

On October 26, 2023, Lawrence Vallely, Therese Vallely, Mary Bestwick, Nilan Gunewardena, Jessica Millan, Lubna Ibrahim, Taurell Lebeau, Julian Payton, David Ross, Hothyfa James Museitif, Giancarlo Samson, Curtis Saulnier, Suraj Sundar, Michael Capovilla, Lucia Senzatimore, Dustin Clark, Natalia Nowicka, Michael Samu, and Majan Zaldana filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging causes of action for (1) violations of the ICRAA, (2) invasion of privacy, and (3) declaratory relief.

On January 8, 2024, plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of Mary Bestwick, Lubna Ibrahim, Natalia Nowicka, Julian Payton, David Ross, Curtis Saulnier, Suraj Sundar, and Lawrence Vallely. Dismissal was entered on January 12, 2024. In addition, on February 16, 2024, plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of Dustin Clark, Hothyfa James Museitif, and Therese Vallely. Dismissal was entered on February 16, 2024.

TURSS now demurs to the second cause of action of the FAC. The remaining plaintiffs Nilan Gunewardena, Jessica Millan, Taurell Lebeau, Giancarlo Samson, Michael Capovilla, Lucia Senzatimore, Michael Samu, and Majan Zaldana (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose.

In addition, Equity now demurs to the second and third causes of action of the FAC and moves to strike portions of the FAC. Plaintiffs oppose both.[1]

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice in support of Plaintiff’s opposition to TURSS’s demurrer, only as to the fact of the filing of the complaints attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the request. The Court notes that “[i]t is well settled that a court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of matters stated in pleadings or affidavits in the court file of another case, although it can be noticed that the documents exist. Judicial notice can be taken only of the contents of orders, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgments.” (Bennett v. Regents of University of California (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 347, 358, fn. 7 [emphasis in original].)

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n the past two years, and within the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs applied for housing at Jia Apartments, Pegasus Apartments, Park West Apartments, Academy Village Apartments, Versailles Apartments, Mariposa at Playa Del Rey Apartments, Kelvin Court Apartments, Market Street Village Apartments and City Pointe Apartments. Plaintiffs completed a mandatory multi-page ‘Application,’ which included a release of information permitting the Defendants to get private and personal information from third parties about the Plaintiffs.” (FAC, ¶ 32.)

“Equity Residential then requested and obtained investigative consumer reports from TransUnion Rental Screening about the Plaintiffs, which were furnished during the processing of the Plaintiffs’ applications for an apartment home at Jia Apartments, Pegasus Apartments, Park West Apartments, Academy Village Apartments, Versailles Apartments, Mariposa at Playa Del Rey Apartments, Kelvin Court Apartments, Market Street Village Apartments and City Pointe Apartments.” (FAC, ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs allege that “Equity Residential failed to comply with the mandatory requirements, disclosures and authorizations required under the ICRAA,” and that “TransUnion Rental Screening furnished reports in violation of ICRAA.” (FAC, ¶ 33.)

Plaintiffs further allege that “Equity Residential concealed from Plaintiffs the nature and type of the investigative consumer reports they would procure about the Plaintiffs, the date the reports would be procured, the entity or entities which would provide the reports (including from

TransUnion Rental Screening), and Plaintiffs’ rights regarding investigative consumer reports.” (FAC, ¶ 41.)

In the second cause of action for invasion of privacy, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he conduct of Defendants in requesting, preparing, furnishing, and receiving reports on Plaintiffs’ character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living, in contrivance of the protections enshrined in the ICRAA, constituted a serious invasion of Plaintiffs’ privacy.” (FAC, ¶ 79.) Plaintiffs allege that “[b]y acting and failing to act as herein alleged, the Defendants have violated the ICRAA and invaded the Plaintiffs’ rights of privacy by obtaining investigative consumer reports about the Plaintiffs without complying with mandatory requirements under the ICAA for getting investigative reports about the Plaintiffs.” (FAC, ¶ 81.)

TURSS asserts that “Plaintiffs’ factual allegations do not adequately establish the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and Plaintiffs could not have reasonably possessed such an expectation.” (Demurrer at p. 3:15-16.) TURSS notes that the FAC alleges that “Plaintiffs completed the required ‘Application’ that included a consent to release of information and submitted it to Equity Residential.” (FAC, ¶ 36.) As noted by TURSS, the FAC further alleges that “Plaintiffs are informed and believe that in rental housing applications, criminal background and previous eviction backgrounds checks are normally done by requesting and obtaining investigative consumer reports conveying information regarding the applicant’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.” (FAC, ¶ 35.) TURSS asserts that “[a]fter acknowledging that such investigations are commonplace under these exact circumstances, and also consenting to the release of information, Plaintiffs cannot then allege that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy or that their privacy was invaded when the information was revealed to Equity.” (Demurrer at pp. 3:28-4:3.)

In the opposition, Plaintiffs assert that “TransUnion diverts the Court’s attention towards common law standards for invasion of privacy, while ignoring the fact that in certain circumstances, statutes may form the basis for recognizing a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy, such as the ICRAA…” (Opp’n at p 4:1-4.) Plaintiffs cite to Civil Code section 1786.52, which provides, inter alia, that “[n]othing in this chapter shall in any way affect the right of any consumer to maintain an action against an investigative consumer reporting agency, a user of an investigative consumer report, or an informant for invasion of privacy or defamation.” But as discussed in the Court’s October 9, 2023 Minute Order on TURSS’s demurrer to the original Complaint, this statute does not demonstrate that the above-referenced elements of a cause of action for violation of the right to privacy do not apply. Civil Code section 1786.52 simply states that a consumer may “maintain an action against an investigative consumer reporting agency, a user of an investigative consumer report, or an informant for invasion of privacy or defamation.”

Plaintiffs further ague that “Plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the reports about them and a reasonable expectation that such reports will not be obtained without complying with the ICRAA.” (Opp’n at p. 4:12-14.) But Plaintiffs do not address TURSS’s point that Plaintiffs allege in the FAC that “Plaintiffs completed the required ‘Application’ that included a consent to release of information and submitted it to Equity Residential.” (FAC, ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs also do not appear to address their allegation that “Plaintiffs are informed and believe that in rental housing applications, criminal background and previous eviction backgrounds checks are normally done by requesting and obtaining investigative consumer reports conveying information regarding the applicant’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.” (FAC, ¶ 35.) The Court agrees with TURSS that in light of these allegations, Plaintiffs do not allege “a reasonable expectation of privacy…” ((Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 1000.) In Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 1000, cited by TURSS, the California Supreme Court noted that “in order to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the plaintiff must have conducted himself or herself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he or she must not have manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive actions of defendant. If voluntary consent is present, a defendant’s conduct will rarely be deemed highly offensive to a reasonable person so as to justify tort liability.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains TURSS’s demurrer to the second cause of action, without leave to amend. As set forth above, the Court sustained TURSS’s demurrer to the cause of action for invasion of privacy in the original Complaint. In addition, Plaintiff has not

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 713.)

As set forth above, “[t]he elements of a cause of action for violation of the California Constitution’s guaranteed right to privacy are (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 990, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40 [internal quotations omitted].)

In the demurrer, Equity asserts that the second cause of action fails because Plaintiffs “admit they consented to the release of their information and, therefore, cannot allege they had a reasonable expectation of privacy that Equity invaded.” (Demurrer at p. 3:3-5.) Equity notes that the FAC alleges that “Plaintiffs completed a mandatory multi-page ‘Application,’ which included a release of information permitting the Defendants to get private and personal information from third parties about the Plaintiffs.” (FAC, ¶ 32.) As noted by Equity, the FAC

further alleges that “Plaintiffs are informed and believe that in rental housing applications, criminal background and previous eviction backgrounds checks are normally done by requesting and obtaining investigative consumer reports conveying information regarding the applicant’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.” (FAC, ¶ 35.) Equity asserts that “[a]fter acknowledging that such investigations are commonplace under these exact circumstances, and also consenting to the release of information, Plaintiffs cannot then allege that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy or that their privacy was invaded when the information was revealed to Equity.” (Demurrer at pp. 3:27-4:2.)

In the opposition, Plaintiffs assert that they have sufficiently alleged that they had reasonable expectations of privacy under the circumstances. Plaintiffs point to their allegations that “Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that Equity Residential would not solicit or receive information concerning their character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living, unless Equity Residential complied with all governing laws,” and that “Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that they would be protected by the laws governing dissemination of information of a private nature concerning their character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.” (FAC, ¶¶ 76, 78.) Plaintiffs also point to the allegation that “Defendants kept Plaintiffs’ private information private from Plaintiffs, violating the ICRAA and Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations.” (FAC, ¶ 82.)

Plaintiffs also contend, without citing to supporting legal authority, that “Equity argues that Plaintiffs gave voluntary consent…The voluntariness of consent is dubious when the party of authority within a power dynamic (i.e. landlord) extracts that consent from the other party (i.e. tenant) under the guise that everything is on the level – though it is not.” (Opp’n at p. 5:14-18.) The Court notes that it is unclear what Plaintiffs mean by “on the level.” (Opp’n at p. 5:18.) Moreover, Plaintiffs do not point to any allegations in the FAC stating that they did not voluntarily consent to a release of their information.

As discussed, Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiffs completed a mandatory multi-page “Application,” which included a release of information permitting the Defendants to get private and personal information from third parties about the Plaintiffs.” (FAC, ¶ 32.) In addition, as set forth above, Plaintiffs allege that they “completed the required ‘Application’ that included a consent to release of information and submitted it to Equity Residential.” (FAC, ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs also allege that “Plaintiffs are informed and believe that in rental housing applications, criminal background and previous eviction backgrounds checks are normally done by requesting and obtaining investigative consumer reports conveying information regarding the applicant’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.” (FAC, ¶ 35.)

The Court agrees with Equity that in light of these allegations, Plaintiffs do not allege “a reasonable expectation of privacy…” (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1000.) As discussed above, in Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 1000, also cited by Equity, the California Supreme Court noted that “in order to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the plaintiff must have conducted himself or herself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he or she must not have manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive actions of defendant. If voluntary consent is present, a defendant’s conduct will rarely be deemed highly offensive to a reasonable person so as to justify tort liability.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Equity’s demurrer to the second cause of action, without leave to amend. As noted by Equity, “[d]espite another…opportunity at pleading claims for invasion of privacy…Plaintiffs fail to allege…facts to support their claims for invasion of privacy…” (Reply at pp. 4:28-5:2.) As discussed, Equity argues in the instant demurrer that “Plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim fails because Plaintiffs do not allege that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy…” (Demurrer at p. 2:12-13.) The issue of Plaintiffs’ alleged reasonable expectation of privacy was also addressed in the Court’s October 9, 2023 minute order on TURSS’s demurrer to the original Complaint. (See October 9, 2023 Minute Order.) In addition, in their opposition to Equity’s demurrer, Plaintiffs have not proffered any basis for any amendment to cure the deficiencies in their second cause of action.

Equity asserts that the third cause of action for declaratory relief fails because Plaintiffs have not alleged any actual, present controversy. “A complaint for declaratory relief must demonstrate: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.” ((Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.) “The ‘actual controversy’ requirement concerns the existence of present controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties pursuant to contract (Code of Civil Procedure section 1060), statute or order…Where the allegations of the complaint reveal the controversy to be conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court, the fundamental basis of declaratory relief is lacking.” (Ibid. [emphasis omitted].)

Equity notes that in the third cause of action for declaratory relief, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants demands [sic] all leases must be renewed or re-certified, and because the same forms are always used, which authorizes the Defendants to obtain investigative consumer reports about the Plaintiffs, a judicial determination is necessary to prevent the Defendants’ continued violations of the ICRAA.” (FAC, ¶ 84.) Equity asserts that although Plaintiffs allege that “all leases must be renewed or re-certified,” (FAC, ¶ 84), Plaintiffs do not allege that they became tenants or have current leases with Equity. As noted by Equity, Plaintiffs allege that they were “prospective” tenants. (See FAC, ¶¶ 6-24.) Plaintiffs do not appear to respond to this point in the opposition.

Equity also argues that “Plaintiffs further reveal their contrived controversy to be fictional and only hypothetically anticipated to occur in the future, by explaining that their basis for seeking declaratory relief is to ‘stop further violations of the ICRAA so that these wrongful acts will never occur again as to the apartment complex.’” (Demurrer at p. 5:20-24, citing FAC, ¶ 85.) However, Plaintiffs also allege in paragraph 85 of the FAC that “[a] dispute and actual controversy have also arisen as to how to correct and mitigate the damages to Plaintiffs and other similar persons from Defendants’ illegal actions in violation of the ICRAA statutes…” (FAC, ¶ 85.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]n actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiffs and the Defendants regarding the legality and effect of the Defendants’ Application, which Plaintiffs contend violates the ICRAA.” (FAC, ¶ 84.) Equity does not appear to address these allegations in its demurrer. The Court notes that “a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” ((Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047); (see also PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682 [“A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.”].)

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Equity’s demurrer to the third cause of

A court may strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any part of a pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” ((Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” ((Id., § 437.)

In the motion to strike, Equity first asserts that “[p]aragraphs 5, 49, and 73 of the Complaint and Paragraphs 8 through 10 of the Prayer for Relief in Plaintiffs’ FAC seek a declaratory judgment, and permanent injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs’ only basis for seeking such relief is found in their Third Cause of Action for declaratory relief. As further explained in Equity’s Demurrer to the FAC, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for declaratory relief because they have not alleged any actual, present controversy…Therefore, Paragraphs 5, 49, and 73 of the FAC and Paragraphs 8 through 10 of the Prayer for Relief must be stricken as irrelevant…” (Mot. at p. 2:5-12.) As set forth above, the Court overrules Equity’s demurrer to the third cause of action for declaratory relief. Thus, the Court denies Equity’s motion to strike paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the Prayer for Relief of the FAC. The Court also denies Equity’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief in paragraphs 5, 49, and 73 of the FAC.[2]

Equity also moves to strike paragraphs 5, 49, and 73 of the FAC and paragraph 4 of the Prayer for Relief on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is improper.

Equity cites to Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[i]n order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294…These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.” In addition, “Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) imposes additional requirements on plaintiffs attempting to hold an ‘employer’ liable for punitive damages ‘based upon acts of an employee.’ The employer must have ‘had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or [been] personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.’ Subdivision (b) also states that, ‘[w]ith respect to a corporate employer,’ the offending conduct ‘must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.’” ((College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721 [internal citation omitted].)

Equity asserts that “Plaintiffs do not allege that Equity acted with oppression, fraud, or malice and do not allege that any offending conduct was carried out by or authorized by Equity’s senior management…” (Mot. at p. 3:21-23.)

In the opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the ICRAA contains its own standard pertaining to punitive damages, citing to Civil Code section 1786.50, subdivision (b), which provides that “[i]f the court determines that the violation was grossly negligent or willful, the court may, in addition, assess, and the consumer may recover, punitive damages.” Plaintiffs assert that they have “alleged facts that support a finding that defendants have acted with lack of care with respect to obligations under the ICRAA, sufficient to constitute gross negligence.” (Opp’n at p. 4:13-15.) Plaintiffs also assert that willful conduct is alleged. Plaintiffs cite to paragraph 52 of the FAC, which alleges as follows:

“Defendants’ conduct and violations of the ICRAA was and is willful and grossly negligent. Defendants acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of their obligations and the rights of the Plaintiffs. Defendants willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the following facts: (a) Defendants are large corporations with access to legal advice and have retained counsel who has advised the Defendants that they must comply with California Civil Code sections 1786 to 1786.60; (b) Equity Residential required a purported authorization to perform credit and background checks in the process of screening Plaintiffs for Jia Apartments, Pegasus Apartments, Park West Apartments, Academy Village Apartments, Versailles Apartments, Mariposa at Playa Del Rey Apartments, Kelvin Court Apartments, Market Street Village Apartments and City Pointe Apartments which, although defective, evidences Defendants’ awareness of and willful failure to follow the governing laws concerning such authorizations; (c) The plain language of the statute unambiguously indicates that inclusion of a box to check to request copies of reports is required, and that the disclosure form must contain the name, address, and phone number of the investigative consumer reporting agency conducting the investigation; and (d) TransUnion Rental Screening assembled and furnished reports without complying with the ICRAA.” (FAC, ¶ 52.)

In the reply, Equity does not appear to cite any legal authority demonstrating that Civil Code section 1786.50, subdivision (b) is not the appropriate standard here. Equity asserts, however, that “[t]he Court should strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages because the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege willful or grossly negligent conduct on the part of Equity.” (Reply at p. 2:23-25.) However, as set forth above, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the following facts: (a) Defendants are large corporations with access to legal advice and have retained counsel who has advised the Defendants that they must comply with California Civil Code sections 1786 to 1786.60[3]; (b) Equity Residential required a purported authorization to perform credit and background checks in the process of screening Plaintiffs for Jia Apartments, Pegasus Apartments, Park West Apartments, Academy Village Apartments, Versailles Apartments, Mariposa at Playa Del Rey Apartments, Kelvin Court Apartments, Market Street Village Apartments and City Pointe Apartments which, although defective, evidences Defendants’ awareness of and willful failure to follow the governing laws concerning such authorizations.” (FAC, ¶ 52.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Equity’s motion to strike paragraphs 5, 49, and 73 of the FAC and paragraph 4 of the Prayer for Relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court sustains TURSS’s demurrer to the second cause of action of the FAC, without leave to amend.

In addition, based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Equity’s demurrer to the second cause of action of the FAC, without leave to amend. The Court overrules Equity’s demurrer to the third cause of action of the FAC. The Court denies Equity’s motion to strike.

The Court orders TURSS and Equity to file and serve their answers to the FAC within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿

[1]The Court notes that Plaintiffs also filed an “Opposition to Defendant Transunion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” However, it does not appear that TURSS filed any motion to strike as to the FAC. Thus, it appears this opposition may have been filed by Plaintiffs inadvertently.

[2]The Court notes that Equity moves, inter alia, for “an order striking Paragraphs 5, 49, and 73,” (Notice of Mot at p. 2:5-6) but such paragraphs do not solely seek declaratory relief. As noted by Plaintiffs, “[a] notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense...” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (a).)

[3]In the first cause of action for violations of the ICRAA, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Equity failed to comply with Civil Code section 1786.16. (FAC, ¶¶ 58-60, 62-63.)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50