Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV27193, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV27193 Hearing Date: May 30, 2024 Dept: 50
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ALT METHOD INC., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. BIJAN MAWJI, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
23STCV27193 |
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Hearing Date: |
May 30, 2024 |
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Hearing Time: |
2:00 p.m. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS
BIJAN MAWJI’S AND MAWJI TAIT HOLDINGS INC.’S MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFFS’ ALT
METHOD INC.’S AND JONATHAN TABAROKI’S SERVICE OF SUMMONS |
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Background
Plaintiffs Alt Method Inc. and Jonathan Tabaroki (“Tabaroki “) (jointly,
“Plaintiffs”) filed this action on November 6, 2023 against Defendants Bijan
Mawji (“Mawji”) and Mawji Tait Holdings Inc. (“MTH”) (jointly, “Defendants”).
The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) dissolution of partnership, (2)
for an accounting, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) conversion, and (5)
tortious interference with contractual relations.
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n or around the
latter half of 2019, Defendant Mawji approached Plaintiff Tabaroki with a
business proposition. Specifically, Mawji informed Tabaroki that Defendant
Mawji wanted to start a merchandise production business tailored to online
influencers and talent…In connection with his business proposition, Mawji
proposed a 50/50 partnership with each of Mawji and Tabaroki investing
$70,000.00 at the outset of the business…Plaintiff Tabaroki agreed to form this
50/50 partnership and, based upon Mawji’s representations and assurances,
thereafter transferred the initial sum of $70,000.00 to Mawji.” (Compl., ¶¶
17-19.) “Tabaroki then formed the company Alt Labs, LLC…in the State of
California, which company was owned fifty percent (50%) by Mawji’s company,
Mawji Tait Holdings, and fifty percent (50%) by Tabaroki’s company, Trousdale
Group LLC…” (Compl., ¶ 20.)
Plaintiffs allege that “the partners decided to raise equity to expand
the partnership and created Plaintiff Alt Method, a corporation, as a vehicle
to bring on additional investors.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs further allege
that “[i]n or around 2021, after the partnership was an established and growing
enterprise, Mawji, through his ‘uncle’ Raj, introduced the potential client
Mecca USA…” (Compl., ¶ 29.) “Mawji intentionally delayed the finalization of a
written contract between the partnership and Mecca USA…Following these
deliberate delays, and before a formal order could be placed by Mecca, Mawji
decided that he no longer wanted to share with Plaintiffs the prospective and
anticipated revenues and profits that would be derived from doing business with
Mecca.” (Compl., ¶¶ 31-32.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[r]ather than moving forward with the
partnership, Mawji purported ‘resign’ [sic] from Alt Method, formed his own new
competing company, and induced the partnership’s customers to sever their
contracts and cease conducting business with Plaintiffs and to, instead,
conduct the same business with Mawji’s new company.” (Compl., ¶ 33.) “Mawji’s
first step in implementing this scheme was to unilaterally withdraw funds from
the partnership bank account with Alt Method, redirecting all such funds for
his own personal use and for his new competing company, which does business as
Dominion…Mawji then began to unilaterally modify Alt Method’s customer invoices
to cause payments that should have been directed to the partnership to instead
be directed to bank accounts exclusively owned and/or controlled by Mawji.”
(Compl., ¶¶ 35-36.) “In total, through this conduct, including directly
withdrawing and converting monies from Alt Method’s bank accounts and directly
diverting and converting payments from Alt Method’s customers, Mawji was able
to unlawfully misappropriate and convert at least $300,000.00 in funds.”
(Compl., ¶ 37.)
On January 16, 2024, Plaintiffs
filed proofs of service indicating that Defendants were personally served with
the summons and Complaint on January 11, 2024 at the address 6801 Waxing Way,
Sacramento, California 95842.
Defendants now move for an order “to
quash the service of summons on Defendants on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over Defendants.” Plaintiffs oppose.
Evidentiary Objections
The Court rules on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary
objections to the Supplemental Declaration of Daniel B. Lopez as follows:
Objection No. 1: overruled
The Court rules on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary
objections to the Supplemental Declaration of Bijan Mawji as follows:
Objection No. 1: overruled
Objection No. 2: overruled
Discussion
Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 provides in part: “[a] defendant, on
or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time
that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion…(1)
To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court
over him or her.” ((Id., § 418.10, subd. (a).) Pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10,
subdivision (e), “[a] defendant or
cross-defendant may make a motion under this section and simultaneously answer,
demur, or move to strike the complaint or cross-complaint.”
Service
First, Defendants assert that “Plaintiffs failed to personally serve
Defendants.” (Mot. at p. 3:10.) Defendants cite to Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th
789, 793, where the
Court of Appeal noted that “[i]n the
absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing
service of process is essential to establish that court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant…When
a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving,
inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service…” The Floveyor Court noted
that “[t]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable
presumption that the service was proper. However, the presumption arises only
if the proof of service complies with the applicable statutory requirements.” ((Id. at
p. 795.)
As set forth
above, on January 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed proofs of service
indicating that Defendants were personally served with the summons and
Complaint on January 11, 2024 at the address 6801 Waxing Way, Sacramento, California
95842. The Court notes that pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 415.10, “[a] summons may be
served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
the person to be served. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete
at the time of such delivery.”
In support of the motion, Defendants submit the Declaration of Bijan
Mawji, who states that “[n]either on January 11, 2024 or otherwise was I
personally served a Summons, Complaint or Notice of Case Assignment-Unlimited
Civil Case at 6801 Waxwing Way, Sacramento, CA 95842.” (Mawji Decl., ¶ 3.)
Mawji also states that “[n]either on January 11, 2024 or otherwise was I
personally served a Summons, Complaint or Notice of Case Assignment-Unlimited
Civil Case on behalf of Defendant Mawji Tait Holdings, Inc. (‘MTH’) at 6801
Waxwing Way, Sacramento, CA 95842.” (Mawji Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendants assert that
accordingly, “Plaintiffs now have the burden to prove the existence of
jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective
service.” (Mot. at p. 3:20-21.)
In the opposition, Plaintiffs
assert that they have effectuated service upon both Defendants. As discussed, on January 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed proofs of service
indicating that Defendants were personally served with the summons and
Complaint on January 11, 2024 at the address 6801 Waxing Way, Sacramento, California
95842.
In his declaration in support of the opposition, Jonathan Tabaroki
states that “[t]o locate the Defendants, I retained the services of
E-Investigations, Inc. which, following its investigation, determined that
defendant Mawji resided at 6801 Waxwing Way, Sacramento, California 95842.”
(Tabaroki Decl., ¶ 20.) Tabaroki states that he “retained the process server
company Capital Process Service to serve Defendants at the address
E-Investigations, Inc. had uncovered, specifically 6801 Waxwing Way,
Sacramento, California 95842,” and that “[o]n January 11, 2024, process server
Jenice Rossner from Capital Process Service served the Summons, Complaint, and
related documents upon an individual who indicated he was Defendant Mawji.”
(Tabaroki Decl., ¶¶ 21-22.) Tabaroki states that “later that same day, on
January 11, 2024, Defendant Mawji sent [Tabaroki] a text message communication
stating, in part, ‘So now you’re suing me?’ while also threatening that a
‘Counter claim coming [sic] and daddy is included’ and exclaiming that the
filing of the lawsuit was ‘[s]uch a dumb move.’” (Tabaroki Decl., ¶ 24, Ex. H.)
Plaintiffs assert that Mawji’s text message communications to Tabaroki
on January 11, 2024, show that Mawji is aware of and in receipt of the summons
and Complaint that were filed and served. (Tabaroki Decl., ¶ 24, Ex. H.) Defendants note that “[i]t is well
settled that strict compliance with statutes governing service of
process is not required. Rather, in deciding whether service was valid, the
statutory provisions regarding service of process should be liberally construed
to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice
has been received by the defendant. Thus,
substantial compliance is sufficient.” (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research,
Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295,
313 [internal citations omitted].)
Based on the
foregoing, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have demonstrated facts
requisite to an effective service. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that notice of the
summons and Complaint was received by Mawji. It cannot be disputed that Defendants received
actual notice of this action. Therefore, Defendants’ attempt to defeat
jurisdiction on technical grounds is unavailing.[1]
Personal Jurisdiction
Defendants also assert that “Plaintiffs have not established minimum
contacts for MTH.” (Mot. at p. 3:23.) The Court notes that “California courts may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis that is not inconsistent with the state and federal
Constitutions. Thus, the inquiry in California is whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction comports with the limits imposed by federal due process.” (Young
v. Daimler AG (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 855, 865 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Due process permits courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contact”
with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)
“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.) “A nonresident defendant may be
subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum
if his or her contacts in the forum state are substantial…continuous and
systematic. In such a case, it is not necessary that the specific cause of
action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the
forum. Such a defendant’s contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that
they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for
jurisdiction.” (Id. at pp. 445-446 [internal quotations,
citations, and emphasis omitted].)
“If general jurisdiction is not established,
a nonresident defendant may still be subject to California’s specific jurisdiction if a three-prong test is
met.” (Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1558, 1568 [internal emphasis omitted].) “Specific
jurisdiction will be found over an out-of-state defendant only when (1) the
[out-of-state] defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum
benefits, (2) the controversy [giving rise to the present lawsuit] is related
to or arises out of [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum, and (3) the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial
justice. The plaintiff asking the forum state to exert jurisdiction over the
out-of-state defendant bears the initial burden of establishing the first
two elements by a preponderance of the evidence, and if the plaintiff does so,
the out-of-state defendant then bears the burden of convincing the court why
the exertion of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial
justice.” (Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 243, 253 [internal
quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted].)
In his
declaration in support of the motion, Mawji asserts that “MTH
does not reside in the State of California,” and that “MTH does not conduct or
transact any business in the State of California.” (Mawji Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Mawji
appears to assert that accordingly, “Plaintiffs have not established minimum
contacts for MTH.” (Mot. at p. 3:23.)
In the opposition, Plaintiffs assert that they “have established
minimum contacts for Defendant MTH.” (Opp’n at p. 8:13.) Plaintiffs assert that
“as part of the partnership formed between Defendant Mawji and Plaintiff
Tabaroki in the State of California, including with the intent to conduct
business in California, Defendant Mawji and Plaintiff Tabaroki formed a limited
liability company in the State of California of which MTH was a member.
Moreover, as part of this partnership formed and operated in the State of
California, Defendants formed multiple California companies, operated those
companies in California, were signatories on California bank accounts for these
California companies, converted monies from these California entities,” and
that “Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of these contacts and activities.” (Opp’n at
p. 10:13-20, emphasis omitted.)
In his supporting declaration,
Tabaroki states that “[o]n September 12, 2019, as part of the process of
commencing our 50/50 business partnership, Mawji and I together formed the
California limited liability company 264626 LLC, which we later amended to be
named Alt Labs, LLC (‘Alt Labs LLC’).” (Tabaroki Decl., ¶ 6.) Tabaroki states
that “[a]t all times relevant, the California based Alt Labs LLC was owned
fifty percent (50%) by Mawji’s company, Defendant Mawji Tait Holdings,
and fifty percent (50%) by my company, Trousdale Group LLC…” (Tabaroki Decl., ¶
8, emphasis added.)
Tabaroki also states that “Mawji Tait Holding was added as a signatory
to Alt Lab LLC’s Bank of America business bank account in California.”
(Tabaroki Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. C.) Tabaroki’s declaration also provides that “Alt
Labs LLC’s 2019 and 2020 tax filings further reflect Mawji Tait Holding’s fifty
percent (50%) ownership interest in the California based Alt Labs. True and
correct copies of Mawji Tait Holding’s 2019 and 2020 Partnership Form 1065
Schedule K-1 are attached hereto as composite Exhibit ‘D’.” (Tabaroki Decl., ¶
11, Ex. D.)
As set forth above, the Complaint in this action
alleges, inter alia, that “Tabaroki…formed the company Alt Labs, LLC…in
the State of California, which company was owned fifty percent (50%) by Mawji’s
company, Mawji Tait Holdings, and fifty percent (50%) by Tabaroki’s company,
Trousdale Group LLC…” (Compl., ¶ 20.) The Complaint further alleges that “the
partners decided to raise equity to expand the partnership and created
Plaintiff Alt Method, a corporation, as a vehicle to bring on additional
investors.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) As discussed, Plaintiffs allege that Mawji
“unilaterally [withdrew] funds from the partnership bank account with Alt
Method, redirecting all such funds for his own personal use and for his new
competing company, which does business as Dominion…” (Compl., ¶ 35.)
In his supporting declaration, Tabroki further
states that “at a certain point during the partnership, Defendant Mawji
purported to ‘resign’ from Plaintiff Alt Method Inc. and then proceeded to form
his own new competing company based in California while inducing our
partnership’s customers to sever their contracts and dealings with our
partnership, including to cease conducting business with me and Alt Method Inc.
and to, instead, conduct the same business with Mawji’s new company, Dominion
Apparel, Inc…Mawji’s first step in implementing this scheme was to unilaterally
withdraw funds from our partnership bank account set up in the name of Alt
Method Inc., redirecting all such funds for his own personal use and for his
new competing company, Dominion Apparel, including to transfer money to bank
accounts in Canada under his exclusive control. Upon information and belief,
those Canadian bank accounts are owned and/or controlled by Defendant Mawji’s
company, Defendant Mawji Tait Holding, of which Defendant Mawji is the sole
owner.” (Tabroki Decl., ¶ 13.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently
demonstrated that MTH “has purposefully availed [itself] of forum benefits,” and
that “the controversy [giving rise to the present lawsuit] is related to or
arises out of [MTH’s] contacts with the
forum.” (Jacqueline
B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C., supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 253 [internal quotations omitted].)
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to quash. Defendants
must respond to the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order.
Plaintiffs
shall give notice of this ruling.
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los Angeles
Superior Court
[1]The Court also notes that Defendants raise a few
arguments for the first time in connection with reply, such as that “the
Waxwing POS is untimely…The Waxwing POS alleges that service was made on
January 11, 2024, a week after Plaintiffs were required to serve the
complaint.” (Reply at pp. 3:26-4:2.) As an initial matter, Defendants do not
cite any legal authority to support this assertion. In addition, “[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because
such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter
the argument.¿” (American Drug Stores, Inc.
v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th
1446, 1453¿.) Moreover, as
to the evidence submitted for the first time in connection with Defendants’
reply, the Court notes that “¿[t]he general rule of motion practice…is that new
evidence is not permitted with reply papers.¿”¿(¿Jay¿v. Mahaffey¿(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.)