Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 23STCV27529, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Kevin Ip, an individual and as trustee of the Ip Residence Trust (A), filed this action on November 7, 2023 against, inter alia, defendants Yuna Chen (“Chen”) and Wendy Trinh Tran (“Tran”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) elder abuse, (3) conversion in violation of Penal Code section 496, and (4) breach of contract.

The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Ip took title to the property located at 412 N. San Marino Ave., San Gabriel, California (the “Property”) pursuant to a grant deed dated December 13, 1997. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 14.) “Ip transferred title to the Kevin Ip Family Trust dated July 19, 2007, by grant deed dated July 19, 2007…Ip transferred title again from the Kevin Ip Family Trust dated July 19, 2007, to the Ip Residence Trust (A), by quitclaim deed dated August 9, 2023…” (Compl., ¶ 14.) The Complaint alleges that “[a]round 2014, Chen and Ip became romantically involved. Chen asked Ip if he could help her find a place to rent. Ip agreed to rent the Property to Chen for $2,000 per month.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) “On October 15, 2014, Ip and Chen entered into a California Association of Realtors…Residential Lease or Month-to-Month Rental Agreement for the Property, whereby Chen agreed to lease the Property from Ip for $2,000 per month (the ‘First Lease’).” (Compl., ¶ 17.) “Ip never agreed to sell the Property to Chen and the two never entered any agreement whereby Chen would obtain any ownership interest in the Property.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) “When the First Lease terminated on October 31, 2019, Chen stayed in the Property with her daughter, Tran. On February 25, 2021, Chen signed a second CAR Residential Lease or Month-to-Month Rental Agreement that raised her rent for the Property to $2,800 per month (the ‘Second Lease’).” (Compl., ¶ 22.)

The Complaint alleges that “[a]s Ip grew older, Chen and her daughter, Tran, took advantage of Ip through the use of affection and coercion and wanted Ip to treat them more as his family than his tenants. Chen and Tran stopped paying rent, and has not paid Ip for more than 24 months of back rent since she has lived in the Property, convinced Ip to pay their debts and expenses, and exerted undue influence over Ip to convince him to give Tran and Chen cash, gifts, and property for their personal benefit.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) “In or around January 2023, Ip and Chen’s romantic relationship began to end. At that time, Tran and Chen began to tell Ip that he was no longer allowed to come to the house and that Chen somehow owns the Property, not Ip. Chen now seeks to exclude Ip from possession of the house, claims to own the Property, and has demanded that Ip transfer title of the house to Chen.” (Compl., ¶ 31.) The Complaint alleges that “Ip now seeks a determination of his interests to the Property and to stop Chen and Ip from continuing to abuse Ip and take financial advantage of him.” (Ibid.)

On February 9, 2024, Chen and Tran (jointly, “Cross-Complainants”) filed a Cross-Complaint against Kevin Ip, an individual; Kevin Ip, as trustee of Kevin Ip Family Trust; and Kevin Ip, as trustee of Ip Residence Trust (A). The Cross-Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of contract and specific performance, (3) fraud, (4) declaratory relief, (5) trespass, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (7) breach of contract and specific performance.

Kevin Ip, as an individual and as trustee of the Ip Residence Trust (A) (“Ip”) now demurs to each of the causes of action of the Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainants oppose.

In the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainants allege that “[i]n 2014, YUNA CHEN was getting a divorce after a 23-year marriage. As an immigrant with limited English ability and with little knowledge of business matters, YUNA CHEN was striking out on her own…” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 10.) “Her former husband agreed to pay her $560,000 as their divorce settlement only if she used such funds to buy a home as a stable base and shelter for herself and her two children.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 10.)

“As YUNA CHEN was looking for her next house, her friend KEVIN IP offered to help. She understood KEVIN IP was a well-regarded attorney and businessperson in the local Chinese and Buddhist community in the San Gabriel Valley – this was his reputation according to her knowledge at the time.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 11.) Chen and Ip “were not a couple.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 15.) Ip represented to Chen “that he was the trustee for a wealthy man from Singapore, who owned several properties in the area, including in desirable areas such as San Marino. According to Kevin, one such property was a single family home at 412 N. San Marino Avenue, San Gabriel, CA (‘Property’), which he said could be vacated for Yuna to buy and live in.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 14.)

“Yuna lacked sufficient credit history and stable income record to qualify for a traditional bank loan. Kevin Ip told her the Singapore owner accepted her proposal and would sell her the Property for $680,000, under the following terms – Yuna would pay a down payment of $560,000 and the rest of the purchase price in monthly installments until she paid a total of $680,000, plus she would pay the property taxes during the purchasing period (‘Purchase Agreement’). He also said the owner wanted her to rent for 2 years and pay $2,000 per month, as a trial period, all the while holding her $560,000. He claimed it would take some time to arrange the paperwork for the purchase and to transfer the title, which he would handle. He told YUNA CHEN she would receive title to the Property after the initial 2-year rental period, then the sale would become final after she paid the full purchase price of $680,000.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 18.)

“In September 2014, before she moved into the Property, Kevin Ip asked Yuna to put the terms of the Purchase Agreement in an email for him to confirm with the ‘Singapore owner’ that they had agreed on. He dictated the language she should write…In the wording he directed, Yuna emailed to Kevin her message to the owner in Chinese, setting forth the deal terms to Kevin’s email address -- JusticeKIp@foxmail.com.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 21.) On the basis of the agreement, “YUNA CHEN took the following actions, to her detriment: a. Yuna paid him the $560,000 down payment on or about November 6, 2014; b. moved into the Property as her home, and later her children moved in; c. she made several improvements to the Property; and, d. she paid $2,000 per month during the rental period, from 2015 – 2017.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 22.) In addition, “Yuna paid Kevin Ip monthly installments of $2,800 toward the agreed purchase price of $680,000, starting on August 25, 2017, and continuing for almost six years, with some gaps during COVID-19. In total, she has paid him more than $810,000 for the Property.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 23(b).) “Kevin Ip…never characterized these payments as rent, or demanded past due rent, including during the COVID-19 pandemic. YUNA CHEN has never signed any lease or rental agreement for the Property.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 24.) “YUNA also paid $3,000 to $3,500 for property taxes twice a year at his direction, from October 2017 to the present.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 25.)

Chen “began to make demands that the Property be completely transferred to her name.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 26.) “[W]hen she began urging him to transfer title, because she had fully paid, Kevin Ip became violent, irrational, threatening and his statements started to lose credibility.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 27.) “By a letter dated September 1, 2023, YUNA CHEN’s attorneys demanded performance by Kevin Ip, who refuses to convey title to her. Instead, he has filed a lawsuit against her for Unlawful Detainer.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 28.)

In the demurrer, Ip asserts that “the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action for quiet title, breach of contract, fraud, and declaratory relief as brought by Wendy Tran fail to state a claim because Tran lacks standing to bring an ownership claim for the property.” (Demurrer at p. 4:6-8.)

Ip notes that “standing to sue…is the right to relief in court.” (The Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 936, 944-945 [internal emphasis omitted].) Ip asserts that the Cross-Complaint alleges that Chen, not Tran, allegedly entered into the purchase agreement for the subject property. Indeed, in the second cause of action for breach of contract and specific performance, Cross-Complainants allege that “Cross-Defendants agreed to sell the Property to YUNA CHEN upon payment of the purchase price of $680,000, which is fair and adequate consideration. YUNA CHEN has fully performed…Cross-Defendants breached the contract by failing and refusing…to convey title to Cross-Complainants, despite demand.” (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 37-38.)

In the opposition to the demurrer, Cross-Complainants state that “the quiet title claim will be amended to state only Yuna Chen is seeking to quiet title…not Wendy Trinh Tran…” (Opp’n at p. 2:18-19.) In addition, as noted by Ip, Cross-Complainants do not appear to address Ip’s argument that Tran also lacks standing as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action of the Cross-Complaint.

In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action as to Tran, with leave to amend.

Next, Ip asserts that the “first cause of action for quiet title and second cause of action for breach of contract each fail to state a claim because Chen’s purported oral agreement with Ip to purchase the Property is barred by the statute of frauds…” (Demurrer at p. 4:23-25.)

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(3), “[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent:…(3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” Ip asserts that here, Cross-Complainants “did not, and cannot, allege the existence of any written agreement that she [sic] entered with Ip to purchase the Property.” (Demurrer at p. 5:19-21.)

In the opposition, Cross-Complainants assert that “the statute of frauds is not applicable as the agreement is fully performed and Ip is estopped by his own fraud.” (Opp’n at p. 4:1-2.) Cross-Complainants cite to Monarco v. Lo Greco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623-624, where the California Supreme Court noted that “[t]he doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would result from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract, or in the unjust enrichment that would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to rely upon the statute.” (Internal citations omitted.)

Cross-Complainants assert that here, “the exceptions to the Statute of Frauds and the reasoning of the California Supreme Court have been met. Yuna Chen moved in, seriously and detrimentally changed her position, and she paid over $800,000 towards Property purchase and paid the property taxes. Kevin Ip…demanded and received this benefit (while concealing that he was the owner, not merely a trustee) – her full performance is pled…” (Opp’n at p. 5:22-27.) Cross-Complainants assert that Ip “would be unjustly enriched if he were allowed to avoid the contract based upon it being verbal…” (Opp’n at p. 6:5-6.)

Indeed, as set forth above, Cross-Complainants allege that “[o]n the basis of the foregoing agreement, and in reliance thereon, YUNA CHEN took the following actions, to her detriment: a. Yuna paid him the $560,000 down payment on or about November 6, 2014; b. moved into the Property as her home, and later her children moved in; c. she made several improvements to the Property; and, d. she paid $2,000 per month during the rental period, from 2015 – 2017.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 22.) Cross-Complainants further allege that “Yuna paid Kevin Ip monthly installments of $2,800 toward the agreed purchase price of $680,000, starting on August 25, 2017, and continuing for almost six years, with some gaps during COVID-19. In total, she has paid him more than $810,000 for the Property.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 23(b).) As set forth above, the Monarco Court noted that “[t]he doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere,” inter alia, “in the unjust enrichment that would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to rely upon the statute.” (Monarco v. Lo Greco, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 623-624.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Cross-Complainants have adequately alleged facts to support their assertion that “plaintiff is estopped from relying upon the statute of frauds.” (Monarco v. Lo Greco, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 623.)

Ip also asserts that the “second cause of action…fails to state a claim because it is barred by California’s two-year statute of limitations.” (Demurrer at p. 6:16-18.) Ip cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 339, which provides in pertinent part, “[w]ithin two years: 1. An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing…”

Ip notes that Cross-Complainants allege that “[h]e told YUNA CHEN she would receive title to the Property after the initial 2-year rental period, then the sale would become final after she paid the full purchase price of $680,000.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 18.) Ip asserts that given the allegations of the Cross-Complaint, “Ip should have transferred title to Chen in June 2019…That is when Chen’s breach of contract claim should have accrued. Chen’s deadline to bring any breach of contract claim against Ip was June 1, 2022…Thus, Chen’s breach of contract claim is time barred.” (Demurrer at p. 7:7-10.)

In support of his assertion that the breach of contract claim accrued in June 2019, Ip notes that the Cross-Complaint alleges that Chen “paid him the $560,000 down payment on or about November 6, 2014.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 22(a).) Cross-Complainants allege that Chen “paid $2,000 per month during the rental period, from 2015 - 2017.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 22(d).) The Cross-Complaint further alleges that Chen “paid Kevin Ip monthly installments of $2,800 toward the agreed purchase price of $680,000, starting on August 25, 2017, and continuing for almost six years…” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 23(b).)

Ip asserts that accordingly, “Chen paid Ip thirty months of rent from January 2015 to August 2017…in addition to the $560,000 down payment, for a total of $620,000 towards the purchase price by August 2017.” (Demurrer at p. 6:20-23.) Next, Ip asserts that Chen “would have only needed to may [sic] 22 monthly payments of $2,800 from August 2017 to have paid Ip another $61,600 by June 1, 2019. Thus, taking Chen’s verified allegations as true, Chen would have paid Ip $681,600 by June l, 2019.” (Demurrer at p. 7:1-3.) As discussed, Cross-Complainants allege that the purchase price was “$680,000.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 18.)

In the opposition, Cross-Complainants assert that “Chen filed suit within two years of discovering fraud.” (Opp’n at p. 7:1.) Cross-Complainants cite to Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1143, where the Court of Appeal noted that “the statute of limitations commences when a party knows or should know the facts essential to his claim.” (Internal emphasis omitted.) But Cross-Complainants do not appear to address Ip’s argument that the second cause of action for breach of contract and specific performance is time-barred. Cross-Complainants do not appear to dispute that such cause of action accrued on June 1, 2019. In addition, Cross-Complainants do not appear to point to any allegations in the Cross-Complaint demonstrating any purported later date when they knew the facts essential to the second cause of action for breach of contract. (Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1143.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the second cause of action as to Chen, with leave to amend. The Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the first cause of action as to Chen.

Next, Ip asserts that the third cause of action for fraud does not allege facts with sufficient particularity. “The elements of fraud or deceit are: a representation, usually of fact, which is false, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damage resulting from that justifiable reliance. Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.” ((Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 72-73 [internal citations omitted].) “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” ((Id. at p. 73 [internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original].) In the demurrer, Ip asserts, inter alia, that “Chen does not allege the who, what, when, and where of her claims that Ip led her to believe that she was purchasing the house.” (Demurrer at p. 8:13-15.)

The fraud cause of action alleges that “Cross-Complainants were the victims of false promises by Kevin Ip, who promised to sell Yuna Chen the Property if she paid the price of $680,000. He misrepresented that he was an attorney and uniquely qualified and trustworthy to handle the Purchase Agreement on behalf of the owner, and he would perform as promised without the need for a formal contract. He claimed to be a person of integrity and trustworthiness, as he did many acts of charity at the Buddhist temple and through his nonprofit organization...” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 40.) Cross-Complainants allege that “YUNA CHEN relied on Mr. Ip’s representations and promises, as a person with superior knowledge, acumen and bargaining power, which caused her to pay him the down payment, monthly installment payments, plus property taxes for the Property, totaling over $810,000, and to move into the home and make improvements…After she fully paid him for the purchase, YUNA CHEN discovered the deceit and wrongs by Kevin Ip, including that he does not appear to be a licensed attorney, he was the record owner of the Property and there was never any Singapore owner…” (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 42-43.) However, Cross-Complainants do not appear to allege “how, when, where…and by what means” the alleged representations were tendered. (Stansfield v. Starkey, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 73.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the third cause of action, with leave to amend.

In the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief, Cross-Complainants allege that “[a] judicial declaration is necessary to determine the rightful ownership and possession of the Property as between Cross-Complainants and Cross-Defendants.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 51.) Ip asserts that the fourth cause of action fails to state a claim because “the purported purchase agreement is barred by the statute[] of frauds.” (Demurrer at p. 9:1-2.) As set forth above, the Court finds that Cross-Complainants have adequately alleged facts to support their assertion that “plaintiff is estopped from relying upon the statute of frauds.” ((Monarco v. Lo Greco, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 623.) Thus, the Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action as to Chen.

In the fifth cause of action for trespass, Cross-Complainants allege, inter alia, that “[o]n July 2, 2023, Kevin Ip entered the Property around 6:00 a.m. without notice and without permission. He started yelling, threatening, and harassing YUNA CHEN and WENDY TRAN who also lives in the home. He demanded that they move out immediately and forced them to physically leave the home. This was an intentional trespass and invasion of privacy.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 54.) “Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of property. The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261-262 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)

Ip asserts that the “claim for trespass is devoid of any substantive facts that show either Chen or Tran suffered any harm as the result of any purported trespass.” (Demurrer at p. 9:23-24.) But Cross-Complainants allege that “Kevin Ip’s entry and violent threats were intentionally aimed at terrorizing Cross-Complainants to leave the Property, with terror, harassment and [sic] causing great mental anguish and emotional distress to YUNA CHEN and WENDY TRAN in an amount to be proven at trial.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 59.) Ip asserts that “Chen’s claim that she suffered ‘mental anguish’ is conclusory…” (Demurrer at p. 9:24-25.) Ip does not cite any legal authority to support this assertion. The Court finds that Cross-Complainants’ allegation of harm is adequate.

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action.[1]

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)

Ip asserts that here, Cross-Complainants “have not alleged sufficient facts to show either: (1) any conduct that is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community, nor (2) that she suffered any harm.” (Demurrer at p. 10:13-15.) The Court disagrees. The sixth cause of action alleges that “Kevin Ip’s entry and violent threats were intentionally aimed at terrorizing cross complainants to leave the Property, with terror, harassment and causing great mental anguish and emotional distress to YUNA CHEN and WENDY TRAN in an amount to be proven at trial.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 62.) As set forth above, Cross-Complainants allege that “[o]n July 2, 2023, Kevin Ip entered the Property around 6:00 a.m. without notice and without permission. He started yelling, threatening, and harassing YUNA CHEN and WENDY TRAN who also lives in the home. He demanded that they move out immediately and forced them to physically leave the home...” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 54.) Cross-Complainants further allege that “[h]e forcefully pounded on YUNA CHEN’s locked bedroom door, yelling for her to get out and claiming he had to use the room. He was violent, threatening and forceful in his pounding and yelling. She fearfully opened the door and a verbal altercation ensued. He ousted her from the bedroom, and locked the door so she could not re-enter, even as he demanded they move out.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 55.) In addition, Cross-Complainants allege that “[t]his was a premeditated attack, as Kevin Ip parked his car to block the driveway so that YUNA CHEN could not remove her car or use it to move any belongings or get away quickly.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 56.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action.

In the seventh cause of action for breach of contract and specific performance, Cross-Complainants allege that “[o]n August 30, 2023, Kevin Ip, Yuna Chen and Wendy Tran signed a Joint Stipulation,” which “was a settlement of Civil Harassment Case No.23PDR001009, in Los Angeles County Superior Court…” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 65.) Cross-Complainants allege that “[u]nder the Stipulation, Kevin Ip promised to stay away from the Property and the Defendants, and to stop driving by the Property…On February 2, 2024, Kevin Ip drove passed the Property and watched Wendy Tran as she was driving on the street after exiting the home…Under the Stipulation, Kevin Ip promised to remove his boxes and personal property from the Property within 4 weeks…Despite multiple demands, Kevin Ip has refused to cause these boxes to be removed, thus breaching the Stipulation…By these actions, Kevin Ip has breached the Joint Stipulation, and caused damages to Cross-Complainants in an amount according to proof.” (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 66-69, 71.)

“The essential elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.” (HaHamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1614 [internal quotations omitted].) In the demurrer, Ip asserts that “neither Chen nor Tran have alleged that they suffered any harm as the result of the alleged breach…Because defendants cannot allege any facts to show that by driving down a street Ip has somehow caused them harm, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action should be sustained.” (Demurrer at pp. 10:27-11:2.) Cross-Complainants do not appear to dispute or respond to this point in the opposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action, with leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the second, third, and seventh causes of action of the Cross-Complaint as to both Cross-Complainants, with leave to amend. The Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the first and fourth causes of action of the Cross-Complaint as to Tran only, with leave to amend. The Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the first cause and fourth causes as to Chen. The Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action as to both Cross-Complainants.

The Court orders Cross-Complainants to file and serve an amended cross-complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. If no amended cross-complaint is filed within 20 days of this Order, Ip is ordered to file and serve his answer within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿

[1]Ip also argues in the reply without citing to any supporting legal authority that “Defendants also fail to recognize that the owner of real property cannot trespass on his own land.” (Reply at p. 4:5-7.) The Court notes that “¿[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.¿” (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453¿.) Thus, the Court declines to consider the points raised by Ip for the first time in the reply.

KEVIN IP, an individual and as trustee of the Ip Residence Trust (A), Plaintiff, vs. YUNA CHEN, et al. Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV27529
	Hearing Date:	June 28, 2024
	Hearing Time:	2:00 p.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50