Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV27529, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27529    Hearing Date: February 28, 2025    Dept: 50

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

 

KEVIN IP, an individual and as trustee of the Ip Residence Trust (A),

 

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

YUNA CHEN, et al.

 

                        Defendants.

Case No.:

  23STCV27529

Hearing Date:

February 28, 2025

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: 

 

PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

 

           

Background

Plaintiff Kevin Ip, an individual and as trustee of the Ip Residence Trust (A), filed this action on November 7, 2023 against, inter alia, defendants Yuna Chen (“Chen”) and Wendy Trinh Tran (“Tran”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) elder abuse, (3) conversion in violation of Penal Code section 496, and (4) breach of contract.

The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Ip took title to the property located at 412 N. San Marino Ave., San Gabriel, California (the “Property”) pursuant to a grant deed dated December 13, 1997. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 14.) “Ip transferred title to the Kevin Ip Family Trust dated July 19, 2007, by grant deed dated July 19, 2007…Ip transferred title again from the Kevin Ip Family Trust dated July 19, 2007, to the Ip Residence Trust (A), by quitclaim deed dated August 9, 2023…” (Compl., ¶ 14.) The Complaint alleges that “[a]round 2014, Chen and Ip became romantically involved. Chen asked Ip if he could help her find a place to rent. Ip agreed to rent the Property to Chen for $2,000 per month.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) “On October 15, 2014, Ip and Chen entered into a California Association of Realtors…Residential Lease or Month-to-Month Rental Agreement for the Property, whereby Chen agreed to lease the Property from Ip for $2,000 per month (the ‘First Lease’).” (Compl., ¶ 17.) “Ip never agreed to sell the Property to Chen and the two never entered any agreement whereby Chen would obtain any ownership interest in the Property.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) When the First Lease terminated on October 31, 2019, Chen stayed in the Property with her daughter, Tran. On February 25, 2021, Chen signed a second CAR Residential Lease or Month-to-Month Rental Agreement that raised her rent for the Property to $2,800 per month (the ‘Second Lease’).” (Compl., ¶ 22.)

The Complaint alleges that “[a]s Ip grew older, Chen and her daughter, Tran, took advantage of Ip through the use of affection and coercion and wanted Ip to treat them more as his family than his tenants. Chen and Tran stopped paying rent, and has not paid Ip for more than 24 months of back rent since she has lived in the Property, convinced Ip to pay their debts and expenses, and exerted undue influence over Ip to convince him to give Tran and Chen cash, gifts, and property for their personal benefit.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) “In or around January 2023, Ip and Chen’s romantic relationship began to end. At that time, Tran and Chen began to tell Ip that he was no longer allowed to come to the house and that Chen somehow owns the Property, not Ip. Chen now seeks to exclude Ip from possession of the house, claims to own the Property, and has demanded that Ip transfer title of the house to Chen.” (Compl., ¶ 31.) The Complaint alleges that “Ip now seeks a determination of his interests to the Property and to stop Chen and Ip from continuing to abuse Ip and take financial advantage of him.” (Ibid.)

On February 9, 2024, Chen and Tran (jointly, “Cross-Complainants”) filed the original Cross-Complaint against Kevin Ip, an individual; Kevin Ip, as trustee of Kevin Ip Family Trust; and Kevin Ip, as trustee of Ip Residence Trust (A). The Cross-Complaint alleged causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of contract and specific performance, (3) fraud, (4) declaratory relief, (5) trespass, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (7) breach of contract and specific performance.

Kevin Ip, as an individual and as trustee of the Ip Residence Trust (A) (“Ip”) demurred to each of the causes of action of the Cross-Complaint. On June 28, 2024, the Court issued an order sustaining Ip’s demurrer to the second, third, and seventh causes of action of the Cross-Complaint as to both Cross-Complainants, with leave to amend. The Court also sustained Ip’s demurrer to the first and fourth causes of action of the Cross-Complaint as to Tran only, with leave to amend. The Court overruled Ip’s demurrer to the first and fourth causes of action as to Chen, and overruled Ip’s demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action as to both Cross-Complainants.

On February 26, 2024, Cross-Complainants filed an Amended Cross-Complaint alleging causes of action for (1) quiet title, (2) breach of contract and specific performance, (3) fraud,

(4) declaratory relief, (5) trespass, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (7) breach of contract and specific performance.[1]

Ip now demurs to the second, third, and seventh causes of action of the Amended Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainants oppose.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Kevin Ip’s request for judicial notice.

Discussion

A.    Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” ((C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

B.    Allegations of the Amended Cross-Complaint

In the Amended Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainants allege that “[i]n 2014, YUNA CHEN was getting a divorce after a 23-year marriage. As an immigrant with limited English ability and with little knowledge of business matters, YUNA CHEN was striking out on her own…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 10.) “Her former husband agreed to pay her $560,000 as their divorce settlement only if she used such funds to buy a home as a stable base and shelter for herself and her two children.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 10.) “As YUNA CHEN was looking for her next house, her friend KEVIN IP offered to help. She understood KEVIN IP was a well-regarded attorney and businessperson in the local Chinese and Buddhist community in the San Gabriel Valley – this was his reputation according to her knowledge at the time.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 11.)

 Chen and Kevin Ip “were not a couple.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 15.) Ip represented to Chen “that he was the trustee for a wealthy man from Singapore, who owned several properties in the area, including in desirable areas such as San Marino. According to Kevin, one such property was a single family home at 412 N. San Marino Avenue, San Gabriel, CA (‘Property’), which he said could be vacated for Yuna to buy and live in.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 14.)

“Kevin Ip told Yuna to make an offer to the ‘Singapore owner’ to buy the Property, and Kevin (as the trustee) would help get it accepted, as he was authorized to act for the owner.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 16.) “Kevin Ip told her ‘the owner’ accepted her proposal and would sell her the Property for $680,000 under the following terms: a) Yuna would pay a down payment of $560,000, then pay rent for $2,000 per month, as a trial period; b) Yuna would pay monthly installments of $2,800 until she paid a total of $680,000, since Yuna lacked sufficient credit history and stable income record to qualify for a bank loan; and, c) Yuna would pay the property taxes and certain utilities during the purchasing period (‘Purchase Agreement’). He claimed he would arrange the paperwork for the purchase and he would transfer the title later after she paid the full purchase price of $680,000.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 18.)

“In September 2014, before she moved into the Property, Kevin Ip asked Yuna to put the terms of the Purchase Agreement in an email for him to confirm the terms they had agreed on. He dictated the language she should write, and directed Yuna to email Kevin in Chinese, setting forth the deal terms to Kevin’s email address –JusticeKIp@foxmail.com.”

(Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 21.) “On the basis of the foregoing agreement, and in reliance thereon, YUNA CHEN took the following actions, to her detriment: a) Yuna paid him the $560,000 down payment on or about November 6, 2014; b) moved into the Property as her home, and later her children moved in; c) she made several improvements to the Property; and, d) she paid $2,000 per month during the rental period, from 2015 – 2017.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 22.) “Beginning in August 2017, Kevin Ip told her the rental period ended and the installment purchase period started.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 23.) “Yuna paid Kevin Ip monthly installments of $2,800 toward the agreed purchase price of $680,000, starting on August 25, 2017, and continuing for almost six years, with some gaps during COVID-19. In total, she has paid him more than $810,000 for the Property.”  (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 23(b).) “YUNA also paid $3,000 to $3,500 for property taxes twice a year at his direction, from October 2017 to the present.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 25.) “By June 25, 2022, Yuna had fully paid Kevin Ip the purchase price under the Purchase Agreement…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 26.)

“In 2022 and 2023, Kevin Ip kept promising to convey the title to her…In July 2023, when Yuna demanded the title be transferred, Kevin Ip became violent, irrational, [and] threatening…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 28.) “By a letter dated September 1, 2023, YUNA CHEN’s attorneys demanded performance by Kevin Ip, who refuses to convey title to her. Instead, he has filed a lawsuit against her for Unlawful Detainer.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 30.)

           

C.    Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Specific Performance

In the second cause of action for breach of contract and specific performance, Cross-Complainants allege that “Cross-Defendants agreed to sell the Property to YUNA CHEN upon payment of the purchase price of $680,000, which is fair and adequate consideration. As alleged above, YUNA CHEN has fully performed. Indeed, she has paid Kevin Ip over $810,000…Cross-Defendants breached the contract by failing and refusing to convey title to Cross-Complainants, despite demand. The Property is unique and has been YUNA CHEN’s home since 2014. Money damages are not a sufficient remedy. Thus, Yuna Chen is entitled to an order for specific performance.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 39-40.)

Ip asserts that the second cause of action “is barred by California’s two-year statute of limitations.” (Demurrer at p. 3:24-26.) Ip cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 339, which provides in pertinent part, “[w]ithin two years: 1. An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing…”

Ip notes that the original Cross-Complaint alleges that Ip “told YUNA CHEN she would receive title to the Property after the initial 2-year rental period…” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 18.) As noted by Ip, this allegation appears to have been removed from the Amended Cross-Complaint.

Cross-Complainants allege in the original Cross-Complaint and the Amended Cross-Complaint that that “[b]eginning in August 2017, Kevin Ip told her the rental period ended and the installment purchase period started.” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 23; Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 23.) Ip asserts that accordingly, Cross-Complainants’ second cause of action “lapsed in 2019 under California’s two-year statute.” (Reply at p. 2:1, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 339.)

As set forth above, the original Cross-Complaint was filed on February 9, 2024.  

In the opposition, Cross-Complainants cite to Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1143, where the Court of Appeal noted that “the statute of limitations commences when a party knows or should know the facts essential to his claim.” (Internal emphasis omitted.) But Cross-Complainants do not appear to dispute that the allegations of the original and amended Cross-Complaints show that Cross-Complainants knew the facts essential to their second cause of action in August 2017, when the rental period allegedly ended. (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 23.) As discussed, Cross-Complainants allege that Chen was told “she would receive title to the Property after the initial 2-year rental period” and that “[b]eginning in August 2017, Kevin Ip told her the rental period ended.” (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 18; Cross-Compl., ¶ 23; Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 23.) Cross-Complainants’ second cause of action is based upon the allegation that “Cross-Defendants breached the contract by failing and refusing to convey title to Cross-Complainants, despite demand.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 40.)

Ip cites to Lee v. Hensley (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 697, 709, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he rule is that a defect in a verified complaint, by reason of an allegation which renders it vulnerable, cannot be cured simply by omitting the allegation without explanation in a later pleading. Facts once alleged cannot be withdrawn from consideration by merely filing an amended pleading omitting them without explanation. Accordingly, the court was fully justified in examining and considering the original complaint.” (Internal citations omitted.) As noted by Ip, the original Cross-Complaint is verified. Cross-Complainants do not appear to provide any explanation as to why the Amended Cross-Complaint omits the allegation that “[h]e told YUNA CHEN she would receive title to the Property after the initial 2-year rental period…” (Cross-Compl., ¶ 18.) Moreover, as noted by Ip, Cross-Complainants do not address the Lee case in their opposition. Thus, the Court agrees with Ip that the Court may examine the allegations of the original Cross-Complaint.

In the opposition, Cross-Complainants also assert that “Yuna Chen filed suit within two years of discovering fraud.” (Opp’n at p. 2:24.) Cross-Complainants cite to Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), which provides, “[w]ithin three years:…An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Cross-Complainants contend that “[f]rom 2014 to 2023, Kevin Ip kept up his chicanery, misrepresentations and promises to perform, so the fraud was not revealed for many years, until 2023.” (Opp’n at p. 3:1-3.) But Cross-Complainants’ second cause of action is for breach of contract and specific performance, not fraud. As set forth above, Ip demurs to the second cause of action on the grounds that it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 339. Cross-Complainants do not provide any argument as to why this two-year statute of limitations would not be applicable to the second cause of action.

In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to the second cause of action of the Amended Cross-Complaint. The Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend because the Court previously sustained Ip’s demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of contract and specific performance in the original Cross-Complaint (See June 28, 2024 Order), and because Cross-Complainants have not proffered any basis for an amendment to the cause of action.[2]  

D.    Third Cause of Action for Fraud

Next, Ip asserts that Cross-Complainants’ third cause of action for fraud does not allege facts with sufficient particularity. “The elements of fraud or deceit are: a representation, usually of fact, which is false, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damage resulting from that justifiable reliance. Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.” ((Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 72-73 [internal citations omitted].) “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” ((Id. at p. 73 [internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original].)

In the instant demurrer, Ip asserts that “Chen does not specifically allege when or how Ip purportedly ‘told Yuna to make an offer to the ‘Singapore Owner’ to buy the Property,’ or that he was ‘authorized to act for the owner.’…Chen does not allege when or how she supposedly ‘offered to Kevin Ip her purchase offer of $650,000,’ or how, when, or in what way Ip purportedly ‘claimed it was too low.’…Chen does not allege how, when, or in what way ‘Ip told her ‘the owner’ accepted her proposal and would sell her the Property for $680,000.’…Chen also does not allege when between 2014 and 2023 Ip promised to ‘handle the legal paperwork in English,’ or when or how she finally discovered that Ip had engaged in ‘deceit and wrongs.’” (Demurrer at p. 6:2-9.)

However, Cross-Complainants’ third cause of action for fraud alleges, inter alia, that “[i]n 2014 and consistently in all their interactions until 2023, orally and in writings, Kevin Ip also misrepresented to her that he was an attorney, showing her business cards and email addresses that claiming to be [sic] Justice Ip, ‘his honor’, and Kevin Ip, Esq., and using email addresses indicating his legal qualification and profession…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 42.)[3] Ip does not appear to address these allegations in the demurrer or assert that they are insufficient. The Court notes that “¿¿a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.¿¿” (Kong ¿v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047¿¿; ¿see also ¿PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682 [“A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.”]¿¿.)

            Ip also asserts that the “fraud claim is time barred because it was not brought within three years from when defendants knew, or should have known, of the alleged fraud.” (Demurrer at p. 6:14-15.) Ip contends that “Chen’s fraud claim accrued on June 1, 2019, when she had paid Ip the full purchase price and did not receive title.” (Demurrer at p. 6:17-18.) But Cross-Complainants allege that “[b]y June 25, 2022, Yuna had fully paid Kevin Ip the purchase price under the Purchase Agreement…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 26.) Ip does not appear to address this allegation in the demurrer. Moreover, Ip does not appear to point to any allegations of the Amended Cross-Complaint showing that Cross-Complainants should have known of the alleged fraud in June of 2019. The Court does not find that Ip has shown that the third cause of action is untimely.

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the third cause of action of the Amended Cross-Complaint.

E.     Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Specific Performance

In the seventh cause of action for breach of contract and specific performance, Cross-Complainants allege that “[o]n August 30, 2023, Kevin Ip, Yuna Chen and Wendy Tran signed a Joint Stipulation,” which “was a settlement of Civil Harassment Case No.23PDRO01009, in Los Angeles County Superior Court…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 69.)

Cross-Complainants allege that “[u]nder the Stipulation, Kevin Ip promised to stay away from the Property and the Defendants, and to stop driving by the Property,” but that “Kevin Ip drives by the Property in violation of his agreement to stay away…” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 70, 73.) Cross-Complainants further allege that “[u]nder the Stipulation, Kevin Ip promised to remove his boxes and personal property from the Property within 4 weeks. Despite multiple demands, Kevin Ip has refused to cause these boxes to be removed, thus breaching the Stipulation.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 71.)

“The essential elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.” (HaHamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1614 [internal quotations omitted].) In the demurrer, Ip asserts that the seventh cause of action fails because Cross-Complainants have not alleged damages. But as Ip acknowledges, the fourth cause of action alleges that Kevin Ip “should be ordered to pay damages in the form of rent for storing his boxes of papers and personal property at the Property long after he breached the Stipulation.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 74.) Ip contends that “[i]t is absurd for defendants to demand that Ip should somehow pay them rent” (Demurrer at p. 7:3-4) but does not provide any analysis as to how Cross-Complainants’ damages allegations are purportedly legally insufficient. Accordingly, the Court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action of the Amended Cross-Complaint.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Ip’s demurrer to second cause of action of the Amended Cross-Complaint, without leave to amend. The court overrules Ip’s demurrer to the third and seventh causes of action of the Amended Cross-Complaint.

The Court orders Ip to file and serve an answer to the Amended Cross-Complaint within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿¿  

Ip is ordered to give notice of this Order.¿ 

 

DATED:  February 28, 2025                          ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



[1]Cross-Complainants’ first, second, and third causes of action are alleged by Chen against all Cross-Defendants. The fourth cause of action is alleged by Chen against Kevin Ip. The fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action are alleged “[a]gainst Cross-Defendant KEVIN IP.”

[2]In the opposition, Cross-Complainants contend that “[t]he demurrer should be overruled and Ip and his lawyer should be sanctioned $2,000 for…an abuse of the legal system…” (Opp’n at p. 4:20-21.) The Court does not find that Cross-Complainants have shown that Ip or his counsel “abuse[d] the legal system.” Nor do Cross-Complainants cite to any legal authority to support their request for sanctions. Thus, the Court denies such request.

[3]Cross-Complainants allege that “YUNA CHEN relied on Mr. Ip’s representations and promises, as a person with superior knowledge, acumen and bargaining power, which caused her to pay him the down payment, monthly installment payments, plus property taxes for the Property, totaling over $810,000, and to move into the home and make improvements.” (Amended Cross-Compl., ¶ 46.)