Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 23STCV27885, Date: 2024-02-16 Tentative Ruling

1200 management llc,

Plaintiff,

vs.

liron shvartz, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

23STCV27885

Hearing Date:

February 16, 2024

Hearing
Time: 10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE:

DEMURRER OF
DEFENDANT LIRON SHVARTZ TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAITN [SIC];

MOTION TO STRIKE
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR PORTIONS THEREOF

On November 14, 2023,
Plaintiff 1200 Management LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed this unlawful detainer action
against Defendant Liron Shvartz (“Defendant”).

In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in possession of the premises
located at “600 S SPRING ST #R3, LOS ANGELES, CA 90014.” (Compl., ¶ 3(a).)
Plaintiff alleges that it is the owner of the premises. (Compl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff
alleges that on or about July 6, 2022, Defendant agreed to rent the premises
for a five year tenancy and agreed to pay rent of $5,400, payable monthly.
(Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he requests, inter alia, past-due
rent of

$35,542.49,
reasonable attorney fees, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Compl., ¶ 19.)

Defendant now demurs to
the Complaint and moves to strike the Complaint “or portions thereof.” The
demurrer and motion to strike are unopposed.

A
pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f)¿.) A demurrer
for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders
the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to
respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, footnote 2¿.) However, “¿[a] demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.¿” (¿Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.)¿¿

In the
demurrer, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff does not have standing
to bring the instant action. Defendant cites to Code of
Civil Procedure section 367, which provides that “[e]very
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as
otherwise provided by statute.” The Court notes that “[o]nly a real party in interest
has standing to prosecute an action, except as otherwise provided by
statute. ((Ibid.) A
party who is not the real party in interest lacks standing to sue…A real party
in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon
by reason of the substantive law…A complaint filed by someone
other than the real party in interest is subject to general demurrer on the
ground that it fails to state a cause of action.” ((Redevelopment
Agency of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 912, 920-921 [internal
quotations omitted].)

As set forth above, the Plaintiff
alleges that it is the owner of the premises located at “600 S SPRING ST #R3,
LOS ANGELES, CA 90014.” (Compl., ¶¶ 3, 4.) Defendant’s request for judicial
notice in support of the demurrer asserts that “Exhibit 1, is a true and
correct copy of a Grant Deed recorded March 31, 2023, in the Los Angeles County
Recorder’s Office as Instrument Number 2023-020-7004 showing that title to the
Property is vested in ‘600 S. SPRING OWNER, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company.” (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. 1.) However, the Court notes that the Grant
Deed attached as Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice does not
appear to reference the alleged address of the subject property, 600 S Spring St.
#R3, Los Angeles, CA 90014. (Ibid.) Rather,
a legal description of the real property is provided. (Ibid.)
The Court is thus unable to determine from Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Request for
Judicial Notice that the subject property is owned by “600 S. Spring Owner,
LLC,” as Defendant asserts.

Next, Defendant argues that “the R2
UD Complaint is uncertain…” (Demurrer at

p.
7:15.) Defendant also makes additional arguments in the demurrer concerning the
“R2 UD Complaint.” Defendant states in the demurrer that “[o]n or about
November 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer lawsuit captioned 1200
Management, LLC v. Liron Shvartz, LASC Case No. 23STCV27886 in
connection with the premises which is referred to as ‘R2’ (hereinafter, the ‘R2
UD’).” (Demurrer at p. 3:12-14, emphasis added.)

However, the case number of the instant action is 23STCV27885.
Defendant acknowledges that “[o]n or about November 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed
an unlawful detainer lawsuit captioned 1200 Management, LLC v. Liron Shvartz,
LASC Case No. 23STCV27885 in connection with the premises which is referred to
as ‘R3’ (hereinafter, the ‘R3 UD’).” (Demurrer at p. 3:15-17.) Thus, the Court
does not see why the instant demurrer contains arguments concerning a Complaint
in a different action (referred to by Defendant as “R2 UD”).

Next, the Complaint in the instant
action alleges that “[t]he notice in item 9a was served on the defendant named
in item 9a as follows:… By posting a copy on the premises on (date): 11/7/23…
because no person of suitable age or discretion can be found there.” (Compl., ¶ 10(a)(3).) Defendant argues that
“[t]he Complaint is alleging that the Three-Day Notice was posted on the
premises because no person of suitable age or discretion can be found there.
Unless the supermarket is ran by kindergarten kids, such allegation is not
plausible and no proper service of the Three-Days Notice can be made.”
(Demurrer at p. 8:9-12.) The Court finds that this a factual argument that is
not appropriate on demurrer. The Court notes that “[a]s
a general rule in testing a pleading against a demurrer the facts alleged
in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be.” ((Del
E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.)

Defendant also appears to argue that
the Complaint is subject to demurrer because “the purported Three-Day Notice
was not posted, not mailed and not delivered to the individual defendant or
anyone else at the Property…” (Demurrer at p. 8:18-19, emphasis omitted.)
Again, this is a factual argument not appropriate on demurrer. ((See California
Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247, “the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a
pleading as a matter of law…”)

Defendant also asserts that
“Paragraph 10(b) to the R3 UD Complaint was not filled in and is supposed to
state the name of the person who was served the notice and especially since it
is alleged against Black Rock Market, Inc. in the other lawsuit.” (Demurrer at
p. 8:22-24.) But the Court does not see why the existence of a defendant in
another lawsuit is relevant here. The instant Complaint is alleged against
Defendants Liron Shvartz and Does 1 to 10, not “Black Rock Market, Inc.”
Paragraph 10(b) of the instant Complaint (Form UD-100) provides, “(Name): was
served on behalf of all defendants who signed a joint written rental
agreement.” The instant Complaint does not appear to allege that multiple
defendants signed a joint written rental agreement.

Defendant also argues in the
demurrer that “[t]he Complaint is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible in
that Defendants, and each of them, cannot ascertain from the Complaint whether
Plaintiff is suing Defendant only or whether there are other occupants to which
Plaintiff referred to.” (Demurrer at p. 9:22-24.) The Court does not understand
this argument, as paragraph 1 of the Complaint alleges that “PLAINTIFF (name
each): 1200 Management LLC alleges causes of action against DEFENDANT (name
each): LIRON SHVARTZ.” In addition, the box in front of “DOES 1 TO 10” is
checked on the first page of the Complaint.

Lastly, Defendant argues that “the
Complaint is subject to a demurrer because there is a defect or misjoinder.”
(Demurrer at p. 10:3-4.) However, Defendant provides no further argument as to
why the Complaint is purportedly subject to demurrer on these grounds.

Based on the foregoing, the Court
does not find that Defendant has demonstrated that the instant unlawful
detainer Complaint is subject to demurrer. Thus, the Court overrules
Defendant’s demurrer.

A court may strike any “¿irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading¿” or all or any
part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 436¿.) “¿The grounds for
a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from
any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)¿¿

In the motion
to strike, Defendant argues that “[i]n this instance, the entire
Complaint is not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a
court rule, or any order of the court because it there is no standing for
Plaintiff…” (Mot. at p. 4:19-20.) This argument is addressed above in connection
with Defendant’s demurrer.

Defendant also argues that “[t]he allegations contained in Paragraph
10(a)(3)(b) are false. There is always an adult over the age of eighteen in the
supermarket at the Property and therefore, such allegation is false and
impossible as a matter of fact…” (Mot. at p. 5:4-6.) As discussed, this is a
factual argument not appropriate at the pleading stage. As set forth above, “[t]he grounds
for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or
from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)¿¿

Next, paragraph 19(d) of
the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff requests “reasonable attorney
fees.” Defendant cites to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021, which
provides that “[e]xcept as attorney’s
fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement,
express or implied, of the parties…”

Defendant argues that “[s]ince the
agreement(s) to which Plaintiff refers to are not attached to the Complaint or
pleaded verbatim and/or contain any provisions for attorneys’ fee, the
Plaintiff cannot make any demand(s) for attorneys’ fee because such improper
demands are not and cannot be supported.” (Mot. at p. 5:25-27.) But paragraph
15 of the Complaint is checked and alleges that “[a] written agreement between
the parties provides for attorney fees.” Plaintiff does not appear to cite any
legal authority demonstrating that such allegation is insufficient. Moreover,
Paragraph 6(e) of the Complaint alleges that “[a] copy of the written
agreement, including any addenda or attachments that form the basis of this
complaint, is attached and labeled Exhibit 1.” Plaintiff does not appear to
address this agreement or contend that it does not contain an attorney’s fee
provision.

Next, Defendant asserts that “the remedy sought…under Paragraphs 11
and 17(f) is not proper.” (Mot. at p. 6:10-11.) The Court notes that neither
paragraph 11 nor paragraph 17 of the Complaint in the instant action is
checked. Moreover, paragraph 17 states “Other allegations are stated in
Attachment 17,” and does not include a subdivision (f). Thus, it is unclear
what purported remedies Defendant is referring to.

Lastly, the Court notes that
Defendant’s notice of motion states, “[i]n the alternative to striking the
entire Complaint Defendant will seek to strike the following portions of the
Complaint: (a) The prayer for attorneys’ fees (Paragraphs 15 and 19(d) to the
Complaint); (b) the prayer for damages as requested in Paragraphs 19(c) to the
Complaint; (c) Paragraph 6 to the Complaint; (d) Paragraph 10(b) to the
Complaint; (e) Paragraph 12 to the Complaint…” (Notice of Motion at p. 1:7-11.)
The Court notes that Defendant’s memorandum of points and authorities in
support of the motion does not contain any argument concerning paragraphs
19(c), 6, 10(b), or 12 of the Complaint. Thus, the Court does not find that
Defendant has demonstrated why such paragraphs should purportedly be stricken.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
demurrer to the Complaint is overruled. Defendant’s motion to strike is denied.

Defendant is ordered to file and serve its
answer to the Complaint within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿

[1]The Court notes
that starting at page 8 of the motion to strike, Defendant appears to have
inadvertently attached a copy of the memorandum of points and authorities in
support of the demurrer.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Defendant Liron Shvartz (“Defendant”) moves for an order compelling Plaintiff 1200 Management LLC to provide verified responses, without objections, to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One. Defendant also seeks monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel.

Defendant’s motion will be continued to a new date as set forth below. NO HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON FEBRUARY 16, 2024.

Pursuant to the Court’s power to “amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8)), the Court orders the parties in this case to participate in an Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”). (Note:¿The Court’s policy regarding IDCs appears in the Courtroom Information available in Dept. 50 and on the Court’s website.)¿Lead or other designated counsel for the parties with full authority are ordered to participate in person in an IDC. After consulting with opposing counsel regarding available dates, Defendant must make a prompt reservation for the IDC using the Court’s online reservation system. Defendant must file Dept. 50’s one-page IDC form in the department seven days prior to the IDC, and the responding parties may file the same form in the department setting forth a response three days prior to the IDC.

Once Defendant has confirmed an IDC date, Defendant must use the Court’s online reservation system to continue the motion to a post-IDC discovery hearing date. The parties are ordered to have with them whatever materials are needed to make the IDC session productive and successful. Prior to the IDC date, lead or other designated counsel for the parties, with full authority, are to meet and confer, in person or via telephone in a further attempt to resolve as many of the issues as possible before the IDC. (See CRC Rule 3.670, subd. (f)(2).) If the parties resolve their discovery disputes before the IDC date, Defendant is ordered to take both the IDC and the motion off calendar as soon as possible.

1200 MANAGEMENT LLC, Plaintiff, vs. LIRON SHVARTZ, et al. Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV27885
	Hearing Date:	February 16, 2024
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	ORDER RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT LIRON SHVARTZ: (1) COMPELLING PLAINTIFF 1200 MANAGEMENT, LLC’S RESPONSES TO SET ONE OF FORM INTERROGATORIES; AND (2) IMPOSING MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,111.65

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

[1]The Court notes that starting at page 8 of the motion to strike, Defendant appears to have inadvertently attached a copy of the memorandum of points and authorities in support of the demurrer. Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Department
50

[1]The Court notes
that starting at page 8 of the motion to strike, Defendant appears to have
inadvertently attached a copy of the memorandum of points and authorities in
support of the demurrer.

Superior Court of California