Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 23STCV29594, Date: 2024-07-30 Tentative Ruling

WOORI AMERICA BANK, Plaintiff, vs. DARIAN FOODS INC., et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	23STCV29594
	Hearing Date:	July 30, 2024
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Woori America Bank (“Plaintiff”) requests entry of default judgment against Defendants Darian Foods Inc. and Hwa Ok Yang. Plaintiff seeks judgment in the total amount of $48,477.50, comprising $39,275.50 in damages demanded in the Complaint, $993.25 in general damages, $2,828.83 in interest, $3,737.31 in costs, and $1,642.61 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff also seeks a judgment that “All equipment, fixtures, inventory, accounts, instruments, chattel paper, general intangibles, documents, deposit accounts, and investment property (collectively ‘Collateral’) held by Defendants DARIAN FOODS, a California corporation, and YANG, an individual, is hereby deemed foreclosed.” (See Plaintiff’s Proposed Judgment.)

The Court notes a number of defects with the submitted default judgment package.

First, Item 6(b) of Plaintiff’s request for court judgment indicates that the request was mailed to “Greg Scarborough, Deputy Clerk, Secretary of State.” Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 587, “[a]n application by a plaintiff for entry of default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 585 or Section 586 shall include an affidavit stating that a copy of the application has been mailed to the defendant’s attorney of record or, if none, to the defendant at his or her last known address and the date on which the copy was mailed. If no such address of the defendant is known to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, the affidavit shall state that fact. No default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 585 or Section 586 shall be entered, unless the affidavit is filed. The nonreceipt of the notice shall not invalidate or constitute ground for setting aside any judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

Second, Plaintiff seeks $39,275.50 in damages demanded in the Complaint. However, the Declaration of Sang Ouk Han in support of the request provides, inter alia, that “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff’s latest Account Statement, as of June 04, 2024, indicating, the principal amount due of $37,931.89…” (Han Decl., ¶ 19, emphasis added.)

Third, Plaintiff seeks “late fees” in the amount of $993.225. (See Proposed Judgment at p. 2:17; Form CIV-100, Item 2(b)(2).) However, Plaintiff does not appear to allege in the Complaint that it seeks $993.25 in late fees. Plaintiff alleges that it seeks “damages in the minimum amount of $39,275.50, together with interest (at the contract rate) and late charges, according to proof at trial.” (Compl., p. 9, ¶ 1.) The requested amount of “late charges” do not appear to be alleged. The Court notes that that “¿[a] complaint…shall contain…the following:…(2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)¿.) ¿Code of Civil Procedure section 580, subdivision (a)¿ “¿limits a trial court’s jurisdiction to grant relief on a default judgment to the amount stated in the complaint.¿” (¿Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 963, 968¿.) “[I]n all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” ((Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 534.) “As a general rule, a default judgment is limited to the damages of which the defendant had notice.” (Ibid.)

Fourth, it is unclear how the requested $2,828.83 in interest was calculated. It does not appear that Plaintiff has offered any calculations as to how it reached the $2,828.83 figure. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subdivision (a)(3), a party seeking a default judgment must file “[i]nterest computations as necessary.”

Fifth, Plaintiff submitted a specially prepared proposed judgment and did not use Form JUD-100. The Court will require the use of Form JUD-100 because this does not appear to be a case where a lengthy or detailed judgment is necessary. (See LASC Rule 3.213(b).)

Sixth, Plaintiff’s proposed judgment provides, inter alia, “Foreclosure of Collateral…[a]ll equipment, fixtures, inventory, accounts, instruments, chattel paper, general intangibles, documents, deposit accounts, and investment property (collectively ‘Collateral’) held by Defendants DARIAN FOODS, a California corporation, and YANG, an individual, is hereby deemed foreclosed.” (Proposed Judgment, p. 2., ¶ 2.) The definition of “Collateral” in the proposed judgment does not match the definition of the “Collateral” in the Complaint. (See Compl., ¶ 21, “[t]he Security Agreement grants to Plaintiff a security interest in, among other things, all of Defendants’ inventory, equipment, machinery, chattel paper, accounts, and general intangibles whether now owned or hereafter acquired to secure Defendants’ performance of its obligations under the Note, located at 121 W. Whittier Blvd., Montebello, California and any other location where Defendants maintain their assets (the ‘Collateral’).”) As discussed, “in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” ((Finney v. Gomez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)

Seventh, this is an action on a promissory note (Compl., ¶ 11), but Plaintiff has not provided the original of the note. In lieu of the original, Plaintiff may also provide a declaration explaining loss or unavailability, along with a proposed order to accept a copy in lieu of the original. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1806; Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc.¿(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with Plaintiff a schedule for resubmission of the default judgment package.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50