Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV30940, Date: 2024-09-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30940 Hearing Date: September 5, 2024 Dept: 50
SL RETAIL OWNER, LLC, Plaintiff, vs. NOWHERE SILVER LAKE, LLC, dba
EREWHON., et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
22STCV30940 |
Hearing Date: |
September 5, 2024 |
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Hearing
Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: NOWHERE SILVER
LAKE, LLC dba EREWHON’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD-AMENDED
CROSS-COMPLAINT |
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AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION |
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Background
Plaintiff SL Retail Owner LLC (“SL
Retail”) filed this action on September 21, 2022 against Defendants Nowhere Silver Lake, LLC dba
Erewhon (“Erewhon”) and Nowhere Holdco, LLC. The Complaint
alleges causes of action for (1) breach of contract and (2) declaratory
judgment.
On June 30, 2023,
Erewhon filed the operative Second Amended Cross-Complaint (“SACC”) in this
action against Cross-Defendants Sportsmen’s Lodge Owner, LLC, SL Retail, and
Midwood Management Corp. aka Midwood Investment and Development (collectively,
“Cross-Defendants”) The SACC alleges causes of action for (1) breach of contract
(specific performance), (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) fraud (concealment), (5) negligent
misrepresentation, (6) violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200 (unfair competition), (7) declaratory
relief, and
(8) breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment.
In the SACC, Erewhon
alleges, inter alia, that “Cross-Defendants are a New York
developer…and its related entities, who acquired the land surrounding the
historic Sportsmen’s Lodge Hotel in Studio City from a local developer. Once
acquired, Cross-Defendants misrepresented and concealed material facts to/from
Erewhon to induce Erewhon to enter into a lease for retail space in the
to-be-built shopping center.” (TACC, ¶ 10.) Erewhon alleges that “[i]n or
around April 2019 Erewhon became the first tenant to officially enter into a
lease with the Cross-Defendants. Since entering into the lease – and since
using Erewhon’s involvement to attract other tenants – Cross-Defendants have
engaged in a pattern of behavior that is directly contrary to Erewhon’s rights
under the lease.” (TACC, ¶ 11.)
Erewhon now moves for leave to
file a third amended cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants. SL
Retail opposes.
Discussion
Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1),
“[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper,
allow a party to amend any pleading.” Amendment may be allowed at any time
before or after commencement of trial. ((Id., § 576.) “[T]he court’s
discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the
pleadings. The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in
which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” ((Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428 [internal
citations omitted].) “If the motion to
amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the
opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend…” ((Morgan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Prejudice includes “delay in trial, loss of critical
evidence, or added costs of preparation.” (Solit v.
Tokai Bank, Ltd. New York Branch (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)
A
motion to amend a pleading before trial must include a copy of the proposed
amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate
it from previous pleadings or amendments. (¿¿Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (a).)¿¿ The motion must
also state what allegations are proposed to be deleted or added, by page,
paragraph, and line number. (¿Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd¿. (a).)
Finally, “¿[a] separate declaration must accompany
the motion and must specify: (1)¿The effect of the amendment; (2)¿Why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3)¿When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were
discovered; and (4)¿The reasons why the request for amendment
was not made earlier.¿” (Cal. Rules of
Court, Rule 3.1324, subd. (b).)
Erewhon’s counsel attaches as Exhibit 1 to his
declaration a copy of Erewhon’s proposed Third Amended Cross-Complaint
(“TACC”). (Addison, Jr. Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Erewhon’s counsel provides a copy of the redlined
version of Erewhon’s proposed
TACC, showing the changes made to the SACC. (Addison,
Jr. Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.)
Erewhon’s counsel states that the effect of the proposed TACC “is to
plead two new causes of action for Fraud (Concealment and Intentional
Misrepresentation) based on Cross-Defendants Sportsmen’s Lodge Owner, LLC, SL
Retail Owner, LLC, and Midwood Management Corp. aka Midwood Investment &
Development’s (collectively, ‘Cross-Defendants’) very recent production of
internal email correspondence, as well as to refine and bolster the allegations
set forth within Erewhon’s already pleaded cause of action for Breach of
Contract based on other recently produced documents by Cross-Defendants.” (Addison,
Jr. Decl., ¶ 6.)
In the new fourth cause of action for fraud-concealment in the
proposed TACC, Erewhon alleges, inter alia, that “[b]oth in negotiations
leading up to the execution of the Lease and in the Lease itself,
Cross-Defendants falsely represented that their ‘good faith’ estimate of the
amount of Operating Costs Rent for the first Operating Cost Year was based on
an annual rate of $12.25 per square feet of floor space used by Erewhon.” (Addison,
Jr. Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2, ¶ 77.) Erewhon alleges that “[i]n September 2022,
Cross-Defendants presented Erewhon with a bill for Operating Costs Rent at a
per-square-foot price of approximately $26.00 – more than 110% higher than the ‘good
faith’ estimate previously provided.” (Ibid., ¶
80.) Erewhon alleges that “Cross-Defendants at all relevant times knew that
the $12.25 per square foot price communicated to Erewhon was not accurate, and
that Cross-Defendants’ own internal calculations and market research
(information available only to Cross-Defendants and not to Erewhon) reflected
anticipated costs much higher than $12.25 per square foot.” (Ibid., ¶ 81.)
The new fifth cause of action for fraud-intentional misrepresentation
in the proposed TACC similarly alleges, inter alia, that “while the
parties were negotiating the Lease, Cross-Defendants falsely represented to
Erewhon that it would be responsible for paying Operating Costs Rent of
approximately $12.25 per square feet of floor space used by Erewhon. These
representations were made in, among other things, the LOI provided by Ron
Bondy, a document provided by Ron Bondy which contained manipulated financial
figures and purported to set forth a categorical breakdown and calculation of
those costs, and in the parties’ Lease…Erewhon is informed and believes that
Cross-Defendants knew that these representations were false at the time that
they were made. For example, Erewhon is informed and believes that
Cross-Defendants’ internal calculations and market research reflected operating
costs much higher than $12.25 per square foot being represented to Erewhon.” (Addison,
Jr. Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2, ¶¶ 90-91.)
Further, Erewhon’s cause of action for breach of contract in the
proposed TACC contains additional allegations that, inter alia, “on or
around August 17, 2021, Cross-Defendants entered into a written agreement with
ACE to ‘assume primary and complete responsibility for all aspects of the daily
operation, maintenance, and repair’ of the Center’s parking lots.” (Addison,
Jr. Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2, ¶ 57.) Erewhon alleges that “in breach of Section 6.3 [of the Lease]…Cross-Defendants have
charged operating costs they did not incur – namely, the operating costs
incurred by ACE, which were netted out against the parking revenue collected by
ACE.” (Ibid., ¶ 58.)[1]
Erewhon also alleges that “Cross-Defendants have further breached the Lease, section 6.3, by including items not properly
considered operating costs in its 2022 Operating Costs Rent items.” (Ibid., ¶ 59.)
Erewhon’s counsel’s supporting declaration provides that “Erewhon’s
counsel discovered the facts giving rise to its proposed causes of action for
Fraud (Concealment and Misrepresentation) beginning on June 24, 2024, when
Cross-Defendants produced documents which confirmed the facts upon which these
new causes of action are based.” (Addison, Jr. Decl., ¶ 8.) Erewhon’s counsel
states that “[r]egarding Erewhon’s proposed amendments to its already pleaded
cause of action for Breach of Contract, Erewhon received documents from
Cross-Defendants beginning on June 10, 2024, and beginning approximately the
week of June 24, 2024, became [sic] aware that these newly produced documents
gave rise to additional claims for breaches of the parties’ written lease.” (Addison,
Jr. Decl., ¶ 9.)
Erewhon’s counsel asserts that the instant “Request for Amendment is
made as soon as reasonably practicable in light of the fact that
Cross-Defendants only recently produced documents in this case, including the
documents which provide the basis for the new allegations and causes of action
alleged in Erewhon’s TAXC. These documents were provided in two voluminous
productions, one on June 10, 2024 and a second on June 24, 2024…” (Addison, Jr.
Decl., ¶ 10.) The instant motion was filed on July 3, 2024.
In the opposition, SL Retail asserts that “leave to amend should be
denied because it will cause unwarranted delay.” (Opp’n at p. 9:26.) SL Retail
argues that “it is Erewhon’s own lack of diligence in pursuing discovery that
caused the delay. Erewhon should not be permitted to use its own lack of
diligence as an excuse to get an 11th hour amendment and prejudice
Cross-Defendants by re-opening discovery delaying trial [sic].” (Opp’n at p.
10:14-17.)
However, as noted by Erewhon, SL Retail does not appear to articulate
how it would be prejudiced should Erewhon’s instant motion be granted. Nor does
SL Retail appear to provide evidence to support any such prejudice. Erewhon
notes that the opposition does not, for instance, “establish how, or to what
extent, Erewhon’s request to amend will lead to the loss of critical evidence,
increase the cost of preparing for trial, or burden Cross-Defendants through
additional discovery.” (Reply at p. 5:18-20.)
As to SL Retail’s argument that Erewhon failed to diligently pursue
discovery, SL Retail’s counsel states that “[w]hile Erewhon served certain
written discovery in this action, Landlord’s responses were stayed pending the
resolution of Landlord’s Demurrer, Motion to Strike, and Special Motion to
Strike. Following the resolution of Landlord’s Special Motion to Strike, on
August 15, 2023, I received an e-mail from Aaron Levine, counsel for Erewhon,
stating: ‘It seems to me that a good portion of the outstanding discovery may
have been mooted in light of the fact that certain issues have been resolved
and the pleadings have been amended…Once we’ve determined what is still at
issue we can set a date for a simultaneous exchange of responses / supplemental
responses.’ Landlord’s counsel, Staci Tomita, responded, stating, ‘We are fine
with your proposal regarding discovery,’ and Mr. Levine then stated on August
16, 2023, ‘I’ll circle back next week regarding the below-referenced meet and
confer.’” (Hicks Decl., ¶ 2.) SL Retail’s counsel states that “Mr. Levine never
‘circle[d] back’ regarding Erewhon’s written discovery.” (Hicks Decl., ¶ 3.)
SL Retail’s counsel states that “[i]t was not until March 29, 2024 –
more than 7 months later – that Erewhon brought up its withdrawn written
discovery again, indicating it intended to move in limine to exclude any
evidence that would have been responsive to Erewhon’s withdrawn discovery.” (Hicks
Decl., ¶ 4.) SL Retail’s counsel states that “[e]ven though Erewhon never set a
deadline for Landlord to respond or re-serve the requests, I served objections
to preserve Landlord’s rights on April 1, 2024.” (Hicks Decl., ¶ 6.)
In the reply, Erewhon counters that
it did not “withdraw” its discovery to Cross-Defendants. Erewhon notes that its
counsel’s August 15, 2023 email provides, inter alia, that “I propose
that the parties meet and confer regarding the outstanding discovery so that we
can evaluate whether anything can or should be withdrawn or limited.” (Hicks
Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Erewhon asserts that “[a]s the responding parties,
Cross-Defendants bore the onus to confirm which of the remaining discovery
requests were at-issue.” (Reply at p. 8:13-15.)
Erewhon also asserts that “Cross-Defendants’
attempt to ‘set the record straight’ has no bearing on the Motion, which hinges
on Erewhon’s swiftness in bringing its Motion after receiving documents Erewhon
was entitled to for many months. As articulated above, Erewhon brought the
Motion in quick succession…” (Reply at p. 8:19-22.) Indeed, as discussed,
Erewhon indicates that its counsel “discovered the facts giving rise to its
proposed causes of action for Fraud (Concealment and Misrepresentation)
beginning on June 24, 2024, when Cross-Defendants produced documents which
confirmed the facts upon which these new causes of action are based.” (Addison,
Jr., Decl., ¶ 8.) Erewhon’s counsel further states that “[r]egarding Erewhon’s
proposed amendments to its already pleaded cause of action for Breach of
Contract, Erewhon received documents from Cross-Defendants beginning on June
10, 2024, and beginning approximately the week of June 24, 2024, became [sic] aware
that these newly produced documents gave rise to additional claims for breaches
of the parties’ written lease.” (Addison, Jr., Decl., ¶ 9.) The instant motion
was filed soon thereafter, on July 3, 2024. The Court does not find that
Erewhon delayed in bringing the instant motion or that SL Retail has
demonstrated that it has been prejudiced as a result of any claimed delay.
SL Retail also asserts that “the new allegations do not materially add
new claims to the SACC. Erewhon’s Proposed TACC purports to add (i) a breach of
contract claim regarding alleged overpayment of CAM and rent regarding parking
expenses at the Center; and (ii) fraud and misrepresentation claims regarding
the first Operating Year CAM charges assessed on Erewhon. The existing Second
and Third Causes of Action of the SACC already encompass Erewhon’s belief that
Landlord breached the Lease by overcharging it for rent and CAM charges – and
the existing Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action of the SACC already encompass
Erewhon’s belief that Cross-Defendants misrepresented or concealed the facts
related to the true CAM charges that would be assessed on Erewhon in the first
Operating Year, inducing Erewhon to sign the Lease. None of these claims are
materially new.” (Opp’n at p. 11:13-22.)
In the reply, Erewhon counters that “[l]eave to amend does not hinge
on whether the proposed amended pleading presents ‘material[] . . . new claims,’…which
the Proposed TAXC does, and which is a new and unsupported standard
Cross-Defendants improperly rely upon.” (Reply at p. 9:17-19.) To the extent SL
Retail is asserting that the proposed new causes of action are not legally
sufficient because they are not “materially new,” the Court of Appeal in Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048, noted that “the preferable practice would be
to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by
demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate
proceedings.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court
finds that Erewhon has demonstrated good cause to file the proposed TACC.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Erewhon’s motion for leave to file a
third-amended cross-complaint is granted. The Court orders Erewhon to file and
serve the third-amended cross-complaint within 3 days of the date of this
Order.¿¿¿¿
Erewhon is ordered to give notice of this Order.¿¿
DATED:
________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los Angeles
Superior Court
[1]Erewhon alleges
that “Section 6.4(A) of the Lease…states that
Erewhon ‘shall pay Landlord as Additional Rent a proportionate share of
Landlord’s Operating Costs…which shall be computed by multiplying the amount of
the Landlord’s Operating Costs less any Deductible Contributions (defined in Section 5.8) by [Erewhon’s] Proportionate Share.’”
(Addison, Jr. Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2, ¶ 54.) Erewhon alleges that Section 6.3 of the Lease defines “Landlord’s Operating
Costs.” (Ibid., ¶ 55.)