Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 23STCV31568, Date: 2024-03-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV31568 Hearing Date: April 12, 2024 Dept: 50
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ASHLEY CARRELL, et al. Plaintiffs, vs. RELIANT REAL ESTATE
MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
23STCV31568 |
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Hearing Date: |
April 12, 2024 |
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Hearing
Time: 1:30 p.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT
RELIANT REAL ESTATE’S DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT |
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Background
Plaintiffs Ashley
Carrell, Angelica Herrador, Anthony Estrada, Rachel Bird, Felix Alonzo, Krista
Parry, Anita Thompson, James Egan, Myranda Sanchez, Selina Nunez, and Hugo
Hernandez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)[1]
filed this action on December 27, 2023 against Defendant Reliant Real Estate
Management, Inc. (“Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1)
violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act
(“ICRAA”), (2) invasion of privacy, and (3) declaratory relief.
Defendant now demurs to the second cause of action of the Complaint.
Plaintiffs oppose.
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used
only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack
or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) “To survive a demurrer, the
complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need
not be alleged.” ((C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
B. Allegations of the
Complaint
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n 2022 and 2023…Plaintiffs
applied for housing at the Paradise Garden Apartments, Charter Oaks Apartments,
Vues on Gordon Apartments, Goldwyn Apartments, Whiffle Tree Apartments, Arbor
Ranch Apartments, Lincoln Village Apartments and the Mediterra Apartments.
Plaintiffs completed a mandatory multi-page ‘Application,’ which included a
release of information permitting the Defendants to get private and personal
information from third parties about the Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 23.)
Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants then requested and obtained
investigative consumer reports about the Plaintiffs during the processing of
the Plaintiffs’ application for an apartment home at the Paradise Garden
Apartments, Charter Oaks Apartments, Vues on Gordon Apartments, Goldwyn
Apartments, Whiffle Tree Apartments, Arbor Ranch Apartments, Lincoln Village
Apartments and the Mediterra Apartments without complying with the mandatory
requirements, disclosures and authorizations required under the ICRAA statute.”
(Compl., ¶ 24.)
C. Second Cause of
Action – Invasion of Privacy
In
the second cause of action for invasion of privacy, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he
conduct of Defendants in requesting, preparing, furnishing, and receiving
reports on Plaintiffs’ character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
or mode of living, in contrivance of the protections enshrined in the ICRAA,
constituted a serious invasion of Plaintiffs’ privacy.” (Compl., ¶ 49.)
Plaintiffs allege that “[b]y acting and failing to act as herein alleged, the
Defendants have violated the ICRAA and invaded the Plaintiffs’ rights of
privacy by obtaining investigative consumer reports about the Plaintiffs
without complying with mandatory requirements under the ICAA for getting
investigative reports about the Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 51.)
“The
party claiming a violation of the constitutional right of privacy established
in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution
must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (3) a serious invasion of
the privacy interest.” ((International Federation of
Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 338.)
In the
demurrer, Defendant argues, inter alia, that “since
Plaintiffs authorized Defendant to conduct a thorough background check by
signing and consenting to the terms of the ‘Release of Information’ form,
Plaintiffs could not have reasonably expected background information that may
be disclosed under the ICRAA to be kept from Defendant...” (Demurrer at p.
6:19-22.) As set forth above, Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiffs applied for
housing at the Paradise Garden Apartments, Charter Oaks Apartments, Vues on
Gordon Apartments, Goldwyn Apartments, Whiffle Tree Apartments, Arbor Ranch
Apartments, Lincoln Village Apartments and the Mediterra Apartments. Plaintiffs
completed a mandatory multi-page ‘Application,’ which included a release of
information permitting the Defendants to get private and personal information
from third parties about the Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege
that they “completed the required ‘Application’ that included a consent to
‘Release of Information’ and submitted it to Defendant Reliant Real Estate
Management, Inc.” (Compl., ¶ 26.)
In the
opposition, Plaintiffs assert that they sufficiently alleged that
they had reasonable expectations of privacy under the circumstances. Plaintiffs
point to the allegations that “Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that
Defendants would not solicit or receive information concerning their character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living, unless
Defendant Reliant Real Estate Management, Inc. complied with all governing
laws,” and that “[a]t all times Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that
they would be protected by the laws governing dissemination of information of a
private nature concerning their character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living.” (Compl., ¶¶ 47, 48.) Plaintiffs also point
to the allegation that “Defendants kept Plaintiffs’ private information private
from Plaintiffs, violating the ICRAA and Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations.”
(Compl., ¶ 52.)
Plaintiffs also assert that
“[Defendant] argues that Plaintiffs gave voluntary consent, but the consent
[Defendant] secured was through conduct contrary not only to ‘customs’ and
‘habits,’ but to express statutory law.” (Opp’n at p. 4:22-25.) Plaintiffs cite
to TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
443, 450, where the
Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he
‘community norms’ aspect of the ‘reasonable expectation’ element of an invasion
of privacy claim is this:…‘The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s
interest in his
privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to the
occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow
citizens.’…” Plaintiffs also cite to Civil Code
section 1786.16 and allege in the Complaint that this statute was violated.
(Compl., ¶¶ 39-40.)
But such argument admits that
Plaintiffs’ “consent [was] secured.” (Opp’n at p. 4:23.) In the reply,
Defendant cites to Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 9, where the California
Supreme Court found that “the NCAA’s
drug testing program does not violate plaintiffs’ state constitutional right to
privacy.” The Hill Court noted, inter alia, that “[t]he
student athlete’s reasonable expectation of privacy is further diminished by
two elements of the NCAA’s drug testing program--advance notice and the
opportunity to consent to testing. A drug test does not come as a unwelcome
surprise at the end of a postseason match. Full disclosure of the NCAA’s banned
substances rules and testing procedures is made at the beginning of the
athletic season, long before the postseason competition during which drug
testing may take place. Following disclosure, the informed written consent of
each student athlete is obtained. Thus, athletes have complete information
regarding the NCAA’s drug testing program and are afforded the opportunity to
consent or refuse before they may be selected for testing.” ((Id.
at p. 42.) As discussed,
here, Plaintiffs allege that they “completed a mandatory
multi-page ‘Application,’ which included a release of information permitting
the Defendants to get private and personal information from third parties about
the Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶
23.)
In the opposition, Plaintiffs also contend, without citing to
supporting legal authority, that “[t]he voluntariness of consent is dubious when the
party of authority within a power dynamic (i.e. landlord) extracts that consent
from the other party (i.e. tenant) under the guise that everything is on the
level – though it is not.” (Opp’n at p. 4:25-27.) The Court notes that it is
unclear what Plaintiffs mean by “on the level.” (Opp’n at p. 4:27.) Moreover,
Plaintiffs do not point to any allegations in the FAC stating that they did not
voluntarily consent to a release of their information.
As discussed, Plaintiffs allege that they “applied for housing at the
Paradise Garden Apartments, Charter Oaks Apartments, Vues on Gordon Apartments,
Goldwyn Apartments, Whiffle Tree Apartments, Arbor Ranch Apartments, Lincoln
Village Apartments and the Mediterra Apartments. Plaintiffs completed a
mandatory multi-page ‘Application,’ which included a release of information
permitting the Defendants to get private and personal information from third
parties about the Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs further allege that
“Plaintiffs completed the required ‘Application’ that included a consent to
‘Release of Information’ and submitted it to Defendant Reliant Real Estate
Management, Inc.” (Compl., ¶ 26.) The Court agrees
with Defendant that in
light of these allegations, Plaintiffs do not allege “a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the circumstances.” ((International
Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v.
Superior Court, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 338.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the second
cause of action.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court sustains Defendant’s
demurrer to the second cause of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.
The Court orders the remaining plaintiffs to file and serve
an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. If no
amended complaint is filed within 20 days of this Order, Defendant is ordered
to file and serve its answer within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿¿
Defendant is ordered to give notice
of this Order.¿
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]On March 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of Ashley
Carrell, Angelica Herrador, Anthony Estrada, Rachel Bird, Felix Alonzo, and
Krista Parry. Dismissal was entered on March 13, 2024.