Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV01276, Date: 2025-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01276    Hearing Date: June 6, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background   

Plaintiffs Raul Canizales (Plaintiff) filed this action on January 17, 2024 against Defendant Kia America, Inc. (Defendant) for violations of the Song-Beverly Act.

In September 2024, the parties resolved the claim by way of a settlement agreement under which Defendant was to repurchase the vehicle and pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs pursuant to a noticed motion filed pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Kowalski Decl., ¶7c, Exhibit 1.)

Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $35,035.87. Defendant opposes.

            Discussion

Civil Code section 1794(d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

            “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. … The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”  (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted)]; see Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818 [applying the lodestar method to determine attorneys’ fees in Song-Beverly action].)

The Hourly Rate of Counsel

Plaintiff requests a lodestar total of $29,240.90 for work performed by the Consumer Law Experts, PC (CLE). From December 2023 through the present, CLE billed 71.3 hours for services rendered. (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22.)

Plaintiff requests applicable hourly billing rates ranging from $210 to $550 for CLE as follows: Jessica Anvar, $550/per hour; Jordan Cohen, $525/hour; Joseph Kowalski, $415/hour; Julian Moore, $530/hour, Richard Ruiz, $210/hour. (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22.) Based on the Court’s own knowledge and experience, the evidence of reasonable rates in the Los Angeles area (Kowalski Decl., Exhibits 2-21, 23), and the experience of the CLE staff (Kowalski Decl., ¶ 8-12), the Court finds that the hourly rates requested by counsel are reasonable and commensurate with rates charged at their levels.

Reasonableness of the Requested Fees

“[T]he court's discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” ((Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395 (Horsford).)  The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. ((Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” ((Horsford, supra, at p. 396.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel attached a billing record of the hours spent in litigating this case to the instant motion detailing the nature of the work performed. (Kowalski Decl., ¶ 33, Exhibit 22.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are unreasonable in light of the non-complex nature of this case. The Court, based on its own knowledge and experience, finds that the hourly fees are reasonable in the Los Angeles-area legal community. “The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.” ((569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437 [internal citations omitted].)  “In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees . . . .”  ((Id. at p. 437.)

In arguing against Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates, Defendant argues that no complex issues exist in this case. However, Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are not based on the complexity of the case– they are based on the attorneys’ skill and experience. Defendant argues that the highest rate Plaintiff’s counsel charged, $550/hour, is unreasonably high. However, the attorney who billed $550/hour is Jessica Anvar, “the founder and Managing Attorney of CLE,” who has been litigating lemon law cases for over ten years. (Kowalski Decl., ¶ 8, Exhibit 22.) Furthermore, Attorney Anvar billed a total of only 0.9 hours on this case. (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22.) A majority of the hours were billed by one of the CLE attorneys with the lowest rates, Joseph Kowalski, who billed 55.1 hours at a rate of $415/hour. (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22.)   

Defendant also contends that excessive time to complete tasks, research irrelevant issues, complete administrative duties, discuss the case with other attorneys or staff, complete standard discovery, prepare for a PMQ deposition, finalize the settlement, and prepare the instant motion should be cut. The Court does not agree with Defendant’s argument that there was excessive time on research, discussion between the CLE staff, discovery, or finalizing the settlement.

Although many of the entries that Defendant identifies as “excessive” do not appear to be excessive, the Court agrees that a few are or may be. For example, the 3/18/24 time entry for 2.3 hours of work amounting to $1,219 by Julian Moore appears to be excessive. The entry indicates that it was to “review and analyze discovery and review file to conference with associate…”, (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22) however, there is no time entry afterward that indicates this conference took place and there are no other time entries by Julian Moore after this, indicating that Julian Moore’s review was unnecessary. As for the 6/24/25 time entry to prepare for the PMQ deposition, Defendant argues this entry is excessive because the depositions never took place and they were improperly scheduled. In reply, Plaintiff argues that it was not unreasonable to prepare for a deposition even though it ultimately did not go forward. Because Plaintiff argues that “at the time there was no reason to not prepare for the deposition” (Reply, 6:21-22) and Defendant does not argue or provide any evidence that CLE knew the deposition was not going to proceed when the time preparing was incurred, the Court finds no reason to deem this time entry excessive or unreasonable. As to excessive billing for administrative tasks, the Court agrees that the 4/9/24 entry by Richard Ruiz to file and serve documents amounting to $42.00 and the 4/19/24 entry by Richard Ruiz to schedule an LACC hearing amounting to $42.00 are non-billable administrative tasks. Finally, the Court finds that the 12/10/24 time entry by Richard Ruiz for 1 hour to “Download all invoices from 3rd party resources…” (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22) amounting to $210.00 is both excessive time incurred to prepare the instant motion and a non-billable administrative task. Accordingly, the Court reduces the attorney fee award by $1,513.00 ($1,219 + $42.00 + $42.00 + $210.00 = $1,513.00).

Defendant also argues time entries that are block-billed or vaguely written should be cut. The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument about the entries regarding communications with someone labeled as “DC,” as the identity of whoever the communication was directed to is irrelevant. However, the Court agrees that the various time entries referencing unspecified documents by unknown acronyms such as “NCMC,” “NORA,” and “NPJF” do not meet Plaintiff’s burden to produce evidence from which the Court can ascertain the reasonableness of the services provided without merely guessing. ((See Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) Accordingly, the Court reduces the attorney fee award by $155.40, which is the value of two entries Defendant identifies as being vague: the 3/18/24 entry by Richard Ruiz to draft the “NCMC” amounting to $71.40; and the 4/9/24 entry by Richard Ruiz to draft “CMS<NORA<NPJF” amounting to $84.00. (Laughlin Decl., Exhibit 7.) Defendant also argues that the 3/25/24 time entry by Richard Ruiz that references “MCC” is vague and includes an unknown acronym. (Opposition, 6:21-25; Laughlin Decl., Exhibit 7.) However, the actual time entry indicates that it was for a “M&C letter,” (Kowalski Decl., Exhibit 22) which is widely understood to be a “Meet and Confer” letter.

Defendant also argues that at least two entries were not calculated correctly. Defendant identifies the 3/18/24 entry by Richard Ruiz amounting to $71.40 as being incorrectly calculated, as it should have been $63.00. (Opposition, 10:4-6; Laughlin Decl., Exhibit 7.) However, as analyzed above, the Court already eliminated that time entry from the attorney fee award, so no further reduction is needed. Defendant also identifies the 3/25/24 entry by Richard Ruiz amounting to $52.50 as being incorrectly calculated. (Opposition, 10:6-7; Laughlin Decl., Exhibit 7.) Defendant is correct. The time entry is for 0.2 hours at a rate of $210/hour, so the correct amount is $42.00. Accordingly, the Court reduces the attorney fee award by $10.50. 

Finally, Defendant argues that the instant motion is procedurally defective because there is no judgment entered yet. In support of this argument, Defendant argues that “Motions for attorneys’ fees are recovered ‘as part of the judgment’ under Song-Beverly (Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).) No such judgment is entered in this case.” (Opposition, 10:15-17.) Defendant explains that although the parties settled pursuant to a 998 offer compromise, Plaintiff has not yet filed a copy of the final offer with proof of acceptance. (Opposition, 10:17-20.) Although Defendant has adequately explained that Plaintiff must file a copy of the final offer with proof of acceptance to hold the offer enforceable, Defendant has not provided any authority indicating that failure to file the offer and receive a judgment prior to filing a motion for attorney fees makes the motion for attorney fees premature or procedurally defective. Thus, Defendant’s argument here fails.  

Although Plaintiff requested an additional $5,000.00 “for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply brief, and attend the hearing on this issue,” (Motion for Attorney Fees, 2:9-10) in reply, Plaintiff did not clarify how much time was actually spent on reviewing the opposition nor drafting the reply. Thus, the Court refuses to award an additional $5,000.00.

Notably, Defendant makes no objection to Plaintiff’s requested costs and expenses of $794.97.

Conclusion

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover $27,562.00 ($29,240.90 - $1,513.00 - $155.40 - $10.50 = $27,562.00) in attorney fees and $794.97 in costs from Defendant.

            Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  June 6, 2025                                   ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court