Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

FAVIOLA RAMIREZ, ET AL., Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, ET AL., Defendant.	Case No.:	24STCV02462
	Hearing Date:	May 8, 2025
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Background

Plaintiffs purchased a used 2016 GMC Yukon on July 24, 2020. During Plaintiffs’ ownership of the vehicle, the vehicle manifested defects covered by Defendant’s express warranties. Plaintiffs delivered the vehicle to Defendant’s authorized service and repair facilities for repair and service, but Defendant was unable to conform the vehicle to express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities to do so. Plaintiffs allege Defendant also failed to replace the vehicle after it was unable to conform it to the express warranties.

On January 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant alleging violations of the Song Beverly Act: (1) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(d); (2) violation of Civil Code §1793.2; (3) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Civil Code §§1791.1 and 1794).

On April 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. On April 25, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. On May 2, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply to the opposition.

A motion for summary judgment is set for hearing on May 13, 2025. Jury trial is set for June 18, 2025.

Discussion

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(a)(1), “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” Amendment may be allowed at any time before or after commencement of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.) “[T]he court's discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” ((Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428 [internal citations omitted].) “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend….” ((Morgan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Prejudice includes “delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation.” ((Solit v. Tokai Bank (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)

Plaintiff unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend

Plaintiffs move for leave to file a First Amended Complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, which held that the Song Beverly Act (the “Act”) does not apply to sale of vehicles with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale. (Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.5^th at 195-197.) Such vehicles are not new motor vehicles under the Act. (Id.)

Plaintiffs’ FAC seeks to avoid dismissal of this action based on Rodriguez by alleging a fifth cause of action under the Magnus Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2301-2312, et seq. and Uniform Commercial Code §§1203, 2602 and 20607. There is currently a Motion for Summary Judgment set to be heard on May 13, 2025 that would dispose of the operative complaint based on Rodriguez. Plaintiffs argue leave to amend will not prejudice Defendant, because the Magnus Moss Warranty Act and UCC causes of action would be based on the exact same facts, rely on the exact same discovery and would not enlarge or delay the action in any way.

Plaintiff also argues it has stated a viable claim under the Magnus Moss Warranty Act, because the Act provides a cause of action for any consumer who is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with a written or implied warranty. Plaintiff argues it has alleged such a failure against Defendant.

Defendant argues in opposition that Plaintiffs inexcusably delayed in seeking to add the Magnus Moss and UCC claims. Defendant argues these claims were available to Plaintiffs when the complaint was filed. Defendant argues the issue of whether Song Beverly applied to used cars was already before the Supreme Court in Rodriguez when Plaintiffs filed their complaint, and Plaintiffs should have been aware of the potential that the Supreme Court would find Song Beverly inapplicable to used car sales in which no new warranty was issued at the time of sale. Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not justified their delay in seeking leave to amend.

Defendants argue the amended complaint would also delay the trial date. Defendants argue the Magnus Moss and UCC claims may be based on similar violations but the measure of damages is entirely different from the restitution to which Plaintiffs would have been entitled under Song Beverly. Defendants argue the UCC claim is also subject to different notice requirements, as well as requiring actual reliance on the express warranty to purchase the vehicle.

Defendants argue the proposed FAC also fails to state a claim under the Magnus Moss Warranty Act or the UCC. Defendant argues Plaintiffs fail to allege notice and reliance, which are required to state a claim under the UCC.

Defendant argues the Magnus Moss Warranty Act claim depends on Plaintiffs stating a viable state law warranty claim. Defendant argues that the Magnus Moss Warranty Act claim fails, because Plaintiffs’ UCC claim fails.

On reply, Plaintiffs argue they did not anticipate the need to file the proposed amendments, because at the time the complaint was filed, Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112 was still valid law. Plaintiffs argue Jensen would have allowed them to proceed with their Song Beverly claims.

Plaintiffs argue Defendant also fails to demonstrate prejudice. Plaintiffs argue discovery is ongoing and the amendments are based on the same operative facts as the original complaint. Plaintiffs argue they could lose their right to seek a viable and legitimate remedy against Defendant if leave to amend is not granted.

Leave to amend must be granted

Plaintiffs made a tactical decision not to allege the Magnus Moss and UCC claims in the hopes that the Supreme Court would side with Jensen and reject Ramirez. Plaintiffs’ gamble did not pay off. Ramirez is not the law of the land and Plaintiffs’ Song Beverly claims are no longer viable. Plaintiffs’ delay was undue, as the amendments could have been made from the outset of the action.

However, undue delay alone is insufficient to justify denial of Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. Defendant fails to identify any prejudice. The trial date is only a month away, but a trial continuance will be considered if it is required. Any prejudice due to the additional issues injected into the litigation by the two new causes of action would be sufficiently addressed by a trial continuance. Discovery has not yet closed. The action has been pending for a year and a half. The exact same facts are the basis for the two new causes of action. These facts do not support a finding of prejudice that would justify denial of Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend.

Defendant also argues the amendments would be futile, because Plaintiffs fail to allege the elements of notice and reliance required to state their UCC claim and without the UCC claim, the Magnus Moss claim likewise fails. At best, Defendant identifies a pleading defect. Defendant fails to establish that these defects are not reasonably capable of cure with leave to amend. “Leave to amend should be denied only where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but under substantive law, no liability exists and no amendment would change the result.” (Edwards v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 172, 180 (reversing denial of leave to amend based on trial court’s erroneous application of CCP §364 as an affirmative defense).)

The pending Motion for Summary Judgment does not alter the outcome of this motion for leave to amend. A “party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on theories that are not alleged in the pleadings.” ((Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 224.) However, a “plaintiff … wishing to rely upon unpleaded theories to defeat summary judgment must move to amend the complaint before the hearing.” (Internal quotations omitted.) (Id.)

Plaintiffs have moved to amend the complaint before the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. However, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend concedes the merits of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and their inability to prevail on the Song Beverly Claims alleged as the first through fourth causes of action of the original complaint and the proposed FAC.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED.

DATED: May 8, 2025

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

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