Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV04642, Date: 2025-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV04642    Hearing Date: February 7, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Tommy Gorman, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on February 26, 2024 against Defendants Hampton Tedder Electric Company, Hampton Tedder Electric Commercial, and Hampton Tedder Technical Services, Inc.

On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging causes of action for (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA, (2) failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA, (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA, (4) failure to prevent retaliation in violation of FEHA, (5) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5,

(6) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 98.6, (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (8) failure to pay meal and rest period compensation, (9) failure to pay timely earned wages upon separation of employment in violation of Labor Code sections 201 and 203, and (10) penalties for violations of Labor Code section 226 for failure to provide accurate wage statements. 

            In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he “worked for Defendant as a groundman” and “was terminated on or about May 17, 2023.” (FAC, ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges he “is an African American, black man.” (FAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race and color and as a result, Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment actions including, but not limited to, being denied promotion, reprimand, being denied employment benefits or privileges and being denied work opportunities or assignments and termination.” (FAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff engaged in the protected activity of reporting/resisting the aforementioned discrimination, and as a result, Plaintiff was thereafter subjected to adverse employment actions including, but not limited to, being denied promotion, reprimand, being denied employment benefits or privileges and being denied work opportunities or assignments and termination.” (FAC, ¶ 14.)

            Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with legally required meal and rest breaks at the location at which Plaintiff worked for Defendant, and failed to pay Plaintiff premiums for missed meal and rest periods which incurred on every day on which Plaintiff was employed by Defendant.” (FAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff all wages due upon his termination and provide accurate wage statements because they did not account for the missed meal and rest periods or premiums required therefor.” (FAC, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges that he “made protected complaints to Defendant, and specifically Warren Howze and another foreman whose name Plaintiff does not recall, based on conduct he believed to be illegal and/or in violation of California Law, and specifically exercising rights provided for by the California Labor Code.” (FAC, ¶ 17.)

Hampton Tedder Electric Company (“HTE”) now moves to strike portions of the FAC. Plaintiff opposes.

Discussion

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

HTE moves to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in connection with the first through seventh causes of action of the FAC. (FAC, ¶¶ 33, 39, 44, 49, 53, 58, 61.) Plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief alleges that Plaintiff seeks “punitive damages as allowed by law.” (FAC, Prayer for Relief, ¶ 3.)  

A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged do not rise to¿the level of “malice,¿oppression¿or fraud” required to support a punitive damages award. (¿¿See Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63-64¿¿.)¿“¿‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.¿” (¿¿Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)¿¿.) “¿‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.¿” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2)¿.) “¿‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.¿” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3)¿.)¿ 

HTE argues that “Plaintiff alleges no facts that rise to the level of oppression, fraud, or malice. Plaintiff alleges no facts that Defendant engaged in despicable conduct or acted with conscious disregard for the safety of the public.” (Mot. at p. 6:25-27, emphasis omitted.) However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged “oppression” for purposes of his punitive damages claims. As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that “Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race and color and as a result, Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment actions including, but not limited to, being denied promotion, reprimand, being denied employment benefits or privileges and being denied work opportunities or assignments and termination.” (FAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here was a causal link between Plaintiff being a black, African American and the discrimination because he was the only African American black man on the crew and was treated differently than non-blacks.” (FAC, ¶ 12.)

In the motion, HTE also cites to Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), which provides that “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” HTE asserts that “Plaintiff does not allege who from Defendant were his allegedly unfit supervisors, who from Defendant had advance knowledge of these unknown employees alleged unfitness, or how this unknown officer, director, or managing agent had advance knowledge of these unknown, unfit supervisors and unknown conduct by unknown employees.” (Mot. at p. 6:20-24, emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff does not appear to respond to this point in the opposition.

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of Plaintiff’s supervisors who were managing agents of Defendant acting on behalf of Defendant, and an officer, director, or managing agent had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of the employees and employed them with a conscious disregard of the rights of others and ratified the wrongful conduct.” (FAC, ¶ 26.) However, Plaintiff does not appear to allege any specific facts concerning how HTE purportedly “had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the [unidentified] employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded…” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) As noted by HTE, “[i]n order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court grants HTE’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations, with leave to amend.  

Lastly, HTE asserts that “if Plaintiff is granted leave to amend, [HTE] respectfully requests that the Court order that Plaintiff and/or his counsel pay Defendant’s reasonable expenses incurred for having to bring this Motion to Strike.” (Mot. at p. 7:25-27.) More specifically, HTE seeks $3,150.00 in attorney’s fees. (See Maline Decl., ¶ 7.) In support of such request, HTE cites to Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 769, where the Court of Appeal found that “[t]he court had authority under section 436 to require, as a condition of leave to amend, that plaintiff pay defendants’ expenses of the motion to strike the complaint. (See 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 186, p. 693 [grant of relief under section 473 ‘upon any terms as may be just’ typically includes compensating the adverse party for expenses suffered by the proceedings on the motion].).” (Emphasis omitted.)

However, the Court notes that HTE’s request for “expenses in the amount of $3,150.00” is not included in HTE’s notice of motion. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110, subdivision (a), “[a] notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order.” Here, HTE’s notice of motion does not make any reference to the fact that HTE seeks attorney’s fees, or the grounds for such requested fees. Accordingly, the Court denies HTE’s request for fees in the amount of $3,150.00.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, HTE’s motion to strike is granted, with leave to amend. HTE’s request for expenses is denied.

The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days of this Order, HTE is ordered to file and serve its answer within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿ 

HTE is ordered to give notice of this Order. 

DATED:  February 7, 2025                      ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court