Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV06431, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV06431 Hearing Date: October 25, 2024 Dept: 50
Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 665, where the California Supreme Court noted as follows:
“During the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the
number of couples living together without marrying…Such nonmarital
relationships lead to legal controversy when one partner dies or the couple
separates. Courts of Appeal, faced with the task of determining property rights
in such cases, have arrived at conflicting positions: two cases (In re Marriage of Cary (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 345
[109 Cal.Rptr. 862]; Estate of Atherley (1975)
44 Cal.App.3d 758 [119 Cal.Rptr. 41]) have held that the Family Law Act (Civil Code section 4000 et seq.) requires division of
the property according to community property principles, and one decision (Beckman v.
Mayhew (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 529 [122 Cal.Rptr. 604]) has rejected that holding. We take this opportunity to resolve that
controversy and to declare the principles which should govern distribution of
property acquired in a nonmarital relationship.
We conclude: (1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the
distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a
relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The courts should
enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that
the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual
services. (3) In the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire
into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates
an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ the
doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or
resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case.
In the instant case plaintiff and defendant lived together for seven
years without marrying; all property acquired during this period was taken in
defendant’s name. When plaintiff sued to enforce a contract under which she was
entitled to half the property and to support payments, the trial court granted
judgment on the pleadings for defendant, thus leaving him with all
property accumulated by the couple during their relationship. Since the trial
court denied plaintiff a trial on the merits of her claim, its decision
conflicts with the principles stated above, and must be reversed.”
Plaintiff argues that here, “[t]he claims
Plaintiff has brought against Defendant are ‘Marvin’ claims,” and that “it is
not clear that Idaho courts would even allow a Marvin claim to proceed past a
motion to dismiss.” (Opp’n at pp. 6:27-28; 7:4-5.) In the reply, Defendant does
not appear to respond to these points or provide legal authority demonstrating
that Idaho would be a “suitable” place for trial of Plaintiff’s causes of
action.
In the motion, Defendant also asserts that “[t]he
balance of private and public interests also favor dismissal. As shown above,
Faulk, Slinkard’s dentist and all relevant evidence are located in Idaho.
Forcing Faulk and witnesses that reside in Idaho to appear in a California
court would place a great burden on Faulk and witnesses, and the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over Faulk would not comport with fair play and
substantial justice. The public interest factors weigh in favor of granting the
Motion as well. Granting the Motion on forum non conveniens grounds would aid
in avoiding the potential overburdening of the Court’s calendar and judicial
resources.” (Mot. at pp. 11:25-12:3.)
In his supporting declaration, Defendant
states that “[t]he dentist for Amanda Slinkard’s reconstructive dental surgery
was and is in the state of Idaho.” (Faulk Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant also states
that “I am and have been a full-time resident of the State of Idaho since June
2017, and I intend to domicile in Idaho indefinitely.” (Faulk Decl., ¶ 2.) But
as noted by Plaintiff, although Defendant asserts that he would be burdened by “appear[ing]
in a California court,” (Mot. at p. 11:27) Defendant does not appear to provide
any evidence to support such assertion.
Based on the foregoing, the Court does not
find that Defendant has met his burden of showing that Plaintiff’s
Complaint should be dismissed on the ground of inconvenient forum.
Lastly, Defendant also asserts that “[e]ven if
Idaho is not a suitable alternative forum, Humbolt County is a vastly more
suitable venue than Los Angeles County, since neither Slinkard nor Faulk lives,
works, or conducts business in Los Angeles.” (Mot. at p. 11:22-24.) Defendant also
argues that “Los Angeles Superior Court is not the proper venue for this action.”
(Mot. at p. 11:5.) But the instant motion does not appear to be a motion to
change venue. Defendant’s notice of motion provides that “on August 26, 2024…or
as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 50…Defendant Winter
McSherri Faulk’s Motion to (1) Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, (2) Dismiss the Action on the ground of
Inconvenient Forum (the ‘Motion’) will be heard…This Motion is brought pursuant
to California Code of Civil Procedure Section
418.10(a)(1) and (2)…” (Notice of Mot. at p. 2:2-9.)
The Court notes that pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1110, subdivision (a), “[a] notice of motion must
state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the
grounds for issuance of the order.”
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s “reference
to other venues in California is misplaced because such a transfer is not a
proper relief for a Motion to Quash or for inconvenient forum.” (Opp’n at p.
7:15-17.) Indeed, Code of Civil Procedure section
418.10, subdivision (a), cited by Defendant in the notice of motion,
provides in pertinent part that “(a) A defendant, on or before the last
day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may
for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of
the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (2) To stay or dismiss
the action on the ground of inconvenient forum…” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subds. (a)(1)-(2).)
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendant’s motion
to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the
alternative, to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Order.
DATED:
________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court