Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV08392, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08392    Hearing Date: January 30, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Plaintiff Karina Reyes (“Plaintiff”) requests that the Court enter default judgment against Defendant Working Class American Construction in the total amount of $829,831.26, comprising $739,971.43 in damages, $61,225.03 in interest, $974.80 in costs, and $27,660.00 in attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff also requests that the Court enter default judgment against Defendant Ronald Wilson in the total amount of $759,453.18, comprising $674,971.43 in damages, $55,846.95 in interest, $974.80 in costs, and $27,660.00 in attorney’s fees.

In addition, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter default judgment against Defendants Matthew Gore and Lawrence Boguslawski in the total amount of $32,965.76, comprising $4,000.00 in damages, $330.96 in interest, $974.80 in costs, and $27,660.00 in attorney’s fees.

The Court notes a number of defects with the submitted default judgment package.

First, in each of the requests for court judgment (Forms CIV-100), Items 6 (Declaration of mailing) are blank. The Court notes that pursuant to ¿Code of Civil Procedure section 587¿, “[a]n application by a plaintiff for entry of default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of¿¿Section 585¿¿or¿¿Section 586¿¿shall include an affidavit stating that a copy of the application has been mailed to the defendant’s attorney of record or, if none, to the defendant at his or her last known address and the date on which the copy was mailed. If no such address of the defendant is known to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, the affidavit shall state that fact. No default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of¿¿Section 585¿¿or¿¿Section 586¿¿shall be entered, unless the affidavit is filed. The nonreceipt of the notice shall not invalidate or constitute ground for setting aside any judgment.” In Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 108, footnote 15, the Court of Appeal observed as follows:  

“In a related contention, appellant argues that it was not obliged to comply with¿Code of Civil Procedure section 587¿in seeking a default judgment, noting that a defendant ordinarily is not entitled to notice of proceedings after entry of default (Code of Civil Procedure section 1010). We observe that appellate courts and treatises have interpreted the phrase “application … for entry of default” in¿Code of Civil Procedure section 587¿to include applications for entry of a default judgment. (See¿Rodriguez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535–538¿[discussing cases]; see also¿Harris, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 100¿[“The statute provides that no application for default judgment shall be heard, and no default entered, unless such an affidavit has been filed.”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 5:187, p. 5-48 [“As in all defaults,” an affidavit complying with¿Code Civ. Proc., § 587¿must be filed with the application for default judgment.]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,¿supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 162, p. 603 [“A copy of the application for entry of default or for judgment on the default must be mailed to the defendant's attorney of record ….”]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,¿supra, § 164, p. 605.)”  

Second, Plaintiff seeks lost wages amounting to $170,971.43. (Summary of the Case at p. 4:3.) Plaintiff’s Summary of the Case states that “[a]s discussed in Plaintiff’s declaration, Plaintiff’s salary was $1600 per week, and she was forced to quit on January 13, 2023, and she has yet to get rehired. (Reyes Decl. ¶¶ 10, 19) Thus, as of January 30, 2025 (the date of the Hearing / Status Conference pertaining to this Request for Default Judgment), there are 106.857 weeks of lost wages, amounting to $170,971.43.” (Summary of the Case at pp. 3:28-4:3.)

The Court notes that no declaration was filed in connection with the instant request for default judgment. Plaintiff appears to rely on the Declaration of Karina Reyes filed on July 26, 2024. In such declaration, Ms. Reyes states that “[w]hile employed by Defendants, my salary was $1,600 per week. I have not been hired by anyone else since I was forced to quit.” (Reyes Decl., ¶ 19.) However, such declaration was executed on July 20, 2024, approximately six months ago. (See Reyes Decl., p. 4.) Plaintiff has not filed a more recent declaration indicating whether she has been hired.

Third, as to the requests pertaining to Working Class American Construction and Ronald Wilson, Plaintiff appears to seek prejudgment interest on, inter alia, an unliquidated sum (i.e., $500,000 in requested emotional distress damages). The Court notes that “Civil Code section 3287 reads in relevant part: ‘(a) Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day,…’ In other words, prejudgment interest is awarded only when the sum is liquidated within the meaning of the statute.” ((Duale v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.) Plaintiff does not appear to cite to legal authority supporting her request for prejudgment interest on an unliquidated sum.

 Fourth, as to the request pertaining to Working Class American Construction, the Memorandum of costs appears to incorrectly add up $546.00 and $428.00 to total $974.80. (See Form CIV-100, Item 7.)

Fifth, Plaintiff’s proposed judgment does not specify a defined amount of interest or total judgment amount as to any of the defendants.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiff’s requests for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with counsel a schedule for submitting a new default judgment package.

DATED:  January 30, 2025                            ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court