Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV11189, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11189    Hearing Date: January 30, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Plaintiff Sergio Arauz (“Plaintiff”) requests entry of default judgment against Defendant Lorenzo Ruiz dba Entourage Construction. The total judgment sought is unclear.

The Court notes a number of defects with the submitted default judgment package.

First, Item 6 of the request for court judgment (Declaration of mailing) is blank. The Court notes that pursuant to ¿Code of Civil Procedure section 587¿, “[a]n application by a plaintiff for entry of default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of¿¿Section 585¿¿or¿¿Section 586¿¿shall include an affidavit stating that a copy of the application has been mailed to the defendant’s attorney of record or, if none, to the defendant at his or her last known address and the date on which the copy was mailed. If no such address of the defendant is known to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, the affidavit shall state that fact. No default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of¿¿Section 585¿¿or¿¿Section 586¿¿shall be entered, unless the affidavit is filed. The nonreceipt of the notice shall not invalidate or constitute ground for setting aside any judgment.” In Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 108, footnote 15, the Court of Appeal observed as follows:  

“In a related contention, appellant argues that it was not obliged to comply with¿Code of Civil Procedure section 587¿in seeking a default judgment, noting that a defendant ordinarily is not entitled to notice of proceedings after entry of default (Code of Civil Procedure section 1010). We observe that appellate courts and treatises have interpreted the phrase “application … for entry of default” in¿Code of Civil Procedure section 587¿to include applications for entry of a default judgment. (See¿Rodriguez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535–538¿[discussing cases]; see also¿Harris, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 100¿[“The statute provides that no application for default judgment shall be heard, and no default entered, unless such an affidavit has been filed.”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 5:187, p. 5-48 [“As in all defaults,” an affidavit complying with¿Code Civ. Proc., § 587¿must be filed with the application for default judgment.]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,¿supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 162, p. 603 [“A copy of the application for entry of default or for judgment on the default must be mailed to the defendant's attorney of record ….”]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,¿supra, § 164, p. 605.)”  

            Second, Item 1(a) of Plaintiff’s request for court judgment incorrectly refers to a complaint filed on May 3, 2024. The Court notes that the operative Amended Complaint was filed on May 7, 2024.           

            Third, Item 2 of Plaintiff’s request for court judgment is blank. Thus, it is unclear what specific amounts are sought by Plaintiff. Similarly, Item 6 of the proposed judgment (Form JUD-100) is blank.

            Fourth, in his supporting declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that Plaintiff seeks a judgment including, inter alia, $64,202.49 “paid to Defendant Ruiz,” $50,000.00 in estimated costs “to repair substandard work,” and $50,000.00 for “[g]eneral damages for emotional distress.” (Szabo Decl., ¶ 14.) These damages appear to exceed the total amount sought in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff only appears to seek a total of $69,201.63 in the Amended Complaint ($59,201.63 + $10,000). (See Amended Compl., pp. 8-9.) In addition, the Amended Complaint does not appear to allege that Plaintiff seeks $50,000.00 in estimated costs to repair substandard work, or $50,000.00 for damages for emotional distress. The Court notes that Code of Civil Procedure section 580, subdivision (a) “limits a trial court’s jurisdiction to grant relief on a default judgment to the amount stated in the complaint.” ((Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 963, 968.) “[I]n all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” ((Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 534.)

            Fifth, Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration also indicates that Plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest. (Szabo Decl., ¶ 15.) However, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not appear to allege that Plaintiff seeks interest. As discussed, “in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” ((Ibid.)

            Sixth, Plaintiff seeks $102.55 in costs for “Fed Ex to CSLB; CSLB Certification.” (See Form CIV-100, Item 7(d).) Such costs do not appear to be permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, and Plaintiff does not appear to provide any legal authority supporting such requested costs.

            Seventh, Item 8 of Plaintiff’s proposed judgment indicates that Plaintiff seeks a declaration that “Defendant Lorenzo Ruiz dba Entourage Construction is not entitled to collect any sum from Plaintiff Sergio Arauz for the performance of construction related services without proper licensing.” Such specific relief does not appear to have been requested in the Amended Complaint. As set forth above, “in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” ((Finney v. Gomez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with Plaintiff a schedule for resubmission of the default judgment package.

DATED:  January 30, 2025                            ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet 

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court