Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV11205, Date: 2025-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11205    Hearing Date: April 3, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

            Background

On January 18, 2023, Jameisha Levy submitted a PAGA Notice to the LWDA, alleging Labor Code violations by her former employer, AmbuServe. She later filed a PAGA complaint on November 14, 2023, asserting various wage and hour claims on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees. The claims included minimum wage, overtime, rest and meal breaks, recordkeeping failures, and improper employee classification.

On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff Brown filed a wage and hour class action and a PAGA Notice that largely duplicated the claims in the Levy case. On May 3, 2024, Brown filed a First Amended PAGA Complaint, and again on July 15, 2024. The allegations mirror those in Levy, including unpaid wages, missed breaks, inaccurate wage statements, and other Labor Code violations. However, Brown’s First Amended Complaint does not specify that he is filing on his own behalf, only on behalf of other aggrieved employees. A notice of related case was filed on May 30, 2024.

The Levy case was stayed due to a stipulation based on arbitration agreements between parties not involved in the current lawsuit. AmbuServe then filed a special demurrer in the current case. Meanwhile, AmbuServe’s motion to compel arbitration in the class action brought by Brown was denied.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court may take judicial notice of records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States. (Evid. Code § 452 subd. (d).) The Court may also take judicial notice of “Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.” (Evid. Code § 452 subd. (c).)

The Court grants Defendant’s requests for judicial notice as to Exhibits A-G.

The Court grants Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1-2.

Legal Standard

1. Abatement 

CCP section 430.10(c) expressly provides that a party may demur where “there is another cause of action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (See People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 760, 770.) The pendency of another action is classified as a plea in abatement, and, as such, is “not favored.” This disfavor is expressed in a number of rules: (1) The objection itself is strictly limited so that, whether raised by demurrer or answer, the defendant must show that the parties, the cause of action, and issues are identical, and that the same evidence would support the judgment in each case. . . (2) demurrer will not be sustained if the complaint also show that the former action is no longer pending. . . (3) even if objection is good demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend and the action should not be dismissed.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Proc., Pleading, (4th ed. 1997) §924; California Union Ins. Co. v Trinity River Land Co. (1980) 105 Cal App 3d 104, 108.)

In determining whether another action is pending between the same parties on the same cause of action, the facts in the two causes of action are compared to determine what primary right has been invaded. California follows the “primary right theory,” which holds that every judicial action must involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a wrong done by the defendant that consisted of a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing from this wrong; and the remedy or relief itself. Of these elements, the combined primary right, duty, and wrong constitute the cause of action. (Bush v Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1384.) Even when a demurrer is properly sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper order is to abate further proceedings pending termination of the prior action, not an order of dismissal. (Childs v Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal. App. 3d 843, 847-848.)

2. Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction

“Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, when two superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the first court to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” ((Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.) The remedies in the suits need not be precisely the same; rather, the issues in the two proceedings must be substantially similar and the suits must have the potential to result in conflicting judgments. ((County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 91.)

            Discussion

A.    Meet and Confer

On August 8, 2024, AmbuServe’s counsel reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel to confer regarding overlapping claims already addressed in Levy. Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond.

B.    Abatement

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s PAGA action should be abated under California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(c) because all three legal requirements are met: (1) Levy is a pending action, having been filed months earlier on November 14, 2023, and remains active despite being stayed for mediation and arbitration; (2) the parties are the same, because both cases are brought on behalf of the State of California under PAGA, which makes the State the real party in interest in both actions regardless of the individual plaintiff; and (3) the causes of action are the same, as both complaints assert identical Labor Code violations based on similar alleged misconduct by AmbuServe and cover overlapping time periods and employee groups. Under the “primary rights” doctrine, the claims assert the same indivisible rights and thus constitute the same cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that this action is not subject to abatement under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(c) because Defendant fails to meet the statute’s strict requirements: (1) the parties are not the same as the Levy case includes defendants (Melissa Harris and Scott Smith) who are not parties to this action, and Plaintiff Brown is not a party in Levy; and (2) the causes of action are not identical, as Brown’s complaint includes violations of multiple Labor Code sections not present in Levy. Additionally, each plaintiff must establish individual standing as an aggrieved employee under PAGA, meaning different facts and evidence apply. Plaintiff also emphasizes that demurrers on abatement grounds are disfavored and require the defect to appear clearly on the face of the pleading or judicially noticed facts.

In reply, Defendant argues that mandatory abatement under California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(c) is proper because all legal requirements are met. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s objections are flawed because in PAGA actions, the State of California is the real party in interest, not the individual plaintiff, as established in cases like Iskanian v. CLS Transportation L.A., LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (overruled on other grounds) and Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal., Inc. (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 73. Therefore, both actions involve the same parties: the State and AmbuServe. As for the additional individual defendants in Levy, Defendant asserts that Melissa Harris and Scott Smith were named in their capacity as AmbuServe officers and could be held liable under Labor Code § 558.1. Their absence from this action does not preclude abatement. Defendant also contends that any variations in the Labor Code sections cited are immaterial since both actions assert the same PAGA cause of action, on behalf of substantially the same group of aggrieved employees, and seek the same remedy—civil penalties under PAGA. Under the applicable legal standard, substantial similarity of claims is sufficient to support abatement.

The Court finds that the parties in the instant case and the parties in the Levy Case are identical because both cases involve PAGA claims, and thus are brought on behalf of the State of California against Defendant. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386.)

When addressing whether two causes of action are identical, the Court compares the facts alleged in the two actions. The causes of action are identical if both causes of action allege invasion of the same primary right. (Bush, supra, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1384.) A “primary right” is based on the harm suffered and not the particular theory of recovery asserted by the Plaintiff. (Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 860.)

In the Levy case, the plaintiff asserts both class action claims and a representative PAGA claim based on Defendant’s alleged violations of California labor law, including violations against AmbuServe related to minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest breaks, failure to keep accurate records, business expenses, failure to pay employees timely, itemized wage statements, and wages due at termination. Similarly, in the present action, Plaintiff brings a representative PAGA claim alleging alleged violations related to unpaid wages and overtime premiums, failure to provide meal and rest periods in accordance with law, failure to pay all accrued wages upon cessation of employment, overtime under various theories, failure to keep accurate records, minimum wages, failure to pay all wages in a timely manner, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failure to pay vacation pay on termination, failure to pay for expenses, failure to pay sick leave and other boilerplate claims. (FAC ¶¶ 6, 10-35.) The Court finds that both cases arise from the same alleged misconduct—Defendant’s failure to comply with California labor laws—and seek civil penalties under PAGA on behalf of the State. Although Plaintiff contends the claims are distinct due to differences in legal theories and requested remedies, the primary right at issue in both cases is the same: freedom from unlawful employment practices. Under California’s primary rights doctrine, it is the harm suffered—not the specific legal theory—that defines the cause of action. (See Bush, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at 1384.) Accordingly, the causes of action in both cases are substantially identical for purposes of abatement.

Therefore, the Court grants the Plea in Abatement and Stays the action pending disposition of the Levy case.

C.    Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction

Defendant argues that allowing both cases to proceed would be inefficient and duplicative, burdening the court and parties with overlapping discovery, potentially conflicting rulings, and inconsistent judgments—especially with courts’ discretion under PAGA to reduce penalties based on case-specific circumstances. This risk supports abatement under both legal and policy grounds, citing case law such as Conservatorship of Pacheco (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 171, and Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, which also supports applying the rule of exclusive, concurrent jurisdiction to stay this case, even if the strict elements of abatement were not met (though they are here).

Defendant requests that this action be stayed so that the court in Plaintiff’s related class action (which lacks a PAGA claim) can first rule on a pending motion to compel arbitration, which was denied once but is scheduled to be reargued on October 25, 2024. Defendant contends that Plaintiff attempted to avoid arbitration of individual PAGA claims by removing references to personal relief in his amended complaint. Defendant argues that staying this case will avoid conflicting rulings on arbitration and eliminate unnecessary litigation.

            In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not apply. This judge-made doctrine is policy-based and cannot be decided on demurrer. More importantly, it is inapplicable here because the Levy case is currently stayed, eliminating any risk of conflicting rulings, duplicative discovery, or wasted judicial resources. Plaintiff argues that Defendant, having stipulated to the stay in Levy, cannot now claim that judicial economy supports a stay in this case.

Plaintiff also rejects Defendant’s argument that a stay is necessary to avoid inconsistent arbitration rulings, pointing out that the motion to compel arbitration in the related class action has already been denied. Plaintiff asserts that public policy weighs heavily against a stay, as it would undermine the Labor Code’s purpose of protecting workers’ rights. Citing Troester v. Starbucks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, Plaintiff stresses that PAGA is designed to empower employees to enforce labor laws on the State’s behalf, and a stay would hinder that mission. Finally, Plaintiff notes that under both state and federal law, a party requesting a stay must show a “clear case of hardship or inequity,” which Defendant has failed to do.

In reply, Defendant argues that abatement is required under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, which applies when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter and parties. Unlike a statutory plea in abatement, this doctrine does not require identical parties or causes of action and is applied more broadly to prevent inconsistent rulings and duplicative litigation. Defendant asserts that both cases allege the same core PAGA cause of action by the same real party in interest (the State) against the same employer, on behalf of the same group of employees. Defendant claims Plaintiff effectively concedes that these criteria are met and instead relies solely on policy arguments.

Defendant refutes Plaintiff’s policy objections by emphasizing that Levy is not dismissed, but stayed, and could resolve the same claims Plaintiff brings here. Allowing this later-filed action to proceed would waste judicial resources, duplicate litigation efforts, and risk conflicting outcomes. Defendant also cites recent authority (Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245) confirming that PAGA does not override the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule, and that staying a second, duplicative PAGA case still fulfills PAGA’s purpose. Therefore, Defendant argues that this action must be abated under both the statutory plea in abatement and the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine.

            The Court denies Defendant’s request to Stay proceedings under the Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction doctrine without prejudice as moot.

Conclusion

The Court sustains the Plea in Abatement and stays the action pending disposition of Jameisha Levy v. AmbuServe, Inc., Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Case No. 23STCV27953.

Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED:  April 3, 2025                                 

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court