Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 24STCV15083, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling

On June 17, 2024, Plaintiffs Ignacio R. Montes, Maria Montes, Michelle Montes, and dba C&E Upholstery (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendants Michael Ray Peddicord, Gregory Dean Peddicord, and David Allen Eastis (collectively, “Defendants”). The Complaint alleges twenty-eight causes of action.

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they “have been living in the residential property located at 12167 Firestone Blvd. and operating a business from the commercial space at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA, for the last twenty-plus years under a tenancy with the now-deceased property owner.” (Compl., ¶ 19.) “C & E Custom Upholstery was established in 1975 by a prior owner and was transferred to Plaintiff Ignacio on or around 1990. The business has been continuously located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, and remained in that location until 2023.” (Compl., ¶ 21.)

“Plaintiffs rented the property by verbal agreement with Marvin Peddicord on behalf of the owner, Norman Williams, Arlene Williams, and Williams Appliance. Marvin Peddicord acted as a representative for the Williams family, to Plaintiffs’ knowledge, not as an owner or co-owner.” (Compl., ¶ 24.) “Rental payments have been made to Williams Appliance per the…verbal agreement.” (Compl., ¶ 29.) “At some point, either just before or after Norman Edwin Williams passed away, the executive contacts for Williams Appliance, Norwalk Electronics, Arlene Williams, Norman Williams, and Edwin Williams were changed to members of the Peddicord family.” (Compl., ¶ 31.)

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant Michael Ray Peddicord, purporting to have acquired the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, but with documentation that is either dubious or not properly filed, filed Unlawful Detainer actions (hereinafter ‘UDs’) on the two commercial units located at the 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650 against Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) “Defendant Michael successfully evicted Plaintiffs from these units. The Unlawful Detainer case for APN: 8056-007-003 is identified as 23NWUD01174. The Unlawful Detainer case for APN: 8056- 007-004 is identified as 23NWUD01171. These UDs are currently pending appeal.” (Compl., ¶ 17.) “Defendants are harassing Plaintiffs by using a Writ from a separate completed commercial UD case. This writ is being used to intimidate and force Plaintiffs out of their residential unit, located at 12167 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, which is situated on an adjacent lot.” (Compl., ¶ 18.)

In the first cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants engaged in misrepresentation by falsely claiming ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, despite lacking valid documentation or legal standing…This included filing Unlawful Detainer actions against the Plaintiffs based on dubious or improperly filed documentation...” (Compl., ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he intent to defraud by Defendants is evident from their calculated actions to falsely claim ownership and initiate legal proceedings against Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 61.)

In the second cause of action or fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants concealed and suppressed material facts regarding their lack of legal ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. Despite knowing that their claims of ownership were based on dubious or improperly filed documentation, Defendants intentionally withheld this information from Plaintiffs…” (Compl., ¶ 68.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ concealment of their lack of legal ownership and authority was done with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs. By suppressing this information, Defendants sought to induce Plaintiffs to vacate the premises and disrupt their business and residential stability…” (Compl., ¶ 69.) Plaintiffs allege that they “justifiably relied on Defendants’ representations and the formal nature of the Unlawful Detainer actions, believing them to be legitimate…This reliance led Plaintiffs to vacate their business premises and endure ongoing harassment, causing significant disruption and harm.” (Compl., ¶ 70.)

In the third cause of action for fraudulent inducement, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants engaged in fraudulent inducement by falsely representing their ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. They suggested as a fact that they had legitimate ownership and the right to evict Plaintiffs, despite knowing this was untrue…Defendants suppressed the true facts regarding their lack of legal ownership and authority, which they knew to be true…Defendants made these false representations and suppressions with the intent to deceive Plaintiffs and induce them to enter into agreements and vacate the property. This is evidenced by their actions in filing Unlawful Detainer actions and harassing Plaintiffs to force them out of their residence and business location…” (Compl., ¶¶ 76-77.)

In the fourth cause of action for promissory fraud, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants made promises to Plaintiffs regarding their ownership and use of the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. These promises included assurances that Plaintiffs would be allowed to remain on the property and operate their business without interference.” (Compl., ¶ 83.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]t the time these promises were made, they were false. Defendants did not own the property and they had no intention of maintaining whatever illegal contract they created. This is evidenced by Defendants’ subsequent actions to file Unlawful Detainer actions and harass Plaintiffs into vacating the premises…” (Compl., ¶ 84.)

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants made these promises with the intent to deceive Plaintiffs and induce them to continue occupying and paying rent for the property under false pretenses. Defendants’ actions were calculated to benefit themselves while causing harm to Plaintiffs, as evidenced by their fraudulent scheme to take control of the property and misappropriate rental payments…” (Compl., ¶ 85.) Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants failed to perform the promises made, as evidenced by their actions to evict Plaintiffs and disrupt their business operations…” (Compl., ¶ 87.)

In the fifth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants represented to Plaintiffs that they had legal ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, as evidenced by the filing of Unlawful Detainer actions and subsequent harassment to evict Plaintiffs…Defendants’ representation was not true, as they lacked proper documentation and legal standing…Even if Defendants believed they owned the property, their belief was negligently represented, as evidenced by the rushed creation of Norwalk Electronics Supply Inc. by Michael to circumvent legal issues…” (Compl., ¶¶ 93-94.)[1]

In the sixth cause of action for “conspiracy – fraud,” Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants conspired to defraud Plaintiffs by falsely claiming ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. This conspiracy involved coordinated actions to misrepresent their ownership, file Unlawful Detainer actions, and harass Plaintiffs into vacating the premises…” (Compl., ¶ 102.)

In the seventh cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs had an established economic relationship with their customers through their business, C & E Custom Upholstery, located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. This relationship was built over decades, providing a probability of future economic benefit to Plaintiffs…” (Compl., ¶ 109.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants intentionally acted to disrupt Plaintiffs’ economic relationship by filing Unlawful Detainer actions, creating a hostile environment through harassment, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs from their business premises…These actions were designed to force Plaintiffs out of their business location and disrupt their economic stability.” (Compl., ¶ 111.)

In the eighth cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs had an established economic relationship with their customers through their business, C & E Custom Upholstery, located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. This relationship, built over decades, provided a probability of future economic benefit to Plaintiffs…” (Compl., ¶¶ 116.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants acted negligently by failing to ensure the accuracy and legality of their ownership claims and by creating a hostile environment through harassment and wrongful eviction attempts…Their negligence is further evidenced by the rush to create Norwalk Electronics Supply Inc. to circumvent legal issues…” (Compl., ¶ 118.)

In the ninth cause of action for trespass to land, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs have a possessory interest in the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd. and 12167 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA, having lived and operated their business there for over twenty years under a tenancy agreement with the previous owner…Defendants, without permission, entered onto the property by posting non-related legal documentation on Plaintiffs’ residence and obstructing access to the garage and emergency exits...” (Compl., ¶¶ 123-124.)[2]

In the tenth cause of action for harassment, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants engaged in a continuous course of conduct aimed at harassing Plaintiffs, which included the filing of Unlawful Detainer actions, the use of a writ from a separate completed commercial UD case to intimidate Plaintiffs, and other harassing actions to force Plaintiffs out of their residential and business properties…This pattern of conduct evidences a continuity of purpose to unlawfully evict and harass Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 129.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ harassing actions included chaining and locking emergency exits, blocking access to the garage, removing personal property, and posting non-related legal documentation on Plaintiffs’ residence.” (Compl., ¶ 130.)

In the eleventh cause of action for trespass to chattels, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs’ possession of personal property by removing items from the garage and blocking access to the premises located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. This interference was carried out without Plaintiffs’ consent and included chaining and locking gates…Defendants’ actions impeded Plaintiffs’ ability to access and use their personal property, causing significant disruption and inconvenience.” (Compl., ¶ 136.)

In the twelfth cause of action for conversion, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs had ownership and the right to possession of personal property stored at their business premises located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. This property included essential business items and personal belongings necessary for the operation of C & E Custom Upholstery…” (Compl., ¶ 143.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants wrongfully exercised dominion over Plaintiffs’ property by removing items from the garage and blocking access to the premises without Plaintiffs’ consent. This wrongful act included chaining and locking gates, thereby dispossessing Plaintiffs of their rightful property and preventing them from accessing or using it…” (Compl., ¶ 144.)

In the thirteenth cause of action for private nuisance, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants, by their actions and failures to act, created conditions that interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property. These conditions included chaining and locking emergency exits, blocking access to the garage, removing personal property, and using a writ from a separate commercial UD case to harass Plaintiffs…Defendants’ conduct was harmful to Plaintiffs’ health, indecent, offensive to the senses, and an obstruction to the free use of the property…The conditions created by Defendants significantly interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their land. The harassment and obstruction disrupted Plaintiffs’ ability to operate their business and maintain their residence, causing substantial inconvenience and distress…” (Compl., ¶¶ 152-153.)

In the fourteenth cause of action for breach of implied contract, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs had an implied contract with Defendants based on the long-term occupancy and use of the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, for both residential and business purposes. This implied contract was established through the conduct of the parties, including the consistent payment of rent and the use of the property for business operations…” (Compl., ¶ 160.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants breached the implied contract by filing Unlawful Detainer actions, creating a hostile environment through harassment, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs from their business premises…Additionally, Defendants’ actions to block access to the property, remove personal property, and misuse legal processes further constitute breaches of the implied contract…” (Compl., ¶ 162.)

In the fifteenth cause of action for promissory estoppel, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants made promises to Plaintiffs regarding the continued use and occupancy of the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. These promises included assurances that Plaintiffs could operate their business and reside on the property without interference…” (Compl., ¶ 167.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he promises made by Defendants did induce action and forbearance by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs continued to operate their business, paid rent, and maintained the property based on the expectation that they would not face wrongful eviction or interference…” (Compl., ¶ 169.) Plaintiffs allege that “[i]njustice can be avoided only by enforcement of Defendants’ promises. Plaintiffs have suffered significant harm due to Defendants’ failure to honor their commitments, including financial losses, operational disruptions, and emotional distress” (Compl., ¶ 170.)

In the sixteenth cause of action for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into an implied contract based on the long-term occupancy and use of the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, for both residential and business purposes…” (Compl., ¶ 175.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ conduct prevented Plaintiffs from receiving the benefits under the contract. Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by filing Unlawful Detainer actions, creating a hostile environment through harassment, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs from their business premises…Additionally, Defendants’ actions to block access to the property, remove personal property, and misuse legal processes further constitute breaches of the implied contract…” (Compl., ¶ 178.)

In the seventeenth cause of action for unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiffs by wrongfully claiming ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, and collecting rental payments under false pretenses. Defendants’ actions, including the filing of Unlawful Detainer actions and harassment to evict Plaintiffs, were based on dubious or improperly filed documentation…” (Compl., ¶ 184.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants unjustly retained this benefit, causing significant financial and emotional harm to Plaintiffs. The wrongful eviction and continuous harassment disrupted Plaintiffs’ business operations and personal lives…” (Compl., ¶ 185.)

In the eighteenth cause of action for negligence, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care to manage their property and interactions with Plaintiffs in a manner that did not cause harm,” and that “Defendants breached this duty of care by engaging in a series of negligent actions, including filing Unlawful Detainer actions based on dubious documentation, creating a hostile environment through harassment, chaining and locking emergency exits, blocking access to the garage, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs…”

In the nineteenth cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts or practices by falsely claiming ownership and authority over the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. These acts include filing Unlawful Detainer actions based on dubious documentation, creating a hostile environment through harassment, chaining and locking emergency exits, blocking access to the garage, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs…” (Compl., ¶ 197.) Plaintiffs allege that their “economic injury was directly caused by Defendants’ unfair business practices and false advertising. Defendants’ fraudulent representations and wrongful actions led Plaintiffs to continue paying rent and relying on the stability of their tenancy, only to face ongoing harassment and wrongful eviction attempts.” (Compl., ¶ 199.)

In the twentieth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by harassing Plaintiffs, filing Unlawful Detainer actions based on dubious documentation, chaining and locking emergency exits, blocking access to the garage, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs from their residence and business premises located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650.” (Compl., ¶ 203.) Plaintiffs allege that they “suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ outrageous conduct.” (Compl., ¶ 205.)

In the twenty-first cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care to manage their property and interactions without causing harm,” and that “Defendants breached this duty by engaging in a series of negligent actions, including filing Unlawful Detainer actions based on dubious documentation, creating a hostile environment through harassment, chaining and locking emergency exits, blocking access to the garage, and wrongfully attempting to evict Plaintiffs…”

In the twenty-second cause of action for abuse of process, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants initiated Unlawful Detainer actions against Plaintiffs with an ulterior motive to wrongfully dispossess them of their business and residential properties. Defendant Michael, under the pretense of having acquired ownership of the property, used these legal proceedings to harass and intimidate Plaintiffs…This improper use of legal process was aimed at evicting Plaintiffs and disrupting their long-established business operations…” (Compl., ¶ 217.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants committed willful acts in the use of the legal process that were not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. This includes the misuse of a writ from a separate commercial Unlawful Detainer case to force Plaintiffs out of their residential unit…Additionally, Defendants chained and locked emergency exits, blocked access to the garage, and removed personal property, further demonstrating their misuse of legal procedures and intent to cause harm…” (Compl., ¶ 218.)

In the twenty-third cause of action for slander of title, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants published false statements that disparaged Plaintiffs’ title to the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. These statements were made through the filing of Unlawful Detainer actions and other communications indicating Defendants’ wrongful claim of ownership and authority over the property…” (Compl., ¶ 223.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he statements made by Defendants were false and disparaging to Plaintiffs’ title. Defendants’ claims of ownership and authority were not supported by valid documentation or legal rights, and their actions directly contradicted Plaintiffs’ established occupancy and use of the property…” (Compl., ¶ 225.)

In the twenty-fourth cause of action for ejectment, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Defendants’ possession of the subject property is wrongful. Despite winning the Unlawful Detainer actions, which are currently on appeal, Defendants have used dubious and improperly filed documentation to assert their claims over the property…These actions have created a cloud on Plaintiffs’ title and have been used to harass and intimidate Plaintiffs…” (Compl., ¶ 231.) Plaintiffs allege that they “seek a judgment for possession of the property, to be executed by the sheriff, or a judgment requiring Defendants to perfect the title and deliver possession of the property.” (Compl., ¶ 233.)

In the twenty-fifth cause of action for “adverse possession – color of title,” Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs have satisfied the legal requirements for adverse possession under color of title regarding the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650.” (Compl., ¶ 241.) Plaintiffs allege that they “have satisfied all legal requirements for adverse possession under color of title and are entitled to the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. Defendants’ claims to the property are without merit, and Plaintiffs seek a judgment to perfect their title and secure their rightful ownership.” (Compl., ¶ 248.)

In the twenty-sixth cause of action for quiet title, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650, against any and all claims of Defendants. Plaintiffs have held possession and use of the property for over twenty years, continuously and openly, under a good faith belief in their right to the property. This belief was based on verbal agreements with the now-deceased property owner and consistent payment of rent to the recognized owners, Williams Appliance…” (Compl., ¶ 251.) Plaintiffs allege that they “request the Court to declare that Defendants have no valid claim to the property and that Plaintiffs hold rightful title.” (Compl., ¶ 254.)

In the twenty-seventh cause of action for accounting, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “[a] relationship that requires accounting exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Plaintiffs have made regular rental payments and other financial contributions for the maintenance and operation of the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650…These payments were made under the belief that Defendants had a legitimate claim to the property, which has now been disputed. Given the nature of these financial transactions and the alleged misrepresentations by Defendants, an accounting is necessary to determine the exact amounts owed and to whom they should be paid.” (Compl., ¶ 258.)

In the twenty-eighth cause of action for declaratory relief, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief to remove any claims Defendants have to the property located at 12169 Firestone Blvd., Norwalk, CA 90650. The controversy involves the legal rights and duties of Plaintiffs and Defendants concerning the property, and the need for a judicial declaration to resolve the ongoing disputes.” (Compl., ¶ 264.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ claims to the property are based on fraudulent representations and lack legal foundation.” (Compl., ¶ 265.) Plaintiffs allege that “[g]iven the ongoing fraudulent conduct of Defendants and Plaintiffs’ established adverse possession, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief to remove any claims Defendants have to the property and to affirm Plaintiffs’ rightful ownership.” (Compl., ¶ 267.)

The anti-SLAPP statute is “a mechanism through which complaints that arise from the exercise of free speech rights can be evaluated at an early stage of the litigation process and resolved expeditiously.” (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [internal quotations omitted].) Courts use a two-step process for determining whether an action is a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or a SLAPP. First, the court determines whether the defendant has established that the challenged claim arises from protected speech. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If such a showing has been made, the court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.)

“[T]he only thing the defendant needs to establish to invoke the protection of the SLAPP statute is that the challenged lawsuit arose from an act on the part of the defendant in furtherance of her right of petition or free speech.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 307.) An act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech includes the following:

“(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

In determining whether a cause of action arises from protected conduct, the court focuses on “the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims.” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490-491.) “[T]he critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 (emphasis in original).) In making this determination, the Court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Ibid.)

In the motion, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendants’ petitioning activity, including filing Unlawful Detainer (UD) actions and making statements related to those proceedings. Such conduct is expressly protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Mot. at p. 6:16-18.) Defendants cite to Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 90, where the California Supreme Court found that “[t]he constitutional right of petition encompasses the basic act of filing litigation. Sletten is being sued because of the affirmative counterclaims he filed in federal court. In fact, but for the federal lawsuit and Sletten’s alleged actions taken in connection with that litigation, plaintiffs’ present claims would have no basis. This action therefore falls squarely within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute’s arising from prong.” (Internal quotations and citation omitted.)[3]

The Court finds that Defendants have shown that Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth causes of action arise from protected activity, namely, the filing and prosecution of the subject unlawful detainer actions. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Allegations of these causes of action are set forth above. As discussed, “[t]he prosecution of an unlawful detainer action indisputably is protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16. The constitutional right to petition…includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action.” (Birkner v. Lam, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 281 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Moreover, Plaintiffs do not oppose the instant motion, and thus do not dispute that the foregoing causes of action arise from protected activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.

The Court does not find that Defendants have shown that the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, or twenty-eighth causes of action arise from protected activity. Allegations of these causes of action are also discussed above in the “Allegations of the Complaint” section of this Order.

Based on the foregoing, the first prong of the two-step anti-SLAPP analysis is satisfied as to the first through twenty-fourth causes of action of the Complaint, and the burden now shifts to Plaintiffs on prong two¿with respect to these causes of action.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of each of the causes of action of the Complaint. As discussed, the burden now shifts to Plaintiffs on prong two with respect to the first through twenty-fourth causes of action of the Complaint.

With respect to the first through sixth causes of action, Defendants assert that “communications made in connection with judicial proceedings are protected under California’s litigation privilege. (Civ. Code, § 47(b)). This bars Plaintiffs’ fraud claims that are based on statements or actions taken during litigation or related negotiations.” (Mot. at p. 8:24-27.) As to the seventh and eighth causes of action, Defendants similarly argue that “Defendants’ actions are protected by litigation privileges…” (Mot. at p. 12:27.)

As to the tenth and thirteenth causes of action, Defendants assert that “[a]s with the harassment claim, the private nuisance claim is also protected by the litigation privilege…” (Mot. at p. 15:22-23.) Defendants also assert that the ninth cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege (Mot. at pp. 17:26), and that as to the eleventh and twelfth causes of action, Defendants’ actions “are protected by the litigation privilege.” (Mot. at pp. 18:11; 18:22.)

Similarly, as to the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth causes of action of the Complaint, Defendants argue that their actions “are protected by litigation privilege.” (Mot. at pp. 21:11; 21:21; 22:3; 22:9-10.) As to the nineteenth cause of action, Defendants argue that their “actions are shielded by the litigation privilege…” (Mot. at p. 26:3.) In addition, as to the twentieth and twenty-first causes of action, Defendants argue that their “actions are protected by the litigation privilege.” (Mot. at p. 27:16-17.) As to the twenty-second cause of action, Defendants assert that “the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b) bars any claim for abuse of process based on actions taken within the scope of judicial proceedings.” (Mot. at p. 29:21-22.)

As discussed above, the Court finds that Defendants have shown that these causes of arise from protected activity, namely, the filing and prosecution of the subject unlawful detainer actions.

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made:…(b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2…”

“California’s litigation privilege springs from Civil Code section 47. This statute provides that ‘A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty [or] [¶] (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law…’…The litigation privilege applies to any communication made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings by litigants or other participants to achieve the objects of the litigation that has some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Paglia & Associates Construction, Inc. v. Hamilton (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 318, 324 [emphasis omitted].) The Court notes that “[t]he litigation privilege is also relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323.) “Pleadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications.” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 770.)

Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, and thus do not dispute that the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, or twenty-second causes of action of the Complaint are barred by the litigation privilege.

The Court notes that “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s free speech or petition activity…If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, i.e., make a prima facie showing of facts which would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.” (Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907 [internal quotations and references to [Citation.] omitted, underline added.) The Court does not find that Plaintiffs have met this burden here. As discussed, Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion and thus do not address Defendants’ arguments concerning the litigation privilege.

As to the eighteenth cause of action for negligence, Plaintiffs note that “[t]he elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [internal quotations and emphasis omitted].) Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he allegations in the Complaint broadly assert that Defendants breached a duty of care by engaging in actions such as filing unlawful detainer actions and creating a hostile environment. However, Plaintiffs cannot present evidence necessary to establish a legal duty that Defendants have breached.” (Mot. at p. 23:20-23.) Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ motion and thus do not address this point or provide any evidence to support their negligence cause of action. As discussed, “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s free speech or petition activity…If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, i.e., make a prima facie showing of facts which would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.” (Kyle v. Carmon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 907 [internal quotations and references to [Citation.] omitted.) The Court does not find that Plaintiffs have met such burden here.

As to the twenty-third cause of action for slander of title, Plaintiffs cite to Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 263, where the Court of Appeal noted that “[s]lander of title, as recognized by the law, may be defined to be defamation of title to property, real or personal, by one who falsely and maliciously disparages the title thereto, and thereby causes the owner thereof some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Defendants assert that here, “[t]he Complaint does not contain specific factual allegations showing that Defendants acted with the requisite malice.” (Mot. at p. 32:12-13.) Indeed, the twenty-third cause of action does not appear to contain any allegations concerning malice. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, and thus do not dispute this point.

Lastly, as to the twenty-fourth cause of action for ejectment, Defendants cite to Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell (1860) 16 Cal. 221, 244, where the California Supreme Court noted, “[i]t seems to us that the substance of a complaint in ejectment under our practice is this: A owns certain real property, or some interest in it; the defendant has obtained possession of it, and withholds the possession from him. If the defendant’s holding rests upon any existing right, he should be compelled to show it affirmatively, in defense. The right of possession accompanies the ownership, and from the allegation of the fact of ownership--which is the allegation of seizin in ordinary language--the right of present possession is presumed as a matter of law.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Defendants assert that “for an ejectment action, Plaintiffs must allege a superior right to possession…Plaintiffs admit they were evicted by the Court’s judgment and are not in actual possession at the time of the alleged trespass.” (Mot. at p. 33:7-11.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant Michael successfully evicted Plaintiffs from these units.” (Compl., ¶ 17.) As discussed, Plaintiffs do not oppose the instant motion and thus do not dispute Defendants’ argument that the ejectment cause of action is deficient. Plaintiffs do not provide evidence supporting this cause of action.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a probability of prevailing on their first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth causes of action.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.”

In the motion, Defendants state that they “request that the Court order granting this motion also include a directive that Plaintiffs pay Defendants’ attorneys’ fees and costs in bringing this special motion to strike.” (Mot. at p. 37:8-10.) Because of the mixed outcome of the anti-SLAPP motion, the Court reserves its determination on the question of attorney’s fees pending a noticed motion on the issue of which party is the prevailing party and what attorney’s fees and costs are recoverable.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to the first through twenty-fourth causes of action of the Complaint. Defendants’ motion to strike is denied as to the twenty-fifth through twenty-eighth causes of action of the Complaint.

[1]Plaintiffs allege that “Michael Peddicord claimed in court that he was acting on behalf of the owner of both companies, then created a new company named Norwalk Electronics Supply Inc., corporate #5907924, on or about September 18, 2023, merely two days after the last hearing date. He asserted that all taxes had been paid and that Norwalk Electric Supply was restructured under William Appliance. This maneuver was clearly an attempt to circumvent the legal issues surrounding the original corporation.” (Compl., ¶ 34.) The Court notes that it is not entirely clear how these allegations relate to the alleged unlawful detainer actions.

[2]In the instant motion, Defendants argue that “[t]he trespass to land claim involves Defendants’ physical entry onto the Plaintiffs’ property and actions like posting legal documents and obstructing access. The posting of legal documents and related activities were connected to Defendants’ exercise of legal rights or actions taken in furtherance of their Unlawful Detainer (UD) claims. Therefore, this conduct constitutes protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e), especially when these actions were part of and related to judicial proceedings.” (Mot. at p. 16:6-11, emphasis omitted.) This is not disputed by Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the instant motion.

[3]The Court also notes that in Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281, the Court of Appeal found that “[t]he prosecution of an unlawful detainer action indisputably is protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16. The constitutional right to petition…includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

IGNACIO R. MONTES, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MICHAEL RAY PEDDICORD, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	24STCV15083
	Hearing Date:	November 12, 2024
	Hearing Time:	2:00 p.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS’ VERIFIED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CCP 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP), INCLUDING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,165.00

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50