Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV15825, Date: 2024-10-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV15825 Hearing Date: October 30, 2024 Dept: 50
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STEFAN RICHTER, individually,
and on behalf of Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California Private
Attorneys General Act, Plaintiff, vs. DELUXE MEDIA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: |
24STCV15825 |
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Hearing Date: |
October 30, 2024 |
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Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEMURRER |
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Background
On
June 24, 2024, Plaintiff Stefan Richter, individually, and on behalf of
Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act (“Plaintiff”)
filed the instant action against Defendant Deluxe Media, Inc. (“Defendant”). The
Complaint alleges one cause of action for violation of Labor
Code section 2699, et seq.
Defendant now moves for an order dismissing or staying all proceedings
in this action. In the alternative, Defendant demurs to the sole cause of
action of the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes.[1]
Request for Judicial
Notice
The Court grants Defendant’s request for
judicial notice as to “Exhibit 1” attached to the request.[2]
Discussion
First, Defendant asserts
that “the Court should apply the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction
to stay this PAGA action.” (Mot. at p. 4:17-18.)
Defendant cites to Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255-256, where the Court of
Appeal noted that “[l]ong before the Legislature enacted PAGA, California
recognized the judge-made doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Under
this doctrine, when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a
dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion
of the others. The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts
that might arise between courts if they were free to make
contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and
preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits. The rule is a
judicial rule of priority or preference and is not jurisdictional in the
traditional sense of the word, in that it does not divest a court, which otherwise
has jurisdiction of an action, of jurisdiction. Because it is a policy rule,
application of the rule depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies.”
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.)
The
Shaw Court noted that “[a]lthough the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement [Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c)], it has been
interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the
narrow grounds required for a statutory plea [in] abatement do not exist…Unlike
the statutory plea [in] abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of
action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions…If the court
exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the
necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not
identical does not preclude application of the rule. Moreover, the remedies
sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the
court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues
and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under
the pleadings.” ((Id. at p. 256 [internal quotations omitted].) “It has been said
that [a]n order of abatement issues as a matter of right where the conditions
for its issuance exist, whether the right to abate exists under statutory
abatement or the judicial rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Where the
exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule applies, the second action should be
stayed.” ((Id. at
pp. 256-257 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)
Defendant
notes that on April 22, 2024, the case Stefan Richter v. Deluxe Media Inc., et al., Case No. 24STCV09998 was filed in the Los
Angeles County Superior Court (herein, the “April 2024 Action”). (Defendant’s
RJN, Ex. 1.) Defendant’s counsel states that “the class action case entitled Richter
v. Deluxe Media Inc., filed by Plaintiff in the Superior Court of the State
of California, County of Los Angeles on April 22, 2024” was “removed by
Defendant to the United States District Court, Central District of California
On June 7, 2024, Case No. 2:24-cv-04835-MRA-MRW…” (Knotz Decl., ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff asserts that the
instant action and the April 2024 Action are “nearly identical.” (Mot. at p.
6:7.) The Plaintiff in the instant action is Stefan Richter, “individually, and
on behalf of Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys
General Act.” The Plaintiff in the April 2024 Action is Stefan Richter, individually,
and on behalf of other similarly situated employees. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. 1.)
The defendant named in both the instant action and the April 2024 Action is
Deluxe Media, Inc. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. 1.)
The April 2024 Action alleges
causes of action for (1) violation of Labor Code
sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 (failure to pay minimum wage); (2) violation
of Labor Code sections 510 and 1198 (unpaid
overtime); (3) violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and
512(a) (meal break violations); (4) violation of Labor
Code section 226.7 (rest break violations); (5) violation of Labor Code sections 204 and 210 (wages not timely paid
during employment); (6) violation of Labor Code section
226(a) (wage statement violations); (7) violation of Labor
Code sections 201, 202, and 203 (untimely final wages); (8) violation of Labor Code sections 2800 and 2802 (failure to reimburse necessary business expenses); (9) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.
(unfair and unlawful business practices); (10) violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(b)(2)(A) (failure to make proper
disclosure in violation of FCRA); and (11) violation of Civil Code section 1786, et seq. (failure to
make proper disclosure in violation of ICRAA). Similarly, in the instant
action, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein,
violates numerous sections of the California Labor Code, including, but not
limited to, the following:
(a) Violation of California Labor
Code sections 510 and 1198 for failure to pay overtime wages, as set forth
more fully below;
(b) Violation of California Labor
Code sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 for failure to pay minimum wages, as
set forth more fully below;
(c) Violation of California Labor
Code sections 226.7 and 512(a) for failure to provide legally required meal
periods, as set forth more fully below;
(d) Violation of California Labor
Code sections 226.7 and 512(a) for failure to pay required meal period
premiums, as set forth more fully below;
(e) Violation of California Labor
Code section 226.7 for failure to provide legally required rest periods, as
set forth more fully below;
(f) Violation of California Labor
Code section 226.7 for failure to pay required rest period premiums, as set
forth more fully below;
(g) Violation of California Labor
Code section 204 for failure to timely pay wages to Plaintiff and Aggrieved
Employees during employment, as set forth more fully before;
(h) Violation of California Labor
Code sections 201, 202, and 203 for failure to pay all wages at time of
discharge from employment, as set forth more fully below;
(i) Violation of California Labor
Code section 226(a) for failure to provide accurate wage statements to
Plaintiff and Aggrieved Employees, as set forth more fully below;
(j) Violation of California Labor
Code section 1174(d) for failure to keep complete and accurate payroll
records relating to Plaintiff and Aggrieved Employees, as set forth more fully
below; and
(k) Violation of California Labor
Code sections 2800 and 2802 for failure to reimburse Plaintiff and
Aggrieved Employees for necessary business-related expenses, as set forth more
fully below.” (Compl., ¶ 34.)[3]
Thus, it
appears that most all of the Labor Code violations alleged in the instant
action overlap with the Labor Code violations alleged in the April 2024 Action.
As noted by Defendant, Plaintiff does
not appear to dispute that the alleged Labor Code violations in the two actions
are the same.
Defendant
asserts that “[g]iven that
Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is entirely dependent on the Labor Code claims he
brought on behalf of himself and all hourly-paid/non-exempt current and former
California employees in the [April 2024 Action], the Court’s rulings with
respect to Defendant’s potential liability on any one of the wage and hour
issues presented in this PAGA Action could easily contradict the Central
District’s rulings in the [April 2024 Action].” (Mot. at p. 6:11-15.) Defendant
also asserts that “[t]he Court and the Parties would…waste time and resources
concurrently litigating virtually identical claims and issues in parallel
forums.” (Mot. at p. 6:19-20.)
In the opposition, Plaintiff
asserts that “the Court should not apply the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction
to stay this PAGA action.” (Opp’n at p. 4:1-2.) Plaintiff asserts that “the
federal court overseeing the [April 2024 Action] does not possess subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue in this PAGA Action brought on
behalf of the State of California…” (Opp’n at p. 5:4-6.) But Plaintiff does not
appear to cite any legal authority to support this proposition or provide any
further analysis regarding this assertion.
Plaintiff also
asserts that “[e]ven
assuming arguendo that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction may
apply here, contravening policies fundamental to the State of California
outweigh Defendant’s negligible and overwrought concerns. As noted above, the
California Legislature’s enactment of PAGA was designed to benefit the general
public…” (Opp’n at p. 6:4-7.) Plaintiff asserts that “the
real party at-issue in this PAGA Action is the State of California, unlike in
the [April 2024 Action] where the real parties at-issue are Plaintiff and
putative class members. Moreover, the relief sought in this PAGA Action—civil
penalties—are meant to primarily benefit the public, whereas the relief sought
in the Class Action is meant to benefit Plaintiff and the putative class
members in the form of wages and monies owed.” (Opp’n at p. 6:16-20.) Plaintiff
cites to Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 86, where
the California Supreme Court noted that “[t]he Legislature’s sole purpose in
enacting PAGA was to augment the limited enforcement capability of the [LWDA]
by empowering employees to enforce the Labor Code as representatives of the
Agency. Accordingly, a PAGA claim is an enforcement action between the LWDA and
the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government…Moreover,
civil penalties recovered on the state’s behalf are intended to remediate
present violations and deter future ones, not to redress employees’
injuries.” (Internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted.)
But as noted
by Defendant, “the rule of
exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of
parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent
actions.” ((Shaw v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 256.)
Moreover, in Shaw, the Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he trial court
recognized, as have we, that application of the exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction rule here did not vitiate the purposes for which PAGA was enacted.
It additionally recognized that resolution of this case would duplicate court
efforts, waste resources, and potentially produce divergent results. The trial
court could reasonably conclude that the policies giving rise to the exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction rule were not outweighed by those that drove PAGA’s
enactment.” (Id. at p. 262.)[4]
The Shaw Court further noted that “[w]hile the Legislature sought to
maximize code enforcement and deter future violations, we do not discern an
intent in PAGA to waste judicial resources, encourage a multiplicity of
duplicative suits, and prohibit courts from staying suits that might otherwise
lead to inconsistent results. PAGA and the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction
rule can rationally coexist, and so they must.” (Id.
at p. 260.)
In the opposition, Plaintiff
also argues that “[t]o illustrate another example showing why the doctrine of
exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is inapplicable here: a potential denial of
certification of the class in the [April 2024 Action] if it were found to lack
commonality and/or even typicality, would not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing
– let alone have any effect on – this PAGA Action.” (Opp’n at p. 7:6-9.) The
Court does not see how this is relevant to the exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction analysis here. As discussed, “[t]he rule is based upon the public
policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were
free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same
controversy and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Shaw
v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees
with Defendant that a stay is warranted, particularly to avoid inconsistent
rulings. Thus, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to stay the instant action “pending
resolution of” the April 2024 Action. (Mot. at p. 4:13).[5]
Conclusion
Based
on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to stay is granted.
The
Court sets a status conference on ___________________ at 10:00 a.m. in Dept.
50. The parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the
April 2024 Action five court days prior to the status conference, with a
courtesy copy delivered directly to Department 50.¿¿
Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Order.
DATED: October 30, 2024 ________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]As an initial
matter, Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s memorandum of points and authorities
in support of the motion exceeds the applicable page number limit set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113, subdivision (d).
This provision provides, inter alia, that “[e]xcept in a summary
judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum
may exceed 15 pages.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
3.1113, subd. (d).) Defendant’s memorandum of points and authorities in
support of the motion is 16 pages. Accordingly, the Court disregards the
sixteenth page of Defendant’s memorandum. The Court declines to reject
Defendant’s motion in its entirety, as Plaintiff requests.
[2]The Court notes
that Defendant’s RJN states that Exhibit 1 is the “Complaint in Richter v.
Deluxe Media Inc., Case No. 2:24-cv-04835-MRA-MRW, currently pending in the
United States District Court, Central District of California.” However, Exhibit
1 to Defendant’s RJN shows a Complaint captioned Stefan Richter v. Deluxe
Media Inc., et al., Case No. 24STCV09989, filed in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court.
[3]Defendant asserts
that “[n]otably, the only claim in the PAGA Complaint that is not in the Class
Action Complaint is the claim for failure to keep accurate payroll records
under Labor Code Section 1174(d), a claim that is
entirely derivative of the underlying Labor Code violations (e.g., failure to
provide accurate records of hours worked and meal periods) and thus does not
raise any new issues of law or fact.” (Mot. at p. 4:2-5, emphasis omitted.) Defendant
cites to paragraph 86 of the Complaint in the instant action, which alleges
that “Defendants intentionally and willfully failed to keep accurate and
complete payroll records showing the hours worked daily and the wages paid to
Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees.” (Compl., ¶ 86.)
[4]In Shaw, “Petitioners
brought a representative suit under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004 (PAGA)…They conceded that their suit arises from the same facts and
theories as another PAGA action pending in Los Angeles. While their petition
for judicial coordination…with the Los Angeles PAGA suit was pending, the trial
court in this case stayed petitioners’ suit. After the petition for
coordination was denied, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to lift the
stay, concluding that the stay was warranted under the doctrine of exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction.” (Shaw v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 251.) The Court of Appeal
found that “the trial court did not err in applying the exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction rule to this dispute.” (Ibid.)
[5]In light of the
foregoing, the Court need not and does not address Defendant’s remaining
alternative arguments in the motion.