Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV17244, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV17244    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff Jie Li (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against Defendants Fredy Perez Pacheco (“Pacheco”), Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), and Does 1 through 50 for motor vehicle and general negligence.  The Complaint alleges that on August 19, 2022, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Defendant Pacheco, who was acting in the course and scope of his agency/employment for Defendant Uber.  Pacheco crashed into another vehicle, causing Plaintiff to suffer personal injuries and damages.  On February 6, 2025, the Court dismissed Does 1 through 50 with prejudice.

On February 14, 2025, Defendant Uber filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Motion”).  On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition and on June 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Reply.  The Court, in its discretion, considers the late-filed Reply.  ((Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d).)

Motion to Compel Arbitration

A.    Legal Standard

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by prepondernace of evidence.  (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.)  It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions.  (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause.  (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  Subsequently, the moving party must establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.  (Ibid.)  The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination.  (Ibid.)  “California law, ‘like [federal law], reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’”  (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2, generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.  If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed.  ((Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to any contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce which contains an arbitration clause.  (Wolls v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197, 211.)  Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration provisions shall be enforced, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Ibid.)  A state court may refuse to enforce an arbitration clause on the basis of generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.  (Ibid.)  A state court, however, may not defeat an arbitration clause by applying state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.  (Ibid.)

For the FAA to apply, a contract must involve interstate commerce. (Ibid.)  When it applies, the FAA preempts any state law rule that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.  ((Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.)  A party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects interstate commerce, and the failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable.  ((Ibid.)  Evidence must be presented, in the form of declarations or other evidence, that establishes that the contract affects interstate commerce.  (Ibid.)  “[S]ince arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.”  ((Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

B.    Arguments

a.     Motion

Defendant Uber moves for a Court order compelling the arbitration of the instant dispute.  Defendant also requests an order dismissing or staying the action pending arbitration.

In support of its Motion, Defendant submits the declaration of Chenshan Yu, a Data Scientist employed by Defendant Uber since 2022.  Yu declares that he has personal knowledge and experience with Uber’s business and platforms, databases and records, user data, and terms of use.  (Yu Decl., ¶ 3.)  Uber is a technology company that uses its proprietary technology to develop and maintain platforms such as Uber Rides, which connects people with various transportation services, and Uber Eats, which connects people with delivery services of meals, groceries, household items and goods.  (Id. at ¶ 4.)  According to Yu, to use Uber’s platforms, a user must register for an account and agree to the Terms of Use (“Terms”).  (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.)  Uber maintains electronic records in its database regarding how each user registers for an account and manifests consent to its Terms, including the version of Terms in effect at the time of consent.  (Id. at ¶ 6.)  This information is stored in a secure manner and cannot be accessed by unauthorized users.  (Ibid.)  Authorized personnel, such as Yu, may access the information but cannot modify it.  (Ibid.)

On December 23, 2024, Yu searched Uber’s database by entering Plaintiff Li’s phone number, located her unique identifying number, and found that Plaintiff signed up for Uber’s services on August 11, 2022.  (Id. at ¶ 7, Ex. A.)  The Terms applicable at this time went into effect on April 4, 2022, and contained an Arbitration Agreement.  (Id. at ¶ 7, Exs. A-B.)  Yu also determined that on January 20, 2023, Plaintiff was presented with a blocking pop-up screen on the Uber application informing her regarding updated Terms and stating in large type “We encourage you to read our Updated Terms in full.”  (Id. at ¶ 8.)  The “Terms of Use” and “Privacy Notice” were displayed underlined and in bright blue text with a hyperlink.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the pop-up screen expressly stated: “By checking the box, I have reviewed and agreed to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice” and “I am at least 18 years of age.”  (Ibid.)  Until the user checked the box and the “Confirm” button at the bottom of the screen, the user was precluded from using the Uber application.  (Id. at ¶ 9, Ex. C.)  Once the user did click on the “Confirm” button, “a record of this consent was simultaneously and electronically captured, recorded, maintained, safeguarded, and stored in the regular course of Uber’s business” and linked to the user’s unique identifier associated with his or her account.  (Id. at ¶ 10.)  Yu searched the database with Plaintiff’s unique identifier and located her consent to the January 17, 2023, Terms through the process described above.  (Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. A.)  The Terms that went into effect on January 17, 2023, are attached to Yu’s declaration and contain an Arbitration Agreement.  (Id. at ¶ 12, Ex. D.)  After providing consent to these Terms, Plaintiff continued to access Uber’s services through the application, as demonstrated by her trip and order history.  (Id., Ex. E.)

Based on the evidence presented above, Defendant argues that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate claims against Uber by consenting to the April 4, 2022, and the January 17, 2023, Terms of Use, both of which contained conspicuous arbitration provisions.  Moreover, the parties agreed that the Federal Arbitration Act would govern interpretation and enforcement of dispute resolution procedures, as set forth in the Arbitration Agreement.  (Yu Decl., Ex. D.)  The parties clearly intended the FAA to apply to the instant case, as it is related to internet commerce.  (Motion, p. 9.)  Each of the claims set forth in the Complaint fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement that governs any disputes, claims, or controversies related to the Terms of Use, Plaintiff’s access to Uber services, or incidents resulting in personal injuries.  (Id. at pp. 7-8.)  Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Plaintiff would also be estopped from avoiding the Arbitration Agreement given that she continued to benefit from use of the Uber application.  (Id. at p. 13.)

Defendant also argues that the parties agreed that the arbitrator would determine arbitrability of any dispute as there is an express delegation clause in the Arbitration Agreement and reference to Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) rules, which delegates the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  (Motion, p. 14; Yu Decl, Ex. D.)  Thus, potential questions regarding arbitrability, waiver, and unconscionability should not be decided by the Court.  (Motion, pp. 15-16.)

b.     Opposition

            First, Plaintiff argues that she did not agree to enter into an arbitration agreement with Defendant Uber.  For app-based or online contracts, the arbitration terms must be clear and conspicuous such that a reasonably prudent user would be put on sufficient notice of the terms and manifest consent.  Here, Plaintiff was not actually informed that she was giving up her right to a jury trial as the checkbox did not indicate that the link contained an arbitration agreement.  Uber’s Terms and Conditions are “extensive and far reaching, touching on a wide variety of topics” that can be amended without notice to the users who have already agreed to them.  (Opposition, p. 6.)  Even if the user does detect a change, there is no way for the user to contest any of the changes, which become automatically binding.

            Second, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable.  Plaintiff had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the Agreement and did not even know what arbitration is.  (Li Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)  Plaintiff not only lacked negotiating power but also did not have reasonable alternatives in the market, further demonstrating her lack of bargaining power.

            Third, Defendant manifested waiver of its right to arbitration through its conduct.  Plaintiff filed her Complaint on July 11, 2024.  On November 18, 2024, Defendant sent Plaintiff’s counsel a letter requesting that Uber be dismissed from the lawsuit on the grounds that Defendant Pacheco was an independent contractor.  (Mukhina Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.)  The letter mentioned arbitration only in the last paragraph.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff rejected Uber’s dismissal request, so on December 2, 2024, Defendant filed an Answer with 20 affirmative defenses, listing arbitration as the last one.  (Id. at ¶ 5, Ex. B.)  On December 19, 2024, Defendant posted jury fees, requested jury trial in its case management statement, and did not check any of the boxes in Section 10(c) of the case management statement requiring the parties to identify ADR processes they are willing to participate in.  (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7, Exs. C-D.)  Moreover, Defendant delayed the filing of the instant motion by six months and did not manifest a clear intent to proceed with arbitration.

c.      Reply

            In its Reply, Defendant argues that the claims asserted in the Complaint are exactly the type of claims contemplated by the Arbitration Agreement and fall squarely within the scope of the Agreement.  Defendant reiterates that any threshold questions of arbitrability must be decided by the arbitrator, as agreed by the parties.  Thus, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding arbitrability, waiver, and unconscionability should not be decided by the Court.

            Defendant also argues that the Arbitration Agreement is not procedurally unconscionable because it is not oppressive or surprising.  Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to the Terms and continued to take advantage of Uber’s services.  She could have declined those terms and relied on alternative means of transportation, which demonstrates that she did have a meaningful choice.  Plaintiff offers no evidence that she was surprised by the Arbitration Agreement.  Moreover, the Agreement was presented to Plaintiff multiple times during the initial sign-up process and with an in-app blocking pop-up screen when the Terms were updated.  Plaintiff also had an unlimited amount of time to review the Terms and no pressure to agree to those terms.  The Arbitration Agreement was written in plain English, conspicuously displayed, and referenced on the very first page of the Terms in bold, capitalized letters.  (Yu Decl., Ex. D Section 1.)  Plaintiff does not argue that the brief Agreement was either difficult to read or that she was uneducated or inexperienced.  Defendant also argues that the Agreement is not substantively unconscionable and comports with the Armendariz requirements.  (Reply, pp. 5-6.)  However, Plaintiff does not make any claims regarding substantive unconscionability.

            Furthermore, Uber promptly moved to compel arbitration.  Defendant served Plaintiff with a letter requesting dismissal or stipulation to arbitration on November 18, 2024.  Subsequently, Uber filed an Answer on December 2, 2024.  When Plaintiff served Uber with discovery requests, it objected to these requests on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to binding arbitration.  Less than three months after making an appearance in the case, Uber filed the instant Motion following Plaintiff’s refusal to stipulate to arbitration.  In its Case Management Statement, Section 15, Uber outlined its intention to file a motion to compel arbitration.

            Given the reasons outlined above and the strong public policy favoring arbitration of disputes, Defendant argues that the instant dispute should be subject to arbitration.

C.    Analysis

Having reviewed the moving papers, opposition, and reply, the Court makes the following findings.

a.     Existence of Agreement

Defendant has met its initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.  Upon signing up for the Uber application on August 11, 2022, Plaintiff consented to the April 4, 2022, Terms of Use, and subsequently consented to the updated Terms of Use on January 20, 2023, both of which contained conspicuous arbitration provisions.  Clickwrap agreements are those in which website users must click on an “I agree” box after being presented with a link to the terms and conditions of use.  ((Herzog v. Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1296.)  Such agreements are generally enforceable if they feature reasonably conspicuous terms and an unambiguous manifestation of assent.  ((Ibid.)  Although Plaintiff argues that the terms are not clear and conspicuous, upon review of the Agreement, the Court finds that the text is large, in bold, and on the second page of the Agreement.

Here, the Arbitration Agreement states in pertinent part that the parties agree to submit to arbitration:

any dispute, claim, or controversy in any way arising out of or relating to (i) these Terms and prior versions of these Terms, or the existence, breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation, scope, waiver, or validity thereof; (ii) your access to or use of the Services at any time; (iii) incidents or accidents resulting in personal injury to you or anyone else that you allege occurred in connection with your use of the Services (including, but not limited to, your use of the Uber Marketplace Platform or the driver version of the Uber App), regardless whether the dispute, claim, or controversy occurred or accrued before or after the date you agreed to the Terms, and regardless whether you allege that the personal injury was experienced by you or anyone else; and (iv) your relationship with Uber, will be settled by binding individual arbitration between you and Uber, and not in a court of law.

(Yu Decl., Exs. B, D.)  Thus, Defendant demonstrates that the personal injury claims asserted in the Complaint fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.  The Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.

b.     Controlling Law

The Court also finds that Uber has shown that the Arbitration Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  The Arbitration Agreement expressly states:

…the parties agree and acknowledge that this Arbitration Agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (“FAA”), will govern its interpretation and enforcement and proceedings pursuant thereto. It is the intent of the parties to be bound by the provisions of the FAA for all purposes, including, but not limited to, interpretation, implementation, enforcement, and administration of this Arbitration Agreement, and that the FAA and the applicable arbitration provider’s rules shall preempt all state laws to the fullest extent permitted by law.

(Yu Decl., Exs. B, D.)  Moreover, Uber argues that the dispute relates to internet commerce.  ((United States v. Sutcliffe (9th Cir. 2007) 505 F.3d 944, 953 [“the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce” (citations and quotations omitted)].)  Plaintiff does not dispute that the FAA governs.

            Thus, the Court finds that the FAA applies.

c.      Stipulation to Arbitrate

Defendant has presented proof of attempting to stipulate to arbitration on November 18, 2024, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2, which requires that the party seeking to compel arbitration “plead and prove a prior demand for arbitration under the parties’ arbitration agreement and a refusal to arbitrate under the agreement.”  ((Mansouri v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 633, 640); Civ. Proc. Code, § 1281.2.)  However, Plaintiff has refused to agree to arbitration of her claims against Uber.

d. Delegation of Arbitrability

“‘[C]ourts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide ... disputes about ‘arbitrability,’ ... such as ‘whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,’ or ‘whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy.’”  ((Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 891 [Citations omitted].)  “However, ‘parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.””  (Ibid. (Citations omitted))

“When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract.”  ((Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 68.)  “In those circumstances, a court possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue.”  ((Ibid.)  However, “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]”’ evidence that they did so.  ((First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944.)  The “clear and unmistakable” test reflects a “heightened standard of proof” that reverses the typical presumption in favor of the arbitration of disputes.  (Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal. App. 5th at 892.)

Here, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states:

Only an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including without limitation any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable. An arbitrator shall also have exclusive authority to resolve all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether the Terms are applicable, unconscionable, or illusory and any defense to arbitration, including without limitation waiver, delay, laches, or estoppel.

(Yu Decl., Exs. B, D.)  “If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole—even if it applies equally to the delegation clause - the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable.” (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1559–560.)

Thus, the Court lacks the authority to make any determination on the issue of arbitrability, including whether the agreement is unconscionable or whether Defendant waived its right to arbitrate, as these issues must be determined by the arbitrator.

Accordingly, Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Plaintiff Li and Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. ONLY.  The case is ordered STAYED pending arbitration. The Court sets an arbitration status conference on June 11, 2026 at 10 a.m. in Dept. 50.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Order.¿

DATED:  June 11, 2025                                 ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court