Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case Number: 24STCV18551, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff The Huntington National Bank (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on July 25, 2024 against Defendants Renovo Stone, Inc. and Eduardo Guerrero (jointly, “Defendants”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) common count (money lent), and (3) “claim and delivery/replevin.”

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that “Renovo and Engs Commercial Finance Co. (‘Engs’) entered into a loan agreement on or about October 22, 2019, which was amended by written amendments dated May 26, 2020 and August 19, 2020 (the ‘Loan’).” (Compl., ¶ 5.) “The Loan is for the finance of, and provides for a security interest in, one Poseidon TRex S Single Table, serial number TRSST19-12-726, with all accessories, attachments, and components (the ‘Equipment’).” (Compl., ¶ 7.) “Guerrero entered into a personal guaranty agreement for the Loan on or about October 22, 2019 (the ‘Guaranty’).” (Compl., ¶ 6.) “Huntington is the assignee of the Loan and security interest.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) “Huntington declared a default on the Loan due to Renovo’s breach of the Loan and Huntington made demand for repayment by Renovo pursuant to the Loan terms.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that “Renovo and Guerrero owe $174,142.75 as of July 24, 2024 due to the breach of the Loan and Guaranty, plus interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.” (Compl., ¶ 12.)

On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Application for Writ of Possession. The Application is unopposed.

“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this chapter for a writ of possession by filing a written application for the writ with the court in which the action is brought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (a).) “Except as otherwise provided in [Code of Civil Procedure section 512.020], no writ shall be issued under this chapter except after a hearing on a noticed motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.020, subd. (a).)

“Prior to the hearing required by subdivision (a) of Section 512.020, the defendant shall be served with all of the following: (1) A copy of the summons and complaint. (2) A Notice of Application and Hearing. (3) A copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.030, subd. (a).)

On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed proofs of service indicating that the summons and Complaint were served on Defendants by substituted service on August 11, 2024. In addition, On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating that certain documents were served on Defendants, including, inter alia, a “Renewed Application for Writ of Possession,” a “Notice of Renewed Application for Writ of Possession and Hearing,” a “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Renewed Application for Writ of Possession,” and the declarations of Will Wang and Bryan Punzel.

(1) A showing of the basis of the plaintiff’s claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed. If the basis of the plaintiff’s claim is a written instrument, a copy of the instrument shall be attached.

(2) A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention.

(4) A statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there.

(5) A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure.”

The requirements of Code of civil Procedure section 512.010, subdivision (b) “may be satisfied by one or more affidavits filed with the application.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (c).) “At the hearing, a writ of possession shall issue if both of the following are found: (1) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the plaintiff’s claim to possession of the property. (2) The undertaking requirements of Section 515.010 are satisfied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.060, subd. (a).)[1] “No writ directing the levying officer to enter a private place to take possession of any property shall be issued unless the plaintiff has established that there is probable cause to believe that the property is located there.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.060, subd. (b).)

Here, Plaintiff’s Application for Writ of Possession indicates that the claimed property is a “Poseidon T-Rex S Single Table CNC Fabrication Center, with all accessories, attachments, and components, Serial Number TRSST19-12-726.” (Application, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Bryan Punzel in support of the Application. Mr. Punzel states that Plaintiff “is the assignee of a Commercial Finance Agreement (the ‘Loan’ or ‘Agreement’) entered into between Renovo Stone Inc. (‘Renovo’) and Engs Commercial Finance Co. (‘Engs’) on or about October 22, 2019.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) A copy of the Loan is attached as Exhibit 1 to Mr. Punzel’s declaration. (Punzel Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) “The Loan was amended twice, on May 26, 2020 and on August 19, 2020.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 3, Exs. 2-3.) “The Loan is for the finance of, and provides for a security interest in, one Poseidon T-Rex S Single Table, with all accessories, attachments, and components (the ‘Equipment’).” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 5.) Mr. Punzel states that “Eduardo Guerrero (‘Guerrero’) is the president and owner of Renovo. Guerrero entered into a personal guaranty agreement for the Loan on or about October 22, 2019 (the ‘Guaranty’).” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 4.) A copy of the Guaranty is attached as Exhibit 4 to Mr. Punzel’s declaration. (Punzel Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 4.)

Mr. Punzel states that “Engs perfected its security interest in the Equipment by filing a UCC-1 Financing Statement with the California Secretary of State, File No. 197742283093 on October 23, 2019.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 5.) Mr. Punzel further states that “[a]s the assignee of the Loan, Huntington is also the assignee of the security interest.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff asserts that “because Huntington is the assignee of the security interest perfected by its predecessor Engs, Huntington is entitled to possession of the Equipment once Renovo enters into default on the Loan.” (Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities at p. 3:9-11.) Plaintiff cites to paragraph 15 of the subject Loan, which provides in part as follows:

“Upon Default and at any time thereafter, at Our election, We may (a) accelerate the unpaid balance due hereunder, without protest, presentment, demand or notice (including but not limited to notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration), all of which You waive, and require that You pay, as reasonable liquidated damages for loss of bargain, the ‘Accelerated Balance’ (b) require that You deliver to Us the Collateral; (c) repossess the Collateral or disable the Collateral without court order and You will not make any claims against Us for damages or trespass or any other reason; (d) sell the Collateral by public or private sale, retain the Collateral in full or partial satisfaction of Your obligations hereunder, or otherwise dispose of the Collateral in any manner We choose, free and clear of any of Your claims or rights; (e) sue to enforce Your performance hereof; (f) recover interest on the unpaid balance of Creditor’s Loss plus any other amounts recoverable hereunder from the date it becomes payable until fully paid at the rate of the lesser of 12% per annum or the highest rate permitted by law, and/or (g) pursue any right or remedy available to Us at law, or in equity, including any rights or remedies under the UCC.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 15.)

Paragraph 1 of the subject Loan lists a “Collateral Description” of “POSEIDON T- REX S SINGLE TABLE (New)… WITH ALL ACCESSORIES, ATTACHMENTS AND COMPONENTS.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ¶ 1.)

Mr. Punzel states that “Renovo and Guerrero repeatedly missed payments on the Loan. Eventually, Huntington declared a default on the Loan due to Renovo’s breach of the Loan and made demand for repayment by Renovo pursuant to the Loan terms.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 8.) “Huntington gave notice to Guerrero of Renovo’s default on the Loan and Guerrero’s obligations under the Guaranty. On January 9, 2024, Huntington sent Guerrero a letter informing him of such default and demanding payment on the Loan.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 6.) “On June 24, 2024, Huntington sent Guerrero another letter – this time through its counsel of record – again demanding payment upon the defaulted Loan, and also demanding that the Equipment be returned to Huntington.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 7.) Mr. Punzel states that “[t]o date, neither Renovo nor Guerrero has responded to either letter or engaged in any communications with Huntington. Nor has Renovo returned the Equipment to Huntington.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 11.) Mr. Punzel states that “[a]s of October 31, 2024, Renovo and Guerrero owe $179,436.52 under the Loan and Guaranty, exclusive of interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 11.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown “the basis of the plaintiff’s claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b)(1).) Plaintiff also appears to show that “the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant…the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b)(2).) As discussed, Mr. Punzel states that as of the date of his declaration, “neither Renovo nor Guerrero has responded to either letter or engaged in any communications with Huntington. Nor has Renovo returned the Equipment to Huntington.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff includes “[a] particular description of the property and a statement of its value.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b)(3).) As discussed above, Mr. Punzel states that “[t]he Loan is for the finance of, and provides for a security interest in, one Poseidon T-Rex S Single Table, with all accessories, attachments, and components (the ‘Equipment’).” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 5.)

Mr. Punzel states that “[t]he Asset Management Team’s estimate of the current market value of the Equipment is $70,000.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff has also provided “[a] statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b)(5).)

Specifically, Mr. Punzel states that “I have reason to believe that the Equipment is currently located at 1401 South Alameda Street, Compton, California 90220. This was the location of the Equipment as stated in Paragraph 11 of the original Loan (see page 3 of 6 in Exhibit 1). Moreover, prior to the execution of the Second Amendment to the Loan, Guerrero filled out an online request form seeking a deferment of Loan payments (see pages 6 and 7 of Exhibit 3). In this form, Guerrero stated that the ‘Current Business Address’ was 1401 South Alameda Street, Compton, California 90220. Additionally, a Google search of 1401 South Alameda Street, Compton, California 90220 reveals that a building with a logo that reads ‘RS Renovo Stone’ as well as the word ‘Countertops’ exists at this address. This building appears big enough to hold the Equipment, which is large, bulky, and difficult to move. A true and correct copy of a web printout of this Google search is attached hereto as Exhibit 8 and incorporated herein by reference. For these reasons, probable cause exists for the Equipment to be located at 1401 South Alameda Street, Compton, California 90220.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 12.) Mr. Punzel also states that “[a]lternatively, the Equipment could also be located at 2749 South Orange Drive, Los Angeles, California 90016. This is Renovo’s registered business address as stated in its most recently filed Statement of Information on the California Secretary of State website. A true and correct copy of this Statement of Information is attached hereto as Exhibit 9 and incorporated herein by reference.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 13.) In addition, Mr. Punzel states that “[f]inally, it is possible that the Equipment could be located at 5313 South Manhattan Pl., Los Angeles, California 90062. This is Guerrero’s current personal address, according to a People Search report generated by Huntington’s counsel. A true and correct copy of the People Search report of Guerrero is attached hereto as Exhibit 10 and incorporated herein by reference.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 14.)

Lastly, Plaintiff provides “[a] statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b)(5).) Mr. Punzel states that “[t]he Equipment has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of Huntington.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 17.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff appears to have established the probable validity of Plaintiff’s claim to possession of the subject property.

As set forth above, “[a]t the hearing, a writ of possession shall issue if both of the following are found: (1) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the plaintiff’s claim to possession of the property. (2) The undertaking requirements of Section 515.010 are satisfied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.060, subd. (a).

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010, subdivision (a), “[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall not issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of possession until the plaintiff has filed an undertaking with the court. The undertaking shall provide that the sureties are bound to the defendant for the return of the property to the defendant, if return of the property is ordered, and for the payment to the defendant of any sum recovered against the plaintiff. The undertaking shall be in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant’s interest in the property or in a greater amount. The value of the defendant’s interest in the property is determined by the market value of the property less the amount due and owing on any conditional sales contract or security agreement and all liens and encumbrances on the property, and any other factors necessary to determine the defendant’s interest in the property.” Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010, subdivision (b), “[i]f the court finds that the defendant has no interest in the property, the court shall waive the requirement of the plaintiff’s undertaking and shall include in the order for issuance of the writ the amount of the defendant’s undertaking sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 515.020.”

Plaintiff asserts that a bond is not required under Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010. In his supporting declaration, Mr. Punzel states that “[b]ond is not required under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 515.010 because Renovo and Guerrero do not have an interest in the Equipment.” (Punzel Decl., ¶ 16.) As discussed, the instant Application is unopposed. Thus, Defendants do not dispute that they do not have an interest in the subject equipment. In addition, Mr. Punzel states that “the current market value of the Equipment is $70,000,” and that “[a]s of October 31, 2024, Renovo and Guerrero owe $179,436.52 under the Loan and Guaranty, exclusive of interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.” (Punzel Decl., ¶¶ 11, 16.) In light of the foregoing, Defendants appear to have no interest in the subject property, and the Court waives the requirement of Plaintiff’s undertaking.

Lastly, in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Application, Plaintiff asserts that “the Court should issue a turnover order.” (Mot. at p. 5:13.) Plaintiff cites to

Code of Civil Procedure section 512.070, which provides that “[i]f a writ of possession is issued, the court may also issue an order directing the defendant to transfer possession of the property to the plaintiff. Such order shall contain a notice to the defendant that failure to turn over possession of such property to plaintiff may subject the defendant to being held in contempt of court.” The Court notes that Item 5(g) of Plaintiff’s Order for Writ of Possession (Form CD-120) is checked and provides, inter alia, that “Renovo Stone, Inc.; Eduardo Guerrero; and DOES 1-10, inclusive is ordered to transfer possession of the property described in item 3c to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.070.).” Form CD-120 also provides, “NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: Failure to comply with an order of the court to turn over possession of such property to the plaintiff may subject you to being held in contempt of court.” (Form CD-120, p. 2.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s instant Application for Writ of Possession is granted. Plaintiff shall file and serve a proposed order within 5 days of the date of this Order in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010, subdivision (b), as discussed above.

[1]“A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 511.090.)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50