Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV20057, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV20057    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

            Background

Plaintiff David Bozanich (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment action on August 8, 2024, against Defendant City of Los Angeles (the “City”) and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, asserting one cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Plaintiff was employed as an attorney at the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office (the “Office”). (Compl., ¶ 12.) From 2021 to 2022, he disclosed to relevant authorities the Office’s noncompliance with state and federal requirements for handling Criminal Offender Record Information. (Compl., ¶ 18.) In retaliation against Plaintiff for making those complaints, the City transferred him from his position as the Director of Prosecution Technology and Evidence.com to the position of line deputy. (Compl., ¶¶ 21, 22.) Plaintiff’s new position was a demotion and a form of retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. (Compl., ¶¶ 24-28, 31.)

The City now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff’s retaliation claim to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Association (the “Association”). Plaintiff opposes.  

Judicial Notice

On January 6, 2025, the City filed a request for judicial notice of several documents.

The Court denies the request for judicial notice of Section 201 of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles as it is not relevant, and the City fails to mention it in its papers.

The request for judicial notice of all other documents is granted. (Evid. Code., § 452, subd. (c) [stating that a court may take judicial notice of court records]; Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 518 [“Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.’ (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Official acts include records, reports and orders of administrative agencies”].)

Legal Standard

In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability, etc.). (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414; Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)

Generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.)

“California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) “This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts “involving interstate commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 2, et seq.; Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) The analysis under California law and the FAA is the same. “Thus, under both the FAA and California law, ‘arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” (Higgins v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at 1247 (citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 98).)

Discussion

The City asserts that Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 is subject to the grievance-arbitration procedure set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), entered on March 10, 2020, and amended on February 1, 2021, between the City and the Association. The MOU defines a grievance “as a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this written MOU, or departmental rules and regulations governing personnel practices, or working conditions applicable to employees covered by this MOU.” (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit 3, Attachment 2 (the MOU), p. 26.) The MOU then outlines a multi-step procedure for resolving those grievances. The procedure begins with issue identification and information discussion (Step 1), then management review (Step 2) if the issue is not resolved in Step 1, followed by City Attorney review (Step 3) if Step 2 is unsuccessful, and, finally, Arbitration (Step 4) if the issue remains unresolved. (MOU, Article 20.)

Defense counsel testifies that Plaintiff followed the grievance procedure and, on October 16, 2023, demanded arbitration. (Amended Declaration of Shanise Black (“Black Decl.”), ¶¶ 15, 16; RJN, Exhibit 3.) The parties have also selected an arbitrator in accordance with the MOU. (Black Decl., ¶ 19.)

In his opposition, Plaintiff informs the Court that the arbitration has already taken place, and that the parties are only waiting for the arbitrator’s decision. The City does not deny this fact in its reply.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it proper to grant the request to stay the proceedings pending completion of arbitration. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 141 [“‘[A] court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice.’ [Citation]”].) The Court finds it unnecessary to consider, at this time, the parties’ arguments regarding whether the arbitrator’s decision shall have a collateral estoppel effect in this case.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of Los Angeles’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is granted in part. The request to compel arbitration is denied without prejudice as either moot or premature. The request to stay proceedings pending completion of arbitration is granted.

The Court orders that the entire action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff’s arbitrable claims.

The Court sets an arbitration completion status conference on ________________, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. The arbitrating parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the arbitration by ________________, 2025, with a courtesy copy delivered directly to Dept. 50.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  March 21, 2025                             

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court