Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV20549, Date: 2025-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV20549    Hearing Date: March 12, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Otis King (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Irene De Bari (individually and as Trustee of the Winnie Family Trust) (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 100, inclusive.

The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) deceit, (2) intentional misrepresentation, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) breach of contract, (5) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (6) negligent breach of implied covenant of habitability, (7) intentional breach of implied covenant of habitability, (8) nuisance (negligent), (9) nuisance (intentional), (10) breach of implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, (11) negligent violation of statutory duty, (12) intentional violation of statutory duty, and (13) declaratory relief.

Defendant now demurs to the first, second, third, sixth, seventh, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action, and moves to strike portions of the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and motion to strike.  

Demurrer

A.    Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” ((C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

B.    Meet and Confer

The Court finds Defendant has satisfied the meet and confer requirement for the demurrer. (Demurrer, Declaration of Lindsey M. Hansen, ¶ 5 [testifying the parties’ counsel met and conferred telephonically but could not resolve the issues raised in the demurrer].)

C.    Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges the following: Defendant is the owner of the real property located at 2425 Meadow Valley Terrace, Los Angeles, California (the “Property”). (Compl., ¶ 7.) On or about August 6, 2020, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written lease agreement for the Property, with Plaintiff agreeing to pay $1,700 per month. (Compl., ¶ 8; Exh. A – a copy of the lease.) “Initially, Plaintiff had problems with pests, including cockroaches, rats and mice, along with various plumbing issues, lack of windows or screens, most of which was not resolved by the Landlord during the term of the tenancy.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) “Defendants then repeatedly harassed the Plaintiff about rental increases, and required [Plaintiff] to pay for the necessary repairs to the property from such things as plumbing issues, even when the Property was in substandard conditions at all times.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) “When it was finally learned in 2023 that the unit was illegal and that there had never been a Certificate of Occupancy for the unit, Plaintiff sought recovery of all of his rental payments wrongfully collected by the Defendant; Defendant refused to reimburse the Plaintiff for these monies, thus, necessitating the filing of this action.” (Compl., ¶ 11.)

D.    First Cause of Action for Deceit

Defendant demurs to the first cause of action asserting that it is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for deceit because it does not specify what type of deceit is at issue, and lacks the requisite specificity.  

Plaintiff alleges the following in the first cause of action: Defendant falsely represented that she was legally allowed to lease the property to Plaintiff, and that she would properly maintain the property in habitable and functional conditions. (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 16.) Defendant made those misrepresentations intending Plaintiff to rely on them to sign the lease, move into the property, pay the security deposit, and pay rent each month. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff relied on those representations to his detriment by executing the lease, moving into the Property, paying the security deposition, and paying the rent. (Compl., ¶ 18.)

“Under Civil Code section 1709, one is liable for fraudulent deceit if he deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk.... (Civ. Code, § 1709.)” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1059–1060 (“Beckwith”) [internal quotations omitted].) Deceit for the purposes of Civil Code section 1709 means “[a] promise, made without any intention of performing it. (Civ. Code, § 1710.)” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 [internal quotations omitted].) “The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. [Citations.] [Citation.] Each element must be alleged with particularity.” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 [internal quotations omitted].)

Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the Court does not find the first cause of action uncertain. “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, n. 3.) Here, the first cause of action is not so uncertain that the Defendant cannot reasonably respond.

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege the element of misrepresentation. To allege that element, a “complaint must allege (1) the defendant made a representation of intent to perform some future action, i.e., the defendant made a promise, and (2) the defendant did not really have that intent at the time that the promise was made, i.e., the promise was false.” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.) “To sufficiently plead the first requirement, that the defendant made a promise, the complaint must state “facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. [Citation.] [Citation.] As for the second requirement, the falsity of that promise is sufficiently pled with a general allegation the promise was made without an intention of performance.” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 [italics in original] [internal quotations omitted].) Here, Plaintiff neither alleges (1) facts showing, how, when, where, to whom, and by what means Defendant allegedly represented that she was legally allowed to lease the property to Plaintiff, and that she would properly maintain the property in habitable and functional conditions, nor (2) a general allegation that Defendant made those statements without the intent to perform.

Plaintiff also fails to plead justifiable reliance. To plead that element, a “plaintiff must set ‘forth facts to show that his or her actual reliance on the representations was justifiable, so that the cause of the damage was the defendant’s wrong and not the plaintiff's fault. [Citation.] There must be more pled than a simple statement plaintiff justifiably relied on the statements. [Citation.] The complaint must contain ‘allegations of facts showing that the actual inducement of plaintiffs ... was justifiable or reasonable. [Citations.] [Citation.]” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [internal quotations omitted].) Here, the Complaint only alleges that “Plaintiff’s reliance on Defendants’ representations was justified and reasonable.” (Compl., ¶ 19.) That is insufficient.

None of Plaintiff’s arguments in his opposition convince the Court otherwise.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for deceit, with leave to amend.

E.     Second and Third Causes of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation and Negligent Misrepresentation, Respectively

The second and third causes of action are based on the same alleged misrepresentations discussed above under the first cause of action.

Defendant demurs the second and third causes of action, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged proper damages. (Demurrer, p. 8:12-19 [“As the Complaint is insufficiently plead, it appears Plaintiff’s entire claims of fraud are based on Plaintiff failing to have a certificate of occupancy for the Subject Property. Municipal Codes created a certificate of occupancy in essence to protect renders from unconscionable rent increases by a landlord. His claimed damage is once he learned there was no certificate of occupancy, he was damaged because Defendant would not reimburse him for the entirety of the lease. Plaintiff fails to provide any case law that permits this as a remedy recoverable by a private cause of action Plaintiff fail [sic] to plead a recoverable damage under a private cause of action and fail [sic] the pleading standard of sustaining alleged damage for a fraud cause of action”].)

“To plead deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, plaintiffs were required to allege with particularity as many as seven essential factual elements: ‘(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff.’ [Citation.]” (Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 903 (“Lauckhart”) [internal quotations omitted])

“The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are: 1. The defendant must have made a representation as to a past or existing material fact…2. The representation must have been untrue…3. Regardless of his actual belief the defendant must have made the representation without any reasonable ground for believing it to be true…4. The representation must have been made with the intent to induce plaintiff to rely upon it…5. The plaintiff must have been unaware of the falsity of the representation; he must have acted in reliance upon the truth of the representation and he must have been justified in relying upon the representation…6. And, finally, as a result of his reliance upon the truth of the representation, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Friedman v. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 454, 476 [internal quotations omitted].) Like intentional misrepresentation, “negligent misrepresentation must be pleaded with particularity, with facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 146, 155 [internal quotations omitted].)

A “fraud plaintiff must … allege his damages were caused by the actions he took in reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations. [Citation.] Assuming ... a claimant’s reliance on the actionable misrepresentation, no liability attaches if the damages sustained were otherwise inevitable or due to unrelated causes. [Citation.] [Citation.] If the defrauded plaintiff would have suffered the alleged damage even in the absence of the fraudulent inducement, causation cannot be alleged and a fraud cause of action cannot be sustained.” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064 [italics removed] [internal quotations omitted].)

Here, the Complaint repeats in the second and third causes of action (at Compl., ¶¶ 22, 28) its allegations from the first cause of action. The first cause of action includes the allegations that due to Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation, Plaintiff (1) later learned that he had to move from the Property (Compl., ¶ 18), and (2) incurred costs for relocating from the Property (Compl., ¶ 20).

Costs for relocation can be damages for the alleged misrepresentation.  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 646 [“[F]raud plaintiffs may recover ‘out-of-pocket’ damages in addition to benefit-of-the-bargain damages”].) Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff has alleged damages. However, as discussed above under the first cause of action, the Complaint fails to allege misrepresentation and justifiable reliance, necessary elements of intentional and negligent misrepresentation.

Defendant’s demurrer to the second and third causes of action on the ground of uncertainty also stands. The torts of “intentional misrepresentation” and “negligent misrepresentation” fall under the umbrella of “deceit.” (Wong v. Stoler (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [“Under California law, negligent misrepresentation is a species of actual fraud and a form of deceit”]; Lauckhart, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 903 [“To plead deceit based on intentional misrepresentation …”].) Therefore, it is confusing that Plaintiff has pleaded three separate fraud causes of action based on the same allegations.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for intentional misrepresentation and third cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, with leave to amend.

F.     Sixth Cause of Action for Negligent Breach of Implied Covenant of Habitability and Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Breach of Implied Covenant of Habitability

The Complaint alleges the following under the sixth cause of action. “By renting the premises to Plaintiff, Defendants, and each of them, impliedly warranted the premises to be habitable, safe, decent, legal and sanitary, and free from conditions and defects such as those listed above, which would cause injury to Plaintiff. Further, by renting the premises to Plaintiff, Defendants, and each of them, created a special landlord-tenant relationship with Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 42.) “Beginning on or about the date of possession of the premises by Plaintiff, and continuing thereafter, Defendants, and each of them, breached the implied warranty of habitability by failing to provide, maintain, and/or repair the premises in a proper fashion, as alleged in this Complaint. Defendants, and each of them, did not respond or responded with inadequate efforts to repair the substandard conditions.” (Compl., ¶ 45.) “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and omissions referred to herein, Plaintiff had suffered damages including property damage, economic loss and physical harm, as well as discomfort, annoyance, and severe emotional distress.” (Compl., ¶ 48.)

The seventh cause of action alleges that Defendant’s acts and omissions “were done intentionally and in callous disregard for the comfort, safety, health and well-being of Plaintiff, and were further done for the purpose of saving costs at the expense of Plaintiff, and for the purpose of oppressing and inflicting emotional and physical distress upon Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶  50.) The claim also alleges that Defendant’s “failure to correct the defective conditions described herein was knowing, intentional, willful, and malicious, and was done with full knowledge of the discomfort and annoyance which said failure would cause to Plaintiff. Plaintiff [sic] are therefore entitled to exemplary damages in a sum which will be sufficient to punish and make an example of Defendants, and each of them.” (Compl., ¶ 51.)

“‘[A] warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases.’ [Citation.] The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability ‘are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.’ [Citation.]” ((Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891.)

            Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s negligent and intentional breach of the implied covenant of habitability claims, arguing that they are based on contract and “whether the breach was negligent or intentional is irrelevant …,” and that “Plaintiff’s cause of action is unintelligible as it claims to assert an intentional tort based in a contract ….” (Demurer, p. 9:4-9.)

            However, under California law, a breach of the warranty of habitability claim can be based on contract and tort. (Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1168 [“‘Moreover, while a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability or breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment may sound in contract, the facts necessary to support such claims may also be pled in tort’”].) Therefore, Defendant’s uncertainty argument and the argument that it is irrelevant for Plaintiff to claim that the alleged breach was “negligent” or “intentional” is unpersuasive.

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action for negligent breach of implied covenant of habitability, and seventh cause of action for intentional breach of implied covenant of habitability.

G.    Eleventh Cause of Action for Negligent Violation of Statutory Duty and Twelfth Cause of Action for Intentional Violation of Statutory Duty

Plaintiff alleges the following in the eleventh cause of action. “The laws and regulations of the State of California and County of Los Angeles, including, but not limited to, California Civil Code §§ 1927, 1941.1(a)-(h), 1942.4, 3304 and 3479; California Health and Safety Code §§ 17920.3 and 17920.10; Los Angeles Municipal Code (‘LAMC’) §§ 12.21(a), 12.26.E1(a), 91.109.1, 151.05, and 151.10, imposing [sic] statutory and/or regulatory duties on Defendants to maintain residential premises in a safe and habitable condition, to provide tenants with the quiet use and enjoyment of their residential rental dwellings and to pay Plaintiff properly, if violated.” (Compl., ¶ 66.) “Defendants, and each of them, failed to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in complying with the aforementioned statutory and regulatory obligations and duties, and therefore breached the same and violated said regulations and statutes, which are intended to protect tenants and the general public from the above-described acts, omissions, and abuses.” (Comp., ¶ 67.) “Plaintiff was damaged by Defendants’ violation of statutory duties in an amount to be proved at trial.” (Compl., ¶ 68.)

Similar to the eleventh cause of action, Plaintiff alleges the following under the twelfth cause of action for intentional violation of statutory duty. “Defendants’ violations of statutory duties of the laws and regulations of the State of California and County of Los Angeles, including, but not limited to, California Civil Code §§ 1927, 1941.1(a)-(h), 1942.4, 3304 and 3479; California Health and Safety Code §§ 17920.3 and 17920.10; Los Angeles Municipal Code (‘LAMC’) §§ 12.21 (a), 12.26.E1(a), 91.109.1, 151.05, and 151.10, were knowing, intentional, and willful, and furthermore was malicious and oppressive.” (Compl., ¶ 70.) “Therefore, in addition to the damages previously noted herein for such things as return of rent, security deposit, treble damages, relocation monies. Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages in an amount according to proof at trial, and which sum shall be adequate to punish and make an example of Defendants.” (Compl., ¶ 70.)

            The Court agrees with Defendant that the eleventh and twelfth cause of action fail to state any claim and are uncertain. Plaintiff only cites a number of statutes without explaining how Defendant violated those statutes. Further, it is confusing and unnecessary for Plaintiff to group all statutes together into two causes of action if each statute has different elements or requirements.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the eleventh and twelfth causes of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.

H.    Thirteenth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

Defendant demurs the thirteenth cause of action, arguing that it fails to state a claim and is uncertain.

Code of Civil Procedure “Section 1060 provides in relevant part: ‘Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another ... may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action ... in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties.’” ((Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546, fn. 13.) “To qualify for declaratory relief under section 1060,13 plaintiffs were required to show their action (as refined on appeal) presented two essential elements: ‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 546.) Here, Plaintiff alleges the following. “An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendant as to the rights and duties of the parties under the Lease. Plaintiff contends and believes that the Lease is void on its face and must be deemed terminated from the outset, with all rents, costs and fees paid to the Defendant reimbursed entirely.” (Compl., ¶ 72.) “Plaintiff desires a judicial determination of the respective rights and duties of Plaintiff and Defendant with respect to the Lease as alleged herein.” (Compl., ¶ 73.) Those facts are sufficient since a lease is a proper subject of declaratory relief and an actual controversy has arisen among the parties regarding whether the lease was void from the beginning.

Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action of the Complaint.

            Motion to Strike

A court may strike any “¿irrelevant, false, or improper matter¿inserted in any pleading¿” or any part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿¿Code Civ. Proc., § 436¿¿.) “¿The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)¿

Defendant moves to strike a number of allegations from the Complaint.

As an initial matter, Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 21, 27, 33, 51, 68, and 70 of the Complaint and paragraph 17 of the Prayer for Relief is moot in light of the Court’s ruling above sustaining the demurrer to the causes of action containing those paragraphs with leave to amend.  

Defendant moves to strike the punitive damages allegations (i.e., Compl., ¶¶ 59, 61) in connection with the ninth cause of action for intentional nuisance.

A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged do not rise to¿the level of “malice,¿oppression¿or fraud” required to support a punitive damages award. (¿¿See Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63-64¿¿.)¿“¿‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.¿” (¿¿Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)¿¿.) “¿‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.¿” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2)¿.) “¿‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.¿” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3)¿.)¿

“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort. If the latter, then exemplary damages are recoverable.” ((Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920.)

Here, Plaintiff’s nuisance claim is based on the following allegations. “Plaintiff had problems with pests, including cockroaches, rats and mice, along with various plumbing issues, lack of windows or screens, most of which was not resolved by the Landlord during the term of the tenancy.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) “Defendants’ failure to correct the defective conditions described above was knowing, intentional, willful, and malicious, and was done with full knowledge of the discomfort and annoyance which said failure would cause Plaintiff, and was further done in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 59.) “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants failure, Plaintiff suffered discomfort, annoyance and bodily injuries.” (Compl., ¶ 60.) “Defendant intentionally and maliciously engaged in a course of conduct which was intended to oppress and defraud Plaintiff, and which was done with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Defendant.” (Compl., ¶ 61.) Those facts are sufficient to show oppression. Thus, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to strike paragraphs 59 and 61 of the Complaint.  

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the first, second, third, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.

The Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth, seventh, and thirteenth causes of action of the Complaint.  

Defendant’s motion to strike is denied or moot as set forth above.

Plaintiffs are ordered to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve his answer to the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this order.

DATED:  March 12, 2025                              ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court